Teleological Functionalism:
Normativity, Explanation,
and the Philosophy of Mind
Researcher: Jillian Scott McIntosh
- Date Complete: 1997/09
- Degree Awarded: Ph.D.
- Research Supervisor: A.D. Irvine
Abstract
The purpose of this dissertation is to advance our understanding of the
intentionality and causal efficacy of mental states. More specifically,
the dissertation is intended to help justify an appeal to teleological
functions in the philosophy of mind.
I start by examining the disjunction problem as encountered by causal/information-theoretic
accounts of intentionality. Such accounts individuate the content of mental
states on the basis of their cause or the information they carry. As a
result, they require a principled method of ruling out those cases in which
a state is tokened in the "wrong" circumstances. Without such
a method, a state's content could be massively disjunctive and error would
be impossible. The dissertation then considers one type of purported solution, viz.,
teleological functionalism. The basic idea is that an analogy between malfunction
and misrepresentation will help solve the disjunction problem by invoking
a suitably naturalised notion of normativity. A state's content need not
be what caused it but, rather, what should have caused it.
I argue that there are two legitimate ways of understanding teleological
function in this context. Selectionist theories -- the current favourites -- attribute
functions on the basis of selection history; a thing's function is that
effect or behaviour for which it has been selected. In contrast, systems-theoretic
accounts attribute function on the basis of an analysis of components with
regard to the workings of a whole; a thing's function is that effect or
behaviour which contributes to the performance of the whole, of which that
thing is a part. Upon examination, it becomes apparent that neither notion
of function meets all the desiderata one might reasonably expect
need to be met. This is explicable-the different notions are suited to
two different, though related, explanatory projects.
I argue that selectionist construals of teleological function are appropriate
when, roughly, the project is that of explaining why extant features are
present in the distribution and form that they are. In contrast, systems-theoretic
construals of teleological function are appropriate when, roughly, the
project is that of explaining how these features work. Furthermore, I argue
that, from the perspective of a causal/information-theoretic account, the
normativity that is required for the project of individuating the content
of mental states cannot derive solely from history. Knowing what served
one's ancestors is not sufficient for knowing what one is doing now, let
alone what one should be doing now.
A systems-theoretic (and more specifically, a structural) teleological
functional approach to the problem of intentionality, because it is importantly
ahistorical, has the merit of incorporating normative considerations into
the philosophy of mind without rendering the causal efficacy of intentional
states unnecessarily mysterious. It also has the merit of allowing for
those attributions of teleological function in biology that would not be
overturned by new evolutionary information regarding selection history.
Adherence solely to an etiological construal of teleological function is
too restrictive in both domains. The dissertation ends with a defence of
the structural approach against the charge that it is too liberal in attributing
functions. |