Temporary Increases in Tariffs and Investment: The Chilean Experience

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This article develops a structural dynamic programming model of investment and estimates the model using panel data on Chilean manufacturing plants for 1980–1996. The estimates are used to examine the impact of a temporary increase in import tariffs imposed in Chile taking account of endogenous initial conditions and unobserved heterogeneity. The model replicates the observed investment patterns at both plant and aggregate levels well. A counterfactual experiment suggests that Chile would have recovered from the economic crisis of 1982–1983 at a substantially faster rate had there been no temporary increase in import prices associated with higher tariffs in the mid-1980s.

KEY WORDS: Initial conditions problem; Productivity; Structural dynamic programming model; Unobserved heterogeneity.

1. INTRODUCTION

Trade in capital goods is one of the primary channels through which a country adopts new technology (Eaton and Kortum 2001). This is especially true for developing countries whose productivity crucially depends on its ability to import machines that embody new technology. Hence, an increase in import tariffs which causes the price of imported machines to rise may have a large impact on investment and productivity.

This article develops a structural dynamic programming model of investment and estimates the model using panel data on Chilean manufacturing plants for 1980–1996. The estimates are used to quantify the impact of a temporary increase in import tariffs on investment and productivity in Chile during the mid-1980s taking account of endogenous initial conditions and both observed and unobserved heterogeneity.

Chile provides an ideal setting for studying the impact of tariffs. In 1983, the Chilean government increased import tariffs (uniformly across industries), partly as a response to a balance of payments crisis. As shown in Figure 1, this led to a significant, although temporary, increase in the price of imported machines measured relative to the wholesale price. Since Chile is a small open economy that imports more than 80% of its machines (Banco Central De Chile 2000), higher tariffs may have discouraged investment by increasing the price of imported machines. A negative relationship between import prices and machine investment rates for the period 1976–1996 is apparent in Figure 1.

The model extends models of machine replacement including Rust (1987), Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power (1999), and Jovanovic and Rob (1998). Higher import tariffs slow plants’ replacement by increasing the machine price. If the high tariff regime is viewed as temporary, the expectation of a future drop in machine prices provides an incentive to delay replacement, thereby magnifying the impact of an increase in machine prices. Reversion from the high tariff regime to the low tariff regime causes a burst of aggregate investment because of synchronized replacement decisions due to lower machine prices.

The estimation method involves the repeated numerical solution of a dynamic optimization problem to maximize a likelihood function that accounts for machine replacement decisions and plant productivity. The empirical specification incorporates other potentially important factors, such as aggregate productivity shocks and the financial crisis of 1982–1983. I also accommodate permanent unobserved heterogeneity by assuming that plants differ in their types (Keane and Wolpin 1997), where each type is characterized by distinct technology parameters. Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity is crucial to correctly infer the decision rule of machine replacement.

The estimated model replicates the observed investment patterns well at both plant and aggregate levels. A counterfactual experiment indicates a substantial negative impact of the temporary increase in import prices in the mid-1980s. Had there been no increase in relative import prices between 1983 and 1987, the aggregate investment rate would have been 6.8% higher in 1985 and the output per worker would have been higher by 1.9% in 1986. This suggests that Chile would have recovered from the economic crisis of 1982–1983 much more quickly if the government had not imposed higher tariffs in the mid-1980s.

The model’s cross-sectional implications are also examined. First, while a tariff increase may not significantly affect output prices in an export-oriented industry, it may lead to higher output prices in an import-competing industry and thus provide greater incentive for plants to hasten replacement. My experiment indicates that, for 1984–1988, the difference in relative import prices can explain more than half of the observed difference between export-oriented industries and import-competing industries in investment rates. Second, a plant that uses imported materials intensively might use imported machines intensively as well, and hence it might have a larger increase in machine price than others during the period of high import prices. I find that import-material-intensive plants experienced substantially larger declines in investment and productivity during the period of high import prices than others.

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There are several caveats. First, these results indicate the effects of a temporary increase in relative import prices rather than those in tariffs. Although an increase in tariffs may have been the primary factor that led to higher relative import prices in the mid-1980s, other factors such as the real exchange rate may also have been important determinants. Second, while the model explicitly includes three different observable aggregate state variables, it is still possible that import prices capture spuriously the effect of other omitted aggregate variables. This issue is potentially important because Chile has experienced various political and economic changes during the sample period. Finally, I do not consider a general equilibrium framework. The extent of synchronized investment may be limited in general equilibrium because of the short-run inelastic supply of capital goods (Caballero 1999), although such a bottleneck might be less important in a small open economy like Chile.

This research complements several branches of empirical literature. First, recent empirical studies find that trade in capital goods plays a significant role for research and development (R&D) spillovers across countries (see, for example, Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister 1997; Xu and Wang 1999). While often motivated by the innovation-driven growth model, the literature does not explicitly specify the mechanism through which trade or R&D affects productivity, nor does it address policy issues, such as the effect of import tariffs on R&D spillovers. Second, the empirical literature investigating the relationship between trade policy and productivity often finds that trade liberalization is associated with productivity improvements (Tybout, de Melo, and Corbo 1991; Harrison 1994; Tybout and Westbrook 1995; Pavcnik 2002). There is little agreement, however, on why productivity and trade policy are related (see Tybout 2000). Detailed analyses assessing the importance of a specific mechanism through which trade policy affects productivity are scarce. This article focuses on the role of imported capital goods, and quantitatively assesses its importance in the context of a temporary tariff change. Finally, this work is related to the literature on the impact of the price of capital goods on investment and productivity (De Long and Summers 1991; Jones 1994; Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Kruell 1997; Restuccia and Urrutia 2001). While most empirical work in this literature is based on cross-country data, I closely examine a single country experiencing a large variation over time in the price of capital goods.

Although its main contribution is empirical, this article also offers two minor but interesting methodological contributions. First, to my best knowledge, among the existing empirical papers that estimate a structural model of machine replacement (Rust 1987; Das 1992; Kennett 1994; Adda and Cooper 2000), this is the first paper that incorporates a rich set of permanent unobserved heterogeneity and deals with the initial conditions problem. Second, the presence of unobserved heterogeneity leads to an endogeneity problem in estimating the parameters in the production function. Recent empirical papers that estimate investment models with nonconvex adjustment costs (see, for example, Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen 2007) deal with this issue by applying either the panel generalization of method of moments (GMM) method of Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) or the control function approach of Olley and Pakes (1996). In contrast, given the structure of the model, these approaches are not applicable here. This paper handles the endogeneity issue by estimating the production function parameters jointly with the rest of structural parameters, an approach that also leads to possible efficiency gains.

The article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a basic model of machine replacement. Section 3 develops the structural dynamic optimization model of machine replacement. The results are provided in Section 4, and the final section concludes the paper.

2. A BASIC MACHINE REPLACEMENT MODEL WITH TARIFFS

I consider an environment in which producers are risk-neutral and own a single plant with Leontief production technology

\[ Y_t = A_t \min \left\{ L_{t-1}, K_t/a_t \right\}, \]

where \( a_t \) is a parameter; and \( A_t \) is the vintage specific technology level. Given the constant returns to scale technology, the scale of production is indeterminate. Thus, it is assumed that each plant can employ at most one unit of labor. Given the Leontief technology with one unit of labor, the amount of capital a plant employs is \( K_t = a_t \). Thus, the production of a plant with technology level \( A_t \) is \( Y_t = A_t \).

Technology is embodied in the machine. Without replacing its machine, a plant’s technology level \( A_t \) depreciates over time at the rate of \( \xi \): \( A_{t+1} = (1 - \xi)A_t \). The frontier technology level, denoted by \( A^* \), grows at the rate of \( g \): \( A^*_{t+1} = (1 + g)A^*_t \). To adopt new technology, a plant has to scrap the old machine. It is by machine replacement, therefore, that a plant adopts the frontier technology. Upon replacing its old machine by the new machine with technology \( A^*_t \), a plant has to pay \( \kappa_t A^*_t \), where \( \kappa_t \) is the efficiency unit price of the new machine. The scrap value of old machines is assumed to be zero.

To analyze the effect of tariff rates on the replacement decision, I consider a small open economy that imports capital goods. The domestic machine price, \( \kappa_t \), is related to the advalorem import tariff rate, \( \tau_t \), and a constant world price for capital goods, \( \kappa \), as \( \kappa_t = (1 + \tau_t) \kappa \). Domestic output price, which is equal to the world price, is normalized to one.
There are two tariff regimes \( \{ \tau^H, \tau^L \} \) with \( \tau^H > \tau^L \geq 0 \). The tariff rate follows a first-order Markov process where \( \text{Prob}(\tau_{t+1}|\tau_t) = \lambda^H \) for \( j = L, H \); accordingly, the transition matrix is given by:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\lambda^H & 1 - \lambda^H \\
1 - \lambda^L & \lambda^L
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

(1)

At the beginning of every period, plants observe the realization of tariff \( \tau \). Given the state \( (A, A^*, \tau) \), each plant makes a discrete choice between continuing to use the existing machine or replacing it with a new machine by maximizing the discounted expected sum of profits. The value of a plant at the beginning of period, denoted by \( V(A, A^*, \tau) \), is the maximum of the value of the plant if it does not replace its technology, \( V^N(A, A^*, \tau) \), and the value if it does replace, \( V^R(A, A^*, \tau) \):

\[
V(A, A^*, \tau) = \max\{V^N(A, A^*, \tau), V^R(A, A^*, \tau)\},
\]

(2)

with \( V^N(A, A^*, \tau) = A + BE[V((1 - \delta)A, (1 + g)A^*, \tau')|\tau] \) and \( V^R(A, A^*, \tau) = A - (1 + \tau)kA^* + BE[V((1 + g)A^*, (1 + g)A^*, \tau')|\tau], \) where the expectation over \( \tau' \) is taken using the transition matrix (1); and \( B \in (0, 1) \) is a discount factor. Define \( s = \ln(A/A^*) \), which we call technology position hereafter. Since both the gross profit and the replacement cost are homogeneous of degree one with respect to \( (A, A^*) \), the problem may be normalized in terms of the value \( A^* \). Let \( v(s, \cdot) = V(\exp(s), 1, \cdot), v^N(s, \cdot) = V^N(\exp(s), 1, \cdot), \) and \( v^R(s, \cdot) = V^R(\exp(s), 1, \cdot). \) Then, the Bellman Equation (2) becomes

\[
v(s, \tau) = \max\{\exp(s) + \beta E[v(s - \delta, \tau')|\tau], \exp(s) - (1 + \tau)k + \beta E[v(0, \tau')|\tau]\}
\]

(3)

where \( \delta = \ln(1 + g)/(1 - \xi) \) is the rate of technological obsolescence; and \( \beta = (1 + g)B \) is a discount factor adjusted for the rate of technological progress.

The timing of replacement is determined by equating the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of postponing. The benefit of postponing is that a plant can save the replacement cost in terms of present value since a plant discounts the future. On the other hand, a postponement of replacement incurs an opportunity cost: the difference between profit with current technology and the profit that the plant could have had with the new technology. Reflecting an increase in the opportunity cost of using the old machine over time, the policy rule follows an (S,s) policy such that a plant replaces its machine whenever its relative technology position \( s \) falls below the threshold value, denoted by \( s^*(\tau) \). This threshold value crucially depends on the realization of tariff rates because the marginal benefit of postponing replacement is determined by the tariff-dependent machine price.

To focus on the effect of a temporary increase in tariffs, consider the case of \( \lambda^L = 1 \) and \( \lambda^H < 1 \). In this case, the high tariff regime is a temporary regime because the economy will revert to the low tariff regime in the “near” future. Then, we may show that the threshold value under the high tariff regime, \( s^*(\tau^H) \), decreases in \( \tau^H \). The implications are twofold. First, an increase in the tariff rate itself tends to slow replacement by increasing the replacement cost. Second, as \( \tau^H \) increases, a difference in machine prices between the high tariff regime and the low tariff regime increases; this larger difference increases the benefit of waiting for the tariff to decrease to \( \tau^L \), since the plant can incur a lower replacement cost upon reversion of the regime. Here, the temporary nature of the high tariff regime plays an important role since it provides an incentive to delay machine replacement. This is intuitive: if a plant’s manager believes that the replacement machine price will drop very soon, he will delay replacement.

Assuming that all plants are the same size, the aggregate investment rate may be defined as the fraction of plants replacing their machines. Denote the cross-sectional density of technology positions at the beginning of period \( t \) by \( f_s(s) \). Then, the aggregate investment rate is equal to the fraction of plants with technology positions less than the threshold value \( s^*(\tau) \) as:

\[
\text{Aggregate Investment Rate} = \int_{s<s^*(\tau)} f_s(s) \, ds
\]

Holding the cross-sectional density fixed, the aggregate investment rate is nondecreasing in the threshold value \( s^*(\tau) \). This provides insight into how an increase in the tariff affects the dynamics of aggregate investment and productivity. Since a temporary increase in the tariff leads to slower replacement (i.e., lower value of \( s^*(\tau) \)), it may lower temporarily the aggregate investment. Furthermore, the delay in the adoption of frontier technologies embodied in machines results in lower aggregate productivity.

### 3. STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION

#### 3.1 Basic Observations

I first examine the model’s implications using descriptive statistics. Specifically, I investigate (i) lumpiness in plant-level investment, (ii) the relationship between productivity and machine age, and (iii) the relationship between the timing of investment spikes and machine age.

The data for the analysis are from the Chilean Manufacturing Census collected by Chile’s Instituto Nacional de Estadística. The dataset includes all Chilean manufacturing plants employing 10 or more workers from 1979–1996. The sample includes plants that appeared in the data for the full duration of 1980–1996. See Section 3.4 for other sample selection criteria. The balanced panel dataset contains 1,441 plants over 17 years. Lumpiness in investment at the plant level is apparent in the data. Following Cooper et al. (1999), I define episodes of “investment spikes” as occurring if the gross investment rate is greater than 20%. In the sample, plants with investment spikes constitute only 22.1%, but account for 69.3% of aggregate gross investment. On the other hand, 46.8% of observations have less than 0.02% gross investment rate. A large portion of aggregate investment, therefore, is closely associated with episodes of investment spikes at the plant level. Similar findings on investment spikes are reported for United States and Norwegian manufacturing (Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger 1995; Caballero and Engel 1999; Cooper et al. 1999; Cooper and Haltiwanger 2006; Doms and Dunne 1998; Nilsen and Schiantarelli 2003). Figure 2 plots the aggregate investment rate with the fraction of plants with investment rates over 20%.
The correlation between the two series is 0.944. In view of this close connection between aggregate investment and investment spikes, identifying the shocks affecting plants' lumpy investment decisions may be the key to understanding the dynamics of aggregate investment.

Motivated by the observed lumpiness in plants' investment, machine replacement is assumed to be identified with episodes of investment spikes. Accordingly, the age of a machine is defined as the number of years passed since the last investment spike.

Figure 3 shows the relationship between machine age and the log of plant labor productivity. Productivity is measured relative to the productivity of machine age 1. The figures are constructed using the plant sample of 1990–1996 for which machine ages are observable at least up to eight years. The solid line plots the relationship without controlling for plant-specific productivity and the dotted line plots the relationship after controlling for plant-specific productivity. To control for plant-specific productivity, I subtract the average plant productivity for 1980–1989 from plant productivity and then use the residual as plant productivity. While both lines show that plant labor productivity is negatively related to machine age, the negative relationship is much stronger before controlling for plant-specific productivity (the average slope of \(-0.063\)) than after controlling for plant-specific productivity (the average slope of \(-0.028\)). This difference in the slopes likely reflects a self-selection among plants with different plant-specific productivity; inherently high productivity plants may replace their machines more frequently than others and may tend to have lower machine ages. This finding motivates the inclusion of unobserved plant-specific productivity in the empirical model.

Figure 4 plots the empirical hazard—the actual fraction of plants experiencing investment spikes against the observed machine age—for the years of 1990–1996. The empirical hazard is downward-sloping, indicating that the probability of replacement declines with machine age. This observation contradicts a simple machine replacement model prediction, namely, that a plant is more likely to replace if its machine is older. However, as is well known in the duration dependence literature, the presence of unobserved heterogeneity may lead to downward-sloping hazard even if individual plants' hazards are increasing in machine ages (Cooper et al. 1999). As I show later, the estimated empirical structural model that incorporates unobserved heterogeneity can predict downward-sloping hazards even though any individual plant's hazard is predicted to be upward-sloping. This is because of a composition effect: the newer the machine, the larger the fraction of plants with (unobserved) characteristics that lead to higher replacement probability.

### 3.2 Empirical Specification

To quantitatively assess the relative importance of the effect of the increase in import prices, I develop a structural dynamic optimization model that incorporates other potentially important factors. The empirical specification includes: (A.1)
dependence of machine price on import price, (A.2) aggregate shocks, (A.3) the effect of tax on profits, (A.4) the 1982–83 financial crisis, and (A.5) the possibility of multiyear investment projects. While (A.1) is in keeping with the theoretical model in Section 2, (A.2) to (A.4) capture alternative explanations for the observed Chilean investment dynamics; (A.5) attempts to capture the fact that large investment projects often last more than 2 years. In (B.1) and (B.2), I discuss different sources of unobserved heterogeneity and idiosyncratic shocks.

**A.1) Dependence of Machine Price on Import Price.**

Given that Chile is a small open economy importing more than 80% of its capital goods, a change in the price of imported machines resulting from a change in import prices may affect replacement decisions. The replacement cost, \( \kappa_i \), depends on the log of the import price index, \( p_t \), as:

\[
\kappa_i = K \cdot \exp(\alpha_x p_t),
\]

where \( K \) is the replacement cost at the base year and \( \alpha_x \) is a parameter that represents the elasticity of machine replacement cost with respect to import price.

**A.2) Aggregate Productivity Shocks.**

As Cooper et al. (1999) emphasize, a serially correlated aggregate productivity shock could be an important determinant of machine replacement. I incorporate serially correlated aggregate productivity shocks into the production function as

\[
Y_{it} = A_{it} \exp(\alpha_0 + \alpha_z z_t),
\]

where \( A_{it} \) represents the vintage-specific productivity of the ith plant at the year \( t \), and \( z_t \) is the detrended aggregate productivity shock at year \( t \).

**A.3) Tax on Profits.**

In the sample period, there are two major tax reforms: in 1984–1986 and in 1991–1992. To capture the effect of tax reforms in the model, I let gross profit depend on the tax rate. Furthermore, it is assumed that the tax reforms were unanticipated. I also estimated the model under the alternative assumption that the 1984–1986 tax reform was fully anticipated but the results were very similar.

**A.4) The 1982–83 Financial Crisis.**

Due in part to a combination of external shocks including an increase in the world interest rate and the deterioration in its terms of trade, Chile experienced a major economic crisis in 1982–83. After the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime in June 1982, the government reintroduced exchange rate controls. The financial system collapsed in the midst of the recession (Barandiaran and Hernandez 1999). I incorporate these events into the model by assuming that the replacement costs in 1982–1983 were higher by \( \alpha_o \) than in other years, holding other state variables constant. I assume that the 1982–1983 increase in replacement costs were unanticipated since the financial crisis of 1982–1983 was, at least partly, caused by unanticipated external shocks.

**A.5) Multiyear Investment Projects.**

In the data, plants that had high investment in the previous year tend to have high investment in the current year. This partly reflects a form of measurement error due to the calendar-year nature of the data.

As Doms and Dunne (1998) emphasize, large investment projects often last more than two years. To deal with this issue, I assume that the cost of machine replacement is less if a plant conducts lumpy investment in the previous two years; specifically, the replacement cost at \( t \) is \( \kappa_i = \sigma_i p_t \), instead of \( \kappa_i \), if the plant conducts investment spike in year \( t-j \) for \( j = 1, 2 \).

**B.1) Unobserved Heterogeneity.**

As discussed in Section 3.1, it is important to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity into the model. I consider three sources of unobserved heterogeneity: (i) productivity, (ii) replacement cost, and (iii) technological obsolescence rate.

(i) I assume that individual plants differ in their ability to use machines and parameterize the plant-specific productivity by \( u_{1i} \). Explicitly incorporating plant-specific productivity, I may control for a self-selection, implied in Figure 2, driven by differences in plant-specific productivity.

(ii) Since the machine replacement cost might be systematically different across industries or types of final products, I assume that replacement costs are plant-specific and parameterized by \( u_{2i} \) such that, by modifying equation (4), a plant-time specific replacement cost is given by \( \kappa_{it} = \kappa \cdot \exp(\alpha_x p_t + u_{2it}) \). The unobserved heterogeneity in replacement cost controls for plants' unobserved characteristics that are not relevant to labor productivity but are relevant to replacement decisions.

(iii) The rate of technological obsolescence, \( \delta_i \), might not be identical across plants if they face different depreciation rates or different degrees of technological embodiment in machines. The ith plant-specific technological obsolescence rate is denoted by \( \delta_i \), and I assume that \( \delta_i \geq 0 \) for all \( i \). The rate of technological obsolescence, \( \delta_i \), determines how the plant’s vintage-specific productivity, \( A_{is} \), relates to its machine age, which is denoted \( a_{si} \), and the frontier technology level, \( A^*_s \) : \( A_{is} = A^*_s \exp(-\delta_i a_{si}) \). I use machine age, \( a_{si} \), instead of technology position, \( s_{is} \), as the state variable in the empirical specification since the machine age is what I observe in the data. Technology position and machine age are related by the identity \( s_{is} = -\delta_i a_{si} \).

Letting the vector \( u_{i} = (u_{1i}, u_{2i}, \delta_i) \) represent the ith plant-specific unobserved heterogeneity, I assume that plant-specific productivity is normally distributed with mean zero and variance \( \sigma^2_{ui} \), while \( (u_{2i}, \delta) \) is independent of \( u_{1i} \) and multinomially distributed with the number of support points equal to \( K \), where the kth type is characterized by a vector \((u_{2k}, \delta^k)\) and the fraction of the kth type in the population is \( \pi_k \). In practice, I set \( K = 4 \) and assume that each of \( u_{2k} \) and \( \delta^k \) takes either a high value or a low value. The first type has a low replacement cost and a low depreciation rate, with values \( u_{2k} = 0 \) and \( \delta = 0 \). I initially estimated a low depreciation rate as a free parameter with a nonnegativity constraint and found that it converged to 0. The second type also has a low replacement cost but a high depreciation rate \( \delta = \delta^H > 0 \). The third type has a high replacement cost \( u_{2k} = u_{2H} > 0 \) and a low depreciation rate \( \delta = 0 \). Finally, the fourth type has a high replacement cost and a high depreciation rate. The unobserved heterogeneity \((u_{2k}, \delta)\) is, therefore, specified to have the
following multinomial distribution: $Pr((u_2, \Delta) = (0, 0)) = \pi^4$, $Pr((u_2, \Delta) = (0, \sigma^2)) = \pi^4$, $Pr((u_2, \Delta) = (0, 0^2, 0)) = \pi^3$, and $Pr((u_2, \Delta) = (u_2^2, 0^2)) = \pi^4$.

(B.2) Idiosyncratic Shocks. I allow for a replacement cost shock that is choice dependent, $\epsilon_i(d)A^*_t$, for $d = 0, 1$, where $d = 0$ implies that a plant does not replace its machine and $d = 1$ implies that it does. Following Rust (1987), I assume that, conditional on other state variables, $\epsilon_i(0)$ and $\epsilon_i(1)$ are drawn independently from the Type I extremum distribution. I also allow for a serially uncorrelated idiosyncratic productivity shock, $\xi_i$, so that the production function is given by $Y_t = A_i \exp(a_0 + \alpha z p + u_{1,t} + \xi_i)$, where $\xi_i$ is drawn independently from the normal distribution with mean zero and variance $\sigma^2$. It is assumed that $\epsilon_i = (\epsilon_i(0), \epsilon_i(1))$ and $\xi_i$ are known to the plant before the updating decision is made in the beginning of year $t$.

When a plant replaces its machine in year $t$, only a fraction $\theta \in [0, 1]$ of a new machine is assumed to become productive at year $t$. Specifically, the production for a plant replacing its machine at year $t$ is assumed to be given by a geometric average of production under the new machine (machine age $0$) and production under the old machine (machine age $a_D$) so that $A_0 = [A_0^*]^{\theta}[A_0^* \exp(-\Delta a_D)]^{1-\theta} = A_0^* \exp(-(1-\theta)\Delta a_D)$ when $d = 1$. It follows that the plant's value added (per worker) is

$$Y_t = A_0^* \exp(a_0 + \alpha z p + (1-\theta)\Delta a_D + u_{1,t} + \xi_i).$$

By incorporating (A.1) to (A.5) and (B.1) to (B.2), the net profit flow normalized by the value of $A^*$ with the state $(a_0, z, p, a_T, \gamma_T, D_t, u_{1,t}, \xi_t, \epsilon_i)$ and the replacement choice $d_t \in \{0, 1\}$ is $P_\theta(a_0, z, p, a_T, \gamma_T, D_t, u_{1,t}, \xi_t, \epsilon_i, d_t)$ where

$$P_\theta(a_0, z, p, a_T, \gamma_T, D_t, u_{1,t}, \xi_t, \epsilon_i, d_t) = (1 - \gamma_T)\exp(a_0 + \alpha z p - \Delta a_D + u_{1,t} + \xi_t)$$

for $d_t = 0$

$$= (1 - \gamma_T)\exp(a_0 + \alpha z p + (1-\theta)\Delta a_D + u_{1,t} + \xi_i)$$

$$- \kappa \exp(a_0 p_0 + u_{2,t}) - \sum_{j=1}^{J} \phi_j(a_0 + u_{j,t}) - \alpha p_D D_t$$

for $d_t = 1$, and where $\gamma_T$ is the effective tax rate on profit, $z_T$ is the technological obsolescence rate, $a_D$ is the machine age, $u_{1,t}$ and $u_{2,t}$ capture unobserved heterogeneity in productivity and replacement cost, respectively, $\theta$ is a fraction of a new machine that becomes productive at year $t$ upon replacement, $\alpha$ is the elasticity of machine replacement cost with respect to import price, $\kappa$ is an indicator function that is equal to one if its argument is true and zero otherwise, $p_D$ represents the saving in replacement cost when a plant replaces its machine across 2 or 3 years, $\alpha_D$ is the additional replacement cost in 1982-1983, and $D_t$ is a dummy variable for the years of 1982 and 1983, which is equal to one if $t = 1982$ or 1983 and zero otherwise.

The aggregate variables $z_T$ and $p_T$ are assumed to follow a stationary AR(1) process:

$$z_T = c_z + \Phi_2 z_{T-1} + \eta_{zT}$$

$$p_T = c_p + \Phi_2 p_{T-1} + \eta_{pT},$$

where $\eta_{zT}$ and $\eta_{pT}$ are independent, normally distributed with the variance $\sigma^2_z$ and $\sigma^2_p$. A plant manager maximizes the expected present value of total profits, which, in terms of the Bellman’s equation, can be written as

$$v'(a_0, z, p, a_T, \gamma_T, D_t, u_{1,t}, \xi_t, \epsilon_i) = \max_{d_t \in \{0, 1\}} \{v'(a_0, z, p, a_T, \gamma_T, D_t, u_{1,t},\xi_t, \epsilon_i, d_t)\}$$

with

$$v'(a_0, z, p, a_T, \gamma_T, D_t, u_{1,t},\xi_t, \epsilon_i, d_t) = \Pi_{d_t = 0} \{v'(a_0, z, p, a_T, \gamma_T, D_t, u_{1,t},\xi_t, \epsilon_i, d_t)\} + \Pi_{d_t = 1} \{v'(a_0, z, p, a_T, \gamma_T, D_t, u_{1,t},\xi_t, \epsilon_i, d_t) + \beta \mathbb{E}[v((1-d_t)a_0 + 1, z_{t+1}, p_{t+1}, \gamma_{t+1}, D_{t+1}, u_{1,t+1},\xi_t, \epsilon_i, d_t) | z_T, p_T] \},$$

where the expectation is taken with respect to $(z_{t+1}, p_{t+1}, \epsilon_{t+1})$ conditional on $(z_T, p_T)$. Denote the expected value function $v_0(a_0, z, p, a_T, \gamma_T, D_t, u_{1,t},\xi_t, \epsilon_i)$ and where the expectation on the right hand side is taken with respect to $\epsilon = (\epsilon(0), \epsilon(1))$. For the purpose of exposition, I assume that $\gamma_T$ and $D_t$ are constants over time. Given the extreme-value distributional assumption, the functional equation in terms of the expected value function $v_0(\cdot)$ can be derived as (see, for example, Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985):

$$v_0(a_0, z, p, a_T, \gamma_T, D_t, u_{1,t},\xi_t, \epsilon_i) = \mathbb{E}[v_0((1-d')a_0 + 1, z_T', p_T', \gamma_T, D_T, u_{1,t},\xi_t, \epsilon_i, d_t)] | z_T, p_T,$$

with the conditional choice probability is given by the logit formula (McFadden 1973):

$$P_\theta(d|a_0, z, p, a_T, \gamma_T, D_t, u_{1,t},\xi_t, \epsilon_i) = \frac{\exp\{P_\theta(a_0, z, p, a_T, \gamma_T, D_t, u_{1,t},\xi_t, \epsilon_i, d_t)\}}{\sum_{d' = 0}^1 \exp\{P_\theta(a_0, z, p, a_T, \gamma_T, D_t, u_{1,t},\xi_t, \epsilon_i, d')\}}.$$

Evaluation of (8) requires the solution to (7). Since there is no closed-form solution, I discretize the state space using quadrature grids and solve the approximated decision problem numerically by backward induction.

It is plausible that observed labor productivity is measured with error. By modifying (6), the data generating process of the observed labor productivity in log form, denote by $y_{it}$, follows $y_{it} = a_0 + \ln(1 + g_t) + \alpha z_{it}$

$$- (1 - \theta)\Delta a_D + u_{1,t} + \xi_{it} + \eta_{it},$$

where $\eta_{it}$ is an iid normal random measurement error with variance given by $\sigma^2_{\eta}$. The first two terms on the right of (9) are correlated with the permanent unobserved productivity shock $\xi_{it}$ and a measurement error $\eta_{it}$ is denoted by $\omega_{it}$ so that $\omega_{it} = \xi_{it} + \eta_{it}$.

In estimating the parameters in the production function (9), there is an important endogeneity problem. Namely, both machine age $a_0$ and replacement decision $d_0$ on the right hand side of (9) are correlated with the permanent unobserved productivity...
where \(\{a_{it}(a_{i80})\}_{t=80}^{96}\) denotes the sequence of machine ages for the \(i^{th}\) plant conditional on \(a_{i80}\) while \(\hat{\omega}_l(u_i, a_{it}) = y_o - (a_{i80} + [\ln(1 + g)]t + \alpha z_{t-1} - (1 - \theta d_{it})u_i a_{it} + u_{it-1})\), \(\sigma_w = \sqrt{\sigma_z^2 + \sigma_p^2}\), and \(f(\xi|\omega) = 1/(\sigma\xi\sqrt{1 - \rho^2}) \phi((\xi - \rho^2\omega)/(\sigma\xi\sqrt{1 - \rho^2}))\) is the density of \(\xi\) conditional on \(\omega\). Here, \(\rho^2 = \sigma_z^2/\sigma_p^2\) is the fraction of the sum of variances of \(\xi\) and \(\eta\) accounted for by idiosyncratic productivity shock. The likelihood for replacement decision is obtained in (11) by integrating out unobserved idiosyncratic productivity shock \(\xi\) using its distribution conditional on “observable” variable \(\omega\).

The endogeneity problem in estimating the parameters of the production function (9) is dealt with here by simultaneously estimating them with the parameters in replacement decision (8) by full information maximum likelihood method.

### 3.3 Estimation

#### 3.3.1 Likelihood Function

The likelihood function consists of two parts. The first part represents the likelihood contribution from the time-series of aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) shocks and the import prices. The second part is the contribution from the firm-level labor productivities and replacement decisions, where a rich set of permanent unobserved heterogeneities are present.

Letting the transition density functions of \(z\) and \(p\) be denoted by \(q_z(z'|z) = \phi([z' - \psi_z]/\sigma_z)/\sigma_z\) and \(q_p(p'|p) = \phi([p' - \psi_p]/\sigma_p)/\sigma_p\), where \(\phi(\cdot)\) is the standard normal density, the partial likelihood function of aggregate TFP shocks and import prices is given by:

\[
L^p(\theta_1) = q^*_{z}(z_{70})q^*_{p}(p_{70}) \prod_{r=1}^{96} q_z(z_{r-1})q^*_p(p_r)p_{r-1},
\]

where \(q^*_{z}(z) = \phi([z'/(\sigma_z/(1 - \psi_z))]/\sigma_z/(1 - \psi_z))\) and \(q^*_{p}(p) = \phi[p'/(\sigma_p/(1 - \psi_p))]/\sigma_p/(1 - \psi_p)\), \(\psi_z = (c_z, c_p, \psi_z, \psi_p, \sigma_z, \sigma_p)\) is a subvector of parameters that appear only in \(q(\cdot)\). The aggregate data cover longer periods (1970–1996) than the plant-level panel data (1980–1996). The availability of the aggregate data in presample period of panel data is crucial to deal with the initial conditions problem discussed below.

Machine age, \(a_{it}\), is defined as the number of years passed since the last investment spike. For each value of machine ages in 1980, the \(i^{th}\) plant’s machine ages for subsequent years can be constructed based on the law of motions \(d_{it} = (1 - d_{it})a_{it-1} + 1\) using (observable) replacement decisions \(\{d_{it}\}_{t=80}^{96}\). Given the initial machine age \(a_{i80}\) and the unobserved type \(u_i = (u_{i1, u_{i2, t}, \delta})\), the type-specific likelihood contribution for production function and replacement decision of the plant is

\[
L_i(\theta; a_{i80}, u_i) = \prod_{t=80}^{96} \frac{1}{\sigma_w} \phi\left(\frac{\hat{\omega}_l(u_i, a_{it}(a_{i80}))}{\sigma_w}\right)
\]

production function

\[
\times \int P\left(d_{it}(a_{it}(a_{i80})), z_{t}, p_{t}, \gamma, D_{t}, u_{ti}, \xi\right)f(\xi|\hat{\omega}_l(u_i, a_{it}(a_{i80})))d\xi,
\]

replacement decision

\[
(11)
\]

where \(\{a_{it}(a_{i80})\}_{t=80}^{96}\) denotes the sequence of machine ages for the \(i^{th}\) plant conditional on \(a_{i80}\) while \(\hat{\omega}_l(u_i, a_{it}) = y_o - (a_{i80} + [\ln(1 + g)]t + \alpha z_{t-1} - (1 - \theta d_{it})u_i a_{it} + u_{it-1})\), \(\sigma_w = \sqrt{\sigma_z^2 + \sigma_p^2}\), and \(f(\xi|\omega) = 1/(\sigma\xi\sqrt{1 - \rho^2}) \phi((\xi - \rho^2\omega)/(\sigma\xi\sqrt{1 - \rho^2}))\) is the density of \(\xi\) conditional on \(\omega\). Here, \(\rho^2 = \sigma_z^2/\sigma_p^2\) is the fraction of the sum of variances of \(\xi\) and \(\eta\) accounted for by idiosyncratic productivity shock. The likelihood for replacement decision is obtained in (11) by integrating out unobserved idiosyncratic productivity shock \(\xi\) using its distribution conditional on “observable” variable \(\omega\).

The endogeneity problem in estimating the parameters of the production function (9) is dealt with here by simultaneously estimating them with the parameters in replacement decision.

It is not possible to directly evaluate the individual likelihood contribution (11) because we do not observe either \(a_{i80}\) or \(u_i\). Then, the partial likelihood function for productivity shocks and replacement decisions is obtained by integrating out \((a_{i80}, u_i)\) from (11):

\[
L^R_i(\theta) = \prod_{t=1}^{N} \int L_i(\theta; a_{i80}, u') dm^R_{i80}(a_{i80}, u')
\]

\[
= \prod_{t=1}^{N} \sum_{k=1}^{E} \sigma^2 \int \sum_{s_{80}} L_i(\theta; d_{it}, (u_{i1}', u_{i2}'), \delta')
\]

\[
\times m^R_{i80}(a_{i80}|(u_{i1}', u_{i2}'), \delta') \frac{1}{\sigma_{ui}} \phi\left(\frac{u_{i1}}{\sigma_{ui}}\right) du_{i1},
\]

(12)

where \(m^R_{i80}(a_{i80}, u_i)\) is the joint distribution of the machine age in 1980 and the unobserved heterogeneity while \(m^R_{i80}(a_{i80}|u_i)\) is the distribution of the machine age in 1980 conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity. The model has a rich structure in terms of unobserved heterogeneity and, in the second line of (12), the likelihood is evaluated by integrating out the unobserved heterogeneities with respect to their distributions.

The full information likelihood function is the product of the partial likelihood functions (10) and (12):

\[
L_i(\theta) = L^p(\theta_1) L^R_i(\theta).
\]

(13)

The parameter \(\theta\) is estimated by maximizing the log of the full information likelihood (13).
To deal with this issue, for each candidate parameter $\theta$, I construct a “transitory” distribution of machine ages in the beginning of 1980 conditioned on both the unobserved heterogeneity $u$ and the realization of aggregate variables for 1970–1979. Let the probability distribution of plants with machine age $a$ at year $t$ conditional on the type $u$ be $m_{t}^a(u|a)$. At the beginning of 1970, $m_{t=0}^a(u|a)$ is assumed to be a stationary distribution. I obtain the 1971 distribution $m_{t=1}^a(u|a)$ by updating the 1970 distribution $m_{t=0}^a(u|a)$ using the conditional choice probability ($8$) evaluated at the realized values of the aggregate shock and the import price of 1970, $(z_{j0}^P, p_{j0})$. Similarly, the 1971 distribution $m_{t=1}^a(u|a)$ is updated to obtain the 1972 distribution $m_{t=2}^a(u|a)$. Repeating this process up to 1980, I obtain the transitory machine age distribution in the beginning of 1980, $m_{t=20}^a(u|a)$ which is conditioned on $(z_{j0}^P, p_{j0})$. Using this 1980 distribution to integrate out the unobserved initial machine age, I evaluate the partial likelihood function (12).

The validity of this “model-based” approach requires that the time-series of aggregate productivity shocks and import prices fully capture the aggregate shocks that are relevant for replacement decisions. This could be a strong assumption because there were many policy changes in Chile during the 1970s. To check the robustness, I also estimate the model using a “flexible” initial conditions distribution in the spirit of Heckman (1981). I find that the quantitative implications of counterfactual experiments are similar between the “model-based” approach and the “flexible” approach. Furthermore, the result from the “flexible” approach indicates that the initial conditions distribution may not be well identified if it is modeled flexibly. For these reasons, I focus on the results from the “model-based” initial conditions specification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Maximum likelihood estimates by full MLE: All manufacturing sectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TFP Process</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c_{z}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi_{z}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{z}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Production Function</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{0}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_{z}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{\delta}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{w}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Permanent Unobserved Heterogeneity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_{H}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u_{H}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{u}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2. Estimates of average technological obsolescence rates across different estimators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full MLE</th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>Within-Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>0.486</td>
<td>0.869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{\delta}$</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. For MLE, the average technological obsolescence rate is computed as $\bar{\delta} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \pi_{i} \delta_{i}^{N}$. $\delta_{i}^{N}$ is the average value added with the frontier technology.

### 3.4 Variable Definitions

Recall the assumption that a plant’s replacement decision may be identified with a gross investment rate over 20%. That is, $d_{it} = 1$ if the $i$th plant’s gross investment rate at year $t$ is more than 0.2 and $d_{it} = 0$ otherwise. Here, the gross investment rate is defined as the gross investment in new capital goods during the current year, divided by capital stock at the end of the previous year. The measure of gross investment here includes machinery and equipment and vehicles but excludes buildings. Furthermore, since the model focuses on the replacement of old machines by new machines embodying the frontier technology, I exclude the purchase and sale of used capital from the measurement of gross investment. The capital stock is constructed from the 1980 book value of capital (the 1981 book value if the 1980 book value is not available) using the perpetual inventory method. Some plants did not report the book values of capital in either 1980 or 1981. Since it is not possible to construct capital stock without these reports, the plants missing their book values of capital were excluded from the sample. I also excluded from the sample the plants with capital-output ratios less than 1%, since I consider the observations miscoded or misreported.

The detrended Solow residuals are used as a proxy for the aggregate productivity shock. A time series of the Solow residuals is first constructed from 1970–1996 using growth rates across different estimators.
accounting: \( Z_t = \frac{Y_t}{(K_t L_t)^{1-w_k}} \), where \( w_k \) represents the share of capital, \( Y_t, K_t, \) and \( L_t \) are the gross domestic products in 1986 pesos, aggregate capital stock in 1986 pesos, and working age person (15–64) in Chile. A value for \( w_k \) is set to 0.3 (Bergoeing, Kehoe, Kehoe, and Soto 2001). Then, I regress the log of \( Z_t \) on a constant and a time trend and use the residuals, \( z_t \), as the data for the log of aggregate productivity shock.

For relative import prices, \( p_t \), the log of the ratio of import wholesale price indices in the Chilean peso to respective output price indices is used. For plants’ labor productivity, \( y_{it} \), I use the log of the ratio of value added, deflated by the respective output price deflators, to the number of workers. I excluded from the sample the plants with negative value added. The labor productivity variables are then trimmed using the sample first percentile and the sample 99th percentile.

Trade orientation is classified into two categories: export-oriented and import-competing. In particular, plants that belong to a two-digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) industry of which export-output ratio is more than 20% are classified as export-oriented; plants that belong to a two-digit ISIC industry of which import-output ratio is more than 20% are classified as import-competing. To classify plants into domestic-material-intensive and import-material-intensive, I use the plant-level information on the use of imported materials. Specifically, plants are classified as import-material-intensive if they use imported materials more than a half of sample years (i.e., no less than 9 years out of 17 sample years); otherwise, they are classified as domestic-material-intensive.

### 4. RESULTS

#### 4.1 All Manufacturing Sectors

Table 1 presents the maximum likelihood estimates and their asymptotic standard errors, which are computed using the outer product of gradients estimator, for all manufacturing sectors. The discount rate \( \beta \) is not estimated but set to 0.95. The results from counterfactual experiments are robust to changes in the value of \( \beta \).

The estimates of coefficients \( \psi \) and \( \theta_p \) are both significantly positive, implying persistence in both aggregate shock and import price series. The parameter estimates for the microeconomic model of machine replacement are plausible, and standard errors are generally small. The import price elasticity of replacement cost, \( \alpha_p \), is estimated as 0.819. This estimate is largely consistent with what is expected if the price of machines is determined by the geometric average of the domestic price and the import price since Chile imports the 82.5% of machines from abroad, on average, for the period of 1985–1996 (see Banco Central De Chile, 2000). The replacement cost during the financial crisis of 1982–1983 is systematically higher than...
The technological obsolescence rate, $\delta$, differs across plant types. The estimated fraction of plants with zero technological obsolescence rate in the population is large: $\pi_1 + \pi_3 = 0.612$. This indicates that for a majority of plants, machine replacement is not the way to increase productivity. On the other hand, the technological obsolescence rate for other plants is high: 8.1%. Thus, there exists substantial heterogeneity in technological obsolescence rates across plants.

Table 2 compares the maximum likelihood (ML) estimate of average technological obsolescence rate with the alternative estimates from using ordinary least squares (OLS) and Within-Groups estimators. The panel data from 1990–1996 is used for OLS and Within-Groups estimators because, prior to 1990, we may not observe machine age if its value is less than 10 years. For OLS, I regress the log of the labor productivity on machine age, an interaction between machine age and discrete investment choice, and year dummies, $\xi_t$, so that the specification is given by $y_{it} = \bar{\delta} + \bar{\delta} \alpha_{it} d_{it} + \xi_t + \epsilon_{it}$, where the error term $\epsilon_{it}$ is equal to $-(\delta_t - \bar{\delta}) \alpha_{it} d_{it} + \alpha_{1,t} + \alpha_{2,t}$ from the viewpoint of the model (9). The specification of Within-Groups estimator is similar but plant-specific effects are partly controlled for by within-groups transformation.
Table 5. MLE: Import-material-intensive versus domestic-material-intensive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Domestic-Material-Intensive</th>
<th>Import-Material-Intensive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_p$</td>
<td>0.628 (.070)</td>
<td>1.473 (.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Plants</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. $\delta = \sum_{t=0}^{T} \eta_t \delta_t$ is the average technological obsolescence rate.

The average technological obsolescence rate is estimated by the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) at 3.1%. The OLS estimate is significant at 4.9% with standard error of 0.3%, which is likely to be biased upward because of the negative correlation between machine ages and unobserved productivities. The Within-Groups estimate is also significant but lower than the ML estimate at 1.5% with standard error of 0.2%. While there are different sources of biases, the Within-Groups estimator might be biased downward because of measurement errors in machine ages; within-transformation lowers signal to noise ratio and magnifies the bias toward zero induced by measurement errors that are driven by the classification errors in past replacement decisions.

Figure 5 graphically depicts the fit of the model to the actual fraction of plants with investment spikes as well as the aggregate machine investment rate data. The model appears to replicate well the observed aggregate investment patterns. As shown in Figure 6, the model also performs well in replicating the observed machine age distribution. Table 3 compares the actual and predicted proportion of plants with investment spikes by machine ages for the years 1994–1996. The model appears to predict the machine replacement probability, conditional on machine ages, reasonably well. In particular, the model correctly predicts a downward empirical hazard even though the replacement probability for any individual plant is predicted to be nondecreasing in machine ages. This is because plants with younger machines are more likely to have unobserved characteristics that lead to more frequent replacement.

Figure 7 compares the actual versus predicted average labor productivity for 1980–1996. According to the estimated model, the average machine age decreases from 5.0–5.8 between 1981 and 1986. The shift in the machine age distribution caused a 2.4% decline in average labor productivity for the same period and thus the delay in the adoption of technology embodied in machines had a nonnegligible effect on labor productivity.

4.2 Import-Competing Versus Export-Oriented

The impact of a tariff increase on output prices may be different across trade-sectors. In an export-oriented industry, a tariff increase may not significantly affect output prices, while a tariff increase may lead to higher output prices in an
import-competing industry. Export-oriented industries, therefore, are likely to experience a larger decline in investment rates during the period of high tariffs. To examine this issue, I reestimate all the model’s parameters using the subsamples classified by trade-sectors. Table 4 presents the estimates of selected coefficients. The estimate of import price elasticity of replacement cost, $\alpha_p$, is 0.909 for export-oriented and 0.850 for import-competing industry.

Figures 8 and 9 present the actual and the predicted fractions of plants with investment spikes for export-oriented and import-competing industry. In both figures, the thick and the thin lines show the investment rates for export-oriented and import-competing industries, respectively. The estimated models suitably capture investment patterns as well as their differences between export-oriented and import-competing industries.

I conduct a counterfactual experiment—shown as the dotted line in Figure 9—to test what would happen to the investment rate of import-competing industry if the realization of its relative import prices were identical to that of export-oriented industry for 1980–1996. I find that the gap of investment rates between export-oriented industry and import-competing industry would have been narrower by 60% on average for the period of 1984–1988 had there been no difference in the realization of relative import prices.

4.3 Import-Material-Intensive Versus Domestic-Material-Intensive

Plants that are importing materials may have better access to foreign machines and hence might be more likely to use the imported machines, as opposed to the domestic machines. If so, the machine replacement costs of material-importing plants may be more elastic with respect to import price than those of plants that do not import materials.

To examine this issue, I reestimate all the model’s parameters while identifying the use of imported materials at the plant level. Plants are classified as import-material-intensive if they use imported materials more than a half of the sample period. The estimates of selected coefficients are presented in Table 5. The point estimate suggests that plants using imported material intensively experience a higher elasticity of replacement cost by 0.845($= 1.473 - 0.628$) points as compared with plants using domestic material intensively.
Figure 10 reports the result of a counterfactual experiment to test what would happen to the investment rates of import-material-intensive plants if the import price elasticity of replacement cost is the same as that of domestic-material-intensive plants. While the dashed line shows the predicted investment rates of import-material-intensive plants given the actual elasticity ($\alpha_p = 1.473$), the dotted line shows the model’s prediction of what would happen to investment rates of import-material-intensive plants given the counterfactual elasticity ($\alpha_p = 0.628$). The investment rate of import-material-intensive plants would have been higher by 2.6 percentage points on average for the period of 1984-1988 if the elasticity of replacement cost for import-material-intensive plants had been the same as that for domestic-material-intensive plants.

4.4 Experiment: The Effect of a Temporary Increase in Import Prices

To quantitatively examine the effect of a temporary increase in import prices, I conduct an experiment to determine what would have happened to investment and productivity of Chilean manufacturing if import prices had remained constant at the 1982 level over the period of spanning 1983–1987.

Figure 11 presents the simulated fractions of plants with investment spikes for all manufacturing sectors under the counterfactual (dotted line) and the fraction of plants with investment spikes for the actual import prices (dashed line). The impact of the high import prices is substantial; for instance, in 1985—when the tariff rate was the highest—the aggregate investment rate would have been 21.6% instead of 14.8% had there been no temporary increase in import prices from 1983–1987. The figure suggests that Chile would have recovered from the economic crisis of 1982–1983 much more quickly had there been no temporary increase in import prices associated with higher tariffs in the mid-1980s.

Figure 12 shows what would have happened to average output per worker for all manufacturing sectors if the import prices of 1983–1987 were the same as that of 1982. To highlight the impact of the delayed technology adoption on productivity, the time trend and the aggregate shocks are eliminated from the graph. According to the experiment, the output per worker would have been higher by 1.9% in 1986 if the import prices of 1983–1987 had remained at the 1982 level. The estimated accumulated output loss from 1983–1996 associated with the high import prices of 1983–1987 is also substantial at 11.1% of annual output.
The results of similar experiments for the export-oriented industry and the import-competing industry are presented in Figures 13(a)–(d). Reflecting the larger increase in relative import prices for the export-oriented industry, the negative impact of temporarily high import prices on investment and productivity was substantially larger for the export-oriented industry than for the import-competing industry. Finally, the results of similar experiments for import-material-intensive plants and domestic-material-intensive plants are presented in Figures 14(a)–(d). While the 1985 investment rate of domestic-material-intensive plants would have been higher by 5.3% without any temporary increase in import prices from 1983–1987, the investment rate of import-material-intensive would have been higher as much as by 10.2%. The negative impact of temporarily high import prices on the output per worker of domestic-material-intensive plants in 1986 is 1.5%, which is substantially lower than the impact on the output per worker of import-material-intensive plants, 2.3%.

5. Conclusion

This paper empirically examines the impact of a rise in the price of capital goods induced by an increase in import tariffs on investment and productivity. A structural dynamic optimization model of machine replacement is developed and estimated using the Chilean manufacturing plant-level data for a period characterized by substantial changes in tariff rates. Using the estimated model, I provide counterfactual experiments to quantify the impact of temporarily high import price on aggregate investment and productivity. I also examine the model’s implications across trade-sectors and across plants differing in their use of imported materials regarding the links among relative import prices, investment, and productivity.

The results of counterfactual experiments provide important quantitative implications regarding Chile’s tariff policy. To the extent that a temporary increase in tariffs affected relative import prices, a change in trade policy may have had a substantial impact on aggregate investment dynamics in the mid-1980s. The counterfactual experiments also indicate that the impact of temporary increases in tariffs may be substantially different across trade-sectors as well as across plants differing in their use of imported materials. During the high tariff period, the export-oriented industry suffered larger negative effects than did the import-competing industry due to the increase in relative import prices. The negative effects of import price increases are particularly large among import-material-intensive plants.

There are at least three directions in which this model may be extended. First, while this paper focuses on analyzing intraplant productivity change associated with machine replacement, others (Pavcnik 2002; Melitz 2003) emphasize the resource reallocation through the process of entry and exit as an important source of aggregate productivity changes. Developing a structural model with entry and exit and estimating it using rich microeconomic data to quantify the role of resource reallocation in explaining the dynamics of aggregate productivity would be a fruitful exercise. Second, the model developed here abstracts from both capital-labor ratio choice and worker flows. The incorporation of technology choice and employment movement into the model is likely to prove useful for analyzing the links between technology choice, worker flows, and investment. Finally, technology adoption through machine replacement might induce a plant to start exporting. Incorporating export decisions into the model in view of recent findings of exporter facts (Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum 2003) and examining how machine replacement is related to export decisions at the plant level, remains an important topic for future research.

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