CHAPTER 4

CHILE, 1992: BOURDIEU AND HABIT

The social order is merely the order of bodies: the habituation to custom and law that law and custom produce by their very existence and persistence is largely sufficient, without any deliberate intervention, to impose a recognition of the law based on misrecognition of the arbitrariness which underlies it.

--Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations

Para conocer a Pinochet, basta con leer sus declaraciones . . . sus palabras lo dicen todo.

--Nelson Caucoto, in Luis Alejandro Salinas, The London Clinic

The Persistence of Habit

“Tiredness and waiting,” observes Deleuze, “even despair are the attitudes of the body.” This is the more reserved, soberer side of Deleuze’s thought; we are some
distance here from nomadic lines of flight. The point is to underscore the Spinozan maxim that “we do not even know what a body can do.” As we have seen, the body opens up a world of immanent resistance and Exodus: an “imperceptible passage of attitudes and postures to ‘gest,’” a Brechtian shock that is “necessarily social and political” as well as “bio-vital, metaphysical, and aesthetic.”¹ Yet, “obstinate and stubborn,” weary and worn down, often enough the body is simply a creature of habit. At its most reduced, most contracted, affect becomes habit. For instance, the tick inhabits “a world with only three affects, in the midst of all that goes on in the immense forest.”² It seeks out light, to climb a branch; smell, to detect and drop down on an animal passing below; and warmth, to burrow into that animal’s skin. These three affects are an index of the tick’s power, what its body can do; and they enable the tick’s becoming, its leap and clandestine submergence within a host animal’s hide. But these same affects also structure a profound passivity, a “tiredness and waiting” that reaches its apogee in the famous Rostock tick that, as Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben reports, zoologist Jakob von Uexküll “kept alive for eighteen years without nourishment.” The tick incarnates the persistence of habit, a captivation or “remaining-inactive” in which everything continues the same.³

The world today often seems to consist in little more than the sum of its routines; perhaps this is why it can feel as though history has indeed come to an end. Agamben suggests that we are closer to the tick than ever: “For a humanity that has become animal again, there is nothing left but the depoliticization of human societies.” We are hardly even bored any more, for boredom is at least the “awakening of the living being to its own captivation,” a realization of our own habituation.⁴ On television, we are obsessed with people like us who, as with the Rostock tick, are denied almost all external stimulus (reality TV’s Big Brother). On the Internet, millions surf listlessly,
perhaps with half an eye on webcams of coffee warming or paint drying. Ours is but a bare life, all the more so for the routines that fill it, captivating us as much as the tick is captivated by the meager affects that constitute its plane of immanence. Contemporary culture is pervaded with the sense that most of us are condemned to cubicles and McJobs, a world of blank indifference enlivened only by petty rivalries with co-workers or grievances towards employers. After its initial shock, even terror becomes routine: we adapt to the search procedures of airport security just as British shoppers in the 1970s adjusted to the inconveniences of IRA bomb threats. Few of us really believe either in the threat of terror or, still less, in the measures taken to deter it (which is in part why terror maintains its power to shock, because it is both expected and unexpected); but we go along with the rigmarole, altering our habits accordingly. Our bodies become accustomed to waiting in line, to passing through metal detectors, to iris scans and security pat-downs.

Few of us believe: habit persists even when ideology fades. German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk describes our contemporary condition as “a universal, diffuse cynicism,” which is “that state of consciousness that follows after naive ideologies and their enlightenment.” The paradigmatic cynic is “an average social character in the upper echelons of the elevated superstructure” who is aware that he or she is exploited at work and alienated by the culture industry, but who continues on none the less, in the spirit of “a detached negativity . . . that scarcely allows itself any hope, at most a little irony and pity.” Now a host of books, from Timothy Bewes’s *Cynicism and Postmodernity* to Wilber Caldwell’s *Cynicism and the Evolution of the American Dream*, reinforce the contention that, “over and over, cynicism pops up as a description of our society’s problems.” Moreover, today this cynicism is more diffuse, no longer restricted to Sloterdijk’s “upper echelons.” In what is often regarded as a sign of
widespread depoliticization, we are all cynical now, thanks to a “mass cultural retreat from politics itself.”

Cynicism threatens traditional conceptions of politics. No wonder so many commentators (and politicians, as Bewes documents) consider that their task is to rescue us from our cynical tendencies, to inspire us once again with belief: “Every diagnosis of cynicism renews a call to believe.” Critics such as Arthur Redding might assert that we are better off declaring that “we are not ‘believers.’” But cynicism also gives criticism pause for thought, in that it leaves little room for a politics of either denunciation or revelation. When we are already “enlightened” without our enlightenment altering our behavior, then a critique of mystifying representations loses its purchase. Ideology is no longer at issue. Social actors are neither persuaded nor mystified by ideology; rather, they are indifferent. As Sloterdijk observes, “the traditional critique of ideology stands at a loss before this cynicism.” At the least, the concept of ideology should be reformulated, in line with Deleuze and Guattari’s injunction to “revamp” its theory, to take account of the processes that secure social order while bypassing discourse and representation. So, commenting on Sloterdijk’s observations, the Lacanian critic Slavoj Žižek notes the failure of Marx’s formula for ideology: “They do not know it, but they are doing it.” Now that, by contrast, “they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it,” Žižek argues that “ideology is not simply a ‘false consciousness,’ an illusory representation of reality, it is rather this reality itself which is already to be conceived as ‘ideological.’” He urges an analysis of how “ideology structures the social reality itself,” beneath or despite discourse (in Žižek’s terms, beneath or despite the symbolic register). If ideology is no longer a matter of (mis)representation, then it should be reconceived as immanent and affective.
Alternatively, we might dispense with the concept of ideology altogether, in the spirit of Deleuze and Guattari’s “there is no ideology and never has been.”\(^{14}\) In this chapter, I turn to French social theorist Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of habit as a better model by which to understand social order and control, and as both correlative and corrective to Deleuze’s tendency to valorize an immanent affect as opposed to a transcendent state. For Bourdieu, the patterns of behavior that sustain state institutions and enable social reproduction are engrained directly in the body. Bourdieu argues that “‘ideology’ (really, by now, we would be better off calling it something else) does not appear as such, to us and to itself.”\(^{15}\) Effects attributed to ideology inhere, rather, in the embodied common sense that constitutes what Bourdieu terms the “habitus.” Habitus is generated by the repeated practices that seem commonsensical precisely because they are undertaken without ever coming fully to consciousness; and it also, in turn, generates the habits in which are incarnated an entire disposition towards the world. Habitus is “the social made body,” that is, social principles invested directly in the body “below the level of calculation and even consciousness, beneath discourse and representation.” In short, habitus is a system of habits, and also a structure that (re)produces habits that tend to be aligned with the social field within which the habitus is formed. Hence the habitus can go without saying, without acknowledgement, in that “when habitus encounters a social world of which it is the product, it is like a ‘fish in water’: it does not feel the weight of water, and it takes the world about itself for granted.”\(^{16}\)

Habit’s persistence, however, also generates its own form of resistance. The first sign of this resistance is inertia: when the social field within which habitus operates differs from the field that formed it, friction results as the old habits no longer fit the new circumstances. Moreover, such dislocation is inevitable, for habitus is always a
product of past experience, the repository of an embodied, historical memory. There is always some tension or slippage, however slight, between habitus and field. And geographical dislocation or rapid social change may mean that habitus is particularly poorly equipped to deal with the new contexts. Habitual strategies, previously taken for granted, may find little purchase, produce unanticipated effects, or simply be blocked. But old habits die hard. And frustration builds when habits are blocked or repressed. Precisely because habit is the expression of an embodied common sense, changing the social field may come to seem easier or more logical than adjusting our existing habits or adopting new ones. The stage is set for a conservative resistance, conservative because its goal is to preserve or recover the conditions of possibility for the unimpeded performance of habitual activities. There is no reason, however, to imagine that such resistance is necessarily politically conservative. Immigrants, for instance, may bring with them habits forged by radical social moments, or may find themselves indisposed to habituate themselves to social conditions that the local population has long tolerated. African slaves in the Americas sustained their resistance to the plantation system in part thanks to the cultural and religious habits that had endured through the middle passage. The shock of old habits meeting new circumstances demands novel and creative strategies, hybrid solutions that change social reality and in turn engender new habits. Habit suggests that things could be different (because they always once were different). Reading Bourdieu somewhat against the grain, downplaying his functionalist tone and scientistic inclinations, I stress a conatus or striving specific to habitus. The persistence of habit ensures historical memory, but it is also an ethical claim on the future. Habit is both a reminder of the past and the kernel of what is to come. Hence habit leads us to the multitude: a social subject that gains power as it contracts new
habits, new modes of being in the world whose durability is secured precisely by the fact that they are embodied well beneath consciousness.

Latin America is often envisaged as a site of passion and affect, but it is equally often supposed to be a place where nothing ever happens, in which the state is characterized by endless bureaucratic delays to which its citizens swiftly become habituated. For all his fame as a novelist of magical realism, and so purportedly of surprise, creativity, and delight, Gabriel García Márquez is as much a writer of habit, tedium, and repetition. *One Hundred Years of Solitude* is an epic without a plot, whose characters are stymied by their propensity to reproduce the attitudes and actions of their forebears. Matriarch Úrsula Iguarán notes these insistent repetitions, which enable her to navigate the household even after she loses her sight, as “she discovered that every member of the family, without realizing it, repeated the same path every day, the same actions, and almost repeated the same words at the same hour.” Or consider the opening of “No One Writes to the Colonel,” in which the colonel of the novella’s title makes a cup of that ubiquitous stimulant, coffee, banishing tiredness with caffeine. But he and his wife have ailing bodies: he “experienced the feeling that fungus and poisonous lilies were taking root in his gut”; she “had suffered an asthma attack” the night before and “sip[s] her coffee in the pauses of her gravelly breathing. She was scarcely more than a bit of white on an arched, rigid spine.” The pair’s deteriorating physical condition is a direct result of their long wait for the colonel’s overdue pension: “For nearly sixty years . . . the colonel had done nothing else but wait.”

In what follows in “No One Writes to the Colonel,” there is not much action beyond the small routines that occupy the couple in their quiet, desperate poverty. The colonel makes coffee, winds the pendulum clock (a constant reminder of time’s passage), sees to the rooster he is keeping for a forthcoming cockfight, picks out his suit, shaves, dresses . . . “He did each thing as if it were a transcendent act.” But these habits are far from transcendent. Rather, they are the semi-automatic, reiterated reflexes of a life spent waiting for transcendence, for a response from whichever ministry it is that is charged with allocating money to war veterans. Of all the colonel’s routines, the most symptomatic is his weekly trip to greet the mail launch, follow the postman to the post office, and watch him sort the mail, hoping for a letter from the pensions office. Always in vain: “As on every Friday, he returned home without the longed-for letter.” Waiting, the colonel and his wife are subject
to a “slow death.” Almost to the end, they maintain their patience, however much it is tested as they squabble over strategies to keep their bodies at least semi-nourished. Should they sell or keep the clock, and above all the rooster whose fight could lead to a big pay-out? Finally, the couple are reduced to bare life, at a loss even as to what to eat. And yet, strangely, this near-abject condition, as they lose any hope for transcendence, ushers in an almost ecstatic ascesis. After all his hesitation and anxiety, after so long being ignored or taken advantage of by the state and local notables alike, somehow the colonel’s waiting is over: “It had taken the colonel seventy-five years—the seventy-five years of his life, minute by minute—to reach this moment. He felt pure, explicit, invincible at the moment that he replied: ‘Shit.’”

The ambivalence of the colonel’s expletive is that it can be read both as the ultimate in resignation, a willingness even to eat shit; and also as a refusal, the first stirrings of resistance.

There is, then, a politics of habit, which persists even as ideology wanes. We might consider it a micropolitics of affect, or a regularized low-intensity affect, closely associated with ethics. The decline of ideology is not the end of politics; a new politics is born, or rather the hidden truth of the old is finally revealed. Nor is it in fact the end of history; indeed habit is marked by and struggles with history and temporality, whereas ideology and hegemony claim to transcend and subsume our experience of time. In a sense, habit is life itself: as the nineteenth-century philosopher and psychologist William James noted, “living creatures . . . are bundles of habits.” But habit is also a source of life in that it is more than mere repetition. For Bourdieu, “one of the reasons for the use of the term habitus,” a word that is the Latin for habit, “is the wish to set aside the common conception of habit as a mechanical assembly or preformed programme.” Habitus is generative: “An endless capacity to engender products,” it is a force for “invention,” even though its “conditioned and conditional freedom . . . is as remote from a creation of unpredictable novelty as it is from a simple mechanical reproduction of the initial conditionings.” It is in the gap, the temporal or geographical
lag, between initial conditionings and habitual practice, that a politics opens up, albeit unseen and unrecognized. The politics of habit has long been misrecognized, its workings misattributed to ideological factors and hegemonic projects. In this misattribution, the role of habit is ignored and politics is (again) rendered opaque. Or rather, the fact that politics itself works opaquely, beneath discourse and representation, is hidden by an insistence on clarity and transparency.

Theorists of habit also often focus on the everyday. For feminist cultural critic Rita Felski, “the everyday is synonymous with habit, sameness, routine. . . . The idea of habit crystallises this experience of dailiness.” Habit is associated, then, with “everyday life.” As Felski puts it, “Everyday life simply is the routine act of conducting one’s day to day existence without making it an object of conscious attention.” Habit drives and is driven by the unseen and barely audible hum of micropolitics that pervades our daily routines; it is like background noise in that we are almost oblivious to its ongoing importance, the ways in which it structures our all too familiar, endlessly repeated quotidian activities. Habit comprises the immanent micropolitics that Michel Foucault theorizes as governmentality or biopower. Habit is an instance of a power that has “invest[ed] life through and through.” But it is therefore enabling as well as regulating or repressive. Without our habits, we would be paralyzed in the face of the myriad decisions that we otherwise take for granted. The power that sustains our mundane routines is also a power directed to the production of life; it is a “power capable of optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general.”

The everyday, routine, and almost invisible politics of habit contrasts with the often spectacular display that characterizes politics as it is more usually understood. The politics of habit is not the clash of ideologies within a theater of representation. It is a politics that is immanent and corporeal, that works directly through the body. Yet
habit is primary; it is not an effect or consequence of political processes that take place elsewhere. Rather, other forms of politics depend upon the dispositions and attitudes that habit inculcates. If we were to think of habit as ideology (and I agree with Bourdieu that we would be better off calling it something else), it would be closer to the French Marxist Louis Althusser’s “ideology in general” than to ideology as the “system of ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social group.” Ideology in general precedes and underwrites specific ideologies, in that it constitutes the subjects who then conform to or recognize a system of representations. For Althusser, ideology in general consists in the mechanism of interpellation whereby Ideological State Apparatuses such as the school or the family call subjects into being, subjects whose condition of existence is that they recognize the power of some other, transcendent Subject (capitalized by Althusser) that is reciprocally produced in the same operation. Hence, although interpellation is material, in that it takes place in institutions and through practice (in his illustration, the subject comes into being by turning to face a police officer who hails him or her, and who comes to incarnate the Subject), what it produces is ideal. Physical gestures and attitudes such as kneeling at mass or school assembly construct a doubled subjectivity, in which many subjects turn to face the one, transcendent Subject that appears to be mediated though ideas and representations. But the display, the theatrical (or cinematic) separation of Subject from subjects, is a product of the process that it subsequently appears to have produced. It is an effect that is taken to be cause; a quasi-cause that arises through habit.

The habits that structure ideology in general constitute the state and its institutions, and also establish a relation to those institutions that appears to be ideological. The subjects that emerge through interpellation act as though they were following their consciences, as though ideas governed actions. Hegemony theory
discloses that these ideas are not free, that they are orchestrated elsewhere. But it still stresses belief and consent. This does not go far enough: it does not recognize that belief arises from habit. Althusser cites the dictum of seventeenth-century philosopher Blaise Pascal: “Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you will believe.” A Catholic will go to mass, a school pupil sing in assembly, a citizen enter the voting booth, and it can appear as though these practices were an effect of free will or, alternatively, of willing if deluded consent to a hegemonic project. Althusser insists, by contrast, that interpellation is a practice, and so already corporeal: always already acted out or performed, a subject’s ideas are “material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject.” The ideal is at best contingent: its content irrelevant, it is effect rather than cause. Belief in the power of ideology is itself ideological; ideology is at best a quasi-cause in that everything happens (only) as though ideology were in fact determinant. Hence “the ideology of ideology” is the conviction that ideology matters, that our actions follow on from the ideas that we hold or even from the ideas that hold us and so from the ruses of some hegemonic project.27 And when this ideology of ideology wanes, when it becomes apparent that subjects “know very well what they are doing” but are still doing it, we have entered posthegemonic times.

My case study here is Chile from the heyday of resistance to Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship in the 1980s, to the relative quiescence of the so-called transition to democracy in the 1990s. Between 1983 to 1986, so-called new social movements organized a rolling campaign of protest against the Pinochet regime. These movements included women’s groups, the families of the detained and disappeared, and neighborhood associations, all of which emerged in the vacuum left after parties and unions were proscribed. A loose popular alliance, this “multi-form opposition” led to much discussion of the power
of civil society, and manifested, it was said, a widespread “cry for change” constrained only by “the Junta’s massive efforts to hold down the opposition.” The protests later fed into the broad coalition that agitated for a “no” vote in the 1988 referendum that finally put paid to the dictatorship. This coalition was figured as a “concertación” or pact binding civil society in a rejection of authoritarianism, and in a desire for reconciliation. The divisions that had been characteristic of Chilean society, aggravated and underlined both by Salvador Allende’s left-wing Unidad Popular (1970-1973) and by Pinochet’s dictatorship (1973-1990), would be replaced by a broad culture of consensus. Yet, as anthropologist Julia Paley puts it, the “paradox in the Chilean transition” is that social movements “largely diminished with the onset of post-dictatorship democracy in the 1990s. This quieting of social movement activity at what appeared to be a moment of openness for political activity is striking.” As the Concertación came to power, with democratically-elected president Patricio Aylwin in 1990, Chileans abandoned the protests and mobilizations of previous years. If the Concertación was the culmination of the social movements, it also finished them off more effectively than Pinochet ever could. So the question that plagues any analysis of these movements, greeted with such excitement when they burst onto the scene, is why did they disappear so easily, absorbed within a transition that ultimately left untouched most of the key aspects of Pinochet’s social policy. Why did they “stop short half-way along the road”? Why did “none of them [find] themselves in a position to put forward a coherent project for transformation in whose embrace all the anti-systemic referents could conjugate and combine”?

A classic celebratory account of the social movements is political scientist Cathy Schneider’s *Shantytown Protest in Pinochet’s Chile*. Schneider has much to say about the height of the protests. But faced with apparent depoliticization and what she calls (quoting Aristide Zolberg) a “restoration of boredom” after the dictatorship, she merely suggests that “the deeply rooted opposition political culture and the networks of resistance that allowed Chileans to mobilize against authoritarian rule may only be in hiatus.” She therefore concludes with the presentiment, perhaps no more than the hope, that “Chile will again be shaken by an apocalypse of popular rebellion.” By contrast, Dutch anthropologist Ton Salman’s *The Diffident Movement* is, as its title indicates, a more disenchanted take on the social movement experience. Salman concludes that “it is improbable that the pobladores [shantytown residents] will emerge as a strong social movement any time in the near future.” Political scientist
Kenneth Roberts is likewise pessimistic, opening his book *Deepening Democracy?* with “mixed emotions” and the wish that he could be “more optimistic regarding the prospects for social reform and the deepening of democracy in Latin America.” Roberts puts the blame for this unsatisfactory state of affairs on a failure to establish “a participatory civil society.”

But Paley shows that the rhetoric of civil society and the discourse of participation are part of the problem, rather than the solution. She points out how, “while framed as a way of bolstering civil society by strengthening civil society, this kind of participation subsidized and fortified neoliberal economic reforms.”

A similar emphasis on the continuities between dictatorship and transition can be found in Franco-Chilean theorist Nelly Richard’s *Cultural Residues*, which also provides the best introduction to the culture of the post-dictatorship period in Chile.

Rather than seeing the anti-Pinochet protests as a struggle for consent in the face of dictatorial coercion, I argue that it is habit that best describes both the protests and the quiescence that followed. Habit persists as ideology wanes in what is almost a textbook example of a post-ideological society. Ideology figures within Chilean public discourse only as an ugly holdover from the past: the Concertación claims to supercede the ideological divisions that allegedly once plagued an overly-politicized society. Even critics of the regime agree with the proposition that Chileans have historically taken ideology too seriously, and that Chile’s weakness is that “ideas constitute the principle dynamic force in [Chilean] culture.” The premise of the Concertación, therefore, is that political ideas are no longer up for discussion. If the Pinochet coup was facilitated by the political system’s collapse under the weight of ever more polarized divisions during Allende’s Unidad Popular, governability is now ensured by forestalling or warding off ideological debate. In place of ideological antagonism, the Concertación offers the pragmatics of consensus and a practice of co-operation in the service of (mostly economic) goals that are taken to be objective. Neoliberal technocracy promises an everyday life characterized by uncontroversial routine. So the post-dictatorial transition, in so far as it draws lessons from the past, looks as much to the Unidad Popular as to the dictatorship: if “never again” should the state routinely resort to coercion and violence, equally “never again,” it is implied, should the public sphere be rent by disagreement as it was in the early 1970s. So this is a consensus that no longer depends upon consent. The Concertación refuses both coercion and consent, as though in recognition that the struggle to win consent, to achieve hegemony, would always be incomplete, would always
leave a remainder whose very existence would make alternatives, of either the left or the right, imaginable. The transition from authoritarian rule orchestrates public life as though neither the Unidad Popular nor the dictatorship had ever happened, making socialism and dictatorship equally unimaginable. The transition aims to erase its status as transition: to become a permanent interregnum, an unshakeable habit, dissolving history and ideology at one and the same time.

Imagination is best curtailed if the past can be forgotten. Chilean democracy refuses any foundational narratives, preferring an amnesia that resists language itself. The political sphere in postdictatorial society is founded upon what sociologist Tomás Moulián terms a “compulsion to forget” what immediately preceded that foundation.36 In response, some have advocated a politics of memory: Moulián, for one, in Conversación interrumpida con Allende, which aims to recover a dialogue and a political project cut short by the coup; or the contributors to Nelly Richard’s collection Políticas y estéticas de la memoria, whose focus is on the atrocities committed by the dictatorship.

Memory is at the center also of the continued struggles by families of the disappeared and the series of court cases through which human rights groups pursued Pinochet following his 1998 arrest in London and on right up until his death in 2006. And Patricio Guzmán’s documentary Chile, la memoria obstinada (1997) and Andrés Wood’s feature Machuca (2004) are films that, in different ways, attempt a visual dialogue with the past. In all these cases, the politics of memory invokes the marginal, or what has been marginalized first by the dictatorship and then by the transition: they elaborate upon what Richard terms the “cultural residues” of Chile’s turbulent recent history. Yet this call to the margins both presupposes and reconstructs a vanished center. It recovers historical memory in order to reconstruct common narratives and shared (if contested, but contested because shared) projects of sense-making. As such, the appeal to memory is both an attempt to re-establish hegemony and also a melancholic recognition of hegemony’s impossibility. Even Richard, who recognizes the impossibility of recovering any lost totality except as a specter haunting the fragments that persist into the present, at times succumbs to nostalgia for the totalizing projects of yesteryear. Her discussion of a collection of sidewalk portrait photographs from the 1970s, for example, is strangely in thrall to an era in which women’s bodies were “still subjected to the unity of a central axis of temporal and geographic organization of the gaze.”37 The attempt to put memory into words invokes unity, fixity, and a striated space that puts the subject in the crosshairs of the gaze. Yet now that such unity has been lost, fixity
undone, and the center is lacking or hollow (the Plaza Italia where the portraits Richard discusses were
taken is today the unvisited axis of a traffic roundabout), it is not just the mad or the sick or the criminal
who constitute some subaltern outside. We are all marginal now. Marginality is no privileged position,
around which a progressive politics could construct a new hegemony. Chilean writer Diamela Eltit’s
work illustrates this predicament: the vagrant in her semi-testimonial book El padre mío, for instance,
or the forlorn protagonist of her novel Lumpérica are not atypical figures, for all their eccentricities. It is
not that they inhabit some subaltern outside, at society’s margin; rather, they are the social, they
condense and incarnate the whole of society, even or especially in their odd habits and distracted
ramblings by which they act out or ventriloquize multitudes.

The generalization, and so banalization or habituation, of marginality in Chile has its correlate in
voter apathy: “The number of voters who indicate ‘no preference’ or who nullify their vote has . . .
continued to increase, surpassing all historical precedents and climbing well beyond the average for
Western democracies.” The 2000 presidential election showed a slight reversal of this trend, in part
because of the furore surrounding Pinochet’s extradition hearings in London, but over the long term,
voter participation continues to decline. Even the prospect of the country’s first woman president, in
the 2006 election won by Michelle Bachelet, failed to stem the tide. Nor do other modes of political
mobilization compensate: Chilean protest styles have been exported elsewhere (the “cacerolazo,” or
pot-banging, so much a feature of the Argentine and Venezuelan crises of 2001 and 2002, can be traced
back to anti-Allende mobilizations of the early 1970s), but as part of a divestment from protest within
the country itself. From cauldron of ideological dissent to cool, clean model of neoliberal quiescence
over two decades: in culture as in economics, Chile converted to posthegemonic neoliberalism quicker
and earlier than most. It is notable, however, that where protest has flared up again, it has been around
very everyday issues: urban transport, for instance, or the rising costs of education.

It is often claimed that we are witnessing ideology’s decline, although differing
explanations are offered for the fact. For instance it is argued that, with the end of the
Cold War, liberal-democratic capitalism is common sense, and socialism a bankrupt
dogma. But the end of ideology is also taken to mean that people are now less
interested in politics; falling electoral turnouts show that political narratives no longer
have mobilizing force. For still others, the end of ideology follows from a general
distrust of master narratives associated with postmodernity. Finally, debates around
concepts such as “control societies” and governmentality suggest that neoliberalism
ushers in a new form of rule for which ideology no longer plays a significant role; less
the evacuation of politics, than its more sinister insinuation into every pore of society as
biopolitics. All these arguments have their merits, but they describe not so much the
decline of ideology than the end of the ideology of ideology. For ideology has not
vanished; after all, even many of the obituaries to ideology can be read as ideological
statements. The state continues to inhabit a double inscription, in structures of
representation as well as in bodies. But ideology itself has lost its hold, and yet
everything continues regardless. Contemporary capitalism does not need to weave
ideology into an outwardly coherent system that would gain consent and secure the
reproduction of its specific social order. Hegemony theory, premised on the social
efficacy of ideology, loses its power to persuade us that hegemony is the sine qua non of
social organization. But was it ever? If hegemony is unpersuasive now, and yet its
disappearance does not make for radical social change, then it can hardly have been the
key factor in social domination earlier. Ideology’s apparent decline is no more than the
symptom of a pre-existing condition; it reveals the persistence of habit.

Habit secures social order. Even in its best-case scenario, hegemony never
sufficiently explains how order is secured and maintained. Bourdieu’s theorization of
habit as an immanent structuring structure indicates that power’s most successful
strategies are precisely those that never emerge into discourse, that go without saying in
everyday life’s routine rhythms. The state and its institutions function all the more
effectively because they operate behind the backs even of their own functionaries,
whatever their best intentions. So in what follows I develop Bourdieu’s
conceptualization of habitus as reproduction. He describes how the habitus generates a practical reason that lies not “in the realm of representations” but at “the level of the most profound corporeal dispositions.” These “cognitive structures inscribed in bodies” constitute what Deleuze would term a “virtual” logic that generates actual practices in harmony with the institutions and experiences that shaped those structures in the first place. The workings of habitus are immediate, but also historical and spatial: it forms our sense of time and place, our bearing in the world. Through habitus, power is invested in the production of life itself, in the everyday affects of ordinary encounters.

At times Bourdieu struggles to explain resistance or to imagine possibilities for radical social change. But he does observe that habit can give rise to novelty and creativity. Its embodied memory motivates ethical resistance as well as political conformity. Moreover, in that habitus is a collective disposition, it suggests mechanisms for the formation of collective subjectivities whose cohesive principle is resonance rather than identity, expansive inclusion rather than demarcated difference. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri note, “habits constitute our shared nature” and so “look not only backward but also forward.”

Habit as Immanence

Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is central to his intervention into the debate about structure and agency, “one of the key faultlines that runs through social theory.” Some theories stress the ways in which social structures determine individual or social agency. Marxism and psychoanalysis, for instance, tend to view agency as constrained by structures that are, respectively, material and psychic. Others emphasize that agents can resist or overcome these structural determinants. Cultural studies, for example,
often points to the slippages by which (say) consumers eke out a measure of agency even within contemporary capitalism. As British sociologist Anthony Giddens (whose theory of structuration is an alternative bid to resolve the debate) puts it, those for whom “structure (in the divergent senses attributed to that concept) has primacy over action, and the constraining qualities of structure are strongly accentuated” are arrayed against those for whom “action and meaning are accorded primacy in the explication of human conduct; structural concepts are not notably prominent, and there is not much talk of constraint.” Giddens goes on to characterize this difference as an “imperialism of the social object” facing “an imperialism of the object.”

In short, these are two competing claims to transcendence; what is at stake, Giddens argues, is as much ontological as it is epistemological, as much about our models of what society actually is as about conflicting perspectives on the same model.

Bourdieu’s intervention is therefore also ontological, substituting immanence for the dueling imperial transcendences of structure and agency. He refuses both “mechanism” (an emphasis on structure) and “finalism” (a stress on agency), arguing that the debate between the two is “a false dilemma.” We should certainly “abandon all theories which explicitly or implicitly treat practice as a mechanical reaction” shaped by rules or structures alone, but “rejection of mechanistic theories in no way implies that . . . we should reduce the objective intentions and constituted significations of actions and works to the conscious and deliberate intentions of their authors.” Mechanism and finalism, structure and agency, are equally reductionist, seeking causes always elsewhere, in some other dimension, either the “transcendent, permanent existence” of objective social constraints or the “transcendence of the ego” equipped to make its own rules. So Bourdieu turns to habit, or habitus, an embodied set of dispositions immanent to practice itself, to give “back to history and to society what was given to a
transcendence or a transcendent subject.” Habitus is a system “of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations.” These dispositions are “objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends.” Habit, everyday activity, is therefore the product of a “scheme (or principle) immanent in practice, which . . . exists in a practical state in agents’ practice and not in their consciousness, or rather, their discourse.” Regulation and practice are immanent to each other, rather than mediated either by consciousness or by external structures. Habitus is an attitude of the body. It is an unspoken and unspeakable feel for the social game that generates the positions and actions that agents adopt in given situations, in regular if not fully predictable ways. Because it is immanent, habitus is embedded, and so structured; and it is also generative, an immediate rather than external motor of action.

There are many overlaps between Bourdieu’s habitus and Deleuze’s conception of the virtual. Both are immanent and productive, intensive and affective, corporeal and immediate. The relation between habitus and practice is not unlike that between virtual and actual: habitus leads to practice through an unfolding or differentiation that takes place in the event of an encounter with other bodies. Habitus and the virtual alike describe an ontology that underlies but is of a different order from the realm of representation, discourse, and ideology. Habitus, Bourdieu states, is like the work of art in that it “always contains something ineffable, not by excess . . . but by default, something which communicates, so to speak, from body to body, i.e. on the hither side of words and concepts,” while the virtual, Brian Massumi explains, is “the unsaid of the statement, the unthought of thought.” Hence both theorists’ distaste for ideology: for
Deleuze and Guattari, “there is no ideology and never has been”; for Bourdieu, “I have little by little come to shun the use of the word ‘ideology.’”

Despite these similarities, however, the tenor of Bourdieu’s work differs markedly from Deleuze’s. Where Deleuze emphasizes escape, and a flight towards the immanent virtuality of affect as an empowering realization of what the body can do, for Bourdieu the immanence of habitus is characterized above all by inertia. Bourdieu shows how habit leads to social reproduction and works against radical social change, so much so that (as Bourdieu and his collaborator Loïc Wacquant note) some even accuse him of “a politically sterile hyperfunctionalism.”

Though his “functionalist tenor” does not exhaust Bourdieu’s account of habit, the contrast with the voluntarist tenor of Deleuze’s theorization of affect is dramatic. Yet the difference is not, as Massumi claims, that habitus is an “ideological notion” whereas Deleuze’s account “emphasizes that [habit] belongs as much to the organic stratum, to the productive, physiological capacities of the flesh.”

Bourdieu’s habitus is fully as corporeal as Deleuze’s affect. One way of seeing the contrast between Bourdieu and Deleuze, then, is that it replicates the debate between structure and agency, but now as a contest between two immanences rather than two forms of transcendence.

The key to the difference between Bourdieu and Deleuze, and so to the specificity of the concept of habitus, consists in Bourdieu’s related concepts of “field” and “symbolic capital.” For Bourdieu, habitus is always embedded in a prior social field, which itself is structured by symbolic power. In some ways Bourdieu takes more seriously than Deleuze, then, the notion encapsulated in Deleuze and Guattari’s own affirmation that “politics precedes being.” For if habitus is a set of “structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures,” it is not only generative but also generated. It is the product of a given state of power relations: the social field
as a whole, and its distinct subfields, such as the artistic field, the journalistic field, the academic field, and so on. Hence, in Wacquant’s words, “a field consists of a set of objective, historical relations between positions anchored in certain forms of power (or capital), while habitus consists of a set of historical relations ‘deposited’ within individual bodies.” The dispositions of habitus are also depositions, both in that they constitute a record of the state of the field that formed them, and in that they are the sediments that build up within a particular landscape of power. They are “conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence.” And what they generate or structure in turn tends therefore to reproduce the structures that constituted them, in that they generate practices that call those structures into being, by silently taking them for granted.

Every field is shaped by a competition for domination and capital, its structure “determined by the structure of the distribution of the distinct forms of capital that are active in it.” For there are different forms of capital, whose relative weight depends upon the field in question. The shape of the field of culture, for instance, is determined by its differential distribution of cultural capital, while it is financial capital that counts in the market for economic goods. Yet Bourdieu downplays financial capital, in favor of the various forms of symbolic capital that are the object of struggle, and also the ways in which the value accorded each form of capital is at stake in these struggles, as well as the mechanisms by which one form is converted into another. Power is most effective when it is symbolic, which does not mean that it is representational or “merely” symbolic, but that it is a mode of domination whose legitimacy derives from the fact that its arbitrariness is misrecognized, so much so that it goes without saying. Bourdieu and co-author Jean-Claude Passeron’s axiom of social reproduction is that “every power which manages to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the
power relations which are the basis of its force, adds its own specifically symbolic force to those power relations.” What habitus reproduces is our corporeal assent to power’s legitimacy, and to the unequal distribution of capital that it secures.

Habitus is reflex and relay, product and producer, assuring social continuity by literally incarnating the principles of social order. In Bourdieu’s words, “it ensures the active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in each organism in the form of schemes and perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee the ‘correctness’ of practices and their constancy over time.” It ensures that social agents are attuned to their circumstances. It fosters the self-confidence of the “inheritor” who, rich in cultural capital, exhibits a confidence and flair that is rewarded with further social and cultural capital; and it also ensures that those dispossessed of cultural capital assent to their dispossession by rejecting what is culturally consecrated (be it higher education or high art) with the sentiment that it is not for them. The dispossessed are often the first to suggest that they have only themselves to blame for their predicament. Privilege is naturalized as though it were simply a “gift”; and subordination is taken for granted as though social difference were a question of talent or taste. And all this is legitimated and arbitrated by institutions and officials who need not be aware of what they are doing, who can be committed or even (increasingly) entirely cynical about the ideals they are upholding. For ideals are not at stake. Academic diplomas, for instance, attest to “gifts” and “merits,” and can do so objectively with no hint of bias, because the real work has been done in the conversion and so dissimulation of privilege as attitude. The source of these dispositions is concealed, all the more effectively in that the habits they generate are second nature. Hence “the supreme privilege” of the privileged is “not seeing themselves as privileged,” which in turn “manages the more easily to convince the disinherited that they owe their scholastic and social destiny to their lack of gifts.
and merits, because in matters of culture absolute dispossession excludes awareness of being dispossessed.” There is no conspiracy because there is no hidden knowledge: the game’s winners as much as its losers, as well as its arbitrators, can all act in perfectly good faith. The judgments that lead to social promotion or exclusion, driven by the feeling that “he’s a good chap” or “she’s not one of us,” can be justified by transcendent principles whose legitimacy is assured by the fact that they resonate with immanent habits.

Authoritarian regimes rely neither on persuasion nor on censorship but on the silent harmonization that they establish in everyday routines. Such regimes are often described as “states of exception,” a term associated with the German theorist Carl Schmitt, whose *Political Theology* defines the sovereign as “he who decides on the exception.” For an analysis of the history of states of exception in Latin America, see political scientist Brian Loveman’s *The Constitution of Tyranny*, which outlines the constitutional precedents on which Pinochet drew to justify his coup when the military junta declared that “the armed forces have taken on themselves the moral duty, which the country imposes on them, of deposing the government.” The Chilean constitutions of 1925, 1980, and 1985 codified the instances in which states of exception could be enforced, and Pinochet meticulously obeyed the letter of this authority in his promulgation of states of emergency and states of siege. His regime instituted its own Law of the States of Exception in 1985, further codifying and regularizing exceptionality. This combination of old and new legislation “created a complex hierarchy of states of exception, which could be declared by the government in cases of internal disturbance, subversion, or public calamity.” But amid this increasingly complex typology and perhaps surprising adherence to the rule of law, what is important is how such exceptionality soon becomes normal: “The states of exception were renewed constantly, with the state of emergency in force from 1973 until 1988 when the plebiscite was held.” Exceptionality became the norm, as indeed it was in much of Latin America during this period: the state of emergency in Paraguay under Alfredo Stroessner, for instance, lasted from 1954 to 1988. Exception became routine, while protest became exceptional.
Despite the understandable attention paid to resistance against the Pinochet dictatorship, what should be noted, because it otherwise goes without saying, is how limited it was. Little has been written about “everyday” authoritarianism in Chile, the long periods of relative calm (however uneasy) that predominated in most of the country, most of the time. (Perhaps we could find such accounts in the novel or the chronicle rather than in social scientific studies.) For instance, journalist Samuel Chavkin’s *Storm over Chile* takes its subtitle “The Junta Under Siege” from a chapter describing the protests of 1983-1984, but has almost nothing to say about either the period 1974-1983, from the coup’s consolidation to the outbreak of protest, or 1984-1988, from the height of the protests to the plebiscite that eventually brought down Pinochet. Indeed, the entirety of Chavkin’s account of the period 1984-1988 is contained in the following sentence: “For yet another four years Pinochet continued to hang on to power by torture and murder of his opponents.” Hence Chavkin hardly explains either the quiescence that was the rule or indeed why that quiescence should be broken, however briefly, by mobilization and resistance. By contrast, Schneider’s fuller account of the protests is more thoughtful about the reason for their abeyance in the mid-1980s. She quotes one activist, Leo, recalling that “people left their homes, were beaten, saw no clear purpose to endure the abuse, grew bored with the protests, and returned to their homes.” Beyond state-sponsored opposition, Leo points also to a fatigue and a boredom that took over even in the most radicalized of barrios, a tiredness echoed elsewhere in Schneider’s text: “Activists grew weary,” she notes, commenting on a 1986 survey that showed the remarkable percentage of Chileans who felt tense, “resigned and disappointed,” or “sad”; she remarks on the “state of numbness” that psychologists diagnosed even among activists; and she endorses Zolberg’s argument that “movements of political enthusiasm are followed . . . always by the restoration of boredom.” In this panorama of a movement that has worn itself out, a low-level anxiety comes to the fore as ideological concerns recede. Schneider quotes another commentator’s observation that the new generation of Chilean workers is “a collection of anxious individualists” who are no longer, now in Schneider’s words, “ideologically predisposed.” A general state of “physical and mental exhaustion” prevails. Tiredness and waiting. Schneider depicts a population who, by the end of the dictatorship, are afflicted body and mind by the affects that Spinoza categorizes as sad passions: the “sadness [that] diminishes or hinders a man’s powers of action.” In Bourdieu’s terms, this is the “resignation to necessity” that, he argues, characterizes the habitus of the dominated classes.
It is in this context of exhaustion, and against the celebration of popular resistance found for example in Kenneth Aman and Cristián Parker’s *Popular Culture in Chile*, that Salman emphasizes that the explosion of energy and enthusiasm in the revolt of Chile’s new social movements was “an exceptional episode.” Salman points to “lengthy periods of ‘normalcy’” during which “what is involved are dispositions that do not solely play a role at the level of consciousness.” He employs Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to explain the delay in the emergence of poblador militancy in terms of a “class unconsciousness” incarnating a “sensitivity to authority” and “a wider and deeper tendency to reject deviancy.” The pobladores’ dispositions were “fragmentary and pragmatic and not politically articulated.” Protest only erupted once “the specific habitual and internalized ways of interpreting and perceiving Chilean reality and one’s own position and options within it became inadequate.” Even then, the ensuing mobilization was essentially conservative. For instance, women became active in the name of family and community survival, fostering “a practical, non-ideological politicization of the disrupted linkages in the traditional family, and in the traditional poblador strategies.” Salman emphasizes habitus as inertia, as the embodied sedimentation of a collective history that “resists change and guarantees the continuity of subjects.” Politics, in its traditional conception as a spectacular and articulate attempt to set or change the public agenda through discourse, arises only when there is a breakdown between the expectations incarnated in habitus and the objective conditions of the moment, that is, when traditional (unspoken, unconscious) strategies fail because the field that molded them has changed. Thus the protests’ emergence and their decline had the same cause: a radical disenchantment.

In the first instance, and especially for women and the young, the call to mobilization in 1983 and 1984 catalyzed a “disillusioned optimism” that arose from the failure of inherited strategies that had enabled survival and the prospect of social betterment for an earlier generation of male workers. But as the protests became routine, they became subject to the same disenchantment: disappointment itself became embodied within the pobladores’ habitus. So it is less that the protests “set the stage,” as Schneider suggests, “for a negotiated transition to democracy” than that they were the visible symptom of a deeper transition in the regime of affect, from a sense of expectation nurtured by the state to the all-pervasive low-level anxiety that characterizes a postdictatorial order in which the market sets the tone for social interaction. The period of the new social movements, in other words, effected a change within the habitus of the majority of Chile’s population, who were habituated to the order that would
come fully into its own only after the end of the dictatorship, with the institutionalization of the state of exception under neoliberalism.

Belief is a matter of the body: “To speak of ‘ideologies’ is to locate in the realm of representations . . . what in fact belongs to the order of belief, that is, to the level of the most profound corporeal dispositions.”\(^7\) It is also therefore immediate. Bourdieu adapts and radicalizes the Pascalianism on which Althusser also draws. For Pascal, belief arises from corporeal dispositions, but for Bourdieu it is located in those dispositions themselves, and needs never rise to consciousness. Though praising Pascal’s challenge to “all those who insist on seeing belief in terms of representations,” Bourdieu argues that for Pascal consciousness is still pre-eminent, “as if will and consciousness were the basis of the disposition which ‘with no violence, art or argument makes us believe.’”\(^7\) For Bourdieu, however, dispositions are always primary: “What is essential goes without saying because it comes without saying.” There is no prior decision, and so no wager. Institutions work directly on the body; social order produces no rationale so long as it needs none, and “the principles embodied in this way are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness.”\(^7\) Everything passes through the corporeal, as we are habituated to subjection. We are steeped in doxa, “the relationship of immediate adherence that is established in practice between a habitus and the field to which it is attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for-granted that flows from practical sense.”\(^7\) Despite its immediacy, however, there is always some slippage between habitus and social order. Something always escapes. For as a deposit of the power relations that structure a given social field, habitus is also a residue, an embodied memory of a previous state of that field. And because fields are always in flux, in that their contours are determined only in the course of a permanent struggle between social
agents by means of their continual position-takings, habitus and field are never fully synchronized. Hence the historicity of habitus, or rather its “double historicity” in that it is both the product of history and at the same time the force that, by generating practice, produces history. More fundamentally still, habitus generates time itself, for “time is what practical activity produces in the very act whereby it produces itself. . . . Time is engendered in the actualization of the act.” History and time, in short, are fully immanent: “The theory of practice condensed in the notions of field and habitus allows us to do away with the metaphysical representation of time and history as realities in themselves, external and anterior to practice.”

The historicity of habitus secures social reproduction, but at the same time also allows for the possibility of resistance. It is because the practices it generates express dispositions structured by a previous state of the field, that habitus enables historical structures to be reproduced in the present. But the encounter as dispositions shaped by history interact with the field in its current state, and the inevitable slippage, however slight, between the two, makes for unpredictable effects and so the possibility of a new history. Habitus ensures resonance, but also leads to dissonance. Hence what Bourdieu terms the “hysteresis effect necessarily implied in the logic of habitus,” which means that “practices are always liable to incur negative sanctions when the environment with which they are actually confronted is too distant from that to which they are objectively fitted.” Hysteresis accounts for missed opportunities, for clumsy or unsuccessful moves by which an individual or group confirms, despite themselves, their social decline by continuing with their outmoded habits in the face of social change. Equally, however, it can function as an embodied memory that provides a resource for resistance, just as cultural theorist Paul Gilroy argues that the “structures of feeling which underpin black expressive cultures” derive from memories of both “the once
forbidden drum” and “a terror which has moved beyond the grasp of ideal, grammatical speech.” In either case, the gap between embodied structures and actual practices opens up a time for strategy. It is the strategic aspect of practice that means we can speak of a social game rather than a mechanistic structure. In any game or sport, there is always the chance of an upset. So it is with the interactions that constitute the reproduction of social hierarchy: though the playing field is never level, structured as it is by symbolic domination and unequal distributions of capital, still the result of each move played is always partly in doubt. Time enables strategy, which in turn depends upon timing. As Bourdieu observes in his analysis of gift exchange, what counts is not some transcendent structure or invariable rules, but “the tempo of action” and “the interval between actions,” such that success comes only with the skilful management of time, by acting neither too precipitately nor too late.

Habitus provides us with a feeling for historicity and time, but it also unfolds in space. “Inhabited space,” Bourdieu argues, “is the principal locus for the objectification of the generative schemes” of the habitus. The basic spatial oppositions between left and right, or high and low, and the way they combine with sensual oppositions such as light and shade, or dry and damp, codify social oppositions such as the distinctions between male and female, public and private, sacred and profane. Bourdieu’s analysis of a Kabyle house in Algeria shows how the structured series of divisions between spaces for cooking, for guests, for leisure or work, and so on, all embody a set of arbitrary beliefs, and habituate the house’s inhabitants to the corresponding power relations. Inhabiting space becomes second nature, so the way in which that space orders practice is taken for granted, its lessons absorbed directly: “The ‘book’ from which the children learn their vision of the world is read through the body, in and through the movements and displacements which make the space within which they
A similar pedagogy structures the social architecture of contemporary life. Museums, for instance, establish social meaning through a series of oppositions embedded in the modes of spatial navigation and bodily discipline that they demand: “untouchable - touchable; noise - contemplative silence; swift and haphazard exploration - slow and orderly procession” and so on. The museum induces a “total attitude change,” directly affecting visitors’ physical and mental orientation, simultaneously and immediately. Likewise for the university lecture, at first sight a paradigm of communicative rationality, “the particularities of the space . . . (the platform, the professorial chair at the focal point on which all gazes converge)” provide the lecturer with the “material and symbolic conditions which enable him to keep the students at a respectful distance and would oblige him to do so even if he did not wish to.” Habitus is temporal and spatial, and in turn it provides us with our bearings in time and space, so that we comprehend the world as if by instinct.

The paradigmatic space of contemporary neoliberalism is the shopping mall. Mall space is simultaneously local and universal, situated in a particular geographical location yet also hermetically sealed from local context, part of a world of commodities that knows no national borders. Moreover, as Argentine critic Beatriz Sarlo notes, the mall “creates new habits . . . familiarizing people with the ways in which they should function in the mall.” In Chile during the dictatorship, a quite distinctive version of the mall flourished in capital Santiago’s upscale neighborhoods such as Providencia: the caracol or “shell,” so-called because of its seashell shape, with shops lining a spiral walkway surrounding a central atrium. First to be built was the “Caracol Los Leones,” in 1975; other examples include “Dos Caracoles” (1976), “La Rampa de las Flores” (1979), and “Caracol Vips” (1982). Though their popularity has since declined, the caracoles were all the rage in the late 1970s, the early years of the dictatorship: “Every Saturday, as was the habit at the time, Providencia was the big draw for shopping.” Unlike the typical North American mall, which tends to be no more than two stories high, and to be built to an “L” or “T” plan with major department stores at each extremity, caracoles have no such “anchor” stores,
but are rather occupied by up to 200 more or less equally small retail outlets strung out over the equivalent of five or six stories. Moreover, they also lack the meeting points characteristic of other mall architecture. These common areas, usually at the intersection of the mall’s main thoroughfares, are a legacy of the philosophy of pioneering architect Victor Gruen, the so-called “inventor of the shopping mall” who designed Detroit’s Northland Mall (the United States’ first multifunctional regional shopping center) in 1954, and Minneapolis’s Southdale Center Mall (the first fully enclosed, climate-controlled shopping center) in 1956. Gruen, “a fervent socialist,” hoped that malls would counteract the increasing atomization of 1950s US suburbia, by uniting city center functions and services under a single roof and serving as the modern version of the ancient Greek agora or medieval city square.92
The Chilean malls, by contrast, accentuate atomizing tendencies. In the caracol, even the atrium floor is usually at basement level, and so bypassed by shoppers. Thus there are no areas of special intensity and no points for downtime to break up the shopping experience; the caracoles construct a smooth space which is relatively undifferentiated along the whole length of its gently sloping gradient. These malls can only be successfully negotiated by very small groups or by individuals: any larger congregation of bodies would cause congestion on the narrow ramps. Shoppers are separated out by the gaping void of the atrium. Processes encouraged elsewhere by the dictatorship, such as the dissolution of group identities, are therefore facilitated in the course of reverent interaction with boutique-packaged commodification. No wonder that the North American building that the caracoles most resemble should be Frank Lloyd Wright’s New York Guggenheim museum: both are secular shrines whose centrifugal force draws people away from each other and towards a collection of riches to be venerated. In the malls, however, a state logic of disassociation combines immediately and immanently with the market presentation of seemingly limitless choice lining a prescribed but otherwise aimless path, to generate a cultural practice of anomic consumerism. The endless, spiralling drift up and down that they encourage is a post-ideological disaggregation of potentially subversive bodies; there is neither outside nor inside, only a moebius strip of commerce winding round a central abyss.

Like Deleuze, Bourdieu stresses immanence, immediacy, and corporeality. Habitus consists in the impersonal correlation of bodies and powers, determining the capacity to affect and to be affected (to structure and to be structured by social interaction) beneath the level of discourse. For Bourdieu as much as for Deleuze, “the social order is simply the order of bodies.” But rather than the violent and asocial intensity of affective experience emphasized by Deleuze, an intensity incarnated in nomadic escape or in terror, Bourdieu points to a low-intensity resonance that tends to preserve, transmit, and reproduce social order in everyday life. Bourdieu complicates the notion of affect’s autonomy. Habitus is indeed separate from the order of discourse and representation, but for Bourdieu this means not a revolutionary break from a
transcendent state, but rather that we are immersed in a state logic that is, in the end, itself immanent: “The construction of the state is accompanied by the construction of a sort of common historical transcendental, immanent to all its ‘subjects.’ . . . It thereby creates the conditions for a kind of immediate orchestration of habitus."\textsuperscript{94} It is not that a transcendent state illegitimately imposes upon or blocks an unbound affect; instead, the state gains legitimacy through the habitual resonances that structure immanence itself.

Everything takes place in the ordinary everyday. Bourdieu focuses on quotidian, low-level, and apparently insignificant modes of incorporation, such as “the values given body, \textit{made} body, by the hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy which can instil a whole cosmology through injunctions as insignificant as ‘sit up straight’ or ‘don’t hold your knife in your left hand.’”\textsuperscript{95} These familiar practices anchor the values they inculcate “beyond the reach of consciousness and explicit statement,” constituting a doxa that is the “universe of the undisputed” subtending the “universe of discourse (or argument).”\textsuperscript{96} It is in the everyday that the social arbitrary is naturalized, made second nature, as “political mythology is realized, \textit{em-bodied}, turned into a permanent disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, walking, and thereby of feeling and thinking.”\textsuperscript{97} We stand, speak, walk, feel, and think to collective rhythms synchronized and orchestrated at a pace set by social institutions. But it is also in these everyday practices that we might realize the potential opened up by the temporal slippage inherent in habitus, and the dissonances that result. Even in the most routine of activities, a new autonomy arises, and new habits.
Life

Habit’s rhythmic regularity structures life itself. Like a heart beating within the social body, its quiet pulses go without saying but without them life would be unimaginable. Unlike a beating heart, however, there is nothing particularly natural about habit. Everyday life resonates to a tempo fully invested by arbitrary power relations. As Althusser’s anecdote of interpellation reveals, power is first of all a matter of encounters between bodies, here between police officer and pedestrian. Only retrospectively, after the street-level hailing in which the subject comes into being, can the idea of the state take hold, positing some unified center and source of power. Instead of top-down command, then, power functions from the ground up, molding and shaping daily life in increasingly impersonal ways. Today the bobby on the beat is replaced by closed circuit television, x-ray machines, speed cameras, and biometric passports, each of which regulates the flows of human bodies, speeding them up or slowing them down, separating them out or bringing them together. Regulation is no longer simply a matter of prohibition (what you can and cannot do), but rather actively encourages and fine-tunes particular performances (the roles you should play). In an era characterized by what Foucault terms “biopower,” entire populations are endlessly animated, provoked to perform in regular ways if with sometimes unpredictable results. For life itself is now a terrain of struggle. A biopolitics emerges in which what is at stake is the creation of new habits and the persistence of old ones, the variability and intensity of daily rhythms, and the ways in which habit always outstrips the state. None of this is a matter of ideology or hidden agendas: a new literalism prevails. Power’s tactics can be
read directly from its public statements; there is no point to a hermeneutics of suspicion, which only conjures up imaginary enemies while ignoring what is on plain view. But a new clarity is required. Biopower and biopolitics too easily become indistinct. In itself, habit does not distinguish between life and liveliness.

Periodicity is fundamental for biological definitions of life: from the metabolic reactions that produce and burn energy, to reproduction and self-replication, circadian oscillations, or the myriad regularities (digestion, gestation, migration, hibernation) that pattern more complex forms, life is a series of repetitions. Hence, as Deleuze notes, “this living present, and with it all of organic and psychic life, rests on habit.” Nowhere is this more visible than in the everyday, indeed in the very fact that we can speak of an “every” day. So French theorist Henri Lefebvre observes that “the link between the everyday and cyclic patterns and timescales, the time of day and night, week and month, season and year, is obvious.”

We wake up, get out of bed, drag a comb across our heads. Nothing could appear more natural. But equally, nothing is more engrained with the effects of socialization: the alarm clock sounds, we make ourselves presentable, head for the bus or the car, commute into work, take tea break, coffee break, lunch break. Then back home in time for the football, the pub, or the TV. Life comprises a series of performances to a pre-set tempo. No wonder that for Karl Marx, the first and most basic struggle against capital is the campaign to reduce the working day, and more fundamentally still to abolish the category of socially necessary labor time.

We need to reclaim our time from its measurement by everything from the schoolroom bell to the factory whistle or the beep of a Blackberry. So Marx’s brief depiction of post-capitalist society invokes a world in which people set their own pace, able “to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner.” Part and parcel of our exploitation is that our habits are not our own.
Even in disciplinary society, power is already diffuse and productive, infiltrating everyday life. Foucault describes how policing is more than “the form of a State apparatus . . . linked directly to the centre of political sovereignty”; it is also “an apparatus that must be coextensive with the entire social body.” Disciplinary society is characterized by the exercise of power directly on the body, co-ordinated through discursive formations: “It is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together.” But discursive form rather than content matters most. What is at stake is not “what ideology--dominant or dominated--[these discourses] represent,” but their “tactical productivity . . . and their strategic integration.” Discourse is material: it is a particular way of arranging bodies. Hence Foucault refuses to distinguish between coercion and consent: “To analyse the political investment of the body presupposes . . . that one abandons--where power is concerned--the violence-ideology opposition.”

Moreover, discourses constitute mutually reinforcing networks whose regularities and redundancies correspond to a particular historical epistème or regime of knowledge. Thus penology, psychology, pathology, and so on follow a similar logic; this logic then characterizes the social system as a whole and comes to seem the natural way of being in and understanding the world. Encoded in our “common sense” understandings of criminality, madness, and health is a way of thinking about the world organized by a power so diffuse (because we are incorporated within its all-pervasive structures) that it seems to disappear. Yet from a standpoint outside of a particular epistème, what once was everyday and quasi-natural (because naturalized, incorporated) appears senseless and barbarous: for example, the (now) apparently excessive system of punishment characteristic of the middle ages. Foucault’s historical studies excavate the embodied logics that structured, for instance, the “classical age” (from the seventeenth century to
the French Revolution), and, by implication, defamiliarize the naturalness of our own age.

What prevents us from understanding how habit functions in everyday life, is that its power is invisible, because it is simply too familiar, too much a part of us. Foucauldian historicism is one strategy of critique or resistance through defamiliarization; artistic production can be another. For the Russian formalists, for example, estrangement defined the aesthetic. As critic Victor Shklovsky argues, “the technique of art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar,’ to make forms difficult.” And defamiliarization rescues life from a “habitualization [that] devours work, clothes, furniture, one’s wife, and the fear of war.” Habit, for Shklovsky, numbs the senses and leads to a kind of death in life, in which everything from the most intimate of relationships (“one’s wife”) to world historical events (“the fear of war”) are devoured “and so life is reckoned as nothing.” Defamiliarization counteracts this tendency by splitting apart habit and opening up a space for affect once again, which in turn leads to a revival of cognition in contrast to the mere utilitarian perception or recognition that clouds our repetitive, everyday vision: “After we see an object several times we begin to recognize it. The object is in front of us and we know about it, but we do not see it. . . . Art removes objects from the automatism of perception.” Shklovsky’s point is that ultimately even representation is but a habit; his argument is that the shock of estrangement makes the work present or immediate once again. And though Bourdieu would hardly side with either formalism or what he himself terms the “aesthetic point of view,” in part because he contends that they too abstract from everyday life, he would concur with the injunction to refocus on what is in plain view. For however implicitly power operates, this does not imply that its explicit statements are to be disregarded. If anything, the point is to examine discourse all the more carefully: to
analyze the immanent effectivity of everyday statements and actions, rather than to indulge in the interpretative fever that assumes that the real action is always elsewhere. For it is not as though the workings of power are hidden. They can go without saying only because they have become a matter of habit, because they are all too evident.

What matters is how things present themselves to us, now what they may represent. Ideology critique re-reads texts (reads them “against the grain”) on the assumption that they contain a distorted representation of the world. Its purpose is to bring out the underlying truth that they misrepresent and the distortions to which that truth has been subjected. As Sloterdijk observes, however, this approach is fruitless when faced with discourses whose function is not distortion. What is required, by contrast, is a renewed literalism. German theorist Klaus Theweleit, for instance, insists on taking at face value the writings of the “soldier males” he studies in Male Fantasies. These men were members of the Weimar-era Freikorps, volunteers whose mission was to put down working-class revolt in the aftermath of the First World War, and later hailed by the Nazis as “First Soldiers of the Third Reich.” For Theweleit they embody something like the truth of Nazism, all the more emphatically so in that they predate Hitler’s rise to power. Nazism is not simply an ideological discourse that wins over the masses, still less one man’s manipulation of the political and cultural spheres: ideology only arrives later; hegemony is always belated. The Freikorps literature hides no coded ideological meaning. Everything is stated clearly, on the surface. Hence Theweleit’s extravagant use of quotation, his declared aim simply “to present typical specimens of the writings of soldier males, sticking closely to the text in every case.” For Theweleit, “the material has taken precedence over interpretations.”

Relation trumps interpretation. Anthropology has always manifested an interest in the patterns that structure everyday relations, such as kinship or marriage strategies,
and also the ways in which informants relate their experience of life. Bourdieu carries over this interest to his analyses of twentieth-century France. In part, like Theweleit’s faux-naïve reading of social actors’ statements, his methodology consists in extended quotation (particularly in Distinction or The Weight of the World); but primarily it outlines the statistical regularities and patterns that structure both discourses and institutions. The content of a particular utterance is of less interest than the way in which that content is a placeholder in a series of oppositions that mark out social positions and position-takings within a given field. In Distinction, Bourdieu analyses the taste for (say) classical music or abstract art as a marker for its holders’ distinction from other members of society, who may favor (say) pop music or handicrafts. He constructs three-dimensional maps of social space by analyzing the results of surveys on everyday cultural preferences and correlating their relations. For Bourdieu, there is no real difference between his respondents’ statements and their social status: each is incarnated in the other. Hence “the first precept of method . . . requires us to resist by all means available our primary inclination to think the social world in a substantialist manner. . . . One must think relationally.” As Wacquant observes, “habitus and field designate bundles of relations.” A focus on relation therefore displaces concern with meaning. Relationality is life itself. Everything is on the surface, to be read at face value.

The turn to neoliberalism that Pinochet’s regime inaugurated has been termed a “silent revolution,” as in the book titles of both Chilean politician Joaquín Lavín’s apologia and British researcher Duncan Green’s leftist critique. But Pinochet, despite hiding behind his shades, arms rigidly folded, in the famous photograph that is now an icon of dictatorial authority, was often ready too speak, at times too openly for his advisors’ comfort. There is much to be seen in the reflections provided by dark glasses. One notable incident of Pinochet’s volubility took place when he was in Spain in 1975, for Spanish dictator Francisco Franco’s funeral. On his last day in the country, the general took the opportunity to
clarify a few things to the international press. In journalist Ernesto Ekaizer’s words, the event turned into “more than a press conference, it was an accelerated course in Pinochetism.” Asked about the existence of political prisoners and disappearances in Chile, Pinochet was a little more revealing than diplomacy would have counseled: “We haven’t kil . . . (it’s obvious that he’s about to conjugate the verb ‘to kill’) . . . There haven’t died in Chile more . . . in combat . . . more than 2,500 people.” The dictatorship is continually on the point of letting slip its dirty not-so-secrets. Everybody knows, after all. Hence Luis Salinas’s *The London Clinic* shows the benefits of listening to the general speak: Salinas aims to explain Pinochet primarily by collecting and presenting the general’s own words. The over-riding impression provided by this collection of quotations is of the general’s astonishing confidence, his refusal to apologize, but also a certain candor. The most famous example of this attitude is his remark that “burying two corpses in the same grave makes for great economies.” Pinochet later confirms the bon mot, declaring “That is what I meant. . . . I never regret what I say.” For Manuel Contreras, former chief of Pinochet’s secret service, the only regret is “not having been harder on the Marxists.” What becomes clear is that if Pinochet and co. have nothing to regret, they also have nothing to hide. This is why Pinochet’s words are so damning: he feels no need for justification and no compunction to persuade us of his methods or his goals. Everything is on the surface. Perhaps there are some details that are not worth exploring, some areas best left unexamined; but these are all rather inconsequential. In a 1984 interview, Pinochet is asked (once more) about the disappeared: “Have you ever had any interest in finding out where all those people ended up?” He responds with condescension: “Señorita, no one knows. Look, if there are right now thirteen million Chileans, let’s say twelve million, out of twelve million, two thousand are nothing (he makes a hand gesture to indicate a very small number). . . . In this country, señorita, things need to be forgotten.” Pinochet produces effects rather than arguments. His ideological deficit endlessly reveals itself. The general has no clothes, but he is happy to parade naked. There is no real pretence that he is anything but guilty. As the Spanish newspaper *La Vanguardia* comments regarding the 1998 extradition process in the British courts, after the general’s detention in London, “No-one speaks of Pinochet as if he were innocent.” His defense rested instead upon technicalities. So a transparent neoliberalism employs technocrats rather than ideologues, concerning itself with statistics and economics, and with the management of populations rather than with the singular victims whom the families of the disappeared hope to uncover.
A relational, rather than interpretative, approach can be brought to bear also on the Left and its leaders. Political scientist Katherine Hite’s *When the Romance Ended* studies Chilean Left leaders and the positions they took before, during, and after the dictatorship. It is a study in nostalgia, disillusion, and even cynicism. Hite quotes José Antonio Viera-Gallo, formerly of MAPU (a radical Catholic Left group), undersecretary in Allende’s Ministry of Justice, later speaker of the House under Aylwin:

“Politics has little probability of touching the world of the economy. Here businessmen couldn’t care less about politics . . . and many people, whether they’re professionals or well-paid workers, why should they care?” 112 Her book is full of similar statements from those who were once radicals, often former members of the Unidad Popular, and who have had to come to terms with the Pinochet coup, the long years of dictatorship and exile, and the effects of neoliberal transformation. Hite outlines the accommodations each has made to the changes that Chile and the world have undergone since the 1960s. On this basis, she categorizes her interviewees into four groups: party loyalists, personal loyalists, political thinkers, and political entrepreneurs. She suggests that these are “cognitive frameworks” that remain relatively stable over time. 113 Changes in Chilean political society result not from any conversion of political identities, but from the ways that events favor one cognitive type over another: whereas the sixties saw the ascendancy of party loyalists, today political entrepreneurs have the advantage, but this balance of forces may (and, Hite suggests, will) shift.

Hite does not demonstrate, however, that these cognitive types are analytic rather than descriptive categories, that her subjects’ actions derive from their (enduring) dispositions, and that her labels are more than just ways of classifying their (variable) actions. Moreover, though Hite’s reading, like Theweleit’s and Bourdieu’s, depends upon extended quotation, her quasi-psychological approach assumes that the confessing subject speaks the truth of his or her inner self. Her book is presented as a collective biography of the Chilean left, but categorizing respondents according to psychological type dismantles any sense that they are immanently part of a society or of a social group. They are presented as figures who, by reflecting upon the field in which they engage, are also detached from it, transcendent. In the end, Hite hardly upset a rational actor theory that separates actors from the positions they take, seeing agents as (ideally at least) devoid of any quality but rationality, or the propensity to maximize personal benefit. She does grant different agents differential propensities to choose one way rather than the other, according to “cognitive type,” but she pays little attention to how
these propensities emerge, or to how they change according to the results of the choices agents make. She ignores, in short, the habits that underlie or arise from the act of taking a position in a specific field whose shape is determined in part by the positions that are already staked out. By contrast, a focus on habitus (which lies on the same, pre-conscious level as Hite’s cognitive types) enables an analysis of differential positions and position-takings in all their dynamism. Habitus allows us to go beyond a decontextualized account of agents and actions, to understand instead the ways in which positions are staked out and defined in the embodied and always fluid social context of life itself.

With biopower, the distinction between life and power fades. The state takes an immediate interest in the regularities that order and shape everyday existence. Foucault develops this concept in his first, introductory, volume to *The History of Sexuality*, where he argues that over the course of the classical age, power is invested ever more in managing life directly, via “an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of the population, marking the beginning of an era of ‘bio-power.’” Regulation is no longer merely a matter of establishing limits (between sickness and health, madness and sanity, for instance) or setting down the attendant sanctions and negations that enforce such limits, stigmatizing what lies beyond as the “other” of normality. Biopower is a positive intervention into the production and morphology of the everyday. Power and the body are ever more intimately joined, the one instantiated in the other, and the vestiges of (state or discursive) transcendence are ever more redundant: “Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life itself.” Hence biopower “brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life.” With biopower, any distinction between
nature and politics, or culture and the state, disappears altogether. Biopower is the absolute colonization, and production or incitement, of everyday life.

Biopower is positive and active: it provokes and engenders rather than restricting or negating; it encourages agency and fosters life. Its watchword is performance: with biopower, we are urged to “be all we can be,” as the US Army’s recruitment slogan has it. In Italian theorist Paolo Virno’s words, labor becomes “a virtuosic performance (without end product).”

Especially with the rise of so-called affective labor, we are encouraged to think that we are expressing ourselves in work as in play: restaurant workers in the film Office Space (1999), for instance, are enjoined to wear “pieces of flair,” the material signs of their supposedly bubbly and outgoing personalities that they are to mobilize to provide atmosphere and attitude for their customers. “That’s what the flair’s about,” the restaurant manager berates a recalcitrant waitress. “It’s about fun.” The performance of enjoyment is to suffuse all of life. Indeed, if Taylorization and Fordism in the early twentieth century set out to shape and improve our habits at work, now for post-Fordist biopower there is little difference between work and play. The boundaries between the two disappear as corporations such as Google encourage an ethos of play at work, while everyday life itself becomes productive for capital. Habits are also performances through which we are encouraged both to realize ourselves and to become increasingly efficient, aided by “self-help” guides from Stephen Covey’s mega-bestselling The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People to (say) Jim Canterucci’s Personal Brilliance: Mastering the Everyday Habits that Create a Lifetime of Success. But there is something ambivalent about such performativity, in that it is both orchestrated by power and also constitutive of subjectivity. Are its subjects only subject to power, or is there some space for autonomy or resistance? In promising to teach us new habits, self-help guides and other agents of biopower admit
the possibility of a dehabituation or rehabituation that could enable new subjectivities that outstrip the everyday demands of neoliberal excellence. Self-help hints at the potential cultivation of a new collective self.

The Pinochet dictatorship oversaw an extraordinarily rapid transition from spectacular and disciplinary power to the biopower of a post-disciplinary age. Rather than forcing a conservative reaction, it instituted a wholesale, and in some ways progressive (because modernizing), shift in the way in which power organized the Chilean collective body. Given the rushed timetable of this transition, the regime was a particularly hybrid and somewhat ad hoc arrangement. More generally, as Moulián notes, “revolutionary dictatorships, which attempt to destroy pre-existing forms of life with the aim of imposing a new, rational, order, make use simultaneously of silence and the austere economy of disciplinary power along with the stridency and visibility of repressive power.” As a result, “this type of dictatorship unites power’s invisible functioning, only seen in its effects, with the rage of punishment, which would appear to be simply a matter of passion.” But it would be a mistake to see the dictatorship as simply repressive. On the one hand, the use of Chile’s National Stadium as a detention center in the coup’s early days could be a metaphor for the visual display of authority, as indeed was the bombardment of the National Palace, the Moneda, on September 11, 1973. Such displays function by irradiation: exemplary acts at the center of the gaze generate effects elsewhere, promoting a pedagogical relationship with the people. So cultural critic Diana Taylor argues, in her analysis of the performativity of repression, that torture takes hold by means of an “amplification . . . through which twenty victims can paralyze an entire community or country.” On the other hand, power is more effective if the onus for performativity is more widely distributed. And Moulián argues that this is precisely what has taken place in Chile. He points to the way in which financial credit, intangible but all-pervasive, now fashions and distributes subjectivity: consumption becomes “a field for the exercise of power” by which “society seems to have habituated itself to the neoliberal order that emerged from a bloody dictatorship,” all in the context of “a total absence of any dimension of transcendence.” If disciplinary power works at a distance, biopower is always immediately present. Yet too much of the resistance to Pinochet failed to learn the lessons of biopower. Exiled left-wing dissidents and their clandestine proxies within the country, such as the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic
Front, sought to achieve spectacular actions, notably the assassination of Pinochet himself. Their failure should not be attributed solely to the regime’s repression or the efficiency of its security forces. More importantly, such militancy took no account of the fact that the form of power itself had changed. More promising, then, were protests whose motor was habit, activating a biopolitics that outperformed biopower.

The Chilean arpillaristas, for instance, were women who (like their counterparts, the Argentine “Mothers of the Disappeared”) came together as they regularly encountered each other performing the same dreary routine of checking in the various state offices and morgues in search of their missing relatives. The Pinochet dictatorship, in disappearing their husbands or sons and daughters, forced new habits upon a group who previously had often enough been relatively apolitical housewives. Building on the companionship that they encountered with each other, and prodded also by the Catholic Church’s Vicariate of Solidarity, the women began collectively sewing arpilleras, patchwork scenes of everyday life under the dictatorship. Though these tapestries were (mainly) representational, depicting human rights abuses and the women’s own struggles to seek information and justice, perhaps more important was their mode of production: first, as artisanal activity that drew on familiar and everyday skills, “a diary of life written with scraps of cloth, wool, needle and apron,” often directly incorporating snippets of clothing and even hair from the women themselves or their loved ones; and second as a communal practice by which “the women joined forces and the individual cause was regularly transformed into a collective one.”

Hence cultural critic Marjorie Agosín argues that “the arpillera comes to life under the hands of its creator; more than that it is the life of the creator.” And that creator is a collective subject that emerges from a process of first dehabituation, forced upon what had previously been relatively isolated individuals, and then rehabituation or the forging of new habits in resistance to, but also going beyond, the dictatorship’s life management. The arpilleras established new linkages, both among themselves in their regular meetings with needles and cloth and as their “utterly silent social art” became one of “the most effective clandestine means of communication to resist the military dictatorship.”

The very notion of performance implies also the possibility of breakdown. The difference between watching a film and going to the theater or the circus, say, resides in
part in a certain unpredictability: this time, unlike almost every other time, an actor may fluff his or her lines, or the trapeze artist may lose his or her grip and fall. The fact that a performance is “live” means that we are always half-holding our breath, wondering what could go wrong. The beauty of a live event is its imperfection, the rough edges that constitute its singularity and the fact that it is never an entirely flawless reproduction. Flawlessness is deadening: the liveliness of a concert or show derives from the fact that it allows for elements of spontaneity or creativity, whether that be the jazz musician’s improvisation in which new resonances, riffs, and rhythms are explored, the banter between a stand-up comic and his or her audience, or an inspired performance by an actor who goes beyond what the script demands. For performance is never fully representational: even if there is an original subject to imitation, what is essential is the difference between copy and model, not the similarity. Reiteration allows for, even requires, difference. If life is constituted by habit, liveliness is inherent in the resistance that arises when the regularity and predictability of habit is interrupted. In everyday life, habit can always be waylaid by the friction that results as bodies are repeatedly in contact, whether that be the way in which a repeated performance or a stuck record starts to grate on our nerves, the “culture shock” as old habits meet new circumstances, or the static electricity that builds as surfaces rub against each other, leading to explosive discharge. So habit can also give rise to sudden outpourings of resistance. As the waitress exclaims to her boss in Office Space, showing a spark of life as her performance of enjoyment breaks down: “Y’know what? . . . I do want to express myself. . . . And I don’t need thirty-seven pieces of flair to do it.” She gives him the finger and continues: “There’s my flair! And this is me expressing myself. . . . I hate this job! I hate this goddamn job and I don’t need it!”
Social reproduction is never truly flawless. It is always somewhat hit and miss. Philosopher Judith Butler’s theorization of performativity as embodied enactment of identity roles stresses the ways in which such roles can be “queered”: bent out of shape if not necessarily fully avoided. She takes issue with Althusser’s notion of interpellation, insisting on the possibilities of failed interpellation (only glimpsed in Althusser’s brief reference to “bad subjects”) to show that the voice of power, the state’s “hailing,” and the order of bodies are not fully synchronized. The body always falls short of or exceeds the voice. Hence she argues that “useful as it is, Althusser’s scheme . . . attribut[es] a creative power to the voice that recalls and reconsolidates the figure of the divine voice in its ability to bring about what it names.”

Although Althusser’s essay is a critique of the fetishism that imagines that the state alone authorizes subjectivity, Butler suggests that he remains within precisely this paradigm. For Althusser, not only is “ideology in general” necessary and eternal; so therefore is the state that acts as the essential lynchpin of the double circuit of ideology, command, and habit. Butler points, on the one hand, to interpellation’s citational quality: the fact that the state endlessly has to return to previous instances of interpellation in order to legitimate its attempts to constitute subjects reveals that it can never fully establish its claim to originality; the fact that it continually has to repeat itself shows that it is forever incomplete. On the other hand, Butler is also concerned with what remains unvoiced and unspoken. Censorship, for instance, “produces discursive regimes through the production of the unspeakable,” and more generally the gap between what may and may not be spoken determines “the conditions of intelligibility” of any regime of power. “This normative exercise of power,” she argues, “is rarely acknowledged as an operation of power at all. Indeed, we may classify it among the most implicit forms of power. . . . That power continues to act in illegible ways is one source of its relative invulnerability.” Here, then, Butler turns to
Bourdieu, theorist of “a bodily understanding, or habitus” that does not depend upon the voice or upon speech. For habit describes what exceeds interpellation, whether that be the state’s biopower or a possibly insurgent biopolitics.\textsuperscript{124}

As life itself becomes fully subject to power, it becomes therefore the terrain of political struggle, a differentiation between distinct forms of vivacity, ways of life that are at odds with each other. For Agamben, for instance, totalitarianism signals that “life and politics . . . begin to become one,” and what is at stake is the increasingly blurred distinction between biopolitics and a “thanatopolitics” that plays out in the space of “bare life,” pure potential or habit, in which we all now find ourselves.\textsuperscript{125} Biopolitics describes then both the apogee of politics, its ubiquity and immediacy, and also the effort to preserve a space for politics against its dissolution, to show that there is a life beyond the law. In Agamben’s words, “to show law in its nonrelation to life and life in its nonrelation to law means to open a space between them for human action, which once claimed for itself the name of ‘politics.’”\textsuperscript{126} This “nonrelation” is the struggle by which biopolitics opposes biopower; it is a gamble on autonomy even within immanence, on a detotalization that unlocks the power of creativity. It is the deployment of what theorist Michel de Certeau terms the “tactics” implicit within “the practice of everyday life.” Habitual but far from routine, against the functionalist tone of Bourdieu’s theorization of habitus but in line with the allowance that he makes for unpredictability, a tactic is a “guileful ruse” by means of which agents carve out spaces of autonomy immanent to but just off kilter from the norm, “mak[ing] use of the cracks that particular conjunctions open in the surveillance of the proprietary powers.”\textsuperscript{127} Or in Hardt and Negri’s words, “playing different tactical games in the continuity of strategy” opens up “two conflicting recognitions: one organizing the desire of life and the other the fear of death, biopolitics against biopower.” Liveliness breaks from life as
usual. But can biopolitics and biopower be so easily distinguished? Not, at least, from
the perspective of habit, which is why a further step is required. A path leads from the
friction of resistance, the strategy of refusal and tactics of differentiation, to the
“multitude” as “a diverse set of singularities that produce a common life.”

Towards the Multitude

We have seen how, defining habit as an embodied disposition to act shaped by the
social field that formed it, Bourdieu explains the workings of social control without
recourse to ideology. Tiredness and waiting. Habitus is conservative: it is history,
literally, incarnate; it ensures the tired repetitions of social reproduction; it encourages
us to wait for the familiar rituals of everyday life. And yet Bourdieu’s theory is
premised on the assumption that social change is ceaseless and unstoppable. Habitus is
historical only because social conditions have inevitably changed since the moment of
its formation. Its repetitions are always slightly different. And in our waiting lies the
hope of perhaps radical change. For there is always a lag between the time incarnated in
habitus as disposition and the time of the event confronted by that disposition.
Bourdieu’s materialism is grounded in a conception of the interplay between social
dynamism and the inertia inherent to bound affective states, and so the friction or
resistance that results. Theories of ideology tend to be static; even when they
incorporate notions of contestation, they imply a deadlock that can only be broken by
forces that come from outside of the ideological system. The classical architectural
metaphor of base and superstructure comprises just such a static conception, for which
change arises only as the base (the development of the forces of production) moves
beneath the superstructure’s feet. By contrast, Bourdieu’s is a dynamic theory, for which
change is immanent to all aspects of social production and reproduction. The texture of daily life is defined by our resistance as we are continually pressed to learn new habits and unlearn old ones. Even as biopower subsumes life itself, there is some space for an insurgent biopolitics.

Still, Bourdieu’s functionalist tendencies are not quickly dispatched. De Certeau argues that there is a tension in Bourdieu’s work, between a meticulous attention to everyday “practices and their logic” on the one hand, and on the other the invocation of “a mystical reality, the habitus, which is to bring them under the law of reproduction.” And for critic Jeremy Lane, Bourdieu too often ignores the fact that the “process of incorporation” whereby the logic of a field is taken up by habitus is “always subject to failure; it could always go awry.” Lane points also to the tensions between particular social contexts, smoothed over in “Bourdieu’s assumption as to the existence of straightforward homologies between the different fields.” After all, each field is subject to different pressures and responds to distinct stimuli and so reciprocally shapes habits in different ways, raising the possibility of at least pockets of resistance, areas of social life at odds with the rest. Indeed, some of the most notable social disturbances arise when habits acquired in one context are blocked or denied in another: the disillusion that results can lead to a generalized rejection of the social game itself, a sort of absolute negation in which suddenly everything is subject to question. Finally, however, habit can also play a constitutive role. Bourdieu’s invocations of the concept of conatus, which describes an instinct for survival or increase, suggest ways in which a subjectivity formed immanently through habitus can threaten to displace the social order and may offer new forms of community. But Bourdieu fails to note that habit can be revolutionary, that revolutionaries must have their own habits, and that there is an ambivalence to habit in that it both ensures reproduction and yet also enables the
constitution of the new. So we move towards the concept of the multitude, a subjectivity that consolidates itself through habit.

For all his emphasis on reproduction, Bourdieu’s work revolves around two of the most traumatic disruptions to post-war French society: the Algerian struggle for independence and the “events” of May 1968. While Bourdieu makes few explicit references to the violence of decolonization, still less to its repercussions in the metropolis, Lane argues that his early fieldwork in North Africa was “a significant gesture of solidarity with the Algerian independence movement” and, more importantly, that its analysis of the process of modernization that transformed “peasants into revolutionaries” was also “something of a model for Bourdieu’s later theorisations of socio-cultural change in France.”

Outline of a Theory of Practice, for instance, centers around the transition encapsulated in the scandalous tale of the mason “who had learnt his trade in France” and demanded to be paid in cash rather than accept the traditional gift economy of Kabyle society. It describes the way in which an entire society is restructured with the arrival of an explicit logic of financial exchange. Similarly, Reproduction, Distinction, and Homo Academicus are concerned with the massive changes in French post-war society and the disturbances of the late 1960s that seemed to threaten the entire social order. Perhaps despite himself, Bourdieu is as much a theorist of crisis as of reproduction. Indeed crisis, Bourdieu and Passeron suggest, reveals the truth of the social reproduction that it interrupts, however briefly: “The moment of transition from ruthless methods of imposition to more subtle methods is doubtless the most favourable moment for bringing to light the objective truth of that imposition.” And of May 1968, Bourdieu claims that “such a moment of awareness constitutes in itself an objective change, liable to make the whole mechanism grind to a halt.” The gap between habit and event allows for an awakening that can self-
reflexively transform even the most settled habits. Equally, the development of new habits can open up a gap between subject and field that precipitates a transformative event.

There is nothing necessarily spontaneous or unconscious about the disruption of habit, and dehabituation can be taken on as a conscious strategy. Indeed, it is the avant-garde gesture par excellence. During the Pinochet dictatorship, the Colectivo Acciones de Arte (Art Action Collective or CADA), comprising several prominent Chilean artists and writers such as novelist Diamela Eltit, poet Raúl Zurita, and visual artist Lotty Rosenfeld, staged a series of performances designed to intervene in and interrupt the everyday habits of neoliberal consumerism. As critic Robert Neustadt’s CADA día (literally, “Every Day”) documents, these actions included the October 1979 “Inversion of Scene” that aimed to “underline the transparency of everyday repression” by cloaking Santiago’s Museum of Fine Arts with a white sheet on the one hand, and renting ten milk trucks on the other, while taking out an advert in a daily newspaper that consisted in nothing more than a blank page.135 CADA’s purpose was literally to screen off the museum while touching upon familiar objects and practices (the newspaper, drinking milk) so as, in Nelly Richard’s words, “to modify both the customary perceptions of the city . . . and the social norms which regulate the behaviour of the citizen.”136 Other CADA actions included showering the city with 400,000 flyers dropped from the air, in the name of “a fusion of ‘art’ with ‘life,’” and Lotty Rosenfeld’s conversion of the broken white line in the middle of streets and highways into a series of crosses.137 These are classic shock tactics of artistic defamiliarization, undertaken on a massive scale. Especially in their willful disarticulation of the signs of normality that the dictatorship wanted to convey for both national and external consumption, they set out to force “the gaze to unlearn what the press habitually teaches it.”138 At the same time, and beyond the fact that the artistic avant-garde is all too easily recuperated into a familiar tradition of provocation that can never quite escape the aestheticizing gaze, surely any artistic shock tactic could be no more than pale reflection of the effects of the coup itself. If art is defamiliarization, then like it or not Pinochet was its greatest Chilean practitioner. In philosopher Willy Thayer’s words, “The coup d’état fulfilled the yearning for an event, epitome of the avant-garde.”139
Bourdieu never fully makes up his mind about the source of resistance to power. He sometimes prioritizes intellectual, above all sociological, reflection as the means by which to grasp what otherwise goes without saying. Sociology is a “science . . . of the hidden” that follows social crisis. But the crisis itself is not caused by such enlightenment. Bourdieu’s analyses of social action highlight a practical reason far removed from scientific rationality. Hence the tension between Bourdieu’s own political program, especially in his later work where he champions a “rational utopia” in which “scientists are no doubt the ones who have to shoulder the primary role,” and his descriptions of social movements, in which ethical protest generated by habit trumps political action motivated by rational deliberation. Given the gap between practice and politics, no wonder that Bourdieu also complains that social scientists are out of touch, though his conclusion that it is the “social movements” rather than the scientists that “have a lot of ground to make up” is unpersuasive. For Bourdieu elsewhere demonstrates that resistance arises semi-spontaneously at the interface of habit and social field following significant changes to the rules of the game. He shows not only the ways in which power is secured beyond and despite ideology, but also how protest builds by means other than the construction of so-called counter-hegemonic projects. Moreover, the dissent engendered by and in habitus undermines any putative hegemony or other political articulations. Politics is a restricted practice of representation, counterposed to an expansive ethics embodied in habitual practices.

There is, for Bourdieu, a significant distinction between politics and ethics. Politics concerns opinion; ethics, affect and habit. Moreover, politics is subordinate to or grounded in ethics, albeit that this is an ethics that is (in the terms discussed above) biopolitical in that what is at stake is life itself rather than the forms in which events are represented. Politics as the inclination to articulate “political principles to answer a
problem that is presented as political” is unevenly distributed, and concentrated among
the dominant class. Beyond this dominant class, and “for problems that have not been
brought into a personal or party ‘line,’ agents are thrown back on their ethos.” Ethos
expresses the embodied experience of the habitus, and contrasts with the discursive
realm of hegemonic articulation: “There is every difference in the world between the
conscious, quasi-forced systematicity of a political ‘line’ and the systematicity ‘in-itself’
of the practices and judgements engendered by the unconscious principles of the
ethos.” Ethical dispositions underlie but are never equivalent to political positions. So
political protest is never quite commensurate with an ethical protest, with the heartfelt
if sometimes inchoate resistance that comes from a sense of disruption to a subject’s
very way of life. The conservatism of habitus and its material ontology of embodied
subjectivity means that ethical protest is similar to Foucault’s conception of ethics as
care of the self, the constitution and maintenance of a subject “defined by the
relationship of self to self” that goes beyond any “juridical conception of the subject of
right.” Recourse to an ethos rooted in the practices of the habitus suggests the
possibility of an ethics that would be an immanent and post-political biopolitics of self-
sustaining subjectivity.

Bourdieu argues that the May 1968 student protests were the result of ethical
self-protection in the face of the inadvertent effects of increased access to the French
educational system in the 1950s and 1960s. The expansion of secondary and tertiary
education had led to “diploma inflation” and the devaluation of scholarly certification,
such that educational success could no longer be converted straightforwardly into social
mobility. Yet “newcomers to secondary education [we]re led . . . to expect it to give
them what it gave others at a time when they themselves were excluded from it.”
Whereas “in an earlier period and for other classes, those aspirations were perfectly
realistic, since they corresponded to objective probabilities,” in the wake of systemic expansion “they are often quickly deflated by the verdicts of the scholastic market or the labour market.” The social field had changed, shattering habitual expectation, and provoking an ethical refusal that questioned the very rules of the game: “A whole generation, finding it has been taken for a ride, is inclined to extend to all institutions the mixture of revolt and resentment it feels towards the educational system.” Hence the “anti-institutional cast of mind” that “point[ed] towards a denunciation of the tacit assumptions of the social order, a practical suspension of doxic adherence to the prizes it offers and the values it professes, and a withholding of the investments which are a necessary condition of its functioning.” However much the events of 1968 drew “strength from ideological and scientific critiques,” they were not themselves ideological; rather they constituted a suspension of (practical, embodied) belief in the wake of an interruption to the smooth functioning of social reproduction. They were part of an ethical revolt that drew on habitual inclinations to confront the social order.

We have seen how Salman analyzes Chile’s 1983/1984 protests as a “non-ideological politicization” of the new social movements. Young people’s participation in particular arose from a collective disenchantment: they were “confronted with socialization patterns they felt were anachronistic. . . . Going to school would not get them a good job, the survival organizations would not enable them to express themselves, and the parties had nothing at all to give them.” What provoked the revolt, then, was a radical discontinuity between a habitus produced under one set of social conditions, and a social field transformed by dictatorship. As an inherited habitus attuned to pre-dictatorship conditions failed to prepare a new generation attempting to survive and progress under the military regime, the result was a wholesale rejection of the rules of the game, and a “rejection of any kind of authoritarian control altogether.” Likewise abandoning conventional politics (“for them there was almost a taboo on the political”), they experimented not with projects for counter-hegemony, but with autonomous social structures and modes of valorization. As “they put more and more effort into setting up their own
organizations in these years,” this autovalorization constituted an Exodus from the logic of authoritarianism rather than direct opposition. It was the invention of new, non-ideological forms of politics and new, non-identitarian modes of subjectivity.

Exodus is not simply flight; it is also the construction of new habits of existence. Nelly Richard makes this clear in her discussion of the helicopter flight that liberated four militants of the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front from Santiago’s high security prison in 1996. Her analysis plays on the connection between “fuga” (flight in the sense of “escape”) and “vuelo” (flight as a mode of transport): the militants’ escape was also a creative transportation that broke with any stale dichotomy of repression and resistance. The Front, the armed wing of the Communist Party, had earned a name for themselves for their spectacular if sporadic armed actions in the latter days of the Pinochet regime, not least the assassination attempt on the general’s motorcade in 1986 that had been a hair’s breadth from success. As such, they radicalized the impulse that drove the new social movements’ protests. By 1996, such militant attacks had lost most of their rationale, but the prison breakout pointed to the possibility of continuing militancy on into the era of democratic transition by transforming struggle into flight. Richard focuses particularly on the way in which this escape became also an aesthetic performance, as it was accompanied by a testimonio-style narrative smuggled out of prison (yet another escape) whose recourse to self-consciously literary style produced “signs of figurative obliqueness that speak to us of the allusive and elusive vocation of the metaphor that desubstantiates the truth with its ‘art of flight.’”

The prison break was also then an experiment in creativity that conjured up a vision of new realities that go beyond neoliberalism’s deadening rationalizations. More than just a break with the old rules of the game, flight plays with or even defies those rules, suggesting that other games are possible. Similar experimentation is at work in Eltit’s Sacred Cow, a novel set during an era of anti-authoritarian protest in which “all the signs [had begun] to disintegrate” and “reality shift[ed] to the margins.” The book’s narrator is a shifting, uncertain, multiple voice that moves from first to second to third-person address, an experiment in subjectivity. At one point she joins a movement of women workers, whose mark of belonging is a distinctive tattoo. These women incarnate a constituent power in that they are “drawing up the basis of a new constitution” to press “a demand that is neither conditional nor negotiable” for an expanded space of deterritorialized life: “How are we supposed to live if our bodies are cramped up against the walls? How can we go on living like that? We, the
tattooed workers, insist our demand for living space is absolutely justified. The country must allow us to live with room enough to breathe.” The narrator finds what is at least a temporary sense of community within this movement in which “nothing was in the least personal while at the same time it all belonged to us. I had attained the conviction that came with my tattoo.”

So the bodily brand precedes and founds her belief, which in turn echoes a form of cooperation in which singularity and commonality are fused. At the same time, *Sacred Cow* registers a profound ambivalence around the difficulty of distinguishing good and bad habits, good and bad lines of flight. Nowhere is this more marked than with the birds that haunts the novel’s action and flock together at its conclusion. The birds are in flight, “migrating, screeching with happiness or with pride or with panic, all singing different tunes.” But it is unclear if this is a cacophony or a symphony, in that their screeching “was, none the less, harmonious, one of those contemporary harmonies where every solo is in fact carefully orchestrated.” The narrator concludes that “above all the squawks were of pleasure, a guttural savage pleasure that put things human to shame.” Yet she also recognizes “the murderousness of their flight. . . The flock was criminal, it was obsessive” even as it transformed “cowardly flight” into “an epic of deliverance.”

This ambivalence of joy and death, ecstasy and terror, indicates that the ethical response to authoritarianism also poses a specifically ethical problem, to which I will return in my conclusion: how to distinguish between good multitudes and bad.

Care for the self need not be solely conservative. Indeed, “cultivation of the self” implies growth nurtured through the adoption of good habits, “procedures, practices, and formulas” and the promotion of good encounters, “exchanges and communications, and at times even . . . institutions.” Nor therefore is care for the self individualistic: it is “at once personal and social.”

Foucault describes a dynamic concern for political community and the “practice of freedom” that takes place beyond the social pact for which all that counts is “a subject who has or does not have rights, who has had these rights either granted or removed by the institution of political society.” The care of the self is an ontological self-fashioning through habit. The persistence of habit becomes the insistence of an ever more expansive immanent
subjectivity. It is what Foucault elsewhere terms “a historico-practical test of the limits we may go beyond . . . work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings.” It is also therefore a daily performance, or rather the drive to outperform the limits set by any given social field. It is the underside of biopower: an instance of the creativity and performativity to which we are all now enjoined, but no longer in the service of state or capital. Care for the self is a demonstration of the autonomy of habit.

Habits never fully coincide with the institutions and norms that structure society. But that is not simply because they are the passive residues of a past state of the field. Another way of thinking about “care for the self” is to observe that habits also express conatus, that is, a subject’s insistence on its own powers of existence. Conatus is the Latin for “endeavor” or “striving,” and is part of a long philosophical tradition that includes Descartes, Hobbes, and perhaps particularly (as I will discuss in my conclusion) Spinoza. Bourdieu picks up on the term and defines it as “that combination of dispositions and interests associated with a particular class or social position which inclines agents to strive to reproduce at a constant or an increasing rate the properties constituting their social identity, without even needing to do this deliberately or consciously.” It is therefore an unconscious or habitual striving not only to reproduce but also to expand and fortify the self. Or as Bourdieu puts it in an explanation of his “historicist ontology,” and also as yet another riposte against the charge of determinism, “both habitus and field . . . are the site of a sort of conatus, of a tendency to perpetuate themselves in their being, to reproduce themselves in that which constitutes their existence and their identity.” Hence, Bourdieu concludes, “it is not true to say that everything that people do or say is aimed at maximizing their social profit; but one may say that they do it to perpetuate or to augment their social being.” Whereas at times Bourdieu’s constant discussion of capital in its various forms (cultural,
symbolic, social, or financial) sometimes makes it seem as though he is unable to imagine forces beyond market interactions, here he points to *conatus* as a tendency that precedes and underwrites, or perhaps sometimes goes against, the principles of exchange. And in so far as a group or subject struggles “to perpetuate or to augment [its] social being,” it is constantly struggling against the countervailing tendency of the field towards its own reproduction. The constant asymmetry between habitus and field indicates therefore a constant struggle between the two, even as habitus is also the vehicle by which a field is reproduced.

Bourdieu suggests that both habitus and field seek their own reproduction. But surely only habit expresses *conatus*. Ascribing such a subjectivity to the social field would be hyperfunctionalism indeed. Better, then, to see this asymmetrical struggle as pitting a *conatus* expressed through habit against the inertia of social institutions. But this is now a reversal of the picture Bourdieu otherwise seems to paint elsewhere: in this version of hysteresis, it is the field that lags behind habit: habit is now a means by which a dynamic social subject seeks its own perpetuation or augmentation; and the institutions that structure the field have then to react to this subjectivity, to ensure their own reproduction and survival. Moreover, habit is also now the vehicle by which that subject seeks (again, consciously or not) to change the social order, even to liberate itself from the constraints of a purported contractualism. The social game is a series of encounters or relations through which habit expresses a biopolitical struggle to constitute a social subject that would outperform or outstrip the institutions within which it is inscribed. On the one hand, we have the everyday life of repetitions and embodied periodicity; on the other, there is the liveliness of a creative striving, a *conatus* that goes beyond mere repetition. So, in short, the encounter between habitus and field is deeply ambivalent: on the one hand, it is where social order is reproduced;
but it also comprises events that lead to what Bourdieu terms “a positive or negative surprise,” to joyful or sad passions that in turn either strengthen or weaken the power of an oppositional subjectivity. Biopower confronted by biopolitics. At this point, however, we must leave Bourdieu behind: a focus on habit alone cannot resolve this ambivalence. It is necessary to examine the kinds of subjectivity constituted through habitus, and the possible transformation of conatus from “the drive of every individual being to the production of itself and the world” to what Negri envisages as “a general conatus of the organization of the freedom of all.” We need to understand habit as part of the constituent power of the multitude. The multitude is the subject of constituent power and also perhaps the agent of a revolution that would dissolve all structures of command and control.
Notes

1 Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 189, 192, 194.

2 Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 189; Deleuze, *Spinoza*, 124-125.

3 Agamben, *The Open*, 47, 68.

4 Ibid., 76, 70.


7 Chaloupka, *Everybody Knows*, 5.

8 Bewes, *Cynicism and Postmodernity*, 3. The 2008 election of Barack Obama to the US presidency seemed perhaps to have galvanized many, and heralded the return of belief: “Yes, we can!” But Obama stands out against a backdrop of ever-more pervasive cynicism, now directed equally at the stockmarket wizards and bankers who allowed the financial system to collapse while reaping copious rewards for themselves.


10 Redding, *Raids on Human Consciousness*, 211.


12 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 89.


16 Ibid., 127, 128.

17 García Márquez, *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, 265.
18 García Márquez, “No One Writes to the Colonel,” 109, 110.
19 Ibid., 112, 127.
20 Ibid., 165, 166.
21 James, Habit, 3.
22 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 218, n. 47.
23 Ibid., 95.
25 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 1:139, 141.
27 Ibid., 42, 43, 42.
28 Guilladat and Mouterde, Los movimientos sociales in Chile, 143; Chavkin, Storm over Chile, 264.
29 Paley, Marketing Democracy, 5.
30 Guilladat and Mouterde, Los movimientos sociales en Chile, 233.
31 Schneider, Shantytown Protest in Pinochet’s Chile, 211, 213.
34 Paley, Marketing Democracy, 6.
35 Subercaseaux, Chile, 49.
36 Moulián, Chile actual, 31.
37 Richard, Cultural Residues, 69.
See the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance’s statistics at http://www.idea.int/; the IDEA locates Chile 148th in the world for voter turnout since 1945, sandwiched between Botswana and Chad.


Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 72, 73.

Ibid., 27, 75.


See Bourdieu and Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 52.

For Bourdieu’s “functionalist tenor,” see Lane, *Bourdieu’s Politics*, 116.


Bourdieu and Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 16.


65 Snyder, “The Dirty Legal War,” 264.
66 Ibid., 264.
67 Chavkin, *Storm over Chile*, 278.
69 Ibid., 206.
73 Ibid., 153, 207, 212.
74 Ibid., 49, 193.
75 Schneider, *Shantytown Protest in Pinochet’s Chile*, 194.
77 Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 49.
78 Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 157, 94.
79 Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 68.
80 Bourdieu and Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 139; see also Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 82.
82 Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 78.

84 Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 106.

85 Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 89.

86 Ibid., 90.

87 Bourdieu and Darbel, *The Love of Art*, 51.


90 I thank Jean Franco for drawing my attention to Chile’s *caracoles*.


92 Harden, *Mall Maker*, 3.


95 Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 69.


98 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 78.


100 See Postone, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination*.


103 Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, 1:100, 102.

105 Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” 16.

106 Bourdieu, Distinction, 40.

107 Theweleit, Male Fantasies, 22, 57, 24.

108 Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 228, 16.

109 Ekaizer, Yo, Augusto, 272, 274; ellipses in original.

110 Salinas, The London Clinic, 28, 107, 104.

111 Ibid., 112-13, 95.

112 Hite, When the Romance Ended, 193.

113 Ibid., xv.

114 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 1:140.

115 Ibid., 142-43, 143.

116 Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude, 55.

117 Moulián, Chile actual, 174.

118 Taylor, Disappearing Acts, 130.

119 Moulián, El consumo me consume, 69, 45, 67.

120 Sepúlveda, “Introduction,” 31, 32.

121 Agosín, Tapestries of Hope, 23.


123 Butler, Excitable Speech, 32; see Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” 55.

124 Butler, Excitable Speech, 139, 134.

125 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 148, 122.

126 Agamben, State of Exception, 88.

128 Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 356, 349. See also Lazzarato, “From Biopower to Biopolitics.”


130 Lane, *Bourdieu’s Politics*, 118.


137 For the “fusion of ‘art’ with ‘life,’” see Neustadt, *CADA día*, 35.


139 Thayer, *El fragmento repetido*, 16.


143 Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 398, 420.

144 Foucault, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, 252.

145 Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 143, 144.


147 Richard, *Cultural Residues*, 156.

149 Ibid., 102, 103.

150 Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, 3:45, 58.


152 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” 316.


155 Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 149.