The social order is merely the order of bodies: the habituation to custom and law that law and custom produce by their very existence and persistence is largely sufficient, without any deliberate intervention, to impose a recognition of the law based on misrecognition of the arbitrariness which underlies it.
(Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations 168)

Para conocer a Pinochet, basta con leer sus declaraciones [. . .] sus palabras lo dicen todo.
(Nelson Caucoto, in Luis Alejandro Salinas, The London Clinic 12)

How is social order secured and maintained? Ultimately, this is the question to which both hegemony theory and civil society theory attempt a response. Though the premises of these two approaches differ, they also have much in common. Indeed, although they are in one sense diametrically opposed, in that hegemony theory focuses on culture to the exclusion of the state whereas civil society theory inverts this priority, this diametrical opposition itself indicates that in other ways hegemony theory and civil society theory may simply be mirror images of each other. Both put a premium on discursive and representative
systems: articulation and the struggle to win consent on the one hand; and negotiation and attempts to achieve consensus on the other. It is just that they locate the site of this discursive contestation in differing spheres: a cultural sphere on the one hand, imagined as substituting for the state; and a state-centered civil society on the other, that requires the elimination of culture. But both of these spheres have totalizing tendencies, and the two theories tend to converge: the more the cultural substitutes for the state, the more it takes on the logic of a "total state"; the more that cultural affect is driven from civil society, the more likely it is that what has been repressed should return as a violent fundamentalism that permeates the socius with affect once more. Things get out of control.

Indeed, the most fundamental problem with these two theories of social order is that they merely mimic the social systems they set out to describe—populism and neoliberalism. As such, not only do they lack a critical purchase on the object of their theorization, they also suffer from the same instability that affects these two characteristic regimes of twentieth-century Latin American—and world—politics. Their theoretical problems are
merely the double of pressing political problems that, eventually, brought down populism and, now, mark the end of neoliberalism as a viable project. For the discursive arena, though posited as the site in and from which order can be maintained, soon becomes unsettled and disordered. In the case of populism, at its limit, we saw how communicative apparatuses are replaced by affective ones (Peronism's fetishistic love) that also destabilize the state whose operations culture is merely to veil. In the case of neoliberalism, we saw that eliciting opinion to construct consent over how to steer the ship of state also entails a massive deculturation whereby affect is excluded, only to return as the state's double (Sendero embodying the pure rage of reason).

This led us, then, to move away from discursive and representational systems and to consider affect as a principle of (dis)organization that escapes or lies beyond the symbolic. Following Deleuze and Guattari, I looked at deterritorializing forces that subvert or unsettle the state: the irreducible otherness of terror; the FMLN as war.

1 The contemporary crisis of neoliberalism—-in Argentina, for instance—-exhibits, at least potentially, a slightly different dynamic; in the cacerolazos and piquetes affect returns as a radical skepticism towards any form of representation, and rather than two state apparatuses of the Sendero civil war, we see an evacuation of the state. I will return to this new conjuncture in chapter five.
machine. Yet the relation between the state and affect proves complex; it is not a simple opposition. The state can also be affected, can take on or be taken over by the affect that it excludes: the terrorist state; the Atlacatl as war machine. If we are to differentiate (oppressive) order from (liberating) disorder, some other concept is required. Hence, again, the question: how is social order secured and maintained? After all, the state (and social order more generally) is a stubborn thing; and liberation is likewise stubbornly elusive. Whereas a Deleuzian emphasis on lines of flight (and an examination of liberation movements such as the FMLN) may be invigorating in its theorization of alternatives, and optimistic in its affirmation of an immanent culture that could be autonomous of a transcendent state, functionalist accounts that emphasize the permanence of order (or the reproduction of the status quo) are not so easily discounted. Somehow, order endures.

The challenge remains to produce an integrated (and immanent) understanding of the relations between culture and the state. If we reject the partial explanations given by hegemony theory and civil society theory, neither of which can in the end speak of culture and the state
together, it would be a mistake likewise to emphasize only lines of flight and war machines as radically other to the state. We need to look now at affect as a principle of organization that also helps establish the symbolic. To put this another way, I have suggested some of the problems posed by a theory of culture that does not take account of the state; equally, we have seen the impossibility of a theory of a state that attempts to exclude culture from its purview. What is needed is a theory of culture that is also adequate to a theory of the state; that is, a theory in which culture and the state are seen to be immanent to each other.

Discursive and representational systems do not constitute a transcendent sphere in which conflicts or contradictions that arise elsewhere are represented, negotiated, mediated, and (perhaps) resolved, and that thereby (over)determines the balance of power that holds in those conflicts. They may appear to do so, but they are in fact unstably parasitical on a constituent power that arises elsewhere. Nor, on the other hand, can we see discourse as radically separate or removed from what (for want of a better term) we could call the "real" of culture. To put this latter point in other terms: the distinction
that pits ideology (as representation) against reality (as the materiality that is affect) is itself result of (again, for want of a better term) an ideological operation that constructs the real as real and the ideological as (merely) ideological. On the other hand, ideology—that is, the set of operations by which social positions and conflicts are (mis)represented—cannot simply be ignored; it has itself to be explained, as an integral part of the same immanent system of culture and state. While no premium can be put on discourse and representation—as they do not constitute a sphere that could be the source of an explanation for social order, let alone the source of all explanation—they remain problems to be themselves explained. What is required, then, is an account of ideological statements and discourses that sees them as fully part of, rather than as transcendent to, social reality, and an account of social order as a whole that may explain hegemony, but that does not cede explanatory power to hegemony. I will call such an account a theory of "posthegemony."

posthegemony

The temporal implications of a term such as posthegemony suggest that it names a particularly pressing contemporary
condition. In part, this is true, in that the power or even the very existence of ideology is today increasingly seen to be on the wane. Moreover, given that hegemony theory is, in essence, a theory about the social efficacy of ideology, it is clear that when the power or even the very existence of ideology is seen to wane, hegemony theory automatically loses its power to convince us that hegemony is the sine qua non of social organisation; the decline of ideology is posthegemony’s visible symptom. Indeed, it is almost a commonplace of social analysis to claim that we are now witnessing the decline of ideology.

There are at least four ways of describing and understanding this historical decline. First, what is most often meant is that, with the end of the Cold War, there is no longer any clash of clearly defined oppositional ideologies: liberal-democratic capitalism is simply a matter of common sense, and socialism an intellectually bankrupt dogma. Also, second, the notion of the end of ideology is often taken to mean that people are now simply less interested in politics and in political discourse than they once were; declining electoral turnouts in many Western democracies (most obviously the United States) are taken to show that political narratives no longer have any
mobilizing force, and that voter apathy (or economic wellbeing) reigns. For still others, third, the end of ideology is tied to the general distrust of master narratives associated with postmodernity. Finally, Gilles Deleuze's theorization of "control societies" (as discussed in the previous chapter) is an example of the notion that neoliberal regimes construct and rely upon a new form of rule for which ideology no longer plays a significant role; in other words, that ideology's decline entails not so much the evacuation of politics from public life, but rather its more sinister insinuation into every pore of society as the distinction between the political and the social is eroded.

There is some truth in interpretations of posthegemony in temporal or historical terms, and in the conception of posthegemony as therefore what comes after hegemony. It is certainly the case that the transitions from the Cold War to what could be termed the era of globalization, from modernity to postmodernity, from the politics of Keynesianism to neoliberalism (and from what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri term Imperialism to what they term Empire) are all significant, and raise a new set of problems for social theory and for the understanding of the relation between culture and state. Yet there are deeper
continuities, and the decline of ideology is but a visible symptom of a pre-existing condition—or, perhaps better, a symptom that makes that pre-existing condition visible for the first time. For the end of ideology is like the dog that did not bark: it is less that ideology has vanished, or that there are no more ideological statements (after all, even many of the obituaries to ideology can, and perhaps should, be read as ideological statements); rather, that so much seems to continue regardless. Contemporary capitalism clearly does not rely on ideology, does not need to weave ideology into an outwardly coherent system that would gain consent and secure the reproduction of its specific form of social order. The inevitable question, therefore, is: did it ever? If we are outside or beyond hegemony now, perhaps without knowing it we always were. The decline of ideology indicates a transhistorical problem, and requires that we redescribe and retheorize what previously seemed to accord with hegemony.

My argument is that ideology has never been a determinant element in social organization. Even in its best-case scenario, hegemony has never provided a sufficient explanation to the question of how social order is secured and maintained. In their place, this chapter
examines Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of habitus as the foundation for a theory of posthegemony.

Contemporary Chile, which I take as my case study here, lends itself to a temporal interpretation of the concept of posthegemony. Indeed, in so far as the question of ideology figures within Chilean public discourse today, it is as an ugly holdover from the past: the existence of the ruling Concertación coalesces around an attempt to supercede the ideological divisions that allegedly once plagued an overly-politicized political system. The argument, even among critics of the regime such as Bernardo Subercaseaux, is that Chileans have historically taken ideology too seriously, and that Chile's weakness is that "ideas constitute the principle dynamic force in [Chilean] culture" (Chile: ¿Un país moderno? 49). The premise of the Concertación, therefore, is that political ideas are no longer up for discussion. If the Pinochet coup was the consequence of the political system's collapse under the weight of these ever more polarized (and polarizing) divisions during Salvador Allende's Unidad Popular government, then government is to be now a matter of forestalling or warding off ideological debate. In place of ideological antagonism, the Concertación promises the pragmatics of consensus and incarnates the practice of co-operation in the service of (mostly economic) goals that are taken to be objective. In place of ideology, neoliberal technocracy.

Moreover, the post-dictatorial transition, in so far as it enacts lessons learned from the past, looks as much to the Unidad Popular (Salvador Allende's Socialist-led coalition) as to the dictatorship:
if "never again" should the state routinely resort to coercion, torture, and murder, equally "never again," it is implied, should the public sphere be so rent by disagreement as it was in the early 1970s. Neither coercion, nor consent—as though in recognition that the struggle to win consent, to achieve hegemony, would always be incomplete, would always leave a counter-hegemonic remainder whose very existence would make alternatives, of either the left or the right, imaginable. Indeed, in some senses, the "transition from authoritarian rule" is an attempt to (re)organize public life as though neither the Unidad Popular nor the dictatorship had ever happened, by making socialism and dictatorship equally (and once again) unimaginable.

The decline of ideology can also, then, be seen in the light of this attempt to limit the bounds of the imaginable. And the imagination is best limited if the past can be forgotten: the political sphere in postdictatorial society is founded upon what Tomás Moulián terms a "compulsion to forget" what immediately preceded (and so historically grounds) that foundation (Chile: Anatomía de un mito 31). The politics of memory, then, as essayed by Moulián but also for instance in Nelly Richard's collection Políticas y estéticas de la memoria, is an attempt to re-establish the force of hegemony. It is a politics of marginality only in so far as the call to recover historical memory is an attempt to reconstruct a lost center of common narratives and shared (albeit also contested—but contested because shared) projects of sense-making which can then be engaged from the margins. The call to the margins both presupposes and reconstructs a vanished center. See for instance Richard's analysis of a collection of pavement portrait photographs in her Residuos y metáforas, and her
curious nostalgia for a past in which women's bodies were "still subject to the unity that is the a central axis of temporal and geographical organization provided by the gaze" (106). Yet now that such unity has been lost, that any center seems lacking or empty (and the Plaza Italia where the portraits Richard discusses were taken is now simply the unvisited axis of a traffic roundabout), it is not just the mad or the sick or the criminal who constitute some subaltern outside; we are all marginal now. Marginality is no longer a privileged position for the left. (And is this not the force of so much of Diamela Eltit's work? In El padre mio, for instance, the vagrant whose semi-coherent paranoia constitutes the text is not some subaltern outside, at the margins of society; he is the social, he contains and incarnates the social, even or especially in his schizophrenic ravings.)

This generalization and so banalization of marginality in Chile has its correlate in the phenomenon of posthegemonic voter apathy. As Alfredo Riquelme indicates, "the number of voters who indicate 'no preference' or who nullify their vote has [. . .] continued to increase, surpassing all historical precedents and climbing well beyond the average for Western democracies" ("Voting for Nobody in Chile's New Democracy" 31). The 2000 presidential election, won by the Socialist Ricardo Lagos, showed a small reversal of this trend, no doubt in large part because of the furore surrounding Pinochet's extradition hearings in London and potential trial in Chile--the announcement that the general would return came on the eve of the second round of voting--but over the longer term, voter participation is still declining (see Drake and Winn). And it is not as though other forms of political mobilization compensate: not only has Chile
exported its forms of protest (the "cacerolazo," or pot-banging, so much a feature of the current Argentine and Venezuelan crises, originated in the anti-Allende mobilizations of the early 1970s); it would seem to have divested itself of protest as a whole. From cauldron of ideological dissent to cool, clean model of neoliberal quiescence in little more than twenty years, in culture as in economics Chile would appear to have made the transition to posthegemonic neoliberalism earlier than most.

But in line with my argument that ideological processes are never determinant or explanatory (in other words, that posthegemony is not simply a temporal phenomenon), here I will focus on the periods of most fervent ideological conflict during or preceding Pinochet's dictatorship, most particularly the early 1980s when the opposition to the regime was at its height. These periods constitute the best-case scenario for ideological analysis, in that they are precisely the periods when Chile was widely interpreted as being riven and even torn apart by the intensity of the ideological differences that divided different social groups. The rolling days of protest that struck against the Pinochet regime from 1983 to 1986 provided the inspiration for much of the articulation of civil society discourse, demonstrating, it was said, a popular "cry for change" that had been constrained only by "the Junta's massive efforts to hold down the opposition," in other words by terror (Chavkin 264). These protests pitted not merely society against the state; they also articulated, it was implied, two contrasting visions of both society and the state, and of their mutual relation. The struggle for consent versus the imposition of coercion: two principles of social order, one legitimate the other illegitimate, are said to have confronted each other. I
show, however, that neither consent nor coercion are suitable ways of understanding these protests. For the Chilean dictatorship and the new social movements that rebelled against it alike are, no less than the postdictatorial "transition" that followed them, best described and explained in terms of posthegemony.

Slavoj Zizek succinctly outlines one problem with the theory of ideology, in his discussion of Peter Sloterdijk's Critique of Cynical Reason. Sloterdijk's analysis of post-war (perhaps more accurately, post-1968) West Germany uncovers "a universal, diffuse cynicism," which is "that state of consciousness that follows after naive ideologies and their enlightenment" (Sloterdijk 3). The paradigmatic cynical figure here is "an average social character in the upper echelons of the elevated superstructure" (4) who is aware that he or she is exploited in work and alienated in the face of the products of the culture industry, but who continues on none-the-less, with the spirit of "a detached negativity [. . .] that scarcely allows itself any hope, at most a little irony and pity" (6). Zizek's conclusion, drawn from Sloterdijk's observations, is that the classical definition of ideology is now unsound: no longer Marx's "they do not know it, but they are doing it" (Zizek 28);
rather, the posthegemonic formula "they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it" (29).

As Sloterdijk observes, "the traditional critique of ideology stands at a loss before this cynicism" (3). There is no point producing a critique of mystifying representations when social subjects are already "enlightened" without their enlightenment having any effect on their behavior. Here, then, social control and social order are effected outside (or even despite) discourse. Beyond the strategic and political questions now raised—what would be the effectivity of a politics of denunciation here?—the theory of ideology as (mis)representation also falls into abeyance. Either the concept of ideology should be thrown out, in the spirit of Deleuze and Guattari's "there is no ideology and never has been" (A Thousand Plateaus 4), or it should be reformulated completely, bypassing discourse and representation. Choosing to reformulate the theory of ideology, Zizek argues that "ideology is not simply a 'false consciousness,' an illusory representation of reality, it is rather this reality itself which is already to be conceived as

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2 Deleuze and Guattari do also suggest, while hardly developing, the notion that it might be possible to "revamp the theory of ideology" (A Thousand Plateaus 89).
'ideological'" (21). Zizek broadens Sloterdijk's original observation (and so moves from a temporal to a transhistorical theory of posthegemony): cynicism does not merely reflect a particularly German or a particularly twentieth-century malaise; more generally, we need to analyze the fundamental ways in which "ideology structures the social reality itself" (30) beneath or despite discourse (in Zizek's terms, beneath or despite the symbolic register).

The classic theorization of ideology as a structure that itself constitutes social reality (in Zizek's terms) is Louis Althusser's. Althusser's essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" has too often been read as a contribution to hegemony theory, an association encouraged by Althusser's own reference to Gramsci as "the only one who went any distance in the road I am taking" (16). Althusser also somewhat misleadingly refers in this same note to Gramsci's theory of civil society, albeit in a manner that reveals his own distance from civil society theory. He writes that Gramsci "had the 'remarkable' idea that the State could not be reduced to the (Repressive) State Apparatus, but included, as he put it, a certain number of institutions from 'civil society': the Church,
the Schools, the trade unions, etc." (12; emphasis in original). Althusser clearly indicates that he regards these institutions from so-called "civil society" to be part of ("included" in) the state; it is as constituent parts of the state, as "Ideological State Apparatuses," that, he argues, they constitute social reality.

Althusser is concerned with the dual problem of outlining a theory of the state that would go beyond the "descriptive theory" that emphasizes the state's repressive function (12); and at the same time with producing a theory of social reproduction that would go beyond political economy, given that "the reproduction of labour power takes place essentially outside the firm" (4). His radically reworked concept of ideology—which is, in fact, an approach towards what I am calling posthegemony, an account that explains ideology rather than one that relies upon ideology for its explanation—is an attempt to understand the state and culture (and the labour process) together, as integral and immanent parts of a structured totality.

Althusser sets out by distinguishing between ideology as the "system of ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social group" on the one hand and "ideology in general" on the other (32). The former has
multiple incarnations and variants, in that each class or region may have its own ideology, and these may vary historically; the latter "has no history," in that it is a structure endowed with "an omni-historical reality" (35; emphasis in original). The former, moreover, depends upon and is an effect of the latter: ideology in general constitutes the subjects who then conform to or recognize the systems of ideas and representations that are customarily understood as ideologies. Althusser's point is that ideas have no sense--and certainly no force for social cohesion--without subjects who are to hold to those ideas. Ideology in general consists in the mechanism of interpellation whereby Ideological State Apparatuses such as the school and the family call subjects into being, subjects whose condition of existence is that they recognize the power of some other, transcendent Subject (capitalized by Althusser) that is reciprocally produced in the same operation. Hence, although interpellation (and "ideology in general") is an operation that is material, in that it takes place in institutions and through practice (the subject comes into being by turning to face the Subject), what it produces is ideal. Physical gestures and attitudes such as kneeling at mass or morning assembly at
school construct a doubled subjectivity, in which many subjects turn to face the one, transcendent Subject that appears to be mediated though ideas and representations.

But this mediation is no more (if no less) than a matter of appearances, because the circuit of ideology only passes through the ideal: thanks (it seems to them) to subjects' beliefs and ideas, they adopt the actions and practices appropriate to the ideas that they hold. A Catholic will go to mass, a schoolchild sing in assembly, an adult citizen will enter the voting booth, and so on. Social subjects act as though they were following their consciences, as though their ideas governed their actions, but in fact this is what Althusser terms "the ideology of ideology" (42); it is the overarching belief that secures the belief that belief (that ideology strictu sensu) matters. Althusser is concerned to show, by contrast, that the result of the circuit governed by interpellation (that is, by "ideology in general" or by posthegemony) is equally material: in that they are always acted out, a subject's ideas are "material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject" (43; emphasis in
original). The ideal is here only a moment in a materialist dialectic, and only an incidental one at that, especially in that its content is for Althusser irrelevant and in that it is an effect rather than a cause. Belief in the causal power of ideology is itself ideological; ideology is at best a quasi-cause—meaning that everything happens (only) as though ideology were in fact determinant. When even this ideology of ideology wanes, when it is apparent that subjects may "know very well what they are doing" but still be doing it, that our attention is drawn to the workings of posthegemony.

beyond consent

Consent is no longer at issue; neither in the sense of rational agreement and negotiation nor in the sense of ideology's persuasive powers. Nor is it now so easy to separate culture from the state, as power has to be understood as immanent throughout society rather than simply a matter of top-down command: for Althusser, all the diverse institutions and practices that make up the Ideological State Apparatuses provide sites for interpellation, in a process that retrospectively constitutes the central state (the idea of the state as the
unified center and source of power) as the complement of the individual subject (of culture).

It is in similar vein that Michel Foucault writes of the police apparatus in what he calls "disciplinary society" (Discipline and Punish 209) as more than just taking "the form of a State apparatus [. . .] linked directly to the centre of political sovereignty"; beyond this, the police also constitutes "an apparatus that must be coextensive with the entire social body" (213). Control over representation, and winning hearts and minds, is not enough. Disciplinary society is characterized by the exercise of power directly on the body, bypassing consciousness. It may still be true that, for Foucault, "it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together" (The History of Sexuality: An Introduction 100); but the representationality or otherwise of what is spoken within discourse is no longer at issue. What is at stake is not "what ideology--dominant or dominated--[discourses] represent" but rather discourses' "tactical productivity [. . .] and their strategic integration" (102).

For Foucault also, then, discourse is material: a discourse is a particular way of arranging bodies. Hence Foucault can refuse altogether the distinction between
consent and coercion, violence and ideology: "To analyse the political investment of the body presupposes . . .] that one abandons--where power is concerned--the violence-ideology opposition" (Discipline and Punish 28). But these ways of arranging bodies may change over time, albeit in a co-ordinated manner, in that discourses constitute mutually reinforcing networks. A network of discourses and their regularities and redundancies corresponds to what Foucault terms an epistème. Thus, within disciplinary society, the discourses of penology, of education, of pathology and so on follow a similar logic; this logic then characterizes the social system as a whole and comes to seem the natural way of being in and understanding the world. Encoded in our "common sense" understandings of madness, sanity, health, criminality, and sexuality is a way of thinking about the world organized by a power so diffuse (because we are incorporated within its all-pervasive structures) that it comes (apparently) to disappear. Yet from a standpoint outside of a particular epistème, what once seemed common sense, quasi-natural (because naturalized, incorporated), comes to appear senseless and barbarous--as, for example, the (now) apparently excessive system of punishment characteristic of the middle ages. Foucault's historical
studies are dedicated to excavating the embodied logics that structured, for instance, the "classical age" (from the seventeenth century to the French Revolution), and, by implication, to defamiliarizing the naturalness (and the rationality) of our own age.

In his later work especially, Foucault is less interested in the discontinuities between differing regimes of knowledge and power, than in the progression within and between them. So he analyzes the classical age in terms of the ways in which power comes to be invested ever more fully in the regulation and management of life itself, via "an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of the population, marking the beginning of an era of 'bio-power'" (The History of Sexuality: An Introduction 140). With bio-power, power is no longer simply a question of the establishment of limits (between sickness and health, madness and sanity, for instance, or between the categories of knowledge studied in The Order of Things), with the attendant sanctions and negations that enforce such limits, or of the particular attention to deviation and deviance that stigmatizes what comes to be seen as the "other" of normality. Power is now also a positive intervention into
the production and morphology of the everyday itself. Here, power and the body are ever more intimately tied to each other, instantiated the one in the other, and the vestiges of (state or discursive) transcendence ever more redundant:

Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life itself; it was the taking charge of life, more than the threat of death, that gave power its access even to the body. (The History of Sexuality: An Introduction 142-143)

It is with the concept of "bio-power" that we move decisively towards a theory of "posthegemony," for which the concept and terminology of ideology disappears altogether.

The Pinochet dictatorship incarnated, in perhaps rushed and abbreviated form, the transition from spectacular power of the pre-disciplinary age to the bio-power of the disciplinary and post-disciplinary age. This is one sense in which the counter-revolution was also revolutionary; Pinochet instituted less a conservative reaction than a wholesale, and in some ways progressive (because modernizing) shift in the way in which power organized the bodies that made up the Chilean populace. Given the rushed timetable in which Pinochet inaugurated this transition, it is no wonder that the regime was a particularly hybrid arrangement. As Tomás Moulián notes:
Revolutionary dictatorships, which attempt to destroy pre-existing forms of life with the aim of imposing a new, rational, order, make use simultaneously of silence and the austere economy of disciplinary power along with the stridency and visibility of repressive power. This signifies that this type of dictatorship unites power's invisible functioning, only seen in its effects, with the rage of punishment, which would appear to be simply a matter of passion. (Chile actual 174)

From the theatricality of the use of Chile's National Stadium as a detention center in the coup's early days to the way in which credit (intangible but all-pervasive) is now a mode by which subjectivity is fashioned (see Moulián, El consumo me consume), the dictatorship oversaw profound changes in the way in which power was exercised. If spectacular power works by means of irradiation, by which certain exemplary acts generate effects elsewhere (Diana Taylor, discussing the Argentine case, talks of "the amplification of torture, through which twenty victims can paralyze an entire community or country" [Disappearing Acts 130]), bio-power is always (already) immediately present.

Judith Butler is perhaps the most recent theorist to go beyond traditional conceptions of ideology--though her work has not usually been considered as part of this tradition. Butler's key concept is the notion of performativity, and her early work (particularly Gender Trouble) drew criticism when it seemed to argue that gender is "only" performative, and so can be put on or put off at will. Yet Butler has since gone out of her way to dispel this impression. In Bodies that Matter, her concern is
with the ways in which performativity is constitutive of the subject; it cannot be simply taken up by some pre-constituted subjective will. In *Excitable Speech*, she takes Althusser's notion of interpellation and extends it by discussing instances of failed interpellation (for Althusser, unimaginable) as instances of how the voice and the order of bodies are not always synchronized; or rather, of how the voice may fail to synchronize the order of bodies. She argues that "useful as it is, Althusser's scheme restricts the notion of interpellation to the action of a voice, attributing a creative power to the voice that recalls and reconsolidates the figure of the divine voice in its ability to bring about what it names" (32). In other words, although Althusser's essay is posed as a critique of the fetishism that imagines that the state authorizes and inaugurates subjectivity, Butler suggests that he remains within precisely this paradigm. For Althusser, not only is "ideology in general" necessary and eternal; so therefore is the state that acts as the essential lynchpin of the double circuit of ideology.

Butler is interested, on the one hand, in interpellation's citational quality--the fact that the state, far from being itself foundational, must endlessly
refer back to previous instances of interpellation in order to legitimate its own attempts to constitute subjects. In other words, not only can the subject not claim any originary status; nor can the state itself. On the other hand, Butler is also concerned with what remains always unvoiced and unspoken, for instance in censorship. Censorship, she argues, "produces discursive regimes through the production of the unspeakable" (139), and the scission that results between what may and may not be spoken also determines "the conditions of intelligibility" of any regime of power. "This normative exercise of power," she argues, "is rarely acknowledged as an operation of power at all. Indeed, we may classify it among the most implicit forms of power [. . .]. That power continues to act in illegible ways is one source of its relative invulnerability" (134). Here, then, she turns to Pierre Bourdieu, as the theorist of "a bodily understanding, or habitus" that does not depend upon the voice or upon speech--indeed that may specifically have been demarcated in its opposition to speech.
Meanwhile, however, a methodological problem arises. Given that the state does state, endlessly, how (if at all) are we to treat the texts produced by these discourses of power? Analyses guided by a traditional conception of ideology would treat such texts as objects for critique: on the assumption that they contain a distorted representation of the world, they would be re-read (read "against the grain") to bring out both the underlying truth that they misrepresent and the distortions to which that truth has been subjected. As Sloterdijk observes, however, this approach is meaningless when faced with texts whose function is not distortion.

Klaus Theweleit belongs to the same generation as Sloterdijk of post-1968 West German intellectuals struggling to come to terms with their country's Nazi past. Like Sloterdijk, Theweleit refuses to see Nazism as a historical aberration: his focus is on the continuities between Nazism and what followed and preceded it. In this sense, Theweleit is also a thinker of postdictatorship. However, his interest in continuities also explains his interest in the Weimar period, the main object of his two-volume critique of German fascism. Theweleit's methodology
is to read a series of texts produced primarily by the "soldier males" of the Freikorps, the volunteer armies whose mission was to put down working-class revolt in the aftermath of the First World War, and that would in time be hailed by the Nazis as "First Soldiers of the Third Reich" (Male Fantasies Volume One 22). These men's writings and their practice embody something like an essential truth of Nazism, all the more emphatically so as this is a Nazism before Nazism, a German fascism that predates or exists parallel to Hitler's rise to power. The point here is that Nazism is not simply the result of the influence of an ideological discourse that wins over the masses, still less of one man's manipulation of the political and cultural spheres; Nazism predates Nazi rhetoric and ideology.

Although Theweleit's methodology is a series of readings, and although his work is therefore essentially an analysis of fascist language, he constantly emphasizes that this Freikorps literature does not hide any coded ideological meaning--and therefore that it is not to be read "against the grain." Here (at least), everything is stated clearly, everything is on the surface. Hence Theweleit's apparently extravagant quotation of his sources, his aim simply "to present typical specimens of
the writings of soldier males, sticking closely to the text in every case" (57), and so to avoid interpretation. This being "a central part of [his] methodology: [that] the material has taken precedence over interpretations" (24).

This same anti-interpretative methodology can usefully be applied to Pinochet. The turn towards neoliberalism that his regime helped inaugurate has been termed a "silent revolution" (as in the titles both of the pro-Pinochet apologia written by recent presidential candidate Joaquín Lavín and the leftist critique written by Duncan Green), but Luis Salinas's The London Clinic shows the benefits of simply listening to the general speak: Salinas aims to explain Pinochet and the Pinochet effect primarily by collecting and presenting the general's own words.

The over-riding impression provided by this collection mostly comprised of quotations (from Pinochet, but also from his collaborators and defenders, with some other commentary from the press) is of the general's astonishing confidence. Included here is what is probably the most famous example of this attitude: his remark that "burying two corpses in the same grave makes for great economies" (28). He later confirms this bon mot, declaring "That is what I meant. [. . .] I never regret what I say" (107). While the only regret for Manuel Contreras, former chief of Pinochet's secret service, the DINA, is "I regret not having been harder on the Marxists" (104).

What becomes clear is that if Pinochet and co. have nothing to regret, they also have nothing to hide. This is why Pinochet's words
are so damning: he feels no need for justification and no compunction to persuade us of his methods or his goals. Everything is on the surface. Perhaps there are some details that are not worth exploring, some areas best left unexamined; but these are all rather inconsequential. As is revealed in a 1984 interview:

Question: General, about the disappeared. Have you ever had any interest in finding out where all those people ended up?
Pinochet: Señorita, no one knows. Look, if there are right now thirteen million Chileans, let's say there might be twelve million, out of twelve million, two thousand are nothing (he makes a gesture with his hand to indicate a very small number). [. . .] In this country, señorita, we need to stop dwelling on things [en este país, las cosas, señorita, hay que olvidar]. (112-113)

Pinochet produces effects rather than arguments. This ideological deficit reveals itself continually through the quotations collected in The London Clinic. The general has no clothes; but he feels no need to suggest otherwise. There is no real pretence that he is other than guilty. As the Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia comments in response to the judicial process in the British courts, aimed at his extradition to Spain, "No-one speaks of Pinochet as if he were innocent" (95). His defense rested instead upon technicalities.

Neoliberalism employs technocrats rather than ideologues (and concerns itself with the economics of burial rather than the politics of life).

Bourdieu's methodology is similarly anti-interpretative. In part, like Theweleit's "faux-naïve" reading of the utterances of social actors, it consists in extended quotation (perhaps particularly in Distinction or The Weight of the World); however, it has primarily consisted in outlining the statistical regularities and
patterns that structure both discourses and institutions. The content of a particular utterance is of less interest than is the way in which that content is a placeholder in a series of oppositions that also mark out social positions and position-takings within a specific field. Here Bourdieu shows his debts to structuralism: just as Ferdinand de Saussure (in his *Course in General Linguistics*) saw the value of a linguistic sign defined by its difference from other possible signs ("cat" derives its meaning by being neither "bat" nor "dog"), and Claude Lévi-Strauss (in *The Raw and the Cooked*) looked for the ways in which the apparently absurd narratives of Native American myths were structured according to a logic of binary opposition and differentiation, so Bourdieu analyses the taste for (say) classical music or abstract art in terms of the ways it is symptom of and helps to mark its holders' distinction from other members of society, who may favor (say) pop music or handicrafts. Hence "the first precept of method [. . .] requires us to resist by all means available our primary inclination to think the social world in a substantialist manner. [. . .] One must think *relationally*" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* 228). Relationality replaces
interpretation or the notion that society conceals some deeper meaning.

In *Distinction*, Bourdieu constructs a series of three-dimensional maps of social space by means of the application of correspondence analysis to the results of surveys on cultural preferences undertaken of 1,217 French respondents in 1963 and 1967-68. The surveys asked questions concerning (for instance) the respondents' favorite films and singers, the frequency of their visits to museums, and their opinions on what subjects would make a "beautiful" or a "meaningless" photograph. The answers to these questions were then correlated with their answers to questions regarding their social background, education, and occupation, and with the interviewers' observations about their dress, grooming, and speech. The results of this mapping of French cultural position-taking (see for example *Distinction* 262 and 266) are in essence, Bourdieu argues, only slightly more complex than the similar patterns established for Kabyle society in Algeria (for which see *Outline of a Theory of Practice* 157). In both cases, people locate themselves and are located in social space according to a logic of distinction and differentiation. The most pertinent difference between
France and Kabylia is simply that the former society is internally differentiated into more or less autonomous fields (the economic versus the cultural, high culture versus low culture, academia versus the business community, and so on) each of which, however, obeys a similar (homologous) logic.

Again, it is not as though the discursive is taken to transcend (whether through an operation of reflection or distortion) people's "real" positions. Rather, linguistic or discursive position-takings also are, immediately and immanently, social position-takings. For Bourdieu there is no essential difference between his respondents' statements and their social status: each is incarnated in the other. Everything is on the surface, to be read at face value.

Consider Katherine Hite's *When the Romance Ended*, a study of the leadership of (what was once) the Chilean left and of the positions individual leaders took before, during, and after the dictatorship. This is also a book about post-ideology--perhaps about post-politics--in that it is a study of disillusion, albeit that here disillusion is somewhat like a rather cynical form of nostalgia. Hite quotes José Antonio Viera-Gallo, formerly of MAPU (a Catholic Left group whose leaders were "among the most influential left political thinkers and politicians in the country, quick to rise to the vanguard of the pre-1973 revolutionary left" [34]) and undersecretary in Allende's
Ministry of Justice, later speaker of the House under Aylwin and still senator:

Politics have become relativized, and while still influential, politics has little probability of touching the world of the economy. Here businessmen couldn't care less about politics [. . .] and many people, whether they're professionals or well-paid workers, why should they care? (193)

Hite's book is full of similar statements from those who were once radicals, often former members of Salvador Allende's Popular Unity government, and who have had to come to terms with first the Pinochet coup, then the long years of dictatorship and exile, and finally the effects of neoliberal transformation. Not all have renounced politics in quite the way that Viera-Gallo has, but Hite outlines the accommodation that each has had to make to the changes that Chile and the world have undergone since the 1960s.

Hite interviews at length fifteen such leaders of the Chilean left and then, on the basis of their reactions to the social and political transformations they have witnessed, categorizes them into four groups: party loyalists, personal loyalists, political thinkers, and political entrepreneurs. Hite suggests that these four positions represent basic political "cognitive frameworks" (xv) that remain relatively stable over time. Changes in Chilean political society, then, do not result so much from any conversion of political identities, than in the fact that events may favor one cognitive type over another: whereas the sixties saw the ascendancy of party loyalists, today we see a preponderance of political entrepreneurs, but this balance of forces may (and, Hite suggests, will) shift.

This argument is intriguing, but it is not made convincingly. Particularly, Hite has not shown that these cognitive types are analytic rather than nominalist (or descriptive) categories. There is
no clear reason, for instance, why Hite should suggest that faithfulness to earlier ideological positions is the consequence of an underlying cognitive type of party loyalty, when all she has done is to describe those who have kept to these positions as party loyalists. In short, do her subjects' actions derive from their (enduring) dispositions, or are these categories just ways of describing their (variable) actions?

What Hite has failed to do is, first, to consider the political and intellectual fields in terms of competing positions and position-takings: all her subjects are examined very much separately from each other. Though Hite's reading, like Theweleit's and Bourdieu's, depends much upon extended quotation, this is in the service of a quasi-psychological discourse for which the confessing subject speaks the truth of his or her inner self--hidden perhaps to themselves, but visible to the social scientist armed with the necessary analytic tools and concepts. Though the book is presented as something of a collective biography--mapping the Chilean left through portraits of some of its more influential constituents--the initial move of breaking down the respondents into (allegedly) innate psychological types immediately dismantles any sense that they are immanently part of a society or of a social group. Rather, the subjects of Hite's research are presented as thinkers who may be produced by society, but in reflecting upon that society (whether erroneously, in Hite's view, as in the case of Communist leader Jorge Insunza, or more perceptively, as with José Miguel Insulza) they are also detached from it, transcendent.

Hite shares this separation of actor from position (or position-taking, as a dynamic intervention in a field) with much social
science, particularly with those approaches derived from rational actor theory. For such theory, agents are (ideally at least) devoid of any quality but rationality, or the propensity to maximize personal benefit; confronted with a world of possible choices, they make their decisions accordingly. Hite's psychological approach complicates this perspective by giving different agents differential propensities to choose one way rather than the other (propensities which she categorizes under the name of cognitive types), but she pays no real attention to the genesis of these propensities, or to the effect that the results of the choices agents make may affect these propensities in the future. By contrast, Bourdieu's concept of the habitus (which lies on the same, pre-conscious level as Hite's cognitive types) attempts to go beyond an analysis of differential positions and position-takings that takes them to be a static array of possible outcomes, and to go beyond a decontextualized analysis of agents and their decision-making, to understand instead the mode of production of those positions in its embodied and dynamic social context. Habitus, for Bourdieu, names the unconscious feel for the game (and for the limits that the game seems to ordain) governing the differentiated political (and other) choices made by social actors.

**habitus**

For Bourdieu, habitus is key to the maintenance of social order. Bourdieu adapts the concept from the Husserlian phenomenological tradition and the work of Marcel Mauss, among other sources (for the relation between Bourdieu and
Husserl, see Lane, 23-25), but it has now become one of his own most distinctive concepts. His use of the concept arises, first of all, in his attempt to dissolve the apparent dichotomy between structure and agency, and between synchrony and diachrony:

The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively "regulated" and "regular" without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor. (The Logic of Practice 53)

In other words, rather than a transcendence of rules over practice on the one hand, or a spontaneous disassociation of practice from rules on the other, Bourdieu envisages the immanent co-presence of regulation and practice. The orchestration of practices and representations takes place behind the back of consciousness, and immediately. Thus the point about "ideology"--and Bourdieu notes that "really, by now, we would be better off calling it something else"--is that, thanks to its immanence, "it does not appear as such, to us and to itself, and it is this misrecognition that gives it its symbolic efficacy"
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 250). "Ideology" in the sense of representation or discourse is at best a red herring, and at worst a lure:

Thus the task of legitimating the established order does not fall exclusively to the mechanisms traditionally regarded as belonging to the order of ideology, such as law. [...] The most successful ideological effects are those which have no need of words, and ask no more than complicitous silence. It follows, incidentally that any analysis of ideologies, in the narrow sense of "legitimating discourses," which fails to include an analysis of the corresponding institutional mechanisms is liable to be no more than a contribution to the efficacy of those ideologies: this is true of all internal (semiological) analyses of political, educational, religious, or aesthetic ideologies which forget that the political function of these ideologies may in some cases be reduced to the effect of displacement and diversion, camouflage and legitimation. (Outline of a Theory of Practice 188)

Ideology legitimates only in so far as it distracts, in so far as it serves as bait for an ideology of ideology that veils or screens the "corresponding institutional mechanisms" that ultimately secure social order. Rather than being distracted by the lure of ideology, then, Bourdieu counsels an examination of the immanent processes by which habitus synchronizes bodies and institutions, culture and state.

For Bourdieu, belief itself is corporeal, unconscious: "To speak of 'ideologies' is to locate in the realm of representations [. . .] what in fact belongs to the order
of belief, that is, to the level of the most profound corporeal dispositions" (Practical Reason 55). His is a radicalized Pascalianism. If for Pascal, belief arises from corporeal dispositions—and Althusser also cites the Pascalian dictum "Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you will believe" (Essays on Ideology)—for Bourdieu, belief is located in those dispositions themselves, and need never rise to consciousness. Indeed, though praising Pascal's challenge to "all those who insist on seeing belief in terms of representations" (The Logic of Practice 49) Bourdieu argues that he maintains the pre-eminence of consciousness over practice in that the Pascalian wager prioritizes the decision of the will. Pascal proceeds "as if will and consciousness were the basis of the disposition which 'with no violence, art or argument makes us believe'" (49). For Bourdieu, however, the disposition is always primary. Hence "what is essential goes without saying because it comes without saying" (Outline of a Theory of Practice 157; emphasis in original). There is no prior decision, prior representation, or prior consciousness. Institutions work directly on the body; social order produces no rationale so long as it needs none. "The principles embodied in this way are placed beyond the grasp
of consciousness" (94). Everything begins as well as remains at the level of the corporeal as we are habituated to subjection. We are steeped in doxa, which is "the relationship of immediate adherence that is established in practice between a habitus and the field to which it is attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for-granted that flows from practical sense" (The Logic of Practice 68).

Bourdieu's fullest examination of a structured system of embodied belief is his analysis of the domestic space--and the interface between domestic and public space--in Kabylia, Algeria, focus of his anthropological fieldwork in the 1950s and 1960s. The structured series of divisions between spaces for cooking, spaces for guests, spaces for leisure, work, and so on all embody a set of (arbitrary) beliefs, and habituate the inhabitants of that space to that belief system. "Inhabited space," he argues, "is the principal locus for the objectification of the generative schemes" of the habitus (Outline of a Theory of Practice 89). Its spatial organization is also an embodiment of the divisions and hierarchies that structure culture and society (between male and female, high and low, for instance); as inhabiting space becomes second nature, so the way in which that space orders practice becomes itself
naturalized. Space may be deciphered or "read" as a series of signs (for instance, by the anthropologist), but it is not read this way by its inhabitants: "The 'book' from which the children learn their vision of the world is read through the body, in and through the movements and displacements which make the space within which they are enacted" (90).

Moreover, this corporeal education in and through structured spatial organization is not confined to domestic space: the "social meanings of the museum," for instance, are established through a series of oppositions implicitly embedded in the particular modes of spatial navigation and bodily (self)discipline that it requires, "untouchable - touchable; noise - contemplative silence; swift and hazard exploration - slow and orderly procession" and so on (Bourdieu and Darbel, The Love of Art 51). If such oppositions induce a "total attitude change" in museum-goers (51), we need to understand "attitude" in both its meanings of physical and mental orientation, for both are combined simultaneously and immediately. Likewise in the traditional university lecture,

the lecturer finds in the particularities of the space which the traditional institution arranges for him (the platform, the professorial chair at the focal point on which all gazes converge) material and
symbolic conditions which enable him to keep the
students at a respectful distance and would oblige him
to do so even if he did not wish to. [. . .] The
professorial chair commandeers, willy-nilly, the
intonation, the diction, the delivery, the oratorical
gestures of its occupant." (Bourdieu and Passeron,
Reproduction 109)

Indeed, it is in recognition of the way in which the
traditional university use of space subverts even the best
of intentions, let alone the articulated discourse of the
lecturer, that more recent pedagogical theories are
enshrined in practices of, for instance, small groups and
flat rooms.

As Beatriz Sarlo (in Scenes from Postmodern Life), among others,
has observed, the paradigmatic space of contemporary neoliberalism is
the shopping mall—a space that is simultaneously local and universal,
sited in a particular geographical location yet also apparently
hermetically sealed from its local context, part of a world of
commodities that knows no national borders. In Chile, a quite
distinctive version of the mall flourished in Santiago's upscale
neighborhoods during the dictatorship: the caracol or "shell," so-
called because they were shaped somewhat like spiral seashells, with
shops lining a spiral walkway winding around a central atrium. The
first of these to be built was the "Caracol Los Leones," in 1975;
other examples include "Dos Caracoles" (1976), "La Rampa de las

3 My thanks to Jean Franco for first drawing my attention to the
architectural and post-ideological peculiarities of Chilean malls. I
have also seen a caracol-style mall in Manizales, Colombia, but nowhere
else in Latin America or elsewhere.
Flores" (1979), and "Caracol Vips" (1982). Unlike the typical North American or British mall, which tends to be no more than two stories high, and to be built to an "L" or "T" plan with major department stores at each extremity, caracoles have no such "anchor" stores, but are rather occupied by numerous more or less equally small retail outlets--up to 200 or so of them. Moreover, caracoles also lack the common areas and meeting points characteristic of other mall architecture (and usually located at the intersection of the mall's main thoroughfares) which are a legacy of the philosophy of pioneering architect Victor Gruen, the so-called "inventor of the shopping mall" who designed Detroit's Northland Mall (the United States' first multifunctional regional shopping center, 1954), and Minneapolis's Southdale Center Mall (the first fully enclosed, climate-controlled shopping center, 1956). Gruen's intention was that malls would help counteract the increasing atomization of 1950s US suburbia, by uniting city center functions and services under a single roof and serving as the modern version of the ancient Greek agora or medieval city square.

The Chilean malls, by contrast, accentuate atomizing tendencies. In the caracol, even the atrium floor is usually at a basement level--and so bypassed by shoppers. Thus there are no areas of special intensity and no points for downtime to break up the shopping experience; the caracoles construct something like a smooth space which is relatively undifferentiated along the whole length of its gently sloping gradient. These malls can only be successfully negotiated by very small groups or by individuals: any larger congregation of bodies would immediately cause congestion on the narrow ramps. On the whole, other shoppers can be seen only over the other side of the gaping atrium. Processes also encouraged elsewhere
by the dictatorship, such as the dissolution of group identities, are therefore facilitated in the course of reverent interaction with boutique-packaged commodification. It is no wonder that the North American building that the caracoles most resemble should be Frank Lloyd Wright's New York Guggenheim museum: both are secular shrines with a centrifugal force drawing people away from each other and towards a collection of riches that is to be subject to veneration.

In the malls, however, a state logic of disassociation combines immediately and immanently with the market presentation of seemingly limitless choice lining a prescribed but otherwise aimless path to constitute a cultural practice of anomic consumerism. An endless, spiralling drift up and down is simultaneously a post-ideological disaggregation of potentially subversive bodies; and there is no outside, only a moebius strip of commerce winding round a central abyss.

Rather than the spectacular rituals of corporeal display (on the catwalk, on the sports field), the affectively charged institutions of bodily confinement (prison, boarding school), or the controversial exercise of physical violence (torture, hanging) that draw sociological and discursive attention, Bourdieu prefers to focus on quotidian, low-level, and apparently insignificant modes of incorporation. "One could endlessly enumerate," he suggests, "the values given body, made body, by the hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy which can instil a whole
cosmology though injunctions as insignificant as 'sit up straight' or 'don't hold your knife in your left hand'" (The Logic of Practice 69). It is in the routine and the everyday that the politically and socially arbitrary is naturalized, made (literally) second nature, as "political mythology is realized, em-bodied, turned into a permanent disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, walking, and thereby of feeling and thinking" (69-70). We stand, speak, walk, feel, and think to collective rhythms synchronized and orchestrated by the pace set by social institutions. Doxa is never a matter of opinion, in that opinion requires a field of dispute, split between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. Doxa is constituted in the "universe of the undiscussed" that subtends the "universe of discourse (or argument)" (Outline of a Theory of Practice 168).

Bourdieu and Deleuze, then, both stress immanence, immediacy, and corporeality. Bourdieu's habitus is likewise affective in that it consists in the impersonal and pre-subjective correlation of bodies and powers, determining the capacity to affect and to be affected (to structure and to be structured by social interaction) beneath the level of discourse. But rather than the
violent and anti-social intensity of the affective experience emphasized by Deleuze, and incarnated in terror, what we see here is a low-intensity resonance that preserves, transmits, and reproduces social order. The autonomy of affect for Bourdieu means not a revolutionary break from a transcendent state, but rather an immersion in a state that is, in the end, itself immanent, "the foundation [. . .] of a tacit, prereflexive agreement over the meaning of the world" (Practical Reason 53). Affect is bound not simply by the illegitimate imposition of a transcendent state, but also (pseudo)legitimately—or, at least, in line with a series of immanent laws—in itself, through a habituation that bypasses consciousness.

An authoritarian regime ultimately relies neither on persuasion nor on censorship but on the silent harmonization that it establishes in everyday routines. Though such regimes are often described as "regimes of exception" (see for instance Loveman 1993), what is of interest is the ways in which such exceptionality soon becomes normative. Thus the Chilean constitutions of 1925, 1980, and 1985 (those in force during the Pinochet regime) codified the instances in which states of exception may be enforced, and as Edward Snyder points out, Pinochet meticulously obeyed the letter of this constitutional authority in his promulgation of states of emergency and states of siege. The Pinochet regime would eventually promulgate its own Law of
the States of Exception in 1985, further codifying and regularizing exceptionality. As Snyder observes, the government, using both old and new legislation,

created a complex hierarchy of states of exception, which could be declared by the government in cases of internal disturbance, subversion, or public calamity. These included the state of siege, the most repressive, the state of emergency, and in the wake of the 1980 Constitution, the State of Danger of Disturbance to Internal Peace. The states of exception were renewed constantly, with the state of emergency in force from 1973 until 1988 when the plebiscite was held. (Snyder 264)

Exceptionality thus became the norm, as indeed it was throughout much of Latin America during this period (Paraguay, for instance, was subject to a state of emergency that was uninterrupted from 1954 to 1988). As such, it was also experienced as normal.

Hence although, understandably, much attention has been paid to the resistance that emerged to the Pinochet dictatorship—most notably in the period 1983 to 1986, in a series of protests by pobladores, the inhabitants of Santiago's shantytowns or marginal barrios, that spurred the development of "new social movement" theory—what in fact needs to be noted, precisely because it otherwise goes without saying, is the limited nature of this resistance. Little, however, has been written about what we could term "everyday" authoritarianism in Chile, the long periods of relative calm (however uneasy) that predominated in most of the country, most of the time. Thus for instance, Samuel Chavkin's revised edition of Storm over Chile takes its subtitle "The Junta Under Siege" from its penultimate chapter describing the protests of 1983-1984, but has nothing at all to say about either the period 1974-1983, from the coup's consolidation to the outbreak of protest, or the period 1984-1988, from the height of the protests to the plebiscite that eventually brought down Pinochet. Or rather, all
that Chavkin has to say about the whole period 1984-1988 is that "For yet another four years Pinochet continued to hang on to power by torture and murder of his opponents" (278), which hardly explains either the quiescence that was the rule or the new social movements' protest that constituted the exception that Chavkin otherwise celebrates.

Cathy Schneider's fuller account of the protests is more thoughtful about the reason for their abeyance in the mid-1980s. She quotes an activist, Leo, whose analysis is that "The repression began to destroy the movement [. . .]. People left their homes, were beaten, saw no clear purpose to endure the abuse, grew bored with the protests, and returned to their homes" (187). Leo's comment indicates not simply state-sponsored opposition, but also a fatigue that took over even in the most radicalized of barrios, a tiredness echoed elsewhere in Schneider's text. "Activists grew weary," she notes, commenting on a 1986 survey that showed the remarkable percentage of Chileans who felt tense, "resigned and disappointed" or "sad" (187-8); she remarks also on the "state of numbness" that psychologists diagnosed among even grassroots activists (202); and she echoes Aristide Zolberg's argument that "movements of political enthusiasm are followed [. . .] always by the restoration of boredom" (211). In this panorama of a movement that has simply worn itself out, a low-level anxiety comes to the fore as ideological concerns recede. Schneider quotes Duncan Green's observation that the new generation of Chilean workers is "a collection of anxious individualists" who are no longer, in Schneider's words, "ideologically predisposed" (206). A general state of "physical and mental exhaustion" prevails (206). In body and mind, Chileans in Schneider's description were, by the end of the
dictatorship, afflicted by the affects that Spinoza categorizes as sad passions--the "sadness [that] diminishes or hinders a man's powers of action" (Ethics 3P37 109). Or, in Bourdieu's terms, we see the "resignation to necessity" that, he argues, characterizes the habitus of the dominated classes (Distinction 380).

Ton Salman, more explicit than other commentators about the fact that the explosion of energy and enthusiasm in the revolt of Chile's new social movements was "an exceptional episode," is interested above all in the "lengthy periods of 'normalcy'" during which "what is involved are dispositions that do not solely play a role at the level of consciousness" (4). Salman uses Bourdieu's theory of habitus to explain the delayed emergence of poblador militancy in terms of a "class unconsciousness" (146) incarnating a "sensitivity to authority" and "a wider and deeper tendency to reject deviancy" (147). The pobladores' dispositions were "fragmentary and pragmatic and not politically articulated" (153). Protest only erupted once "the specific habitual and internalized ways of interpreting and perceiving Chilean reality and one's own position and options within it became inadequate" (207). Even then, the ensuing mobilization was, for Salman and especially in the case of women who became active after realizing that the burden of family and community survival increasingly rested on their shoulders, essentially conservative, "a practical, non-ideological politicization of the disrupted linkages in the traditional family, and in the traditional poblador strategies" (212).

Salman emphasizes habitus as a source of inertia, in so far as it is the embodied sedimentation of a collective history that structures the present and so "resists change and guarantees the continuity of
subjects" (49). Politics, as traditionally conceived as a spectacular and articulate attempt to set or change the public agenda through discourse, arises only when there is a breakdown between the expectations incarnated in habitus and the objective conditions of the moment, when traditional (unspoken, unconscious) strategies fail within a changed environment. Thus the spark for the protests and the cause of their decline was, in this analysis, one and the same: a radical disenchantment. In the first instance, and especially for women and the young, the call to mobilization incarnated in the series of protest days in 1983 and 1984 served as catalyst for the "disillusioned optimism" (193) that arose from the failure of inherited strategies that had for an earlier generation of male workers enabled at least survival and possibly the prospect of social betterment. With the routinization of the protests, they too became subject to the same disenchantment: disappointment itself became embodied within the pobladores' habitus. From this perspective, it is less that the protests "set the stage," as Cathy Schneider suggests, "for a negotiated transition to democracy in 1990" (194) than that they were the visible symptom of a deeper transition in the regime of affect, from a basically positive sense of expectation nurtured by the state to an all-pervasive low-level anxiety that characterizes a postdictatorial order in which the market sets the tone for social interaction. The period of the "new social movements," in other words, can be understood as a step-change within the habitus of the majority of Chile's population, as they were habituated to the order that would come fully into its own only after the end of the dictatorship.
the ambivalence of crisis

Though for Bourdieu habitus is essentially conservative—in that it is history, literally, incarnate and is therefore a prime motor of social reproduction—this is not to say that his theory cannot account for social change. Indeed, the commonest criticism of Bourdieu's work—the charge that the postulate of an unconscious agency of habituation entails a sociological functionalism, or even hyperfunctionalism—misses the point that the theory of habitus is premised precisely on the assumption that social change is ceaseless and unstoppable. Habitus is conservative only because social conditions have inevitably changed since the moment of its formation; otherwise it would not be historical. There will always be a lag, a delay, between the time incarnated in habitus as disposition and the time of the event confronted by that disposition. Bourdieu's materialism is premised on a conception of a friction or inertia inherent to bound affective states. Theories of ideology tend to be static; even when they incorporate notions of contestation or opposition, such notions imply a deadlock that can only be broken by forces that come from outside of the ideological system. The classical architectural metaphor of base and superstructure comprises
just such a static conception, for which contradiction and change only arise as the base (the development of the forces of production) moves underneath the superstructure's feet. By contrast, Bourdieu's is a dynamic theory, for which change (if not development) is (once more) immanent to all aspects of social production and reproduction.

Indeed, far from a pessimistic litany of the ways in which the state ensures its own reproduction, Bourdieu's work can more interestingly be read as centered around the most radical of protests and disruptions experienced by French society in the twentieth century: the Algerian independence movement and May 1968. Bourdieu's concern, in other words, is not only to discover the ways in which power is secured beyond and despite ideology; but also how protest can arise by means other than the construction of counter-hegemonic projects. He goes further: the failure to see the force of the dissent engendered by and in habitus, at the level of what he calls "ethics," undermines any project of counter-hegemony, which he categorizes under the label of "politics" in recognition of the way in which (as I argued in chapter one) hegemony substitutes itself for all other possible concepts of the political. Rather, then, than succumbing to the banal assertion that
everything is political—a meaningless claim in that it drains all specificity from the political—he see politics as a fundamentally restricted practice to be counterposed to a cultural ethics.

Access to the political is unequal: opinion polls register the fact that the capacity or inclination to articulate "political principles to answer a problem that is presented as political" (Distinction 398) is unevenly distributed, and found most commonly among the dominant class. Elsewhere, and "for problems that have not been brought into a personal or party 'line,' agents are thrown back on their ethos [. . .]. It is class ethos that is called upon to make up for the lacunae in axiomatics or method" (420). This ethos is generated in the embodied experience of the habitus, and as such lies beneath the discursive realm of hegemonic articulation: "there is every difference in the world between the conscious, quasi-forced systematicity of a political 'line' and the systematicity 'in-itself' of the practices and judgements engendered by the unconscious principles of the ethos" (420). Moreover, although Bourdieu's own tendency may sometimes be to favor the conversion of ethical dispositions into political positions (as in his celebration of the "science" of
sociology), the rest of his work makes clear that it is such dispositions that in fact explain disturbances that are otherwise categorized as political.

Take May 1968, for instance. This social upheaval lies at the heart of (at least) Reproduction, Distinction, and Homo Academicus. Bourdieu argues that the traumatic irruption of student protest at the end of the 1960s was the result of nothing less (apparently) banal than the increasing access to education that had been taking place since the end of the second World War. This expansion of secondary and tertiary education had led to "diploma inflation." Bourdieu describes this as follows:

Newcomers to secondary education are led, by the mere fact of having access to it, to expect it to give them what it gave others at a time when they themselves were excluded from it. In an earlier period and for other classes, those aspirations were perfectly realistic, since they corresponded to objective probabilities, but they are often quickly deflated by the verdicts of the scholastic market or the labour market. [...]

The structural de-skilling of a whole generation, who are bound to get less out of their qualifications than the previous generation would have obtained, engenders a sort of collective disillusionment: a whole generation, finding it has been taken for a ride, is inclined to extend to all institutions the mixture of revolt and resentment it feels towards the educational system. This anti-institutional cast of mind [...] points towards a denunciation of the tacit assumptions of the social order, a practical suspension of doxic adherence to the prizes it offers and the values it professes, and a withholding of the investments which
are a necessary condition of its functioning. (Distinction 143, 144)

Though Bourdieu suggests that this revolt "draws strength from ideological and scientific critiques" (144), it is not per se motivated by or caused in or through ideology. It is a suspension of (practical, embodied) belief that arises from an interruption of the apparent functions of social reproduction. Just as the explanation of social order is found at an immanent, corporeal level, so disorder and dissent is also explained at this same level, beneath ideology.

We can return to Salman's discussion of the "non-ideological politicization" of the so-called new social movements (212). Salman describes the participation of young people within Chile's 1983/1984 protests along the same lines in which Bourdieu describes the causes of Paris's May 1968 events. In Chile, the young were:

confronted with socialization patterns they felt were anachronistic and had exerted a negative influence on their ability to hold their own in the years of the dictatorship. [. . .] Going to school would not get them a good job, the survival organizations would not enable them to express themselves, and the parties had nothing at all to give them. (200)

In Chile as in France, then, revolt should be understood in terms of a radical discontinuity between a habitus produced under one set of social conditions, and events that derive from another. As an inherited habitus attuned to pre-dictatorship conditions failed to prepare a new generation attempting to survive and progress under the military regime, what resulted was a wholesale rejection of the rules
of the game of distinction, and a "rejection of any kind of authoritarian control altogether" (200). None of this was expressed in terms of conventional politics--"for them there was almost a taboo on the political" (200)--and it led not so much to projects for counter-hegemony as to attempts to construct autonomous social structures and modes of valorization. As "they put more and more effort into setting up their own organizations in these years" (200), this auto-valorization of their practices is best seen as an exodus from authoritarianism rather than as direct opposition.

This exodus is not simply flight; it is simultaneously also the construction of new modes of existence. It is vitally necessary, as we saw in our discussion of the Salvadoran civil war, to distinguish between different forms of flight, different incarnations of what I am calling the multitude (for more on which, see my concluding chapter). Take Nelly Richard's discussion of flight in Residuos y metáforas. Here, in an important section near the end of the book, there is a play on the connection between "fuga" (flight in the sense of "escape") and the vuelo (flight as a mode of transport) that was the helicopter flight that liberated four militants of the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) from Santiago's high security prison in 1996. The Front, the armed wing of the Communist Party, had earned a name for themselves for their spectacular if sporadic armed actions in the latter days of the Pinochet regime, not least the assassination attempt on the general's motorcade in 1986 that had been a hair's breadth from success. They might be seen as the radicalization of the impulse that drove the new social movements' protests. By 1996, such militant attacks had lost most of their rationale, but the prison breakout pointed to the possibility of continuing militancy on into
the era of democratic transition by transforming struggle into a form of flight. Richard elaborates upon this aestheticization of the act, accomplished in part through a testimonio-style narrative smuggled out of prison (yet another escape) whose recourse to self-consciously literary style produces "marks of figurativeness and obliqueness [that] speak to us of the elusive and allusive aspiration of metaphor to dissolve truth in its 'art of flight'" (239; emphasis in original).

But what to say about another "vuelo de justicia," another flight from justice that was also another judicial flight? What of the flight of the Chilean air force Boeing 707 that in March 2000 took General Pinochet from the very centre of legal normalization (the British judicial system and the Law Lords' pontifications on government obligations in international law) and, indeed, of bourgeois gentility (the Wentworth estate in the stockbroker belt of the South London suburbs)? To echo Richard's discussion of the helicopter prison rescue of 1996: if we "leave to one side the conjunctural political meaning of the flight [fuga] along with any moral or ideological judgements about the phenomenon of terrorism, to explore rather the symbolism of the event" (224; emphasis in original), what can be said about the General's escape? How is this flight, a flight that did not lack artistry, distinct from that orchestrated by the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front? After all, like the FPMR's, Pinochet's flight certainly made a mockery of institutional authority, and was also a demonstration of the power of will and of desire--to say the very least that could be said of the general's sudden recuperation in the course of the arduous transatlantic and transhemispheric crossing. Pinochet's arrest and flight both constituted in different ways something of an irruption into
reasonably settled discourses of normalization and destabilized, if perhaps only temporarily, both the British constitutional settlement, and the apparently consensual and ahistorical nature of the Chilean transition.

Now, it would be wrong to suggest (say) that the flight effected by the FPMR and that effected by General Pinochet were equivalent. Far from it, both were singular events whose similarity lies in part precisely in that they disrupt the logic of equivalence. Problems arise, however, if we are called upon to analyse both armed only with a politics of form that valorizes such disruptions while bracketing off their "conjunctural political" meanings. Problems arise when metaphoricity is valorized to the exclusion of the literal and the historical, or when an understandable distrust of historical narrative cedes all historical narrative to those who have spent twenty-five years or more perfecting their management of history. Pinochet's flight was no more banal than the FPMR's, and the FPMR's no less spectacular than Pinochet's. It would be impossible, I suggest, to make a political evaluation of the differences between the two on aesthetic grounds alone; any such attempt would rely simply on a political taste whose grounds lie outside the field of aesthetics. We need to investigate the communities constructed along the lines of flight that each constructs. For exodus can--and perhaps should--be also a positive, constitutive movement, enabling substantively new affective ties within the multitude.

Bourdieu, however, never goes beyond the moment of disengagement that characterizes the 1968 protests. Too
often, he returns to science—the "science" of sociology—that he sees as enabled by such crisis, rather than investigate any alternative modes of organization that may escape and reinvent new forms of conviviality. Bourdieu argues, for instance, that "it is no accident that the moment of transition from ruthless methods of imposition to more subtle methods is doubtless the most favourable moment for bringing to light the objective truth of that imposition" (Reproduction xxi). Habits—and habitus—are continually made and re-made, and it is in the space that such transitions open up that doxa becomes orthodoxy, and new self-reflexive knowledges become possible. In that in crisis all the mechanisms of embodied social order suddenly start to lose their grip, we see a "weaken[ing] or ruin[ation of] the social conditions of thought [. . .] which encourages and facilitates the appearance of a reflexive awareness of these foundations" (Homo Academicus xxv). Crisis constitutes the very condition of possibility of Bourdieu's own analysis; but might it also enable the tabula rasa upon which one might at least imagine a reconstitution of society, a new set of habits that no longer sustain the system of distinction that Bourdieu otherwise describes and examines so eloquently?
In Chile in 1984, as in Paris in 1968, at least for a moment that other world seemed possible. Diamela Eltit's novel *Sacred Cow*, set during an era of anti-authoritarian protest in which "all the signs [have begun] to disintegrate" and "reality shift[ed] to the margins" (15) conjures up a vision of a movement of tattooed women workers, bound together at the fundamental corporeal level by their bodily branding. These women are "drawing up the basis of a new constitution" and formulated "a demand that is neither conditional nor negotiable" (70) for an expanded space within which they might construct new modes of life:

How are we supposed to live if our bodies are cramped up against the walls? How can we go on living like that? We, the tattooed workers, insist our demand for living space is absolutely justified. The country must allow us to live with room enough to breathe. (71)

The book's narrator—a shifting, uncertain, multiple voice that moves from first to second to third-person address—finds an at least temporary sense of community within this movement in which "nothing was in the least personal while at the same time it all belonged to us. I had attained the conviction that came with my tattoo" (71-72). As with other orders of habit—and the tattoo is an imprint of habit as surely as any other—conviction or belief are belated effects of the community's corporeal foundation.

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But this passionate conviction echoes a form of cooperation
in which singularity and commonality are fused.

It is a similar cooperation that Sacred Cow also finds
in the figure of a flock of birds that haunts all the
action it describes, birds

migrating, screeching with happiness or with pride or
with panic, all singing different tunes—[a chorus
that] was, none the less, harmonious, one of those
contemporary harmonies where every solo is in fact
carefully orchestrated.

Above all the squawks were of pleasure, a guttural
savage pleasure that put things human to shame. (102)

The birds are, however, profoundly ambivalent; the narrator
also recognizes "the murderousness of their flight. [. . .]
The flock was criminal, it was obsessive" (102). They
incarnate, in short, terror, with all its ambivalence of
joy and death. The birds offer a decidedly new form of
organization, transforming "cowardly flight" into "an epic
of deliverance" (103). What needs further investigation is
the extent to which this new community constituted along an
expansive line of flight, after the shattering of all
previous norms and habits, is a deliverance that will
simply reinstate new (albeit perhaps subtler) mechanisms of
control—as Bourdieu would no doubt suggest—or whether it
offers autonomy, a liberation of affective culture from the
state. As an attempt to answer this question, we will turn
to the concept of the multitude as developed by Italian autonomia, and by Antonio Negri in particular.