Para hacer la guerra hay que ser filósofos. El c. Gonzalo se plantea políticamente las batallas, no técnicamente.
(PCP-Sendero Luminoso, qtd. Gorriti Ellenbogen 278)

It is question of effecting groupings of powers, and these are what constitute affects.
(Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 341)

civil society as global discourse

In our current era of globalization--or rather, in as much as our current era is characterized in terms of globalization--social scientific discourse about civil society comes to serve as the discourse of the left. When the framework of analysis is the global, the operative political polarity is almost inexorably that of global capital faced with national or regional networks of civil society relations. Critical discourse on globalization almost without exception opposes regional or national civil societies to global processes--rather than, for instance, positing different possible modes of globalization. It depends upon and feeds a dichotomy between local and
global. So if populism arises with the transition within national development processes, civil society discourse catches hold at the point at which national or regional situations open up to or face onto the global—as in the breakdown of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, or the struggle against Latin American authoritarianism. Civil society is conceived as the terrain on which closed states and political societies are forced to open to democratizing initiatives within the context of a global shift in forces.

This "opening up" is, however, ambivalent: civil society is a hinge, the site both of the particularistic (or national) and of the universal (or global). It is particularistic in so far as nationally and regionally based movements combat (economic or political) regimes that are apparently imposed from above or without; its claims are universal in so far as such movements also draw on global networks to put pressure on particular, relatively bounded and perhaps aberrant, instantiations of such regimes. Hence civil society is a fluid space, in which international non-governmental organizations operate to create the image also of something like a global civil society—a globality conceptualized as a network of
localities. In either case, the critical discourse of the civil society is designed to open up a breach between the global and what is left of the national or the regional. Into this breach pour the NGOs and with them the social scientists as the apparent standard-bearers of the left.

Or rather, it is not so much that disciplinary analyses follow on from a particular problematic, but that specific disciplines construct their analyses in distinct ways and so construct specific problematics. Especially over the past few years, that array of disciplines that make up the social sciences have constructed a frame of reference in terms of global and globalization processes, to which they oppose nation states and what seem to be their national civil societies—whereas the humanities and culturalist disciplines remain concerned for the most part with developments and conflicts within particular national cultures. Within the humanities, therefore, the dominant political polarity is taken to be that between the popular and the power bloc, in classical left populist form;
whereas the social sciences take classical liberalism onto the international arena.¹

Beyond disciplinary differences, the distinct projects of cultural studies and civil society theory also respond to distinct political contexts. Social scientific discourse about civil society becomes the standard discourse of the left in contexts that are more amenable to globalizing interpretations, such as Latin America, while cultural studies takes up the same role in contexts such as the US and the UK. In each case, I argue, what appears to be a project of the left echoes rather than engages the dominant paradigms of governance, which themselves tend, respectively, toward technocratic neoliberalism in Latin America and toward neopopulism in a metropolis that is slower to open up to the global. This is so even as dominant regimes and their apparent oppositions in both metropolis and periphery are also mixtures (of various sorts) of populism and technocracy, perhaps increasingly so. This is one political fallout of globalization, that

¹ The distinction between these oppositions is not simply that of scale. Each works according to a distinct tropology: populism's dominant trope is displacement of a foreign body, while civil society theory's that of the synecdochic relation of part to whole. It is in this sense that civil society remains within the liberal tradition, even as it translates liberalism to a global context.
we see a steady convergence of regimes and the conjunction of market populism and state technocracy to produce diverse regimes of popular managerialism.

Yet the result of such convergence is less an accommodation or rapprochement between cultural studies and civil society theory than it is the steady consolidation of the latter as the dominant mode of left social analysis; for it is, after all, civil society theory that establishes itself foremost on the terrain of the global. Those within the tradition of cultural studies increasingly either try to appropriate the requisite social scientific vocabulary of globalization and civil society or, true to the tradition's populist impulses, accept a subordinate position in a claim to greater radicality and continued insistence upon the local in the face of the global. The proponents of civil society theory, on the other hand, encouraged by their apparent success in analyzing what appear to be the great emancipatory narratives of recent times (in Eastern Europe and Latin America), gain increasing confidence. The concept of civil society, this founding concept of modern Western European political theory, returns fortified from its peregrinations in the former Second and Third Worlds to be put to use in a First
World that is no longer so clearly central within the global scheme of things.

It is this project of returning the concept of civil society to the West that lies behind Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato's theorization and defense of the concept:

The concept of civil society [. . .] has an ambiguous status under liberal democracies. To some, it seems to indicate what the West has already achieved, and thus it is without any apparent critical potential for examining the dysfunctions and injustices of our type of society. To others, the concept belongs to early modern forms of political philosophy that have become irrelevant to today's complex societies. It is our thesis, however, that the concept of civil society indicates a terrain in the West that is endangered by the logic of administrative and economic mechanism but is also the primary locus for the potential expansion of democracy under "really existing" liberal-democratic regimes. In advancing this thesis, we shall demonstrate the modernity and normative/critical relevance of the concept of civil society to all types of contemporary societies. (vii-viii; my emphasis)

By contrast, my argument in this chapter is that not only does civil society theory not help explain "our" type of society, nor does it adequately explain those (post-authoritarian) societies in which it has had such apparent explanatory success. Moreover, and despite the emancipatory and oppositional role that it claims, I argue that civil society theory plays into the hands of technocratic neoliberalism, providing a false hope for a naive vision of democratization. The concept of civil
society marks off fundamentalism as other in order to reinforce the rationality of an expansive state. It tries to reconstruct the social pact, no longer through affect but despite it.

Especially in Latin America, civil society's expansion is often simply equated with democratization. In part such claims gain their emancipatory aura from the fact that (and to the extent that) civil society discourse dresses itself in the rhetorical flourishes of the old left, as can be seen in Jorge Castañeda's call to arms:

Here, then, is the first democratic order of battle for the left: to encourage every conceivable expression of civil society, every social movement, every form of self-management that Latin American reality generates. (372, my emphasis) Such a comprehensive celebration of civil society, however and in all possible forms it may be conceived, is clearly hyperbolic—and is an obstacle to any sustained theorization or definition of the term. Its only limits here are the limits set by the imagination. This is political and rhetorical shorthand, a gesture toward the new rather than a real attempt to think the problematics of self-management and organization. Yet Castañeda (since elevated into political power by Mexican president Vicente Fox) is not alone in his clarion call for the rejuvenation of Latin American civil society, and this sense of engagement is not only a result of martial metaphors (of "democratic order[s] of battle"). In the wake of authoritarian regimes, and the failure of previous left projects in the face of authoritarianism, left and social democratic intellectuals throughout the continent seem to agree that rebuilding civil society is the key step towards
consolidating democracy and ensuring respect for individual and social rights. Specifically, Castañeda's social democracy (which is adapted from the 1980s positions of the centrist CEPAL, the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) has been taken up by many as one of the few alternatives with which to oppose the dominant neoliberalism. The left's call to battle (or gesture towards the new) derives from its embattled position now that it no longer sets the agenda in Latin America--let alone worldwide.

In the face of the suggestion that it offers a coherent alternative to neoliberalism, I argue that civil society discourse is neither coherent nor an alternative. It is no alternative, for—as we learn from looking at Sendero and recent developments in neoliberal Peru—neoliberalism takes civil society discourse at its word and then some, seeking to implement a transparent and perfectly functional civil society within the national space. The civil society discourse of the left is truncated and incoherent, and achieves only half-heartedly what the right does so well: to exclude culture and affect from the sphere of the state for the sake of some dream of liberal rationality. By contrast, I suggest that we need to look at what is constitutively ignored or repressed by such discourse: the affective relations that signify the irreducibility of the cultural within the political.
My critical focus in this chapter will be on Cohen and Arato's presentation of civil society theory. I take at face value their claim that "despite the proliferation of this discourse, and of the concept itself [. . .] no one [had] developed a systematic theory of civil society" (3) before their intervention. It is interesting, however, to note the extent to which they downplay the specifically Latin American set of discourses on civil society. Despite their remark that the Latin American treatment of these themes (particularly in Guillermo O'Donnell, Alfred Stepan, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso) is "the richest, most open-ended and most synthetic" (48) among those discussions that have returned the notion of civil society to the contemporary socio-theoretical map, Latin America drops off this same map. Later it is the experience of "state-socialist countries" of Eastern Europe alone that is mentioned as providing "the world-historical impetus to revive the category" of civil society (487).

No doubt this situation is result in large part of Cohen and Arato's obvious unfamiliarity with Spanish compared to their much greater familiarity with German texts, though their overall project of re-legitimating civil society as a concept for the West also requires a certain occlusion of non-Western discourses. Moreover, their discourse ambivalently claims both inspiration and distance from social actors themselves: inspiration in so far as the reference to actually existing social movements enables Cohen and Arato to claim they are "not speaking in a void" (346); distance in so far as they reject the "democratic fundamentalism typical of collective actors based in civil society" (561). They maintain this (anti-populist)
position even as they are aware of the criticism of "soulless reformism" that they face in part as a result.

Perhaps it is along these lines that we can understand the phenomenon of Castañeda's *Utopia Unarmed* and its huge success both in Latin America and in the US, in that Castañeda is far less wary of either fundamentalism or even a form of (neo)populism. Castañeda's text has had wide influence, and in many ways has defined the framework for rethinking the Latin American left not just in the social sciences but also in the humanities and in the public sphere more generally, although it has done so without offering much that is new (his analysis of civil society and social movements being essentially little more than a simplification of Alain Touraine's), rather by encapsulating a general trend (that consists in the reevaluation of national liberation movements and advocacy of moderate state intervention in the economy and welfare projects), and providing both historical context and a sense of urgency.

That what is fairly unabashed social democracy and—as also in Castañeda's subsequent book on Che Guevara\(^2\)—a spirited farewell to all that the Latin American left has held dear for most of this century should also be championed even by those who might have positions nominally far more radical that those of Castañeda's, may seem surprising. This success can maybe understood in terms of the project to inject a dose of fundamentalism (of "soul") into a disillusioned (apparently post-revolutionary) Latin America: a

\(^2\) For which see Jean Franco's reading of the various recent biographies of Guevara and the effort they expend in detailing the apparent futility of the traditional Latin American left.
fundamentalism of civil society ("every conceivable expression [. . .] every social movement"). Hence perhaps the central position ascribed to Castañeda in Duncan Green's *Silent Revolution*, which is distributed in the US by Monthly Review Press, a bastion of the traditional left if ever there was one. Green suggests that the "rigorously intellectual" (192) Castañeda's admittedly "hodgepodge" proposal is "one of the most ambitious" attempts to formulate an alternative to neoliberalism (191), steering a middle ground between CEPAL and the São Paulo Forum. Castañeda's (and more generally, new social movement theory's) draw is the ability to make the "middle ground" the site of a fundamentalism, to emphasize (even in the spiritedness of its farewell to arms) the radicalism of Cohen and Arato's "self-limiting radicalism" (493 and passim) where Cohen and Arato themselves emphasize rather the self-limitation.

In similar vein, the *Monthly Review* also published William Robinson's highly laudatory account of the São Paulo Forum, the broad coalition of leftist Latin American groups and parties. The Forum, something of a "Who's Who" of the Latin American left from Brazil's PT (Lula's Worker's Party) to the Sandinistas, the FMLN and the Cuban Communist Party, essentially supports a platform very similar to Castañeda's. Specifically on civil society, Robinson describes the São Paulo Forum's position as follows: "The correlation of social forces in civil society is at least as important as who actually holds power, maybe more so [. . .] The state must be democratized through popular control over its activities" (6). The actors in civil society are to be the new social movements, given (Robinson reports) the proposition that "There has been a real revolution of civil society in Latin America" (6) with the rise of such movements.
Though the São Paulo Forum embraces almost the entire spectrum of the Latin American left, from the PT to the Cubans, including also the United Left (IU) of Peru, clearly the Peruvian Communist Party--Shining Path (henceforth in this text Sendero Luminoso or simply Sendero) remains outside this, as almost any other, coalition. For Castañeda, Sendero functions effectively as the horizon of all leftist reformism, and also the warning for any who choose not to rethink a democratic alternative: "the condition for the renewed viability of reformism in Latin America [. . .] lies inevitably in the threat of something worse. Since it cannot be revolution as such--the way Cuba was for nearly twenty years--it must be different, yet terrifying nonetheless. This is the syndrome of Sendero Luminoso" (488). If not reform, then Sendero: Castañeda suggests that Sendero is both the outcome of neoliberal social disintegration (and as such "reflects the new bane of Latin America" [448]), and the ne plus ultra of a left that refuses to reform. This, for Castañeda, is the fundamentalism to end fundamentalisms. If Sendero "can certainly instill fear in the hearts and minds of many" (488), this is a fear both of the neglected masses (should they not be harnessed to a new program of reform) and of the recalcitrant left (should it manage to harness the masses to a program beyond both revolution and reform).
defining civil society

The great attraction of civil society theory is that it seems to offer a radicalized "third way" between statism and laissez faire market economics. After all, it would be hard to contest Jorge Castañeda's assertion that "the left must have a program" (427), and must go beyond what tends to be merely critique of market economics and the withdrawal of the state, a critique usually based on the effect of such policies upon the poorest members of society. It is not that such critique is unnecessary--far from it--but rather that it is insufficient as the right controls the intellectual as well as the political initiative. The left needs a program that goes beyond the piecemeal celebration of local resistances that all too often passes for the cultural politics of US intellectuals. It is partly in rejection of such a cultural (non)politics that, in the face of globalization, the left has generally chosen to emphasize the broad construction and consolidation of civil society as a program that would both

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3 Of course and ironically, the promise of a radicalized third way is equally the attraction of populism.
appeal to the state and gain legitimation from broad sectors of society.

With utopianism's wane, civil society theory offers a bounded utopia that would be quintessentially modern (rather than pre- or post-modern). For "an age when totalizing revolutionary utopias have been discredited" Cohen and Arato offer "a self-reflective and self-limiting utopia of civil society" (451). Civil society is self-limiting in so far as it is the sphere of mediations between subsystems of society. Civil society is modern in so far as it depends upon an account of modernization as the process of differentiation (constituting the emergence of such subsystems). It is on the heels of the differentiation of the economy and the state, and thus also economic society and political society, as separate spheres that civil society emerges as a reciprocally differentiated sphere that, according to Cohen and Arato's working definition, serves as:

a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of association (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication. (ix)

With this definition they claim to be following the "contemporary collective actors" who have put the project
of civil society back onto the political agenda in so far as "by 'civil society,' these actors have in mind a normative model of a societal realm different from the state and the economy" (346).

Yet even this tripartite model, taken from Antonio Gramsci, is not sufficient—even if it is "fundamental" (423) for Cohen and Arato. Rather, they understand civil society to be positioned both as the site of and at the nexus of a whole series of mediations and differentiations. Indeed (here following Polanyi as well as Gramsci) they see modern civil society as a crucial part of "the re-creation of a fabric of societal intermediations [. . .] in a new and posttraditional form" (425; emphasis in original). Political society mediates between civil society and the state and (if only "in principle") economic society may mediate "between civil society and the market system" (x). Moreover, and importantly, civil society is also internally differentiated in a number of ways. First and foremost they stress the ambivalence of civil society, expressing this ambivalence in terms of a dualistic framework that could account for both integration and innovation. Thus (following Jürgen Habermas) they invoke a distinction between "lifeworld" and "system" whereby they associate
civil society with the communicative interactions of the lifeworld and define both the state and the economy as subsystems guided not by communication but by the rationalized media of power (within political society) and money (for economic society) (426). Moreover, civil society is also itself internally differentiated according to the same schema in that at the porous border between the lifeworld and the subsystems Cohen and Arato see both the possibility of an institutionalized encroachment upon the lifeworld--the "negative dimensions of civil society" (442) for which Cohen and Arato see Michel Foucault as the foremost theorist and critic--and also the possibility that social movements might "exert pressure for inclusion" (532) and (above all) "influence [. . .] within political (and economic) society" through "receptors" in the realm of these subsystems that "can, within limits, be added to and democratized" (531).

Given their stress on differentiation, Cohen and Arato are consistently opposed to what they term the "fundamentalisms" (410) of dedifferentiation, the failure to respect distinctions within civil society), particularly the "democratic fundamentalism" (e.g. 453) that, refusing the distinction between civil and political society, would
overwhelm the state and that they see leading only to anarchy. This terminology is a curious label for an anti-traditional position arguing against fundamental and essential differences—especially given that they also (and more conventionally) use the term for the traditionalist and essentialist "fundamentalism of false communities" (24), and this without differentiating between these two usages. This apparent slippage only makes sense in so far as both fundamentalisms (the radical democratic and the traditionalist) are seen as anti-modern—whether postmodern or an appeal to the premodern (or "primitivist" [453]). Indeed Cohen and Arato place themselves firmly in the defense of "the universalist tradition of cultural and political modernity" (24-5) and, further, see their argument as one for the "further modernization of the culture and institutions of civil society" (25; their emphasis). In this context their self-limiting civil society theory offers a defense of political modernization (guaranteed for Cohen and Arato by the relative autonomy of the state and political society), economic development (likewise guaranteed by the relative autonomy of economic society) in so far as they might be (democratically or offensively) mediated by a civil society that would also
(defensively) maintain the integrity of the lifeworld. Any threat to this social order is seen as a threat to modernity **in toto**, and is termed a fundamentalism.

Yet Cohen and Arato seem aware that it is (at least) the trace of such fundamentalism that has provided something of the soul and promise of social movements in Latin America (and elsewhere). 4 They admit that their project may appear (as they catchily put it) "deficient in its motivational ability" (455). The sign of their ambivalence lies not only in their reactive labelling (and stigmatizing) of democratic "fundamentalisms," but also in their marked and anxious sensitivity to the charge that their own program is but "soulless reformism" (e.g. 423).

It is interesting that, unusually for such a densely-referential book, here Cohen and Arato's interlocutors are un-named, as though the charge of soullessness had no specific authors or came from no specific place. The question of affect haunts their text. Nor are the democratic "fundamentalists" pinpointed: named theorists

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4 Indeed I will argue below that the distinctions they draw are not only arbitrary (as I think Cohen and Arato would admit, at least in the sense that their precise delimitation is the result of a particular historical conjuncture—a particular stage of modernization and social struggle) but also, in the end, untenable.
who argue against the differentiation of civil and political society (paradigmatically Hannah Arendt) are rather described as advocating "direct" or "radical" democracy (cf. 200). Yet fundamentalism is embodied for Cohen and Arato: it is to be found among the social movements themselves. However much it may be hoped that modern social movements "are no longer motivated by fundamentalist projects of suppressing bureaucracy, economic rationality, or social division" (16)—Heaven forfend—we find that in practice fundamentalism is "typical of collective actors based in civil society" (561; my emphasis).

Here perhaps we find the motivation for the book's project as a whole: the concept of civil society needs to be "reconstructed" to protect it from its own most fervent supporters. Civil society discourse is a victim of its own success; its fashionability (for Cohen and Arato) leads to its ambiguity and the threat of fundamentalism on the part of social actors. For while "the notion of rebuilding or defending civil society certainly tends to increase mobilization," it remains all too "easy for such actors [articulating this notion] to slip into fundamentalism" (421). Fundamentalism is "one side" (if "only one side")
"of the new social movements" even if it is also the mark of civil society out of control and leads to "the optimistic views of the theoretical defenders of civil society who see democratic publics, intact solidarities, and forms of autonomy everywhere" (422). Here then "the defenders of civil society [. . .] start to fall under the suspicion of ideology" (422). Fundamentalism occupies the central role that it does for Cohen and Arato's theorization because they see fundamentalism as the false consciousness of actors within civil society. Moreover, though social movements are premised on the porousness of the boundary between civil and (particularly) political society, civil society has to be defined in terms of the defense of this boundary. Civil society theory is now unhinged from and opposed to civil society discourse.

The articulation and defense of this boundary constitutes the primary politics of civil society: in Cohen and Arato's Habermasian terminology, "'the utopian horizon of civil society' [. . .] is based on preserving the boundaries between the different subsystems and the lifeworld. This is the standpoint from which civil society theory would articulate both a (defensive) critique and an (affirmative) project of intervention into political and
economic society. But by extension, **civil society bounded by the political society is also civil society bounded by the (nation) state.** Inevitably, a non-fundamentalist civil society theory that accedes to the separation between civil and political society likewise is **tied** to political society and its institutional support, the nation-state. Admittedly this is only implicit in Cohen and Arato's theorization. But it is everywhere taken for granted, in their discussion of citizenship, of legality, of common identity and so on, as part and parcel of their modernity, that civil society should be a national civil society.

Civil society theory therefore imposes a series of boundaries: and what it aims to exclude is ostracized as fundamentalist. Dominique Colas's genealogy of the uses of the concept of civil society demonstrates that whenever civil society is invoked, the term depends upon the demarcation of a fanaticism that is its other. Civil society is always a component part of a "regulated system of differences" (*Civil Society and Fanaticism* 280), and as such is threatened by the possibility of indifferentiation, which is registered as fanaticism. The system of differences itself has been variously conceived over the long history of the term's use: civil society has been
defined in contradistinction to the people, the City of God, the state of nature, and the state (23). Civil society, in all its uses, allows then for "the flexible management of multiplicity, heterogeneity" (288). The greatest threat to civil society is posed not by the other elements that also serve to manage multiplicity, but by the specter of multiplicity itself. What distinguishes contemporary civil society theory as articulated by Cohen and Arato—what makes this a historic moment for civil society theory—is that with the emergence of democratic fundamentalism, fanaticism is now a component part of and hence practically (from the point of view of practice) indistinguishable from civil society. For the first time, encouraging and mobilizing the forces of civil society also summons forth the fanaticism that threatens to abolish civil society.

The more that civil society expands, the more it incorporates fanaticism or fundamentalism. The more social movements and groups are integrated into civil society, the more differentiated and complex civil society becomes, the more civil society resembles the pure, immediate multiplicity that would destroy the entire system of differences. Civil society's triumph is also its downfall:
as it incorporates previously excluded or oppositional groups, these groups now threaten to annihilate civil society from within. The more permeable are civil society's boundaries, the more it loses its capacity to maintain and regulate the principle of bounding difference. Civil society discourse therefore needs to maintain the sense that fundamentalisms remain that are not or cannot be incorporated within civil society itself. Fundamentalism without wards off the more serious danger of fundamentalism within. In Colas's analysis, concerned above all with Eastern Europe, an unreconstructed Leninism is civil society's ultimate exterior. In Latin America, Sendero Luminoso provides the horizon of all such civil society discourse. Sendero serves as the ultimate, unrecuperable fanaticism; civil society discourse conjures up Sendero as a warning, as an apocalyptic threat to frighten any who might be tempted by fundamentalism, democratic or otherwise. In response, civil society theory emphasizes once more the importance of the nation-state.

For Castañeda, the motor of democratization is a reformulation of Latin American nationalism: "the left in Latin America has no choice but to remain nationalistic" (298). This is scarcely surprising given the intimate connection between civil society and the state, and the
preeminence of the nation as the dominant state form. In other words, a continuing emphasis upon nationalism is a continuing emphasis upon the state as the location of the political, especially in the face of a globalization that pretends to be above politics and a neoliberalism that affiliates itself with the global in order (apparently) to deny the political. Castañeda regards nationalism as the common denominator of all Latin American left movements in the twentieth century, and as the left's positive legacy that may still be mobilized against neoliberalism. Indeed, his book may also be read as an attempt to trace the nationalist zeitgeist of Latin American oppositional movements, a history encapsulated in his opening anecdote concerning the Argentine money claimed by both the Sandinistas and the montoneros, for whom the Cubans acted as mediators: national forces here overdetermine even the left dream of a regional revolution. The latest incarnation of this nationalist impulse is to be a protective regional federalism, which is also to be intrinsically connected to the "birth of a global civil society" (311). Again, however, this civil society has to be seen as connected to first regional and then global coalitions of states; the state is to remain the guardian of politics and the regulator of culture; nationalism (whether regional or federal), then, attributes to the state an increased measure of autonomy whereby it can also regulate the transnational flows of capital. So it is that nationalism is to be the premise of Castañeda's anti-neoliberal project.

As such, and though perhaps it dare not speak its name, the project of civil society's defense and self-
limitation is also a **culturalist** project. Cohen and Arato are somewhat unclear as to their definition of culture, except in so far as it is internal to the lifeworld dimension of civil society and is constitutive of tradition and identity. Thus "an analytical framework" on social movements "that focuses exclusively on strategic interaction"--their interventions into political (and possibly economic) society--"misses [. . .] the cultural orientations" (512). Ironically, for Cohen and Arato it is the fundamentalist position on civil society that is anti-culturalist and anti-traditional, while an emphasis on self-limiting utopia isolates and preserves "the cultural dimensions of civil society" (514). For Cohen and Arato justify the differentiation (and rationalization) of economic and political society as "a precondition for releasing the cultural potentials of modernity" (539).

While my concern here is mainly with the social sciences (and with a particular, if dominant, form of the social sciences), it is not as if such a faith in the virtues of civil society is not present at all in the humanities. Indeed, perhaps because Latin American intellectuals in the humanities are more likely to be funded, at least in part, by the state, or to see themselves as state intellectuals with a public role and audience, then they are generally closer to (or less autonomous from) the social sciences in Latin America than
humanities intellectuals are elsewhere. Néstor García Canclini is perhaps particularly representative here, and particularly renowned: as a philosopher turned anthropologist, no doubt part of García Canclini's success is due to his ability to construct a hybrid discourse whose rhetoric appeals to the humanities and whose research credentials appeal to the social sciences. His *Hybrid Cultures* appears to offer a theoretical perspective on and critique of modernity à la cultural studies (or even postmodern theory), with its offering of the new paradigm of hybridity and its namechecking Bourdieu, Lyotard, Jameson and so on. On closer inspection, however, any theoretical perspective remains little more than offered. Postmodernity interests García Canclini in so far as it is a democratization of power, but not in so far as the state is weakened (especially the state's capacity to subsidize cultural production [278]), for hybridity remains a relation of domination in which the market both overwhelms "the art of the West" and is "stronger than the difference of the subalterns or marginalized groups" (39). Because he believes that there can be no successful subaltern resistance, he therefore suggests that the only course of action open is accommodation with the state, through civil society.

As George Yúdice elaborates (and celebrates)—again, in one of the more prominent leftwing journals, *Social Text*, a flagship of the culturalist left—García Canclini's regional federalism is very much the politics of civil society, to be seen in tandem with Castañeda's proposals. García Canclini, however, gives civil society a cultural focus, premised upon the virtues of a non-totalizable market (and "consumption as a 'means of thinking' that creates new ways of thinking" [Yúdice 18]) and upon states "setting regulatory policies"
(18) particularly for cultural goods. "Communities of consumers" of these cultural goods are to provide "the cultural adhesive for Castañeda's more economically conceived regional federalism" (19).

Yet again, Sendero provides the horizon of all such civil society discourse, outside the market of possible political positions. Yúdice quotes García Canclini's Consumers and Citizens: "a deterioration of peasant and urban economies [. . .] has [. . .] spawned fundamentalisms of ethnic and paraethnic movements (e.g., Sendero Luminoso), which are obstacles to integration" (qtd. Yúdice 19).

Further to Castañeda's explanation of Sendero as a symptom of neoliberal breakdown, here Sendero is also defined as a (para)ethnic fundamentalism. But in this light and given Sendero's status (especially in Yúdice's argument) as symbolic obstacle to the realization of a multicultural civil society, we could reread the last words of Hybrid Cultures, which ask "how to be radical without being fundamentalist" (281) as also, in part, asking how to be radical without being Sendero. For if Sendero is nothing else, it is radical.

At the same time, the question of how not to be Sendero becomes strictly unanswerable. If Sendero is inconceivable, it is also indescribable and unknowable for precisely the discourse that so anxiously wishes to distinguish its own (civil society's) incipient fundamentalism from that represented by Sendero. Incarnating fundamentalism, Sendero is unrepresentable: if fundamentalism is the abolition of all boundaries and all mediations, the iconoclastic erasure of the difference between referent and sign, then it can scarcely enter discourse. Conversely, if fundamentalism were to be understood as one discourse among others, then it could be conceived as part of civil society, its differences relative and negotiable.
Sendero's unrepresentability haunts civil society discourse and provides a rationale for paranoid attempts to discipline civil society. If Sendero cannot be seen, its partisans could be anywhere. Civil society's fundamentalisms can then be rooted out in the name of extirpating Sendero's fundamentalism (or a fundamentalism like Sendero's) that has no (conceivable) place within civil society. Just as Guzmán was frustratingly elusive for the Peruvian security services, so also with Sendero's militants: their eyes and ears were everywhere, but even the bodies of fallen combatants were removed from the scene of battles before the security forces arrived. Francisco Lombardi's film La boca del lobo puts this paranoia on display as it shows a detachment of the Peruvian army who wake up after their first night in a remote Andean village to discover that at some point, someone, without disturbing any guards or sentries, has replaced the Peruvian flag that was flying above the building with Sendero's hammer and sickle. Throughout the film Sendero are never seen—the guerrilla constitute the absolute horizon and limit of visibility in the clear Andean air, the real that invisibly threatens national order and internal coherence. Finally, the commanding officer breaks down under the strain and first orders a massacre of the villagers and then loses control of his own men.5

5 I am grateful to Alberto Moreiras for drawing my attention to these aspects of the film.
new social movements

If civil society, particularly in the (Latin American) South and the (post-Soviet) East, has undergone a profound transformation (a "revolution" as William Robinson suggests [6], taking his cue from the São Paulo Forum), or is perhaps in the West to undergo such a major change, the agents of this transformation are said to be largely the new social movements: Cohen and Arato's claim is that "social movements constitute the dynamic element in processes that might realize the positive potentials of modern civil societies" (492). New social movements have by now inspired a vast literature, and practically a new theoretical approach. 6

6 Though Cohen and Arato argue that this is not a fully constituted theory of civil society. Of Alain Touraine, for instance, one of the key intellectual theorists (and propagandists) of the new social movements, they state that "[his] work points us in the right direction, but he does not offer a theory of civil society" (523). As I noted earlier, I am taking at face value Cohen and Arato's claim to be the first to offer such a theory; however I am aware that this claim could be contested on a number of levels, not least by those partisans of new social movements who maintain a (more or less principled) anti-theoreticism. At times, moreover, this anti-theoreticism is theorized in terms a critique of theory's (or Theory's) colonizing effects. I consider my own project in line with this (essential postcolonial) approach, but also hope to go beyond this problematic: the mere demonstration that (say) Cohen and Arato's civil society theory is Eurocentric is in the end unsatisfying. Let us see, rather, how civil society theory emerges at the conjuncture of various (European and Latin American) discourses, techniques of control, and projects for
New social movements are variously taken to include the post-sixties counter-cultural opposition (such as anti-war and anti-nuclear activism), single-issue pressure groups (for example, of environmental or AIDS activism), identity politics (feminism, the lesbian and gay movements) particularly in so far as they break from either parliamentarian or revolutionary projects. As such they tend to be defined in terms of both constituency and strategy, and thus in terms both of a new (analytic) understanding of society and of a new (political) relation to the state. For on the one hand new social movements theory breaks with theories of "mass society" by describing such movements as expressions of increased social differentiation: in this sense they are also very much symptoms of modernization and "a weakening of traditional cleavages in which people are freed from traditional ties of class, religion, and the family" (Kriesi et. al., xviii). On the other hand (and this is key for Cohen and Arato), new social movements theory tends to emphasize localism (at times particularism) and (often cultural) liberation, and let us then perhaps begin to imagine alternatives that would be aware of the full complexities of such a conjuncture.
defensiveness deriving from a "self-limiting collective identity" (Cohen and Arato 518) that would preclude projects of either smashing or capturing the state.

In Latin America social movements theory usually describes the disparate movements--for example, of those organizing soup kitchens, protesting disappearances, working for the environment or for indigenous people's issues--that took over the role of opposition to authoritarian regimes with the repression and apparent failure of traditional social movements such as political parties or trades unions. Though identity politics is usually to the fore in new social movements theory, that many of these movements are perhaps trades unions (for example, Chico Mendez' rubber tappers' union) or grow out of histories formed above all by traditional political parties (as especially in Chile) perhaps alerts us to the fact that their newness may be deceptive; indeed, it may be that what is new is rather the way in which their role is conceived and the extent to which their coordination is to be much looser, much more premised upon difference than consensus.

If many of the identities promoted through these new social movements are hardly new (though not all, and there are certainly a wider variety of political positions now available), they would earlier have been coordinated by larger organizations, such as parties, whose principle of unity was to be found elsewhere. The new social movements
thus apparently conform to a more direct representation of the social, and are to perform a less attenuated mediation. For previously social movements claimed to speak for a plurality of subjects in a single voice, representing them across a broad range of issues; the new social movements, on the other hand, are more particularized both in terms of their composition and in terms of the issues they address. As so many of the new social movements (from feminist collectives to neighborhood committees) work according to a logic of inhabitation (of gender or of barrio), if not necessarily a logic of identity, they hold out the promise of a quasi-natural participation in the political, a promise accentuated further by the apparent everydayness of their typically small size and anti-bureaucratic workings. In terms of Cohen and Arato's analysis, which stresses the dual nature of social movements as they "operate on both sides of the system/lifeworld divide" (531) (i.e. in so far as they mediate between the strategic project of political-and economic--society and the defensive project of civil society as lifeworld), new social movements theory stresses the extent to which such movements are rooted in the lifeworld. This rootedness is taken to be quasi-organic
precisely in that the lifeworld is defined by its resistance to bureaucratic rationalization.

Is Sendero also a new social movement? Generally it is not seen as such. Indeed it is usually contrasted with movements such as the rondas campesinas because of the latters' political stances, formal organization, willingness to enter into coalitions with the state as well as with other popular groups, and so on (and for a detailed examination of the conflict between Sendero and the rondas, see Degregori et. al., Las rondas campesinas). On the whole Sendero has confounded those who have tried to understand it in ideological terms (as either new or old social movement whose emphasis would be on the promulgation of doctrine or program) and bemused or shocked those who see it as an irrational deviation from the political (as mystical death cult or barbarous terrorism). As Nelson Manrique points out, the implicit convention in Peru is that one "categorizes [Sendero] as terrorist. When the discussion reaches this point, apparently it is impossible to say anything more without running the risk of being considered at best an appeaser of Sendero, if not a covert Senderista" ("La década de la violencia" 137). This point was also made to me (in discussion of a draft of this chapter) by Guillermo Rochabrún, who suggests that as a result Sendero has become a screen against discussion of the left more generally.

One could ask, for example--and again I am indebted here to my conversation with Rochabrún--why is the left not more like Sendero? In the late 1970s there was a consensus on the left that Peru was in a pre-revolutionary situation and that armed violence was the obvious
solution. Seen in this light the left's move towards something like civil society discourse in the (eventually disastrously unsuccessful) United Left of the early 1980s is far more puzzling than Sendero's continuance of what was arguably a common line. No doubt the same question goes for the Latin American left more generally.

Yet Fernando Calderón, Alejandro Piscitelli and José Luis Reyna, in an influential overview of new social movements theory, present Sendero as an example of such a movement, if one that is "striking, absolute, cruel, and disconcerting" (21). Again, however, for these authors Sendero is more symptom than actor (even though what makes it so "striking" and "disconcerting" is precisely its actions): "the movement reflects the complex processes of exclusion and disintegration occurring in Peruvian society" (21) and "Sendero Luminoso is strong because the Peruvian working class is weak" (21). By implication, Sendero is a new social movement because it is not a movement of the Peruvian working class, and because it successfully challenges (or takes the place of) traditional organizations of that class. Curiously, Calderón, Piscitelli and Reyna also state that Sendero "parallels [. . .] the creative search of this society, still overshadowed by its own past" (21). Whether Sendero is a symptom, result, or obstacle to this search remains unclear.

In any event, Calderón et. al.'s definition of new social movements is so capacious as to raise doubts as to the term's use: as well as Sendero and obvious candidates such as the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, they include also the São Paulo metalworkers and Central American national liberation movements as new social movements. A more coherent narrative would include these latter two movements under the category of old social movements. Yet much writing on new social
movements falls into similar problems of definition, which is not to say that more coherent theories of the new social movements may not be possible. No doubt Laclau and Mouffe's work is the benchmark for new social movements theory as theory (Cohen and Arato shy away from or claim to transcend new social movements theory), yet there has been little advance since their *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, and most analysts have concentrated on specific analyses (though with all the proper theoretical gestures) rather than more general and yet still rigorous observations. Practically, however, Sendero generally functions as the limit of new social movements theorizing, even if perhaps theoretically one might imagine a narrative in which Sendero could coherently be included in such analyses. Again, discussion of Sendero becomes a means to avoid discussing the left and its limits.

Sendero itself encourages the view that it is the limit of social movement theory through the aggressivity it has shown to other such movements in Peru, epitomized above all perhaps in its assassination of María Elena Moyano, an organizer in Villa El Salvador, a community on the outskirts of Lima. Above all such aggressivity is a challenge to the general assumption that new social movements can quasi-naturally enter into mutual coalition, an assumption that rests on the still more fundamental, and usually unquestioned, premise that Latin American (and other) societies really are organic wholes, precisely the premise Sendero sets out to challenge. Sendero's claim is that the new social movements are foreign incursions into the Peruvian political scene, especially those supported by non-governmental organizations: "From Sendero's sectarian point of view, organizations that support grassroots groups represent an attempt on the part of the imperial powers [. . .] to strengthen the chains of capitalism in
rural Peru” (Smith 54-5). It is another question as to whether Sendero would claim that an organic society can be achieved. Perhaps it realizes the violence entailed in such a project, and thus the gap between the present state of society and a future organicism. Yet most left analyses before the 1980s (or even the late 1980s) would also have questioned the organicist premise. Indeed, new social movements theory's most significant effect on social theory is perhaps the institution of this new organicism: even as it also highlights difference, these are always negotiable differences.

The new social movements are to constitute a renovated civil society, and civil society is to become the site of an inhabitation as much as of a representation (this is "civil society as an ordinary lebensraum" as Calderón, Piscitelli and Reyna have it [30]). Civil society is to engage in an autopoiesis or self-making (here Cohen and Arato follow on from Niklas Luhman) as social movements relatively autonomous from state structures or external influence become the intermediaries of power, enabling negotiation between lifeworld and (ultimately) state. Politics is here conceived as a process of ideological conflict and continual negotiation to build hegemony (understood in communicational and, for Cohen and Arato, discourse ethical terms) among diverse social actors. Civil society would be the space apart from but adjacent to
political institutions, within which the terms, strategies, and actions of power are debated, contested, or approved by social movements that represent and are inhabited by the different elements and identities in an increasingly modern and differentiated society. As Calderón et. al. put it, "social movements would be aspiring not only to actualize the rights of social and political citizenship (that is, participation in decision-making mechanisms) but also to create a space of institutional conflict in which to express their demands" (29).

Though this paradigm is probably dominant in social scientific discourses framed by the problematic of globalization (and especially in analyses of Latin America and post-Soviet Eastern Europe), it has been contested, on both political and historical grounds, by those who still favor some version of the previous paradigm. Before this emphasis on civil society in its diversity and fragmentation, left projects centered upon class and national anti-imperialism, and upon a contest for the state. Many who hold to this perspective consider the new weight given to negotiation within civil society a retreat from what they see as the more fundamental antagonisms
deriving from a determinant mode of production, and an evasion of the task of taking the state itself.

Yet the rise of new social movements theory is a reaction to the failure of this revolutionary model--and the observation that in many ways any one state is much the same as another, facing more or less the same problems with more or less the same range of answers. Moreover, perhaps the basic blockage for previous left projects was the belief in class essentialism--here expressed in the notion that a worker's state could be fundamentally different from the capitalist state. It is from the failure of class essentialism that both cultural studies and new social movements theory arise, and this perhaps explains the importance of Laclau and Mouffe--who pinpointed this precise problem--for both. The most important theoretical and practical problem now is that of how to go beyond class essentialism without losing the relation between culture and the state, i.e. without falling into the misapprehensions of cultural studies and civil society theory. This will entail reversing or inverting Laclau and Mouffe, particularly their emphasis on the discursive. This reversal is the theory of posthegemony.

It has been suggested that in that traditional political movements have never been so exclusively the preserve of relatively privileged groups (such as intellectuals or male blue collar workers), the new social movements of women, environmental groups, indigenous
peoples and so on draw from and understand themselves in reference to a context still overwhelmingly defined by the earlier form of politics. Therefore the state should still be the object of struggle rather than the neutral mediator of relatively autonomous conflict. For this to be the case, this argument suggests, the role of traditional social movements to coordinate local issues and identity-centered concerns remains crucial if the social energy of protest is not to be dissipated.

Another problem with new social movements theory, as Orin Starn observes, is that it is generally assumed that such movements will be movements of social protest. Starn comments that in Arturo Escobar and Sonia Alvarez' collection, "not a single essay considers drug gangs, conservative civic movements, soccer hooligans, neo-Nazi skinheads, faith healers or evangelical churches" ("To Revolt Against the Revolution" 558)—although to be fair, elsewhere there has been work done on some of these phenomena, and on evangelicalism particularly (e.g. Burdick). Starn goes on to argue that

the lack of attention to these kinds of mass organizations from the social movements scholarship operates to preserve both the pleasing ring of insurgency to the labels "popular initiatives" and "social mobilization" and the simplified picture of the dispossessed as always in feisty opposition to the state, the ruling classes, and the powers that be. (558)

If Sendero is one horizon of new social movements theory this is perhaps the other. Such conservative movements and Sendero alike threaten the notion of an organic society of the oppressed. Starn observes that even these conservative movements have progressive
aspects (and that equally the most cherished organizations of popular protest can and do reproduce relations of domination). Yet at the same time Starn holds Sendero itself at arms' length, taking at face value Sendero's own claims of "absolute [. . .] certainty" to characterize the guerrillas only in terms of "myopic inflexibility" (561). Is this not positing a homogeneity to Sendero that Starn is so quick to unravel in other movements? Again, Sendero serves as the limit of any analysis, even in the context of quite a subtle account of other groups, such as here the rondas campesinas.

the tiller of the state

The new social movements paradigm is in fact less a break from than a continuation of the earlier understanding of politics. For neither position questions the underlying assumptions of civil society itself as an attendant, mediatory sphere that should guide the logic of state policy (be the state transformed or merely reformed). Whether the social movements be new or old, the terrain of democratic politics is essentially taken for granted--only the agents of its transformation or stabilization are in dispute. In either case we have a bipolar division between the people (envisioned either as a relatively coherent national or class bloc or as a more or less fragmented coalition of diverse interests and identities) and the
state, for which civil society (constituted by social movements new or old) acts as mediator.

This is true despite the apparent complexity of Cohen and Arato's tri- (or multi-) partite vision of social structure. For what becomes clear is the limited nature of all mediations except that between civil and political society—the structure they envisage is soon reduced to an essential bipolarity. So, first, we see that the notion of economic society is vestigial or (perhaps better) under erasure. Despite the assertion of "the obvious permeability of political and economic institutions to societal norms" (549) as a theoretical tenet, in practice the boundary between civil and economic society appears remarkably impermeable. Thus elsewhere, immediately after they have again argued that "the political public is an open structure because of its permeability to general social communication," Cohen and Arato add that they "must admit that it is difficult to apply the same conception to economic society, where conditions of publicity and therefore the possibilities of democratization are even more restricted" (713 n. 134). Indeed the project of a mediation between civil and economic society is, for Cohen and Arato, scarcely on the agenda. Any influence of social
movements on the economic to be deferred to a somewhat distant (and only possible) future: social movements engage in a "politics of influence targeting political (and perhaps economic) insiders" (532; my emphasis) and they "target political society (and will one day perhaps target economic society as well)" (532; my emphasis). The prospect of democratizing economic society must remain a theoretical possibility, but is effectively bracketed off—literally, in parentheses—from any current political program. One wonders about the arbitrariness of this bracketing, the effect of which is to render economic processes inscrutable and inviolate.

Second, and similarly but more anxiously (and finally still less successfully), Cohen and Arato likewise attempt to bracket off the state itself from scrutiny or influence by maintaining a fundamental distinction between civil and political society. As I argued earlier, the insistent symptom of the tensions involved here is found in their positing of a "democratic fundamentalism" as something like the false consciousness of social movements. But the rationale for maintaining this position is confused to say the least. At times, the argument would appear to be a democratically-grounded anti-democracy: excessive
dedifferentiation is "incompatible with [. . .] the presuppositions of modern democracy" (469) or even "it would involve such an overburdening of the democratic process that it would discredit democracy by associating it with political disintegration or by opening it to subversion through covert, unregulated strategic action" (451; my emphasis). Democracy is to be defended against democracy, and social movements to be doubly defensive in that they are both to protect their communal identity within the lifeworld against the encroachment of bureaucratic rationalization, but also to do so by preventing precisely this identity from itself--to ensure that "communicative interaction is unburdened from the task of coordinating all areas of life" (539).

At other points, however, the limitation of democracy is justified less according to such paternalism (also expressed in the more nuanced, but perhaps more mystifying, proposition that there are distinct "forms of democracy adequate" to the various subsystems" [415]) but rather as the defense of efficiency in contradistinction to democracy. So, for example, "the need for steering mechanisms for the state and the economy must be respected if we expect them to function efficiently" (415). This
argument from efficiency is at least more coherent than that from any paradoxical anti-democratic democracy, especially given that it parallels the argument made also in defense of the economy's inviolability. For in discussing the possibilities of a form of civil disobedience that would target economic society they state simply that "economic efficiency should not be sacrificed in toto to democratic pressure" (741 n. 80). As in classical developmentalism, efficiency and modernization are posited as a priori principles higher than democratization: democracy is to be advanced for the sake of efficiency (and modernization) rather than vice versa.

As efficiency thus becomes ground, civil society loses its primacy and becomes a subsystem of the "steering performance [. . .] [of] system rationality" (479). In this light the problematic of civil society is less that of democracy (a society-centered problematic) than that of the state-centered issue of legitimacy. Civil society, from the point of view of the state, is the solution to the

7 That legitimacy and legitimation could end up as the defining problematic for Cohen and Arato is unsurprising given their dependence on Habermas. But in applying this problematic explicitly to civil society theory, civil society is viewed from above--i.e. from the point of view of the state, rather than from that of the social movements.
dilemma faced by "bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes[, that they] never manage to solve their problems of legitimacy" (50). We end up then with what is essentially a managerial discourse: the logic of civil society becomes that of the best means to guide the tiller of state. Moreover, civil society becomes that tiller, an auxiliary part of the state's self-guidance mechanism. The mediating role of civil society is simultaneously a rationalizing role, as cultural particularities are filtered, sorted, negotiated and finally eliminated in the logic of management—even if what is to be managed are once again particularities. Heterogeneity here becomes unity. Civil society and the state thus work to process the cultural, strip it of its irrationalities, and return its energies as the force of management. Here it is that the discourse of civil society functions to exclude culture from the sphere of the state: a mediatory operation becomes inexorably an ancillary role of returning culture to itself, but in alienated, misrecognized and rationalized guise.

For in the end it matters not how many inputs there are to civil society, how many different voices or representations are heard or recognized, nor even how they are coordinated—for the different possible constitutions
of civil society provide only variations on a theme. This is true however important those variations may come to be for individual agents or sectors of society—and clearly a difference of some kind is made when a particular group is constituted as represented in civil society, when the limits of the field's inhabitability are changed. Yet whatever the variations, in so far as the state is a singular unity—in so far as the state claims a legitimate monopoly of a specific force, as per Max Weber's classic definition (78), in so far as the unity of the nation-state goes unchallenged—civil society functions as a combinatoire to produce monopoly from multiplicity. Civil society transforms multiple inputs into a single output (policy), even as the state then turns back to civil society to redifferentiate or stratify it in multiple ways.

For however much the state differentiates—as indeed it does, whether by classing some individuals citizens and others not; or by classifying the insane, the educated, the criminal and so on—it differentiates according to a single principle, which is its own principle of differentiation itself. The state functions as the singular principle of modernity's differentiations. Hence the paradox that the state is a machine to produce difference, yet it depends
also upon civil society as a machine to produce unity, singularity--the singularity that is the state itself. In the end the multiple negotiations within civil society are both in the shadow of and the necessary legitimating components of an eminent unity that then overcodes such differences according to a single legitimate and legitimating principle.

Max Weber himself has led many off the track in stressing the aspects of force and legitimacy in his famous essay on the state, especially in so far as he portrays the state as bound up in a Bildungsroman of increasing legitimation: "In the end, the modern state controls the total means of political organization, which actually come together under a single head" (82, my emphasis). Yet if the state is defined by its monopoly, it is surely not simply "in the end" that it acquires such monopoly. It has to be assumed that the state always has this monopoly, at least ideally. Indeed the state is perhaps among the most ideal of organizations, only existing fully in ideality (no doubt this is the point of Hegel's argument that the state is the inevitable culmination of the voyage of reason). Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari argue that "The State was not formed in progressive stages; it appears fully armed, a master stroke executed all at once. [. . .] it is the basic formation, on the horizon throughout history" (Anti-Oedipus 217).

If Sendero is the limit of new social movements theory--and equally the limit of Peruvian civil society--it is because it represents what
is strictly unthinkable from within such theory: the presence of
another state form. Sendero (particularly at its height: say, May
1992) established a counter-state in the areas it controlled (most
notably Ayacucho), attempting to construct "a new moral order in the
countryside. Theft, adultery, wife-beating, corruption, failure to
cooperate in communal work projects and other moral infractions were
severely punished by flogging and occasional executions" (Poole and
Rénique 62). Deborah Poole and Gerardo Rénique go on to suggest that
"During [the] early years many peasants viewed the PCP-SL positively
as a source of the moral order and security which the Peruvian state
had for centuries failed to provide" (62). Sendero is thus less anti-
state than a parallel state (not uniquely so, but more aggressively
seizing a monopoly of legitimate violence than other comparable
movements), exploiting historic weaknesses in the Peruvian state's
claim to monopoly, and civil society cannot operate according to such
a binarism. Hence the simultaneous demand for greater
representativity, for greater adequation between state and civil
society: "The whole of civil society appears more and more lucid in
its demand that the State represent the national community and its
interests on top of the party interests of the State government"
(Tello 116). María del Pilar Tello, among many others, thus points to
a crisis of legitimacy of the state that is, however, effect as much
as cause of the Sendero rebellion. Democratization means a more
adequate representation as the current representational system has
broken down, has split into two (or more) parts; yet the state must
maintain its eminent unity, which it here fails to do.
neoliberalism and the limits of civil society theory

What then constitute the limits, if any, of the state's overcoding? If civil society's expansion is at the same time the expansion of the state's ability to convert cultural differences of various sorts into state-sanctioned difference according to its principle of legitimation and uniqueness, what is to stop the expansion of this state-civil society combinatoire? Indeed, neoliberalism, far from promoting the withdrawal of the state, is from this point of view rather the expansion of the state to something like its extreme attempt at transparency and social totalization: the state appears to shrink in that under neoliberalism it attempts to maintain a direct and total relation of legitimation with the social. In other words, neoliberalism takes up the fundamentalism of civil society but from the side of the state. Neoliberalism is the state's reaction-formation in the face of civil society's (inevitably fundamentalist) demands: in Paolo Virno's terms, this is the "counterrevolution" or "revolution in reverse" whereby social demands are appeased but also inverted by the state (240). Civil society is the state's reaction to a constituent power that it identifies as fundamentalism.
Neoliberalism tends towards the extreme of civil society's expansion by accelerating the process of its increasing legitimating power, perfecting and increasingly relying upon the combinatory apparatus. Perhaps the most visible means by which this is achieved is in the use of opinion polls, through which the residual blockages of a civil society that maintains that sphere's relative autonomy are eliminated, and public opinion enters directly into a managerial discourse with the state. The thickness of civil society tends to disappear, as the state moves to an apparently direct relation with the public. Far, then, from withdrawing under neoliberal regimes--and contra neoliberal rhetoric and ideology--the state expands dramatically as, in Michael Hardt's terms, civil society withers. But this is a state that aspires to transparency in its technocratic conversion of disparate affects into statistical opinions and then a single set of policies.8

8 Hence while I am intrigued by the notion of the "interregnum," as theorized by Alberto Moreiras, following Paul Bové who defines it as a situation in which "there are ordering forces but they have not yet summoned their institutional rule into full view" (qtd. 11), I am not so sure if it is not just that we (political and cultural theorists) are tardy analysts of the new stage of institutional rule. But I would agree with Moreiras's suggestion that our current obligation is to understand (again) the function and operation of value-production (and
It was a feature of Alberto Fujimori's regime in particular that opinion polls acquired—or appeared to—the guiding force for political decisions. Especially after Fujimori dissolved congress with his *auto-golpe* of 1992, public opinion was the mainstay of his political legitimation—a public opinion constituted solely through the opinion polls. As Poole and Rénique indicate: "Over the next few weeks [following the coup], Peruvians were subjected to an avalanche of opinion polls, most purporting to demonstrate massive public backing for Fujimori's coup. Most were simple 'yes' or 'no' polls, suggesting widespread support" (161). Moreover, mostly such polls are taken at face value by researchers and academics, and the mechanism they constitute seldom questioned. Most social science acts as if it were premised upon unconditional belief in such surveys, so that when the tools of social science are taken up by a regime there is little that the social scientist can do but applaud this incorporation of social scientific calculation into the workings of power.\(^9\)

Poole and Rénique's further comment is illuminating: "What the polls clearly revealed was the potency of Fujimori's 'anti-political' and 'anti-establishment' stance" (161). We may in the first instance doubt that polls "clearly" reveal anything themselves; yet in the

"that which values obscure" [14]) in these new times. Here the concept of efficiency is clearly key.\(^9\) Even the one book on Peruvian opinion polls, Fernando Tuesta's *No Sabe / No Opina* is mainly concerned simply with their representativity and their treatment in the press. In interview, however (14 August 1997), Tuesta partly confirmed what is commonly rumored, that Fujimori worked closely with an Argentine polling company (headed by Saul Mankewitch), about whose operations little is known. As these are not published polls, they are not discussed in Tuesta's book.
second instance, the fact of this barrage of polls reveals and constitutes the anti-political nature of the regime. The regime was anti-political in that it almost fully converted the complex relations between culture and the state into a managerial discourse interior to the state itself; culture has been expelled from state discourse. The MRTA hostage crisis and its resolution in the Spring of 1997 is also a clear example of this procedure: the MRTA, similar to and affiliated with the FMLN and other darlings of the 1980s left, assumed that there should be some public space of negotiation, even if it had to be taken by force. Fujimori, on the other hand, insisted that such negotiation was impossible, and when the polls indicated that the time was right, implemented a technocratic solution to eliminate this blockage to the state's expansion and transparency. The MRTA was all too visible, while Fujimori's preferred mode of control is more similar to the subterranean tunnels that permeated the ground beneath the Japanese embassy, equipped with sophisticated listening devices, just as the dream of the social scientific poll taker is invisible permeation of the social combined with absolute eavesdropping skill. On the other hand, the MRTA implemented only poorly the representative strategies of civil society and new social movements theory, as in the end they claimed only to represent themselves and to speak only for and to their own activists in Peruvian jails. Still, even this minimal inhabitability of civil society proved impossible.

Opinion polls are the extension rather than the negation of civil society discourse: they take the notion of popular representation to an extreme, offering the dream
of a direct representation of popular will (the utopia of direct democracy) rather than the mediated representations of formal democracy, whether instantiated in parties or in the new social movements. For such institutions have their own weight and relative autonomy and thus, from the perspective of neoliberalism, their own distortions upon the political process, whether those distortions are measured in terms of bureaucracy or corruption.\textsuperscript{10}

Neoliberalism approaches the limits of civil society discourse. Left and social democratic intellectuals such as Castañeda counterpose the expansion of civil society to the hegemony of neoliberalism—and it is true that neoliberal civil society no longer looks much like civil society, especially as it has been imagined by the left, because there is no role for parties, or for left intellectuals. But this is because neoliberalism conjures up a more perfect civil society. A new breed of intellectual, the technocratic manager, comes into play, observing public opinion and implementing specific

\textsuperscript{10} Perhaps this is why the discourse of scandal is so prevalent and so powerful now: even relatively minor scandals are magnified and scrutinized by a press and a political establishment that sees before it, as if in a mirage, the possibility of eliminating all such obstacles to the smooth and direct operations of a technocratic direct democracy.
strategies of containment (whether this be economic, social or military containment). This is a cold world. And it is here, at this cold limit of neoliberalism that we can see how far we are from populism—if also so close—and begin to ask what exactly has been excluded from this social formation.

For at first glance neoliberalism seems to overlap with populism—and perhaps hence the fact that so many current regimes are hybrid neoliberal neopopulist regimes. What these two formations have in common is the assumption or construction of a direct relation or pact between government and people, and so in effect an apparent expansion of civil society. But populism is not a discourse of civil society and operates rather according to a certain affective affinity that serves to obscure the state; neoliberalism, on the other hand, excludes all affective relations to impose a hitherto unimagined universality of the state. Populism collapses civil society into the cultural sphere (even as the state is left alone in this substitution), while neoliberalism collapses civil society into the state. Hence the disparate moods of each form of regime: neoliberalism's coldness and cruelty on the one hand, and populism's ecstatic love on the other.
We also see very different dramaturgies in the two formations: the bodily incarnation of society in populism, with its crowds in the central plaza facing the charismatic leader, in contrast to the privatization of social space in neoliberalism, the social represented rather by statistical information on a sheet of paper reviewed by a leader without qualities.

On populist love, John Kraniauskas has written of Peronism that:

> With [Evita's] death of cancer in 1952 [...] the paradoxical structure of Peronism's political negation of modernity--simultaneously mobilizing and demobilizing the working class and women--is written right into her body, which itself becomes literally 'seized by meaning' and by a love that is not, quite, patriotic. (129)

Meanwhile, it would be hard to imagine a regime less embodied in its leader than that of Fujimori, whose public image was consistently muted, who was an unknown agronomist and mathematician before he took the elections from the flamboyant (if perhaps not exactly charismatic) Mario Vargas Llosa, and whose reticence is popularly attributed to his Japanese heritage. Fujimori's defining characteristic is a certain rigidity, coded as strength, but this is hardly the strong love of Evita, whose every effort was to produce the effect (and affect) of natural and spontaneous emotion--however much in fact her ailing body was propped up by makeshift technology.

One might compare Fujimori's reticence to Abimael Guzmán's. Though clearly the latter's withdrawal from the public sphere prior to his capture in 1992 was also dictated by pragmatic considerations, Guzmán gained the reputation of always being just out of reach, consistently
evading capture by the narrowest margin. He could be imagined as always everywhere but nowhere: at times rumored to be dead, Sendero's maximum leader left only semi-legible signs of his spectral presence, such as a pair of eyeglasses found after an attack in Ayacucho. It is symptomatic that the Peruvian state viewed the captured videotape of Guzmán dancing to "Zorba the Greek" as such a publicity coup, as it socialized and culturalized Sendero's maximum leader--at a time when, ironically, it has been suggested that, owing to health problems, he was seldom able to travel to the Andean regions where Sendero had most power and support. Guzmán could never project himself at his people's side in the populist manner, and rather is represented in Sendero iconography as the teacher, the bookish professor, finally as the incarnation of a form of thought--pensamiento Gonzalo--that allies him as the "fourth sword of Marxism" along with a parade of dead foreigners (Marx, Lenin, Mao).

Starn offers the intriguing suggestion that Guzmán took his nom de guerre, Gonzalo, from the character in Shakespeare's The Tempest ("Maoism in the Andes" 414). This is especially fascinating given the way in which this play--about colonial relations in the Americas--has structured Latin American self-conceptions from José Enrique Rodó's Ariel to Roberto Fernández Retamar's Caliban. Guzmán chooses neither the modernist, spiritual position of Ariel, nor the materialist, third worldist position of Caliban; rather, he chooses Gonzalo, the closest we have in the play to a European intellectual, who is splendidly ineffectual following the shipwreck, expatiating about a possible utopian commonwealth in which "[l]etters should not be known; riches, poverty,/ And use of service, none; contract, succession,/ Bourn, bound of land, tilth, vineyard, none" (II.i 157-9). The other
characters mock this utopia, suggesting Gonzalo's ambition is for personal power alone: "Yet he would be king on't [. . .] Save his majesty! [. . .] Long live Gonzalo!" (II.i 163, 175).

What precisely then is eliminated in civil society discourse's--and, at its extreme, neoliberalism's--exclusion of culture from the state? The comparison with populism reveals that this excluded culture is above all a matter of affect, of passion, and of the body. This is what I am calling the cultural, and it is here replaced by a statistical articulation--perhaps a hyper-articulacy. Affects are replaced by reasons--by reason--as answers are demanded to the questions of management and state direction. Opinions are solicited and constructed in society's constant self-interrogation, that contrasts so baldly with populism's construction of a barely articulable ontology of affect. For populism, Daniel James perhaps shows this best in his examination of the working class subjects of Peronism, which he suggests "had become by the late 1950s a sort of protean, malleable commonplace of working-class identification" (Resistance and Integration 264). Ask a populist subject "why?" and a response is barely forthcoming. As James continues:
I was constantly struck by the seemingly unquestioning identification, particularly amongst militants, of working-class activism, resistance and organization with being a Peronist. It seems to have become almost an accepted part of working-class "common sense" in the 1955-73 period. (264)

But if this is apolitical--and it surely is--we must be clear that it is a very different form of anti-politics than that of neoliberalism. Populism is an under-articulate disposition of the body, an incorporated common sense, as opposed to neoliberalism's over-articulate frame of mind, an ability to produce opinion. The culture that is excluded under neoliberalism is precisely a matter of this affective sense of bodily location.

Still I would not suggest that populism, with its material, bodily grounding, is somehow more natural than the neoliberal formation. Populism's substitution of culture for the state is a quasi-magical sleight of hand that requires a tremendous amount of investment, and its seduction and construction of the masses is a precarious achievement that has continually to be renewed. Populism is also a very particular organization of affect. At the same time, neoliberalism enjoys a very similar aura of the natural, as if it harnessed the results of a spontaneous production of popular opinion, varnished with the sense of rightness that rationalization and reason bring. Moreover,
as neoliberalism's method is so in harmony with a whole range of social scientific methods and ideologies, it gains additional purchase in as much as its constitutive distortions mirror those of the social sciences and thus remain hidden from an immense body of otherwise and potentially critical knowledge. Moreover, as Pierre Bourdieu suggests, "The idea of 'personal opinion' perhaps owes part of its self-evident character to the fact that [. . .] it expressed from the very beginning the interests of the intellectuals [as] small, self-employed opinion producers" (Distinction 399). With the rise of the technocracy, intellectuals see the establishment of a state built in their own image.

Bourdieu argues that the social scientific survey, upon which the technocracy's production of public opinion is based, proceeds "as if it had already resolved the essential problem of politics, namely, the question of the transmutation of experience into discourse, of the unformulated ethos into a constituted, constituting logos" (460). Civil society theory (and with it the range of positions from new social movements theory to neoliberalism) acts as though a direct habitation of the space of representative negotiation were possible. But on
the contrary, for Bourdieu, "Between ethos and logos, practical mastery and verbal mastery, there is a radical discontinuity" (461). Opinion polls and other such instruments of the technocracy function as apparatuses of capture by which qualitative difference becomes quantitative: they produce a statistical striation of social space that produces first an equivalence between persons and opinions (to allow a direct comparison) and then a calibration of their differences. Once different sectors of society are representable and comparable, they can also be appropriated. As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, the state becomes a "form of expression" (A Thousand Plateaus 445) for the disparate elements that it has compared and ranked in this way.

the return of affect

A range of experiences and affects--what I am calling culture--are processed by the state and through its ancillary mechanisms, of which perhaps the most important is civil society, to construct the realm of managerial reason. Normally this process can pass more or less unnoticed, but in specific situations, where the state is challenged by a counter-state and thus its double appears,
the constituent force of this excluded affect reappears.

This is demonstrated in an extreme form by Sendero Luminoso in Peru, for whom there is almost a direct translation between affect and reason. As Carlos Iván Degregori notes, having underlined the movement's hyper-rationalism:

> With the amount of passion that Sendero Luminoso develops and draws out, it may seem strange to define it as a hyper-rationalist movement. But one might have to invert Pascal's phrase, "the heart has reasons of which reason is unaware" and say concerning the leading group of Sendero that "reason has passions of which the heart is unaware." (Que difícil es ser Dios 20)

The PCP-SL and the divided Peruvian social structure it has helped mold (if by negation) thus challenge most accepted paradigms of social theory—as is demonstrated symptomatically in Sendero's unthinkability within the framework of such social theory. By forming a counter-pole to the state's processing and elimination of cultural, Sendero shows how affect is a constituent element of any social formation, and that it necessarily disrupts the working of any civil society. For, though a counter-state, Sendero has to figure to the official Peruvian state as an irreducible cultural element that cannot be captured by its official mechanisms of civil society. David Apter comments that "just as there are reasons of state, so there are reasons of the anti-state" (5), but these latter must
figure to the state as anti-reasons. Sendero is figured by the state as the indigestible aspect of the cultural, and is stigmatized as the savage and the irrational--the barbarity itself against which the state defines itself. Its disruptions range from the mundane to the spectacular--and the spectacular versions of a group such as Sendero's challenges to state legitimacy are well known. But perhaps most insidious for the state are the numerous minor ways in which the state's processing mechanisms are thwarted by, for example, non-responses or "false" responses to official surveys.

Sendero's most obvious characteristic is its negation of all mediation or negotiation. With Sendero, ideological reason is cultivated and transformed such that it no longer performs a discursive function--even as the discursive productions of Sendero are impressively voluble. It presents another extreme of state discourse, working rigorously to the logic of the excluded middle in the rigid dichotomy between what is legitimate and what is illegitimate. Here language loses its mediatory function and acquires or emphasizes rather the intensity of an affective function, though the range of possibilities here are extremely small (and so their intensity is heightened). Sendero's language is the expression and the sign of purity, and as such foretells the joy of those who may share in that purity and aims to instil fear into those it defines as radically other. Moreover, this ecstasy of reason (Degregori, taking the phrase
from Manual Gonzalez Prada, calls it a "divine cult to reason" ["The Maturation of a Cosmocrat" 55]) is absolutely abstract, and as such tends to be opposed to the people as much as to the state. In its abstract rigor and autonomy, this ideology that lays claim to the scientific tradition comes close to a form of surreal poetry that is both horrifying and sublime: "[The people's] blood will rise like pulsing wings, and that bruised flesh will turn into the powerful whips of vengeance, and muscles and action will turn into a steel battering ram to destroy the oppressors, who will be irretrievably smashed" (Guzmán 313). This is barbarous indeed, but Sendero equally shows up the barbarity of the constituted, official state, by acting out a parody or mimicry of statehood. Moreover, perhaps it brings out the constitutive role of culture that can never be fully tamed by the state's rationalizations.

From outside Sendero we can see that its language is less concerned to legitimize any specific political program in the arena of civil society, than to follow its own affective logic, a logic of physical relations that parallels and reinforces political activity elsewhere. From the perspective of Sendero we may begin to see that the same is true of the state. The passions of reason mimic the reasons of the heart in a reciprocal reinforcement that appears (at least) to require no justification on the terrain of civil society; or rather, if it were to accede to the demands of civil society, it would also be legitimating the existing state discourse. Sendero has to appeal elsewhere to construct its own state model, and it does so through a fairly crude conversion of affect to reason and vice versa. There is no negotiation because there is only one question, that of loyalty to this vision of revolution. While the neoliberal state has a panoply
of different polls and calls for managerial support, Sendero, which manages only the revolution, has reduced this discourse to but the single question: yes or no? (Ironically, then, Sendero anticipates the turn taken by the US state post-September 11.)

Perhaps this question is also the epistemological question: is it true? Degregori suggests that Sendero arose above all as a result of the combination of higher education's expansion in Peru and the overwhelming expectations that rural communities had of this new opportunity for education. As "Andean peasants [. . .] flung themselves into the conquest of 'progress'" they searched for truth, and "those who made it to university would have to go further and search out, by dint of great effort, something beyond truth: coherence" ("The Maturation of a Cosmocrat" 52). For Degregori, then, Sendero militants--and especially the leadership--are driven by a love of truth and coherence, "and when they think they have found them, they are capable of the greatest violence in order to defend and impose them" (53). But this is also naturally a search for closure. As Alberto Flores Galindo tersely comments, in reaction to a 1988 Sendero killing, "Socialism is a wager on the side of life, not that of death. Its objective is not simply the destruction of a state and the liquidation of class domination but also and above all the construction of new social relations that should and can be developing in the present" (196). In my final chapter I will discuss this "on the side of life" in terms of the (good) multitude; but is Sendero's wager on the side of death also multitudinous?
Affect becomes visible with the crisis of the state. The extent to which social relations are structured in terms of affect rather than (or as well as, on another level from) discourse becomes clearer, and other logics of the social begin to emerge. An anti-state in a situation of civil war, Sendero functions to retranslate the discourses of civil society, or rather to reprocess them to reveal their constitution in affective relations. Sendero "affects" civil society, reintroducing affect into its rationalizations. Metropolitan discourses from the public sphere were also transformed by Sendero's refusal to accede to their paradigms of social theory: Sendero provides the limit of civil society theory, the unaccountable distortion at its horizon. Sendero has then perhaps functioned as a brick wall, a screen, an empty signifier upon which other social agents could project images of affective relations in a negative reflection of Sendero's emanations of rational purity, its all-consuming joy.

Even as I have described Sendero's discourse as appearing at times sublime and sublimely horrifying, I must emphasize that I wish to avoid some description of Latin American reality as abject difference. This is neither the "noche obscura" of Joan Didion's Salvador (36), nor the revolution from the Incan South of Simon Strong's Shining
Path. All civil societies are "affected." Neither the Peruvian nor more generally the Latin American experiences are aberrant. As I will go on to suggest in chapter three, all social formations are structured more or less obviously by affect, by the reasons of the heart and the passions of reason, though the precise modality of affect will vary according to specific historical determinations. Our task is to map this geotopography of affect.

Moreover, in the case of Sendero Luminoso, we see perhaps the apotheosis of reason, plucked straight from the finest Western philosophical tradition of Kant (subject of Guzmán's thesis) and Marx. Indeed, a closer examination of Sendero--more perhaps even than further examination of the workings of neoliberalism--may thus most powerfully serve to refute the dominant social scientific paradigms that continue to prioritize Western reason even as they claim to relinquish its monopoly.

New social movements theory aims to return a sense of agency to subaltern subjects: if traditional Latin Americanist political models had assumed a vanguard role for intellectuals (of the party or of the foco), who have then to bring the masses to conscientización, new social movements theorists prefer rather to emphasize the myriad of negotiations and initiatives performed by subaltern
subjects in their self-development and assertive expressions that constitute civil society. No doubt this has been a progressive move, to counter previous trends that saw peasants (particularly) as formed by premodern communities bound by tradition and superstition, outside of history or modern politics. An emphasis rather on peasant agency and reason is clearly a welcome corrective in this context. Yet at times it seems almost as if subalterns are presented as perfect rational choice actors, conforming to the most ideal of Western liberal paradigms of reason—a move that, as Starn points out, deculturates and depoliticizes such agents by presenting them "as if they were outside culture and ideology" ("Maoism in the Andes" 405). For the price such actors pay is that their activities are only recognized so long as they accord to a notion of reason that is imposed upon them; so long, that is, as efficiency and modernization continue to be the ground of civil society. Such actors then are to be ascribed agency, but only on the terms of the social theorist. Anything that cannot be interpreted within such a framework becomes then strictly invisible, as the democratic task becomes the substitution of a rational civil society for affective and cultural relations that are
seen (from the perspective of the state) as distorting its managerial operations. Moreover, and most importantly, such a policy also necessarily involves a massive expansion of the sphere of the state, a wholesale elimination of culture and equally an elimination of politics. However it may be precisely for the sake of such an eliminatory program, such a single-minded prioritization of logical structure over existent affective relations, that Sendero has wreaked such havoc in Peru, as its reason unleashes the fiercest of affects. It is ironic then that what we learn from Sendero is the importance of affect in politics, as they bring us back to the relation between culture and the state (the impossibility of establishing a boundary between culture and political society). This leads to the question of a fundamentalist program for life. If fundamentalism is now everywhere, it might be time to consider embracing its immediacy. What would it mean to take on fanaticism (in a way that Sendero's cult of reason manifestly does not). We might ask not so much how to be radical without being fundamentalist (as García Canclini suggested), but how to be fundamentalist (without being Sendero).