PART TWO: CONSTITUTION
Chapter 3

Escalón, 1989: Deleuze and Affect


--Colectivo “Huitzilipochtli,” El “Cipitío” en el Salvador Sheraton

We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. . . . A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete power, complete bliss.

--Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence

The Return of Affect

The Marxist critic Fredric Jameson famously senses a “waning of affect in postmodern culture.” He argues that “the great modernist thematics of alienation, anomie, solitude and social fragmentation and isolation” have now “vanished away.” Jameson claims that postmodernism offers “not merely a liberation from anxiety but a liberation from every other kind of feeling as well, since there is no longer a self present to do the feeling.” He adds, however, that feelings have not entirely disappeared: it is just that they “are now free-floating and impersonal and tend to be dominated by a peculiar
kind of euphoria.”

Hence, he argues elsewhere, the sensation of “relief” as postmodernism heralds what feels like “a thunderous unblocking of logjams and a release of new productivity.” This relief, Jameson continues, is an effect of our distance from production; it is a symptom of our “economic impotence.”

Now that all trace of production has been effaced from the commodity, consumers can surrender to the narcotic delights of postmodern jouissance.

But since the exuberant 1980s, when Jameson’s essay was originally published, or even the 1990s when it was revised and republished as part of his book, Postmodernism, anxiety has surely returned with a vengeance. We may be no less impotent, yet fear and even terror rather than euphoria define the age inaugurated by the September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington. Affect is back (if it had ever really gone away). Affect has also returned as an object of study: critics such as Corey Rubin and Joanna Bourke have written specifically on fear; theorists such as Teresa Brennan, Antonio Damasio, Brian Massumi, and Eve Sedgwick have reconsidered affect more generally.

There is even talk of an “affective turn.” Critics disagree, however, on the terminology they employ and their definitions. Affect, emotion, feeling, passion, sensation: these terms often overlap, and are used by some interchangeably, but by others to refer to very different concepts. Jameson, for instance, contrasts affect, which he defines as subjective feeling, with the “free-floating and impersonal” feelings that “it might be better and more accurate to call ‘intensities.’” Feminist theorist Brennan, on the other hand, distinguishes the physiological from the linguistic: affects “are material, physiological things,” whereas “feelings are sensations that have found the right match in words.” Neurologist Damasio invokes a similar distinction, but what Brennan terms affect he terms emotion: “Emotions play out in the theater of the body. Feelings play out in the theater of the mind.” Philosopher Massumi defines affect as impersonal
intensity, by contrast with emotion, which calls “qualified intensity,” that is, “the sociological fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point onward defined as personal.” And queer theorist Sedgwick, finally, following psychologist Silvan Tomkins, separates affects and drives: both are “thoroughly embodied,” but “affects have greater freedom with respect to object.”

My use of the term “affect” (and of the related term, “emotion”) is closest to Massumi’s. Moreover, like him I draw on French philosopher Gilles Deleuze to flesh out a politics of affect that resonates with posthegemonic times. Massumi argues that Deleuze’s theory of affect “holds a key to rethinking postmodern power after ideology,” and he suggests therefore “an affective theory of late-capitalist power.” I go further, to argue that we need an affective theory of power per se. Affect is central to the understanding and elaboration of posthegemony, alongside the concepts of habit (affect at standstill) and multitude (affect become subject), which I develop in subsequent chapters. Yet I also argue that the Deleuzian conception of affect is insufficient, indeed that it falls prey to traps similar to those that befall hegemony theory, in that on its own it cannot distinguish between insurgency and order, ultimately between revolution and fascism. Still, affect is where posthegemony theory must start. Feeling is a gateway to the immanence of politics (and to a politics of immanence).

Deleuze’s definition of affect derives from the seventeenth-century philosopher Benedict de Spinoza. Spinoza’s philosophy is centrally concerned with the relationships between bodies, which can be human bodies but also body parts, things, and collectivities. As Spinoza declares in the opening to his discussion of emotions in the Ethics, “I shall regard human actions and desires exactly as if I were dealing with lines, planes, and bodies.” For “all nature” consists of “bodies [that] vary in infinite ways.” And the human body, for instance, comprises many other bodies, requires still other
bodies for its preservation and regeneration (through, say, food or shelter), and in turn “can move external bodies in many ways, and dispose them in many ways.”\(^\text{11}\) So bodies continually affect and are affected by other bodies. Indeed, a body is defined by its potential to affect or to be affected, by its powers of affection; some bodies have much greater powers to affect other bodies, and no two bodies affect others in precisely the same ways. Moreover, this capacity for affection is in constantly flux, depending upon a whole history of interactions. If I am well-nourished, for instance, I may have a greater power to affect other bodies than otherwise; if I have fallen from or collided with some other body, I may have less power of affection. In short, affect is a way of redescribing the constant interactions between bodies, and the resultant impacts of such interactions. Every encounter brings with it some kind of change: as Deleuze explains, “an increase or decrease in the power of acting, for the body and the mind alike”; affect is variation, “a variation of the power of acting.” When our power of acting (of affecting and being affected by others) increases, we feel joy; when it decreases, we feel sadness. So there is a basic distinction between “joyful passions” and “sad passions.”\(^\text{12}\)

Affect is, for Deleuze and Spinoza, an index of power: we may feel pain (a sad passion) when our power of acting diminishes; we may feel exultation (a joyful passion) when it is enhanced. In turn, a body’s power is itself is a function of its affective capacity or receptivity, its power to move or be moved by others. And as its power changes, so does its very essence: increases or decreases in a body’s power, changes in its affection, determine its ability to further affect and be affected, to become another body (more or less powerful). Affect marks the passage whereby one body becomes another body, either joyfully or sorrowfully; affect always takes place between bodies, at the mobile threshold between affective states as bodies either coalesce or disintegrate, as they become other to themselves. Hence, Massumi argues, affect constitutes an
immanent and unbounded “field of emergence” or “pure capacity” prior to the imposition of order or subjectivity. It is another name for the continuous variation that characterizes the infinite encounters between bodies, and their resultant displacements and transformations, constitutions and dissolutions. It is only as affect is delimited and captured that bodies are fixed and so subjectivity (or at least, individual subjectivity) and transcendence emerge. But as this happens, affect itself changes: the order that establishes both subjectivity and transcendence also (and reciprocally) converts affect into emotion. The myriad encounters between bodies in flux come to be represented as interactions between fixed individuals or subjects, and affect becomes qualified and confined within (rather than between) particular bodies. This qualification of affective intensity is also its “capture and closure”; Massumi suggests that “emotion is the most intense (most contracted) expression of that capture.”

As affect is transformed into emotion, it founds sovereignty. Deleuze and his co-author, the psychoanalyst and activist Félix Guattari, provide an example taken from the stage to illustrate the capture and so subjection of affect. In opera, the “romantic hero,” that is, “a subjectified individual with ‘feelings,’” emerges from (and retrospectively orders and envelops) “the orchestral and instrumental whole that on the contrary mobilizes nonsubjective ‘affects.’” But this orchestration of affect, its transformation into emotion, is also immediately political: the “problem” of affect in opera is “technically musical, and all the more political for that.” The same mechanisms orchestrate subjectivity in politics as in the opera house. Massumi focuses on the ways in which contemporary regimes exploit “affect as capturable life potential.” He details how Ronald Reagan, for instance, put affect to work in the service of state power, conjuring up sovereignty by projecting confidence, “the apotheosis of affective capture.” Reagan “wants to transcend, to be someone else. He
wants to be extraordinary, to be a hero.” But ideology had nothing to do with this arch-populist’s transcendence: “His means were affective.” Rather than seeking consent, Reagan achieved the semblance of control by transmitting “vitality, virtuality, tendency.” Affect, then, is more than simply an index of the immanent, corporeal power of bodies whose definition mutates according to their state of affection; it is also what underpins the incorporeal or “quasi-corporeal” power of the sovereign whose empirical body, in Reagan’s case, crumbles before our eyes. In this double role, as an immanent productivity that gives rise to transcendent power, affect is “as infrastructural as a factory.” Like labor power, it is a potential that can be abstracted and put to use, a “liveliness” that “may be apportioned to objects as properties or attributes,” an “excess” or “surplus” that “holds the world together.”

Just as Latin America has long supplied raw material to feed the global economy, so the region has also been exploited for its affective potential. Gold, silver, copper, guano, rubber, chocolate, sugar, tobacco, coffee, coca: these have all sustained peripheral monocultures whose product has been refined and consumed in the metropolis. And parallel to and intertwined with this consumer goods economy is a no less material affective economy, also often structured by a distinction between the raw and the refined. After all, several of these substances are mood enhancers, confected into forms (rum, cigarettes, cocaine) that further distill their affective powers. Others have inspired their own deliria: gold fever, rubber booms. But there has always been a more direct appropriation and accumulation of affective energy: from the circulation of fearful travelers’ tales describing cannibals and savages, to the dissemination of “magic realism” and salsa, or the commodification of sexuality for Hollywood or package tourism. Latin America marks the Western imagination with a particular intensity. And the figures who stand in for the region are therefore distinguished by their affective charge: the “Brazilian bombshell” Carmen Miranda, for instance, her headdresses loaded with fruit signifying tropical bounty, served in films such as *Week-End in Havana* (1941) and *The Gang’s All Here* (1943) as a fetishized conduit for the exuberance and sexiness that Hollywood captures, distils, and purveys as
“Latin spirit.” At the same time, and despite the elaborate orchestration typifying a Carmen Miranda number, some disturbing excess remained, not least in the ways in which Miranda’s patter upset linguistic convention. She blurred English and Portuguese and dissolved both, (re)converting language into sounds that were no longer meaningful, only affectively resonant. In film scholar Ana López’s words, “Miranda’s excessive manipulation of accents . . . inflates the fetish, cracking its surface while simultaneously aggrandizing it.”\(^\text{18}\) So there is a complex relationship between Latin affect and Western reason: both reinforcement and subversion. Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz suggests that at stake in the exploitation of Latin affect is a colonial pact with the devil: he says of tobacco and chocolate from the Americas, as well as Arabian coffee and tea from the Far East (“all of them stimulants of the senses as well as of the spirit”) that “it is as though they had been sent to Europe from the four corners of the earth by the devil to revive Europe ‘when the time came,’ when that continent was ready to save the spirituality of reason from burning itself out and give the senses their due once more.”\(^\text{19}\) An economy of the senses saves reason, gives it a shot in the arm, but also demonstrates reason’s addicted dependence upon sensual as well as spiritual stimulation.

There is, then, a politics of affect; perhaps there is no other kind. We have seen how, in excluding affect from their calculations, both neoliberalism and civil society theory find themselves surprised by its often violent resurgence with the contemporary crisis of the state. Populism and cultural studies, on the other hand, are so fully affected, so invested in affective relations, that they succumb to the lure of the state as fetish and abandon critique. Ignoring or repressing affect and wallowing in it or taking it for granted have ultimately the same effect: affect remains a mystery; politics is rendered opaque. The return of affect demands an adequate conceptualization of affect’s politics, and of its relation to the state. Deleuze’s theory of affect promises such a conceptualization, and so a better understanding of affect’s role in both order and insurgency. It also enables us to rethink the very notion of the “return” of affect, with its implication that at some point affect had been lost to history. Far from it: there is also a
history of affect; or rather, history too is affected. History is often cast as a narrative that emphasizes regularity and predictability: in Massumi’s words, it comprises a set of “identified subjects and objects” whose progress is given “the appearance of an ordered, even necessary, evolution . . . contexts progressively falling into order.”

But such an appearance is conjured up by the same political operation that qualifies the prepersonal multiplicity and mobility characteristic of affect. Narrative history is the by-product of a process that selects, confines, and captures an affective flow that is in fact unpredictably mobile and in continuous variation. In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, “all history does is to translate a coexistence of becomings into a succession.” In this translation, affects become emotions, singular collectives become identifiable individuals, and the state arises, imposing its order upon culture. The affective, now constituted as the emotional, is represented as reactive, secondary, the essence of passivity: events provoke sadness, happiness, or whatever. Affect’s primacy and excess is translated into the secondary residue that is emotion.

History has to be remapped in view of the affective flux that resonates through (and resists) its linear orderings. One starting point is to note how history is both marked and produced by affect, and how historical changes are registered directly on and in the body. It is because it is imprinted on, as well as generated by, the body that, as Jameson claims, “history is what hurts.” Attempts to eliminate affect, either directly through its suppression or through the recuperation of those “affected” into the striations of disciplinary systems, although never fully successful, register as a recomposition of bodies: their incarceration in institutions, their normalization in society; or their subalternization, their dispersion and mutilation beyond the bounds of the social contract. Changes in prison demography or in the numbers or types of felons sent to the gallows, for instance, mark the imposition and expansion of the wage
relation as surely as do unemployment statistics or the redeployment of workers along a factory production line. History impacts on bodies immediately. Even the terms “mark” and “impact” are misleading: it is not that bodies are history’s recording surface, and affect its ink; we need to break from the representational logic that characterizes hegemony theory. Rather, immanence is the key to understanding affect. Affect is not what happens to a body, but part of a process by which a body becomes other to itself. History is no more or less than the recomposition or movement of bodies, a series of modulations in and through affect. Anything else is mere tableau.

We start with emotion, with our common emotions such as happiness or fear. Political theorist John Holloway suggests that “the beginning is not the word, but the scream.” Affect can be re-read back through emotion, and so reinserted into history and politics. After all, emotion is a form of affect (formed affect), and the emotional individual is always on the verge of being overwhelmed, and so desubjectified, by an affect that goes beyond all bounds. For, however much affect is confined, something always escapes: “Something remains unactualized, inseparable from but unassimilable to any particular, functionally anchored perspective.” Individuals risk being carried away, losing their wits or their senses to become possessed by affect. For Massumi, “that is why all emotion is more or less disorienting, and why it is classically described as being outside of oneself.” Hence emotion frequently appears excessive and inappropriate; affect always threatens to reappear, to take over. And no wonder emotion is so often gendered, viewed as feminine: sweeping away fixed identities, affect initiates what Deleuze and Guattari term a “becoming,” a becoming-woman or a becoming-minoritarian. Affect sweeps subjects away from normative models (man, state, human) and towards their counter-poles (woman, nomad, animal). In Deleuze’s words, “affects aren’t feelings, they’re becomings that spill over beyond whoever lives
through them (thereby becoming someone else).”\textsuperscript{27} Affect gathers up singularities and partial objects, bodies of all shapes and sizes, and redistributes and recomposes them in new, experimental couplings and collectivities. In so far as we let this happen, we liberate ourselves--from our selves. Carried away, we (but no longer “we”; someone else, some other collectivity) increase our power to affect and be affected. Flight is not a sign of weakness; it is the line along which we gain powers of affection and experiment with new “ways in which the body can connect with itself and with the world.”\textsuperscript{28}

This chapter’s case study is El Salvador’s FMLN (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, or Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front), the guerrilla group that waged war on the Salvadoran state in the 1980s, until the peace accords of 1992 after which they became a conventional political party. My focus is on the FMLN as an insurgent organization. Rather than recuperating them as part of civil society, or seeing their struggle as predicated on some hegemonic project, I emphasize the consequences of clandestinity and so unrepresentability, and armed force and so terror, to show how the FMLN occupied an affective line of flight. This redescription of the FMLN aligns them more with a group such as Sendero than with (say) the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo or other so-called new social movements. At the same time, there is something savage in all subaltern movements, even those that do their best to stake out a position within civil society or to submit to the logic of hegemony. These efforts are always failures, at least in part, in that subalternity necessarily implies a (non)location outside of the circuits of civil society and rational discourse, outside of hegemonic projects. And there is always something terrifying about such an outside; but also something joyful, and it is this joy that inspires participation, a becoming-other by becoming part of the movement. For the FMLN, affect was both a weapon and the site of an inhabitation at odds with the logic of hegemony. As such, the FMLN is an archetype of the nomad “war machine” valorized by Deleuze and Guattari. As we will see, however, the FMLN was not the only subaltern subject in the Salvadoran war: the state too becomes subaltern, becomes nomadic, in the death squads and in the activities of at least some parts of its armed forces, most notably the dreaded Atlacatl Brigade.
The Salvadoran civil war lasted from 1980 to 1992, and was one of the hemisphere’s most prolonged and intense conflicts. But while much was written about the situation at the time, since the peace accords the country has mostly dropped off the agenda for academia and the media alike. A good introduction and overview to the country as a whole as well as to the civil war is historian Aldo Lauria-Santiago and anthropologist Leigh Binford’s collection *Landscapes of Struggle*. Lauria-Santiago and Binford’s theoretical frame is, they claim, “the complex and contradictory operations of hegemony and counter-hegemony.” But they themselves admit that, even on their own terms, hegemony theory hardly helps explain Salvador’s twentieth-century history: “The country’s authoritarian legacy” made for at best “a condition of ‘weak hegemony.’” Hegemony therefore functions as a *deus ex machina* in their account: the concept is sometimes invoked, loosely defined as “a system of beliefs and practices that favor dominant groups and that serve as frames that shape people’s lived experience,” but more often passed over in silence. In practice, hegemony theory proves a poor guide to the Central American conflicts, and even where the concept is used with more consistency and rigor, as for instance in the discussion of testimonial literature by critics such as John Beverley, it leads (as I argue at more length in my concluding chapter) simply to mis-readings and misunderstandings.

The FMLN emerged in 1980 as a coalition of five armed groups most of which had been founded in the early 1970s. Galvanized by the brutal state repression of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and building on the mass protests against which that repression was directed, they hoped to provoke a general insurrection with their so-called “final offensive” of January 1981. After all, other successful revolutions (most notably the 1979 victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua) had, at least in their final phases, been relatively rapid affairs. Both the Nicaraguans and the Cubans urged the FMLN to adopt a similar insurrectional strategy, and to do so quickly before Reagan assumed the US presidency: “A quick insurrection would present the new administration with a fait accompli, an irreversible situation.” But despite some local victories, overall the 1981 offensive proved a failure, and soon both the FMLN and the Salvadoran armed forces dug in for a longer conflict. Indeed, in the first few years of the war (1980-1984), FMLN strategy stuck more or less to patterns of conventional warfare. With the Salvadoran armed forces “occupied in static defense of infrastructure,” the guerrilla consolidated and expanded their territorial control in the countryside, “building a quasi-regular army” of battalions and brigades concentrated in large camps. In these early years, the FMLN sought primarily “a military resolution to
the conflict,” combining fixed battles and assaults on towns and villages, in an almost permanent series of minor offensives, with economic sabotage that sapped the Salvadoran state’s ability to respond. The rebels enjoyed significant success in this period: most analysts concur that had the guerrilla coalition been able to unify politically and militarily in time, and so had in fact their “final offensive” come earlier, they probably would have succeeded in overthrowing the Salvadoran state. Even without that decisive victory, by the end of 1981 “the FMLN had indisputable control over at least a quarter of the national territory,” and this in the most densely populated country in the Americas. Even the vehemently anti-FMLN analysts José Angel Bracamonte and David Spencer concede that the guerrillas were “without any doubt . . . the best militarily developed insurgent movement in the history of the American continent.”

It soon became clear that the Salvadoran revolution would prove a “long war” (to use political historian James Dunkerley’s phrase) in more ways than one: not only could it trace its inspiration back to the 1930s, and a Communist uprising bloodily repressed by the oligarchic state; it would also become one of the hemisphere’s most sustained guerrilla insurgencies. By the mid-1980s the FMLN strategy’s unsuitability for such a long war was apparent. Hugh Byrne records that by the end of 1983, “the guerrillas were winning the war. However, the FMLN had military weaknesses. Its concentration of forces made the insurgents vulnerable to the assets of the armed forces, particularly helicopters, aircraft, and artillery.” Byrne goes on to observe that “a quasi-regular war played to one of the strengths of the ESAF [El Salvadoran Armed Forces]: its access to sophisticated equipment and extensive funds to wage a high-technology war.” From 1984, the FMLN therefore switched tactics. They divided into smaller and more mobile units. They dispersed their forces throughout the country, only “concentrating them for strategic actions, particularly at night for short periods.” Guerrilla units combined military and political functions, “working to build political support among the population.”

Though significant parts of the country (particularly in the departments of Chalatenango in the West, Morazán and Usulatán in the East, and around the Guazapa volcano just to the North of the capital, San Salvador) remained beyond the permanent control of the Salvadoran state, in this new deterritorialized warfare the rebels were always on the move, or ready to move. Civilians, too, learned to flee—not least after the December 1981 massacre at El Mozote, a small village in Morazán, in which the army killed those who had stayed behind when the guerrilla fled, in the expectation that their noncombatant status
would protect them. Many sought refuge in Honduras, and refugee camps such as Colomocagua and Mesa Grande just over the border. However, given these camps’ proximity to rebel-dominated zones in El Salvador, there was much traffic to and fro. Another massacre, at the Río Sumpul in May 1980, was an attempt by a combination of Salvadoran and Honduran armed forces to prevent such movement: at least 600 campesinos were killed trying to cross the river as the Hondurans forced them back to face their Salvadoran pursuers. What emerged therefore was a transnational population simultaneously in resistance and in Exodus. While the state tried to reinforce borders, slow down transport, and trap guerrillas and civilians alike in repeated “hammer and anvil” operations, those who inhabited a zone such as northern Morazán were in “a condition of permanent flight.”

Affect threatens social order. A focus on the apparatuses of capture that confine affect, and on the lines of flight that traverse them, along which affect flees, enables a redescription of both social struggle and historical process. Resistance is no longer a matter of contradiction, but rather of the dissonance between would-be hegemonic projects and the immanent processes that they always fail fully to represent. This dissonance results from an incompatibility between state and war machine, sovereignty and subalternity, emotion and affect, however much the former also overlap and indeed rely upon the latter. Moreover, in and through affect other modes of community and coexistence are envisaged and practiced. So in what follows I investigate Deleuze’s conception of affect as resistance, as a political alternative to state hierarchy. Particularly, I read back from our dominant contemporary emotions—the modulated nervousness and fear that now grips us, the carefully calibrated public anxiety that results from “affect modulation as a governmental-media function”--to analyze the terror to which the contemporary state claims to respond. The state identifies in terrorism a mode of organization that is radically different and upsetting to its forms of order. The state intuists that terror threatens the very division between inside and
outside upon which hegemony theory and civil society theory both depend. Hence, although the discourse on terror invokes a radical distinction between civilization and its others, in the end terror undermines such certainties, opening up a line of flight that undoes all binaries.

Deleuze theorizes affect, and the relationship between affect and the state, without either assimilating affect to state logics of normalization or assuming that the affective is simply supplement or excess. Rather, he describes a dynamic relationship between a nomad war machine characterized by affect and a state apparatus that seeks to eliminate that war machine’s affects and energies by (trans)forming and stratifying them. Deleuze focuses on what the state excludes and represses; he demands that we confront immanence on its own terms, showing its distinction from transcendence (as well as the latter’s dependence on the former). This is the basis for a theory of posthegemony: an analysis of culture that accounts for the state without subordinating itself to its logic, and that can therefore chart the historical vicissitudes of the relations between nomad and state; an analysis of the double inscription of politics, as well as the disparities between its two registers. Yet the danger is that this doubleness is now collapsing: the state itself is now becoming terrorist, and so diffusely nomadic; sovereignty is increasingly affective rather than merely affect’s parasite. Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge that “the State apparatus appropriates the war machine, subordinates it to its ‘political’ aims and gives it war as its direct object.” But the suicidal, fascist state goes beyond any rationality of “aims” or objectives. And especially in posthegemonic times, with the so-called society of control or “control society,” the state is ever more immanent. The state has to be explained twice: as it is instantiated in affects and habits, as well as in its projection as transcendent sovereignty. Again,
distinguishing immanence and transcendence (affect and the sovereign state) is but a first step for posthegemonic analysis.

Affect as Immanence

Deleuze’s entire philosophical project is premised on an affirmation of immanence, and a refusal of all transcendence. In theorist Michael Hardt’s words, Deleuze “limits us to a strictly immanent and materialist ontological discourse that refuses any deep or hidden foundation of being.” He turns to Spinoza, whom he and Guattari term “the prince of philosophers” precisely because “perhaps he is the only philosopher never to have compromised with transcendence and to have hunted it down everywhere.” And if it is from Spinoza that Deleuze draws his conception of affect, it is because the Spinozan conception of affect offers a path towards immanence, leading from immediate encounters between bodies to a fully impersonal “plane of immanence.” As commentator Gregory Seigworth summarizes, “there is not one type of affect in Spinoza, but two (affectio and affectus), and, then, not only two but, before and beneath them both, a third . . . and then, . . . not just three but a multitudinous affectivity beyond number (a plane of immanence).” Affectio is “the state of a body as it affects or is affected by another body”; affectus is “a body’s continuous, intensive modification (as increase-diminution) in its capacity for acting”; affect proper then is “pure immanence at its most concrete abstraction . . . affect as virtuality”; and Seigworth quotes Deleuze’s definition of the plane of immanence as “the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete power, complete bliss.” So, just as affect itself can be read back through emotion, here is a progression: from the actual interactions of bodies as they always overflow any set identities; to the ever-changing essence of any body or
combination of bodies, defined by their power to affect and be affected; and on to an ever more expansive conception of immanence itself, as pure virtuality. We have both a program of study, from emotion, to affect, to bodies and collectivities, to immanence; and perhaps also a political program, too.

But if we are continually surrounded by and immersed in (immanent to) the mechanisms and flows of affect, it can still stubbornly appear that transcendence is the only game in town. In philosophical terms, Platonism has still to be overthrown. In political terms, the state continues to claim transcendence and thereby sovereignty—although other figures, “the body of the earth, that of the tyrant, or capital” also establish themselves by “appropriating for [themselves] all surplus production and arrogating to [themselves] both the whole and the parts of the process, which now seem to emanate from [them] as a quasi cause.” A quasi-cause acts as though it inhabited the empty dimension that constitutes transcendence, and also then as though it were the source of what in Anti-Oedipus is designated “desiring-production.” Causes are presented as effects, and vice versa. Representation is posited as ulterior reason, and lack as the key to desire. Thus the state consolidates its power, allocating and distributing lack within and beyond the territorial boundaries it thereby secures, denying any power to the immanent affectivity of bodies as they affect and are affected by each other. Hegemony is substituted for politics, constituted power with its reliance on negation and judgment for the affirmative constituent power embedded in affective encounters.

The state is an “apparatus of capture” that transforms affect into emotion, multiplicity into unity, intensity into the extension of territorial empire. This is the state’s “incorporated, structural violence.” And against (but also prior to) the state is arrayed a nomad war machine for which “weapons are affects and affects weapons.”
Deleuze and Guattari argue that the nomad is fundamentally separate from and exterior to the state: “In every respect, the war machine is of another species, another nature, another origin than the State apparatus.” Just as the state, however warlike it may be, defines itself against war, against and in fear of a “war of all against all,” so the war machine repels the state: “Just as Hobbes saw clearly that the State was against war, so war is against the State, and makes it impossible.” Deleuze and Guattari conclude that “war is . . . the mode of a social state that wards off and prevents the State.” The state and the war machine are also differing modes of community. Whereas the state privileges and incarnates form (and so identity, fixity, definition), “the regime of the war machine is on the contrary that of affects, which relate only to the moving body in itself, to speeds and compositions of speed among elements.” Whereas the state subjects bodies to identity, fixed (often, incarcerated) and defined according to (static) categories, “affects transpierce the body like arrows, they are weapons of war.” Against the striated space of categorization, of bounded differences, the nomad war machine organizes itself within a smooth space of continuous variation, of endless modulation: affectus tending towards immanence. Politics is no longer a matter of the consent and negotiation implied by the hegemonic contract; it is a (non)relation or incompatibility between processes of capture and affective escape.

The FMLN became ever more flexible, mobile, and nomadic so as to maintain its challenge to the Salvadoran state. It abandoned ideological as well as military rigidity, even largely abandoning ideology tout court. For Bracamonte and Spencer, it was its “lack of ideological trappings [that] allowed the FMLN to continually develop successful tactics that worked to near perfection.” In place of ideology, affect. Joining the FMLN involved not the adoption of any specific set of beliefs, but a change in affective state; indeed, it involved a shift from the individualized subjectivity associated with opinion as well as emotion, to the depersonalized commonality characteristic of affect. Guerrilla
testimonios indicate the trauma and the intense affective charge of the transition to clandestinity. The subject of one such account, Ana María Castillo (“Comandante Eugenia”), explains how becoming-guerrilla is a form of social death: “You . . . will leave your family, your friends, and it’s inevitable that some of your loved ones will die. Perhaps they’ll kidnap your relatives to test if this’ll lead them to you. You won’t be able to do anything about it.” Dialogue and discourse with the rest of the world, or the world left behind, become impossible: “You’ll even see people you know in the street who know you, and your heart will be in your mouth with the desire simply to say hello, but you won’t be able to. You’ll have to pass by on the other side . . . and that’ll hurt you.”

Clandestinity entails radical separation, and the guerrilla returns only as specter. She can see and (here, at least) be seen, but cannot look back and cannot speak. She is suffused with desire (as well as hurt), but also helpless, desubjectified, strangely passive: “You won’t be able to do anything about it.” Her motives will have to go unrecognized, taken to be snobbery (“perhaps they’ll think ‘How stuck up Eugenia’s become’”) or treachery: “All my worker comrades will be left believing absolutely anything, even that I may have betrayed them. That I’ve gone who knows where.” She has gone, and if she is brought back, it will only be as a corpse: “They won’t take me alive.”

If the transition to clandestinity is a scission, a becoming-spectral, for the guerrilla it is also a passage to bodily union. Going underground is an immersion in the material that desubjectifies the guerrilla as he or she becomes immanent to the struggle and to the revolutionary movement. Charles Clements, a pacifist US doctor who spent a year with the FMLN around the Guazapa volcano, notes this emphasis on the corporeal in a conversation with the guide who leads him to the war zone. Asked “¿Porqué un gringo se incorporó?” Clements comments that “the question puzzled me. I didn’t understand the verb. ‘¿Qué quieres decir por incorporarse?’ (What do you mean by ‘incorporate’?) I asked. He explained to me that when you join the struggle, you ‘incorporate’ with the guerrillas—literally, I suppose, to join their body.” Despite himself and his sense of difference because is a gringo, a doctor, and a pacifist, Clements later realizes that he too has incorporated, has joined the social body and lost his sense of individuality: “I had altogether ceased to be Charlie Clements.” For Clements, this realization provokes a profound sense of crisis. His aim had been to keep neutral, to keep his distance. But in the Front, the “Zone” that the FMLN traverses, desubjectification and an immanent immediacy that destroys all distance are inevitable. And for the fighters, incorporation fulfills a desire
to be subsumed in the collectivity: alongside the hurt and perhaps terror involved in inhabiting spectral excess, there is also the joy of commitment, of being fully enfolded within the struggle.

A community gathers on the line of flight, the *guinda* or forced march that defined life in the FMLN’s liberated zones. For internationalist guerrilla Francisco Metzi, these tension-filled voyages were “exceptional times for fraternity. They were when we came closest to a truly Communist way of being.” 50 Undoubtedly, they were associated with particularly intense fears, as the insurgents abandoned entrenched positions and were at their most vulnerable while on the move. But Belgian priest Roger Ponceele notes that they also occasioned intense happiness: “We are ever more mobile. . . . We are always en route to somewhere else. . . . As I go along I am always giving thanks to God.” 51 Be it fear or happiness, the *guinda* resonated with an affective intensity that enabled new ways of being together. Above all, flight required ingenuity or daring: there was constant creativity in the attempt to come up with new ways to slip through (or make porous) the boundaries that parcelled up the territory. These frontiers could come and go as an outcome of military manoeuvres. Often, the Salvadoran armed forces attempted a pincer move, and a column of guerrillas and civilians had, at dead of night, to become invisible and pass through enemy lines. At other times, the boundaries to be infiltrated were political, geographical, or infrastructural: they included national borders but also the highways, such as the Panamericana that splits El Salvador West to East, the road North that bisected the conflictive zones of Guazapa and Chalatenango, or the “black road” dividing Morazán in two. Chronicler José Ignacio López Vigil’s *Rebel Radio* describes the challenges involved in such border-breaching: “The idea was to march all night to reach the Black Road. . . . That was the edge of the noose. If we could get across the road before dawn, we’d be home and dry. But to do that, we had to move the command post, the radio station, the clinic with the wounded, the explosives workshop--and all the residents of the area!” 52 Breaching these limits was a key experience of the civil war. For clandestine radio operator Carlos Henríquez Consalvi, the black road was “the limit separating life from death.” 53 Fleeing across such a boundary involved silence, invisibility, and danger, but also the sense that this was a necessary part of building a new world. Along the line of flight, voices hush and contact replaces discourse as the collective body of the guerrilla and civilian multitude decomposes and recomposes itself in a veritable Exodus: “One by one, our hands on the backpack of the person in front, holding our breath, we crept
past the cuilios [government soldiers] and they didn’t see us. Later on Rogelio [Ponceele, the priest,] told us that was how the Hebrews marched across the Red Sea to escape from the pharaoh.”

The sovereign state constructs a striated space governed by transcendence, by an authority presumed able to adjudicate from on high as to who or what belongs where. This entails a series of exclusions as well as categorizations, the better to purge civil(ized) society of affect. A formidable institutional work of marginalization produces the illusion of a rational normativity. The state constitutes its ideal citizenry through a complex process of simultaneously containing and othering those elements that do not conform to its ideal. The mad, the bad, and the sick (for instance) are all excluded in often similar ways, condemned to a maze of bureaucratic (non)spaces: hospitals, prisons, asylums. Nonconformity is marked by terms signifying an affective excess and loss of self-control: hysteria, lunacy, deviance. As Michel Foucault argues, the “abnormal” is made an object of discourse, and as such excluded (objectified, othered), but also bounded or contained, and so recuperated for the sake of legal, medical, and philosophical conceptions of normality, which, further, hold out the possibility of transforming monstrous affect into labile emotion: “Confinement actually excludes and it operates outside the law, but it justifies itself in terms of the need to correct and improve individuals, to get them to see the error of its ways and restore their ‘better feelings.’” If the institutions of what Foucault terms disciplinary society effect a more or less precarious internal exclusion--the confined are not quite part of but also not quite outside the body politic--they combine but also conflict with more radical exclusions that define the margins of society itself. Many of these forms of othering have archaic roots, such as the Ancient Greek punishment of ostracism or the Hebrew ritual of scapegoating that implied expulsion without recuperation. Within modernity,
absolute exclusion tended to be replaced by its relative, recuperable forms. But some modes of radical othering persisted (capital punishment, for instance, albeit in apparently more humane, medicalized garb), while others were newly minted. The most significant modern politics of absolute othering are encountered at colonial boundaries. Strictly, perhaps, these are modernized versions of premodern exclusions, in that the Ancient Greeks already left us the legacy of splitting civilization from “barbarism,” so called because alien tongues were perceived only as incomprehensible mumblings: ba, ba, ba. But with the growth of European empires from 1492 onwards, and the discovery of what Tzvetan Todorov terms “the Exterior other,” came the invention of the primitive, to whom were ascribed affects banished from modern societies. In cultural critic Marianna Torgovnik’s words, “Europeans were increasingly ghettoizing and repressing at home feelings and practices comparable to what they believed they saw among primitives.” Hence the repressed returned, displaced onto the subaltern: “There was still a persistent, residual need for expression. So [these feelings] were projected abroad in a complicated process by which an aspect of the self was displaced onto the Other.” Colonialism instituted something like a division of affective labor by which feeling was lodged with the subaltern.

The repressed is also enticing; what is forbidden or displaced is, after all, a desire, which can itself become the object of desire. Torgovnik details how, from within a twentieth-century modernity experienced as homogeneity, standardization, and boredom, Westerners looked to the primitive as the locus of an “ecstasy” that was both “a sign of eros or life force” and “a state of excess, frenzy, and potential violence.” And although Torgovnik reads this quest as a search for a semi-religious transcendence, surely (for instance in her case study of primatologist Dian Fossey) seeking “intimacy with mountains” or “friendship with animals and access to the language of beasts” is
closer to an immanent materialism. Moreover, Torgovnik too quickly associates attempts to escape Western normativity with solipsistic mystical experiences, such as those found among New Age movements or even the commodified “generational style” of piercing culture. Not that exoticism should be celebrated. But it can be read as in part a protest, a yearning for escape from the self, or the selves we are permitted by the disciplinary state. Exoticism is also a desire, however misplaced, for a form of community that goes against the rational organizations and orderings instituted by the modern state. Again, affect is best understood in terms of its (non)relation with the state: as a refusal that is, at least potentially, the declaration of a guerrilla war.

The persistence of the desire for immanence demonstrates that affect’s capture by the state is contingent, partial, and unstable. Captured and (de)formed affect underwrites the state and its claims to sovereignty, but also suggests that other social formations are imaginable: affect is autonomous; immanence does not depend upon transcendence. Immanence pre-exists social organization, but it has continually to be re-invented through an experimentation that endlessly produces the new. This experimentation in new modes of being resists the strategies of containment, the attempts to secure social order, purveyed by a state that claims transcendence and fixity premised upon the assumption and negotiation of contractual obligations or hegemonic consensus. Moreover, any such escape is collective. This is not the self-absorbed individual tuning in, turning on, and dropping out. To experiment in new modes of being is immediately political, and in new ways: the war machine arrayed against and in defiance of the citizen consumer as much as the state. In fleeing, affect resists or eludes the state’s apparatuses of capture, kick-starting the construction of what Deleuze and Guattari term a “body without organs” that leads towards the plane of immanence. What appears at first to be marginal and excessive becomes a force destabilizing
individualized and categorical identity, as it carries the bodies it affects along an axis of deterritorialization. Deleuze argues that flight is not negative, for “revolution never proceeds by way of the negative”; it is active, productive, and creative, as “the movement of deterritorialization creates of necessity and by itself a new earth.”

Incorporation is experienced as plenitude rather than excess, and gives rise to guerrilla joy. In They Won’t Take Me Alive, Eugenia’s husband Javier says of her death: “I think she died in this fullness. Fully happy. Death merely bestows the crown of heroism upon a life profoundly given over, without any remainder” (emphasis added). Becoming-guerrilla is death to one mode of sociality, but rebirth in another. For FMLN combatant Edwin Ayala, “here in the Front you are born again, everything is new, you learn everything, you start on your first steps.” So returning to social order could be quite as traumatic as becoming clandestine. Recounting his 1992 demobilization, Ayala reflects on what he will miss about guerrilla life: from singing to making tea on an open fire or constructing air-raid shelters, to the collective affect of “sensing everyone’s happiness at the moment of a victory.” He contemplates a future of “boredom what with all the hassle of navigating the world of ‘civilization’ again.” At the threshold between what is implicitly “barbarism” and his reinsertion into “civilization,” he meets a fallen comrade’s mother: “I left the multitude to go up to someone; at first I hesitated, but up I went, it was Leo’s mother. Standing before her, I couldn’t find anything to say. She was sitting down. So I crouched low and asked, ‘Are you really Leo’s mother?’” For Ayala, re-entering civilian life is a transition from the multitude back to the personal, from silence to a speech that names family ties and social position. From affect, to an affectless boredom and emptiness.

Happiness and joy are constant features of guerrilla experience. Happiness arises when combat goes your way, as in Ayala’s comment about “happiness at the moment of a victory.” Moreover, and however much the FMLN assumed the mantle of principled combatants forced to violence for lack of any peaceful path to social change, there is the joy of seeing your enemy fall. Killing is associated with joyful passions. Combatants only ever express regret over the necessity of executing traitors from within the guerrilla ranks. A special joy comes when casualties are inflicted on the government’s elite battalions--such as the Atlacatl, trained in the US and responsible for grave human rights violations. And there is little that compares to the happiness that arises when the FMLN blow up Domingo
Monterrosa, the colonel who had been responsible for the infamous El Mozote massacre, in which over 750 unarmed campesinos died (what “may well have been the largest massacre in modern Latin-American history”). After Monterrosa’s death, even the noncombatant priest Ponceele expresses a happiness intensifying into a joy that he assumes is shared by all: “I was so happy. You too, surely? . . . How happy we all were when we heard that the plan that they’d prepared against that man had succeeded! . . . There were games and dancing. And we were so happy about what had happened!”

For López Vigil’s Rebel Radio, which gives full details of how the operation to kill Monterrosa was executed and exults in its ingenuity, the episode is a moment of communal celebration and ecstasy: “Have you ever heard the Brazilian soccer team score a goal in Maracaná stadium? That’s what the yelling was like! . . . The radio operators, the kids, everyone in the command post in one big cheer, hugging and kissing each other like at a wedding!” Only Francisco Mena Sandoval, a guerrilla comandante who had previously been a Salvadoran army officer, and who observes that “Monterrosa, just like myself, was from a humble background,” can also see in the colonel’s life and death a wasted opportunity: “A good military man, as he undoubtedly was, could play a different role in an Armed Forces that was at the service of the nation and subordinate to civil authority elected by the people.”

Only Mena Sandoval, in this hybrid of populism and civil society theory and imagining alternative representational structures, excludes happiness--and affect--from his discourse.

Ponceele, on the other hand, consistently returns to a happiness that evades representational logic, that he “cannot describe in words.” Beyond the happiness of victory, the guerrilla priest associates this indescribable joy particularly with the constant movement required of life in the liberated zones: both the guindas and also the entry into towns freed from government control. When he arrives at a newly-liberated town, Ponceele reports again “a great happiness, difficult to describe in words.” The mainly rural guerrilla army mingle with the townspeople and an atmosphere of festivity prevails. When the fighting is over “and our army comes in, it’s really happy. . . . The compañeros wander around happily drinking their soft drinks and often organize a dance. . . . The girls like to dance with a guerrilla, even though the compas don’t dance well. They play rancheras and cumbias and it’s one big happiness.”

A sense of carnival accompanies the barriers breached as the FMLN demonstrate the permeability of the tenuous border between city and countryside. Rebel Radio (a book that throughout emphasizes humor and comic misadventure) likewise stresses the carnivalesque atmosphere attending the guerrillas’ entry
into town. In an episode not translated in the English edition, we learn that they would put on a show of popular theatre called “The Fifth Floor of Happiness”: “And the Radio transmitted first the combat and then the happiness.” The Fifth Floor of Happiness then becomes the title of Dutchwoman Karin Lievens’s *testimonio* of three years with the guerrilla.

Topologically, the distinction between transcendence and immanence is the difference between the empty dimension of hierarchical sovereignty and the n-1 dimensions (a multiplicity stripped only of the transcendent) that define immanence. This distinction often plays out in the conflict between the Maoist guerrilla “fish in the sea” and imperialist air power, or between underground subversion and state monumentality. For instance, tall buildings provoke a kind of fatal attraction for the homeless, mobile, components of the nomad war machine. Building upwards has marked homogenizing unification from Babel to Petronas. Babel still epitomizes the dream of unimpeded and transparent communication, but it was also merely the first such project (and the first such tower) to fall. One hesitates to call Babel “modern,” but like the Pyramids its height required the cooperation that ultimately only modernity would perfect. And Kuala Lumpur’s city center, site of the Petronas towers, is an “intelligent precinct” set in the world’s most ambitious communications project: Malaysia’s “Multimedia Super Corridor” (MSC) is an area the size of Singapore that will be fully wired and the site of two new “smart cities,” Putrajaya and Cyberjaya, “with multimedia industries, R&D centres, a Multimedia University and operational headquarters for multinationals wishing to direct their worldwide manufacturing and trading activities using multimedia technology.” “The future is the MSC,” declares its website. Not if the war machine has anything to do with it.
Among the FMLN’s most daring accomplishments, and perhaps the civil war’s defining moment, was the capture of the San Salvador Sheraton, one of the city’s tallest buildings, in November 1989. As López Vigil puts it: “We attacked the big hotel because it was the highest point in the neighbourhood.” They were attracted to its height, and so to its commanding position within the fashionable neighborhood of Escalón in which they were launching a counter-attack during their November 1989 offensive. But the Sheraton also held a few surprises. The FMLN “had no idea who was inside: none other than the secretary general of the Organisation of American States, João Baena Soares, who was in El Salvador to learn about the war and ended up seeing it up close.” Still more significantly, staying on the hotel’s top floor were twelve US Green Berets, who suddenly became in effect the FMLN’s prisoners. The then US president (George H. W. Bush) sent an elite Delta Force special operations team from Fort Bragg, ready to intervene directly in the Salvadoran civil war for the first time. But after twenty-eight hours the guerrillas left the hotel of their own volition. As far as the press were concerned, they simply vanished: “Reporters who approached the hotel just after dawn . . . said there was no sign of the rebels.” Another report emphasizes the guerrillas’ elusiveness (“the rebels were nowhere to be seen”) in contrast with the US soldiers’ territorial immobility and reliance upon direction from above: “The Green Berets, however, were still behind their barricades. ‘We’ve had no orders so we’re staying here,’ one of them said to a large crowd of journalists.”
The offensive was now over. The FMLN had shown that they could mount and sustain an engagement at the very heart of middle-class Salvadoran society; elsewhere, the government had shown that it had no qualms about bombing its own population, or about murdering some of the country’s leading intellectuals, six Jesuit priests at the Universidad Centroamericana. State terror more than matched any “outrageous act of terrorism” (in the words of a US State Department spokesman) that may have been committed by the insurgents. The resulting impasse led to the peace accords that ended the war. But in a twist, and perhaps an anticipation of future wars, future attacks on tall buildings, the incident at the Sheraton, prompted by a decision to escape working-class barrios bombarded from the air, had demonstrated that the almost imperceptible deterritorialization incarnated in Exodus can also be the most disturbing form of attack. Slipping through the barrier dividing subaltern from elite, the FMLN destabilized the possibility of maintaining any such division, any such exclusion of culture and affect.
Deleuze and Guattari are not alone in revalorizing affect as a mode (perhaps unconscious, and all the more significant for that) of social critique. A politics of affect has also, for instance, characterized feminism. So literary scholars Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar examine representations of the “madwoman in the attic” and argue that “over and over again” women authors of the nineteenth century “project what seems to be the energy of their own despair into passionate, even melodramatic characters who act out the subversive impulses every woman inevitably feels when she contemplates the ‘deep-rooted’ evils of patriarchy.” Likewise, but from a Marxist perspective, critic Terry Eagleton aims to rescue affect from another form of confinement, its aestheticization. He claims that the aesthetic is the privileged means by which affect is purified, submitted to the apparent disinterestedness of liberal ideology, by being transformed into “habits, pieties, sentiments, and affections” and so becoming “the ultimate binding force of the bourgeois social order.” But precisely for this reason, art offers a resource for revolution, if it can only be reconnected to a resistant corporality: “If the aesthetic is a dangerous, ambiguous affair, it is because . . . there is something in the body which can revolt against the power which inscribes it.” Moreover, affect’s ambivalence is also thematized by psychoanalysis, for which the affects aroused in mental illness (melancholia, anxiety, and so on) result from a repression whose origin is fundamentally social. And while psychoanalysis has tended to collude in the state’s normalizing strategies, other trajectories are imaginable: postcolonial theorist Ranjana Khanna, for example, argues for a “critical melancholia,” an “affect of coloniality” that makes “apparent the psychical strife of colonial and postcolonial modernity.”

Ambivalence works both ways. As Torgovnik points out, a search for ecstasy also characterizes fascism: “When the Nazis renewed a glorification of the primitive Folk and the primacy of Blood and Land, they unleashed a tidal wave of oceanic
sentiment typified by the rallies at Nuremburg. They also produced the devastation of World War II and the horrors of the death camps.” Hegemony theory found its stumbling block in fascism: Laclau was faced with the problem of how to distinguish between left and right populisms, hegemony and “counter”-hegemony, fascism and revolution. As I will show, Deleuze’s affect theory also hesitates in the face of Nazism, although by contrast now for fascism’s non-hegemonic tendencies, its promotion and inhabitation of a line of absolute deterritorialization. Today, the radical other goes by the name of terrorism. The conflict between transcendence and immanence, the state and the war machine, tall buildings and nomad, affect and (new forms of) normativity, is encapsulated as the “war on terror.” The label “terrorism” is instant delegitimation, othering and denying to what it demarcates any rights or recognition. Terror defines contemporary politics, and yet it is negated as non-political, as the affective excess of an irrational “fundamentalism.” I suggest that Deleuze allows us better ways to think through the phenomenology and politics of terror, but also that an examination of terror reveals new ambivalences. Terror breaches the boundaries between civility and its other, and therefore helps foment a control society in which the state, too, becomes affective and so immanent.

Terror

Terror is now the absolute boundary of civility, marking the ultimate decision: “You’re either with us or against us,” as George W. Bush declared after the September 11 attacks. This renovated “civilization or barbarism” dichotomy no longer allows for any civilizing project, only a stark choice. Upon the heads of terrorists the “global community” pours all the sobriquets previously reserved for the inmates of disciplinary
society’s institutions: fanatics, outlaws, and madmen constitute an “axis of evil.” They are the ultimate exterior other, the global non-community. But the vituperation that terrorists draw also perhaps indicates a fear that they have their own community, invisible, inhabiting the pores of our own. Moreover, it suggests that perhaps we will all be drawn into this radical immanence, whether we want to or not. Faced with a total war against terror, liberals attempt to renovate a politics of rationalization, under the banner of “understanding.” The West now has all the more reason to try to understand its others beyond (and often as not, also within) its borders; the US should reflect on how its foreign policy has caused it to be so hated, so despised. A logic of representation returns, giving a face or voice to the invisible plotter. Understanding provides the terror’s agents with motives and rationale--without of course ever condoning the destruction itself. But the disjunction between understanding and condoning, the fact that understanding motives requires bracketing off terrorist actions, shows that terrorism provides even liberality with its limit, fixed now between understandable motivation and excessive action. Again, a non-rational residue remains, here in the surplus of means over ends. This residue is an affect (for what is terror but affect at fever pitch?) that liberals prefer to ignore.

Liberals and the new illiberal or neoliberal state may appear to be fundamentally at odds, but both agree that terror, the one affect that neither the state nor liberalism has succeeded in assimilating, should be eliminated from discourse and politics. Whereas the state personalizes this elimination, by slowing down the movement of peoples through security or immigration barriers, or by instigating manhunts against demonized individuals (Saddam, Osama, Mullah Omar), liberals attempt to dissociate persons from their actions, seeing those actions only as markers of desperation. Yet the illiberal state is surely correct not to bracket off affect altogether: its single-minded
prosecution of the “war against terror” identifies terror itself as the embodiment of non-
recuperable affect, and the state of siege induced by so-called terrorism’s invisible forces
as what is finally at issue for social cohesion today.

The propensity of cultural studies is to suggest that terrorism is, ultimately, a
discursive construction: there is no terrorism in itself, simply the construct of
“terrorism,” vilifying and preventing us from understanding counter-hegemonic forces
or marginalized groups (Irish republicanism, Palestinian resistance, Moslems). This
argument shrinks from justifying terror, but turns the tables to suggest that terrorism in
fact serves the state: terror is the ultimate excuse for discipline, invoked by the state to
justify the illiberalism of increased surveillance, detention without trial, and even (in the
United States) the possibility of torture. Sociologist Frank Furedi, for instance, argues
that “the politics of fear has such a powerful resonance . . . because of the way in which
personhood has been recast as the vulnerable subject,” and that in response we should
“set about humanizing our existence.” There is something to this position. Terrorism
does function as a construct to produce docile civil subjects at the same time as it
presents us with images of evil masterminds forever beyond the pale. The label
“terrorism” has become a potent weapon in the state’s discursive arsenal, taken up by
numerous nation-states to reframe historic disputes with the new linguistic simplicity of
the “war against terror.” Yet in reducing once more all politics to hegemony (the
attempt to build discursive coalitions, to assert equivalences and construct
antagonisms), cultural studies refuses to think affect. It turns everything into a political
game, played on the same playing field with a shared playbook.

The illiberal state is, by contrast, right to identify in terrorism a mode of
organization that is radically different and upsetting to its forms of order. Terror is not
simply one more piece in a war of position, or even some constitutive outside to
hegemony tout court. Terrorism may be a signifier that has come to prominence (albeit not for the first time) in recent years, but it cannot be reduced to the nominalism of discursive strategies. Terror is also, and above all, a particularly intense configuration of affect. Moreover, the state is right to fear that terror threatens the very division between inside and outside upon which hegemony theory and civil society theory both, at least implicitly, depend. Terrorist movements may mirror modes of organization and representation characteristic of the state, while terror itself may appear (or be painted as) utterly beyond the pale, but ultimately terror works by concentrating, and so intensifying, affective characteristics that can be found in the very pores of all social organization. Terror works on the affective residue that remains from the work of constitution upon which sovereignty depends, returning us to the mobile affective flux that precedes the organization of social hierarchy.

The illiberal state is also right to insist that with terror comes the end of negotiation, the limit of rational discourse. One does not negotiate with terror. But this well-worn cliché, often used to justify state repression (albeit usually without the realization that state repression can reciprocally be taken to justify terror), is well-founded only in so far as terror can never come to the negotiating table. Terror may prompt or condition dialogue, but strictly speaking when the negotiating starts, the terror ends. Terrorists who do negotiate undergo a change of state. This is why liberals distinguish “terrorism” or “terrorists,” the individuals or movements who take up terror, from the terror itself: one can negotiate with individuals, but not with terror. Hence also the duality that structures so many terrorist groups: Sinn Fein-IRA; FMLN-FDR; ETA-Herri Batasuna; PLO-Al Aqsa Brigades; the political wing and the military wing. Likewise, even the most repressive state tends to prefer proxies (death squads, secret services) who will invisibly fight its invisible enemies. Neither facet is, in any
simple way, a mere supplement, just as neither fully expresses the truth of the other. Sinn Fein is not “simply” the IRA in Armani rather than with Armalites, as Ulster Unionists sometimes argue. Equally, the Armalite has a logic and an affect of its own, and this mute logic deserves its own investigation, because it will never be fully repressed, exorcized, or talked over.  

My implicit comparison between the FMLN and al-Qaida, and between the Salvador Sheraton and New York’s World Trade Center, may seem surprising. Unlike Sendero, the FMLN were long the darlings of the international left, perhaps the last third-world guerrilla group (excluding the Mexican Zapatistas, whose métier and milieu have never been violence in the same way) to count on widespread networks of international solidarity. Yet there is no point rehearsing the hackneyed opposition between “terrorist” and “freedom fighter”; the continuity between the two is more significant. Groups such as the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador in the United States, or the El Salvador Human Rights Committee in Great Britain, propagated a fundamentally distorted representation of the nature of the Salvadoran war: they portrayed it as always and only the justified struggle of the weak against the strong, in the name of human and civil rights. This representation, by confusing affective force with citizen rights, arguably debilitated the FMLN more than it aided them. The FMLN carved out new spaces of freedom and pioneered practices of innovative creativity. But they were also, and inextricably, agents of terror: a war machine, not a negotiating team. Given the intensive affect that they inhabited and produced, we cannot imagine them as proponents of pluralist liberalism. And equally, by insisting on the centrality of hegemonic struggle (and for all their celebration of subalternity), those who read Central American testimonios within the framework of cultural studies missed the plot. For instance, controversial anthropologist David Stoll was surely right to insist that Rigoberta Menchú’s *I, Rigoberta Menchú* is a guerrilla testimonio, written in support and at the instigation of the Guatemalan Guerrilla Army of the Poor; John Beverley’s comment that in fact her book was seen “as a defense of indigenous cultural autonomy and identity politics, rather than left-wing revolutionary vanguardism” merely shows the more or less willful blindness with which the text
was read outside of Guatemala, and more generally the almost perverse obtuseness of much of the movement for solidarity with Central America.  

Terror comes to us from without, whether we like it or not, and makes us all equal. Terror overtakes us and overpowers us; we are subjected to, not subjects of, terror. We are all victims, rather than agents, and there can be the sense of a savage democracy in victimhood: stockbrokers and merchant bankers can suddenly feel as vulnerable as janitors, no longer masters of the universe. Terror effects a levelling that obliterates individuality. We are all equal because we are all (potential) victims of terrorist violence, and so all subject to terror. We are forced to realize that we are part of a collective, again whether we like it or not. Terror works through random indiscrimination: a whole social order, and all its elements, is under siege. We become synecdoches for that social order: women, children, the old, or the disabled are all (equally) instances of (say) the Israeli state or British imperialism. But therefore terror is never entirely random: it always interpellates. This is terror as a constitutive outside, exposing the presence of the community that it aims to destroy, as though by imprinting its image in negative on our retinas. It brings us together; we are all enjoined to “pull together” in the aftermath. Even those who survive are encouraged, by the state and by terror alike, to identify with the victims: for instance, in the endless *New York Times* obituaries to the World Trade Center dead, which the paper tells us “are really our stories, translated into a slightly different, next-door key.” It could have been me, it could have been you; in this, we are indifferent. Love your neighbor, love yourself.

We are also all equal because we have been torn from the order we otherwise incarnate. Disordered, unprotected or doubting the effectiveness of the protection we are offered, we are now indifferent from the terrorist. Just as the terrorist resides,
homeless, uncertainly beyond the limits of the social, so we too now experience, however briefly, something of that existence. This is terror as it (often literally) explodes the border between inside and outside. Hence the aptness of the suicide bomb: a terrifying equalization as the terrorist “takes us with him.” But hence also the suspicion that terror sows among the population it threatens. We are encouraged to identify with our fellow citizens (it could have been me), but also to suspect our fellow citizens (it could be you). The terrorist was once and could still appear to be like us. If we are all in a synecdochal relation to the state, then we may have to take the law into our own hands: the man over there with the backpack, is he one of them? Is he with us or against us? Suspect your neighbor (suspect yourself?). Terror is therefore immediately collective, immediately social, while it simultaneously if only momentarily shows us the limits of the social, as the walls come crashing down. Terror conjures up an existence beyond community, but also other forms of community. The terrorist network that infiltrates a state-centered social order posits a stateless, immanent networks of cells and nodes, however much a terrorist group may claim to be founding a new (parallel, or mirror) state. For why should the state be inevitable? The community established in and through terror may be invisible or imperceptible, but we are all drawn into it when subject to terror. Part of the romance that inevitably attaches itself to terrorism is found here. Becoming-terrorist means social death, with all the rituals of clandestinity that include a change of name, separation from family and friends, and the burden of secrecy that marks one out from what now appears to be a superficial everydayness. Yet it also means discovering a new, perhaps seemingly more profound, community of conspirators and fellow travelers, safehouses and coded communications. An intensive community replaces an extensive one: sacrificing social individuality is experienced as
gaining a new form of vitality and life, even when that life is directed towards inflicting death.

As it deindividuates, terror debilitates rational thought and language. Psychologist Rony Berger notes that “during a terror attack and immediately thereafter, most people’s cognitive functioning is temporarily altered.” Survivors report “confusion, disorientation, attention difficulties, lack of concentration, forgetfulness, difficulty in decision-making and impaired judgment.” Terror is immediately corporeal rather than signifying or linguistic. It grips the body first; often it paralyzes the body. Terror functions not so much as a thought as (to borrow Massumi’s phrase) “a shock to thought.” Or perhaps it is a thought that is so excessive that it is itself shocking, unassimilable, and immediately corporeal. It stuns; we catch our breath to call back language. The mouth dries up. In terror, language gives way to mute fearfulness. Alternatively, as part of an intensive feedback loop that stops the body dead and kick-starts it again over and over, as the body simultaneously conserves energy and rushes to produce new supplies, terror induces kinetic hyperactivity: palpitations, shakes, sweats. Sugars flood the bloodstream and muscles tense. Our legs tremble; we go weak at the knees. Terror’s intensity leaves the tongue flailing, gabbling. Language gives way to the scream, deformed, asignifying. Long afterwards, the body remains hypervigilant and sensitive to the smallest disturbance or noise, easily startled or distracted. Terrorist violence may be compared to language (the anarchist “propaganda of the deed”), but it is always of a different order, an order that subverts and puts a stop to language. Terror in this sense is like pain, which “does not simply resist language but actively destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language.” Biologically, terror short-circuits the cortex to affect the limbic system directly. We are reduced, however briefly, to what the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben in *Homo Sacer* terms
“bare life,” which critic Andrew Norris explains is “mute, undifferentiated, and stripped of both the generality and the specificity that language makes possible.”

Terror is also inherently anti-narrative. Narrative either precedes terror (as justification or exorcism) or follows it (as resolution or explanation). Yes, narrative surrounds terror: acts of violent terror infiltrate themselves into discourse, as in the ubiquitous contemporary references to September 11; discourse agglutinates around terror and the terrorist, providing the “oxygen of publicity” that Margaret Thatcher declared the IRA to breathe. Terror demands an explanation, or some justificatory narrative. At times we may find we can talk of nothing else. Yet this is precisely because terror itself produces no narrative, and overwhelms all other discourse. The narratives that surround terror function as so many tunes whistled in the dark; they attempt to compensate for a terrifying void. Terror is like all violence which, as anthropologist Robert Thornton claims, “necessarily disturbs all structural, causal or narrative sequences and continuities.” It prompts and even underwrites narrative but it is always left outside of the histories that it relates: “The act of violence . . . requires that a new story be told to explain the loss, to account for the disruption, and to rebuild social relations after its occurrence.” As Thornton explains, “this makes violence appear to be located at the ‘beginning’ of new social forms, new behaviours, and new accounts, and thus to appear as their ‘cause,’ but this is a false perception based on the peculiar temporality of violence itself, and its chaotic nature.” In terror, violence is fully apprehended as such. Terror shares, then, this “peculiar temporality” beyond and beneath narrative, beyond narrative time. And while stories may help resolve the wounds that terror opens up, such stories also justify violence, because without it there would be no story.
The FMLN’s 1989 offensive, and its occupation of the San Salvador Sheraton, inspired one of Latin America’s most interesting testimonial texts: a book that describes itself as a “combination of chronicle and literary collage,” a “testimonio-document-popular consciousness.” El “Cipitío” en el Salvador Sheraton begins with the effects of the first sounds of the offensive, the war brought home to the city, on bystanders downtown. The initial response to this bombardment of rocket launchers and artillery is shuddering shock and stasis:

Saturday, November 11. 0900 (or a little earlier)

Boom! --the first slam; Boom! --two . . . Boom! --three . . ., Boom! Boom! --four . . . five . . .

Boom! --six . . . seven . . . eight . . .

The heart trembles with each clout. You can hear the explosions are somewhere in the distance, but that was when the chaos took hold of San Salvador’s center. Looks are exchanged and the scene freezes. People stop walking or doing anything . . . “The marble statues / Are here and there / One, two, and three.” Did you hear that, did you hear? asked one of the statues, and the scene unfroze.

I kept on walking, as though I were crossing an icefield . . .

Speech, seeking confirmation (“did you hear?”), interrupts and displaces the initial shock and terror, but an icefield remains. The book’s narrator, a middle-class intellectual sympathetic to the FMLN, goes home to pack his bags and make ready for exile, in some bad faith: “Tomorrow, Sunday 12th, I’m leaving for Mexico. I’ll get involved in organizing in favor of Salvadoran culture (ahem).”

As the middle classes make to leave, terrorized in and from their daily routines, the spirits arrive. Though the narrator hopes that in Mexico he will find “a good standard of reporting from the press,” the book abandons any simple linear narrative at this point. Rather, it imagines the guerrilla forces to be accompanied by a Salvadoran sprite, the cipitío, with his companion the ciguanaba (often represented elsewhere as a castrating mother) and associated mythical creatures, telling their story interlaced with poetry, newspaper reports, personal testimony, drawings, and photographs of the military action. The narrator’s voice is joined by many others: a cacophony of noise, conflicting perspectives, sounds, images, even music as the narrator listens to Holst’s “Planets” suite, played by the Berlin Philharmonic. He listens to Karajan conducting “Mars” while, “trembling,” he listens to “Mars, conductor of helicopters and tanks, with the force of a cosmic beast, with his hurricanes of fire, his five-hundred-
pound bombs and more, falling hard-heartedly over the valley and hills of San Salvador.” He struggles to see and understand what is going on, blinded by the “brutal” disinformation of the official networks playing military marches and “Yellow Submarine.” He barricades himself in his house, trying to tune in to the guerrillas’ Radio Venceremos, but the signal has been jammed. He can give an account of terror’s effects but not of events themselves: “We are witnesses, then, mostly to sounds, although to some extent also to sights, because we have touched upon the fear found in the faces of the people.” Finally the war has “arrived at the metropolis in this country of campesinos . . . Until now we had only lived the war through television and through rumors.”

Television and rumor: these are two modes of communication that come to the fore in control society. But whereas the former is “one to many” (however many channels may be available at any particular time, each retains the “one to many” structure), the latter is inherently “many to many” in that it has no single enunciating subject and no single destination. Rumor always circulates, faceless and ever changing its shape, in the background and in the pores of society.

El “Cipitío” approximates the mutability and continuous variation of rumor with its collage of elements, some verifiable, others clearly fictional, still others mythically enlarged or distorted. The book portrays the FMLN as similarly circulating and shape-shifting in the pores of society. Proscribed from the official channels of (dis)information, no wonder the guerrilla inhabit the circuits of rumor, and that their exploits are accordingly talked up (or down) and mythicized. When the offensive moves towards middle-class Escalón, “Comandante ‘Cipitío’” moves the members of the guerrilla band into and out of the Sheraton safely by turning them into a jaguar, a coyote, a deer, a hummingbird, a quetzal, and so on, all of whom travel on a cart that is “invisible to the patrols and the guards” while the Mayan moon Tezcatlipoca obligingly hides behind the San Salvador volcano. The guerrillas fade out of representability. The guards hear the cart’s ghostly noise, “ú, ú, ú, ú, ú, ú . . . chiiiiífr, chir . . . chilín-chilín,” but are unable “to figure out where it was coming from.” And as discourse is replaced by sound, language is also undermined. Not only do the fighting and the bombardments produce a series of onomatopoeic explosions: “Ra-ta-plan-plan-plan . . . plin . . . pffff . . . boom . . . pffff . . . boom . . . Over here . . . Over there . . . boom-boroom . . . ra-ta-pum-boom-boom . . . On all sides.” The discourse of justification and hegemonic projects shows the strain of war, repression, terror, and subversion, as it is disrupted and reformulated, deformed: “DemocraCIA: ra-ta-ta-TA . . . Freedom: boom-boom-boom-
boom-boom . . .” Similarly, the cipitío and the ciguanaba are distinguished less by their language than by their distinctive laughs. The few times they do speak, it is either in Salvadoran slang (“¡Ya, pué!” “pues, cipotones”) or in an indigenous language, as when they discover the green berets’ presence in the hotel: “Comandante ‘Cipitío’ let out a shrill hee, hee, hee, hee, HEE . . . and gave out orders and positions. From the lobby the ‘Ciguanaba’ shouted out in Náhuat ‘I am your mother, the woman warrior.’”

Spoken in Náhuat by a mythological creature, and so destined to be unheard by its addressees, the ciguanaba’s claim posits a subaltern foundationalism. The FMLN are portrayed not simply as resisting an oppressive state regime, however much this was the basis of the solidarity they garnered internationally. Rather, they are seen as connected to traditions that precede the state, as inhabiting a milieu that lies outside of any state/civil society duopoly. Indeed, even as they infiltrate the metropolis and occupy the heart of middle-class Salvadoran society, the FMLN are never fully of that society. Whether in the “liberated zones” of rural Guazapa, Morazán, and Chalatenango, or in urban Escalón and the Sheraton, the FMLN constitute an alternative mode of social organization more than any “counter-state.” If anything, as the Ciguanaba suggests, they are associated with forces that have given birth to the state, only to reject it.

Terror underwrites reason and unreason alike. Anthropologist Michael Taussig describes how terror demarcates the colonial difference of subalternity. Reworked to construct a colonial “sense” of the distinction between “civilization” and “barbarism,” terror thus “heightens both sense and sensation.” So, “if terror thrives on the production of epistemic murk and metamorphosis, it nevertheless requires the hermeneutic violence that creates feeble fictions in the guise of realism, objectivity, and the like, flattening contradiction and systematizing chaos.” Colonial reports such as Roger Casement’s 1911 account of the Putumayo rubber boom in the Amazon, and testimonial narratives (say, Rigoberta Menchú’s I, Rigoberta Menchú) are equally “feeble fictions,” driven by the terror that provides their raisons d’être only to systematize the chaos that it threatens. At least testimonio attempts to present what
Taussig notes is “so painfully absent from [Casement’s] Putumayo accounts, namely the narrative mode of the Indians themselves.” But claims to give the subaltern voice are problematic: “Rescuing the ‘voice’ of the Indian” constitutes “the ultimate anthropological conceit,” and Taussig refuses the rationalism that grants Western culture the power of representation.92

Terror constructs sense and depends upon it, but ultimately also undoes it as the state comes to be indistinguishable from the affect that it apparently repels. In his analysis of colonial terror (and capitalist “primitive accumulation”) in the Putumayo, Taussig argues that “terror nourished itself by destroying sense.” Though terror per se is scarcely imaginable (however much it is felt), the fact that it is so quickly recontextualized by narrative justification must not, he suggests, make us “blind to the way that terror makes mockery of sense-making, how it requires sense in order to mock it.” Taussig sees state terror, the (re)appropriation of terror by the state, as “a colonial mirroring of otherness that reflects back onto the colonists the barbarity of their own social relations, but as imputed to the savagery they yearn to colonize.”93 In the circuit of terror, the state captures the war machine, then goes on to project its own barbarism on to the so-called terrorist, who in turn frustrates such categorization by passing almost invisibly through territorial borders, followed by the state’s ever more anxious surveillance. Terror sets up a spiral of immanentization in which origins and causes become increasingly blurred: the state ends up chasing its own tail, frustrated at its inevitable failure to delimit even its own boundaries; confident civilizing missions soon become caught up in messy quagmires, bogged down in jungles, or stranded in the desert. The fiction of a “mission accomplished,” or even that such a mission could ever be accomplished, becomes the feeblest narrative of all. As any notion of hegemony breaks down, let alone the distinction between civil society and its outside, it becomes
hard to distinguish state from war machine. The state too is affected, becoming immanent, becoming imperceptible. In the end, affect alone is an insufficient guide to posthegemonic politics.

Towards Habit

We have seen how, defining affect as increase or decrease in the power of acting, and as series of encounters between bodies that involves also a mutation in those bodies, Deleuze opens a gateway to immanence. He contrasts a fluid escape towards the plane of immanence with the static categorizations and insistence on identity characteristic of a state that establishes itself as transcendent quasi-cause. The state is an apparatus of capture, transforming mobile affect into a set of fixed emotions. Yet there is always some slippage, something excessive even in emotion that threatens to revert to affect, and indicates a line of flight along which a nomad war machine (re)constitutes itself. Domination and insurgency can be re-read in terms of this perpetual tension between transcendence and immanence, capture and Exodus, rather than as a series of competing hegemonic projects or as a dialogue between state and civil society. A community gathers on the line of flight, a community whose principle of organization has nothing in common with the state’s territorializing claim to sovereignty: intensely occupying multiple dimensions on the plane of immanence rather than submitting to the empty dimension of hierarchical order, the war machine unsettles and destabilizes all pretension to hegemony. In terror, however, state logic reaches its limit and even begins to dissolve. Terror vividly demonstrates the porousness of the border between reason and affect, and the impossibility of banishing affect altogether. Terror undoes the distinction between inside and outside. But it also problematizes Deleuze’s own
contrast between state and nomad, immanence and transcendence, between a liberating affect and a stifling regime of emotion that turns around a state fetish.

The distinction between a transcendent state and immanent affect is patent and palpable, but it is also ultimately unsustainable. First, transcendence itself is but an epiphenomenon, a (perverse) result of immanent processes. At best the state claims transcendence: it acts as though it were sovereign; it represents itself as cause by attempting to align with and account for the affects of which it is in fact mere effect. But even the control that it does exercise is not a result of these claims, but rather a product of the ways in which it, too, operates immanently. Second, then, at times of crisis such as in the face of insurgency, the state becomes unabashedly immanent, drawing its own line of flight or absolute deterritorialization. The state always over-reaches itself, but it also sometimes abandons any claim to transcendence in a suicidal death drive, most clearly in the case of fascism. We see this now almost every day. For third, with the emergence of a society of control or “control society,” replacing an earlier disciplinary society, transcendence withers away and yet the state continues business (almost) as usual. We are all now a little bit affected, a little less secure in our previously fixed subjectivities. But we are none the less subjected. Perhaps it is simply that the state is a habit we just cannot break; perhaps the state was always no more (or less) than habitual. In either case, we will have to move towards a theory of habit, rather than resting on an analysis that concentrates solely on an affective war machine set against (emotional) states.

Michael Taussig emphasizes that affect is never simply exterior to the state. He argues that state power, or rather the “magic” by which it conjures up its potent illusion of power, depends upon both terror and death: “The magic of the state is saturated by death.” It is less that the state deals out (or even fends off) terror, than that it recodes,
redirects, and regulates an affective force that Taussig associates with the popular and above all with spiritism, with communing with the dead. Hence “the outlandish but real possibility that underpinning the legitimacy of the modern state is a vast movement of transposition between the official and the unofficial for which spirit possession is paradigmatic.” Language arises in this transposition, because it is also a figuration: the state represents society to itself as given, constituted, and hierarchically ordered. So the state mimics spiritism’s power, and then appears to give life to those it newly declares to be dead because they lack its revivifying language. The state is dependent upon affective materiality, and “it is, by and large, the poor, especially the urban poor, who fulfill this desperate need for a body. It is these poor whose task it is to supply stately discourse with its concrete referents.” Therefore it is not so much that the subaltern is excluded from power. In fact, the state is parasitic upon the power of the so-called “excluded”; it is they who provide it with legitimacy and life, as much as (or even more than) the state that denies them welfare and recognition. The state is a reflex, constituted by and in affect, only to expel any affective surplus to the demonized margins of its territorial and symbolic control. The state excludes culture and affect, categorizing and disciplining it, but as a reaction-formation that also depends upon an affective culture that is, in fact, primary.

However much it is accumulated, memorialized, and stratified, intensity replaced by monumentality, the sacred affect appropriated by the state remains inherently unstable. Not only is society under threat at its margins (the terrorist beyond the pale), it is also endlessly subverted at its core. In Taussig’s words, “Guarded as it is by unmoving troops in scarlet uniforms and ceremonial swords, it is nevertheless the very nature of the sacred to leak.” Civil society would eliminate affect, and expel terror to the margins, but it never fully achieves its aim. Even Fredric Jameson, in a
remark that has gained less attention than his claim about a waning of affect, argues that in postmodernism, “as throughout class history, the underside of culture is blood, torture, death, and horror.” The state leaks, but it also over-reaches; its pretensions to sovereignty never fully coincide with its constitution in and through affect. As Foucault meticulously demonstrates in his analyses of micropolitics, power never descends from on high as the principle of sovereignty claims; rather it is always exercised immanently and immediately, on and through the body, in “a multiplicity of force relationships immanent in the sphere in which they operate.” This non-coincidence between power’s self-image and its actualization offers the possibility of escape, of Exodus. But sometimes it is the state itself that escapes, and with devastating consequences.

For Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus*, “one can never go far enough in the direction of deterritorialization: you haven’t seen anything yet--an irreversible process.” Yet Deleuze later indicates growing caution or “sobriety.” *Anti-Oedipus*’s relatively cavalier spirit, its broad declaration of a new “universal history,” gives way to an emphasis on specificity: “There is no general prescription. We have done with all globalizing concepts.” Deleuze and his interlocutor Parnet call for an analysis of the dangers, as well as the opportunities, offered by schizophrenizing, deterritorializing strategies. They ask: “How is it that all the examples of lines of flight that we have given, even from writers we like, turn out so badly?” Outlining the various lines of social organization and their politics in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari return to the dangers of deterritorialization on the lines of flight. “It would be oversimplifying,” they say, “to believe that the only risk they fear and confront is allowing themselves to be recaptured in the end, letting themselves be sealed in, tied up, reknotted, reterritorialized. They themselves emanate a strange despair, like an odor of death and immolation, a state of war from which one returns broken.” Perhaps
fascism is to be situated along this line of flight: “Fascism,” Deleuze and Guattari now argue, “involves a war machine. . . A war machine that no longer had war as its object and would rather annihilate its own servants than stop the destruction. All the dangers of the other lines pale by comparison.”¹⁰¹ The distinction between immanence and transcendence--between affect and emotion, constituent and constituted power--may not be sufficient to differentiate revolution from fascism. Either that or fascism, too, can be revolutionary; and revolution, fascist.

Philosopher Nick Land, a “hard core” Deleuzian who offers a refreshing alternative to the tepid humanist Deleuzianism that has found a home in cultural studies, argues that Deleuze and Guattari’s caution represents a catastrophic act of bad faith, a lapse into moralism. For Land, deterritorialization must continue at all costs. In a parody of Foucault’s preface to Anti-Oedipus, he asks “how do you make yourself a Nazi?” and answers that “trying not to be a Nazi approximates one to Nazism far more radically than any irresponsible impatience in destratification.” Land concludes that “nothing could be more politically disastrous than the launching of a moral case against Nazism: Nazism is morality itself.”¹⁰² Thus Land denies the possibility of moral resistance to fascism--while posing fascism as an overwhelming moral possibility. Whether or not he would be similarly skeptical of other forms of resistance remains unclear. Land here implies a political response, in that his frame is defined by the very anti-fascist problematic that constitutes the political for Deleuze and Guattari. Yet in The Thirst for Annihilation he refuses the concept of politics, preferring an almost mystical celebration of desiring-production as, simultaneously, creativity and orgiastic death. And in “Meltdown,” Land describes politics as “police activity, dedicated to the paranoid ideal of self-sufficiency, and nucleated upon the Human Security System.”¹⁰³
For critic Arthur Redding, on the other hand, the analysis of fascism in *A Thousand Plateaus* is potentially more shocking than even Land (himself hardly apocalypse-shy) realizes, in that it points to “the revolutionary nature of National Socialism, a point . . . which even a philosophy so ‘irresponsible’ as Deleuze’s trembles upon.” Moreover, this is fascism not just as the utopian populism suggested by (say) Alice Kaplan in *Reproductions of Banality*, but as a sustained critique of the state form; it is the state’s rebellion against its very form as state. Not that this should provoke a celebration of fascism. Rather it suggests the limits of celebration, limits which *Anti-Oedipus* had too easily disparaged. As Redding puts it, drawing on the anarchism of Georges Sorel and Walter Benjamin, we should reiterate that “we are not ‘believers.’”

Just as cultural studies too often takes its self-imposed duty of solidarity to entail belief in any and all “counter-hegemonic” forces, wherever they be found, it is tempting to fall into a similar trap with affect. Even Massumi associates affect purely with vitality: “Affect is vivacity of context,” he claims. “Affect enlivens.” But we should no more “believe” in the vitality of affect than simply reverse the polarities of the opposition pitting supposedly benevolent states against rebels deemed terrorists. Affect is a “disposition to change”; but change may also be for the worse.

Sympathizers portrayed the FMLN as a counter-hegemonic force of national liberation and self-determination, a coalition of the poor searching for their voice in the face of an inflexible state bent on silencing all protest. Latin American cultural studies, predicated on a theory of hegemony that valorizes articulation in the double sense of national-popular coalition building and discursive voicing, found in such movements a model for its own theorization of counter-power. It is therefore unsurprising that the advance of cultural studies in the United States should be associated with, on the one hand, gestures of solidarity with Central America and, on the other hand, a discussion of *testimonio* as the medium best suited to such articulation of emergent subjectivities. This chapter has
presented a radically different conception of the Salvadoran guerrilla, as a movement of
desubjectification, deterritorialization, and affective intensity that preferred silence to discourse, and
that systematically evaded and undid any effort of (self)representation. I have therefore also implied
some of the ways in which the FMLN ran the risks of the lines of flight they traversed across the
Salvadoran polity: terror as well as liberation lay on these lines; there are at least formal and
phenomenological similarities between the FMLN, darlings of the left, and Sendero or al-Qaida, who
are nobody’s heroes (or nobodies’ heroes, in that expressing admiration for Sendero or al-Qaida can
convert you into a juridical non-person). They can and should all be considered under the rubric of
terror. There is nothing here to celebrate; we are not believers in the FMLN. But no need either for the
pangs of disappointment that marked Latin American cultural studies after the downfall of national
liberation movements. Posthegemony suggests a politics of experimentation rather than solidarity, a
politics ever open to the possibility of betrayal, even self-betrayal.

Nor did the forces bent on the FMLN’s destruction exactly follow the playbooks of hegemony or
sovereignty. It is true that the regular Salvadoran army was almost a parody of state sedentariness: a
nine-to-five army that “rarely fought at night” and that “play[ed] their radios so we’ll know where they
are. If they didn’t, we might catch each other by surprise, and they’d have to fight.” Yet the war was
also one of death squads and special forces, and parts of the army were quick to take up guerrilla
methods. Sometimes therefore roles reversed, as Radio Venceremos’s Carlos Henríquez Consalvi notes
of an incident early on in the conflict: “While the army [was] using guerrilla tactics of movement and
infiltration, we [were] acting like a regular army, defending positions.” Moreover, as the war
continued, the United States helped form and train several elite counter-insurgent units, who were
always distinguished from regular army troops, and especially feared by the guerrilla. Above all, part
army unit, part death squad, and never fully under state control, there was the battalion that took its
name from a mythical indigenous leader: the Atlacatl. Critic Gareth Williams provides a salutary and
path-breaking reading of what he terms the “Atlacatl affect.” He observes an “astounding symmetry of
affective divisions” between guerrilla narratives seeking to harness the power incarnated in dead
martyrs for revolution, and the state’s “own violent sacrificial dance that was also anchored in the
harnessing of the dead. However, in this case it was no longer a harnessing of the dead carried out for
insurrectional purposes but rather for insurrection’s violent dismemberment.” Sustained by a
mystique of magical violence, “bloody consumption,” and “abject slaughter,” the Atlacatl committed
some of the civil war’s most notorious massacres, including both El Mozote and the murder of the
Jesuits during the 1989 offensive--the latter just days before the FMLN invoked their own magical
warlike powers in occupying the Sheraton. The Atlacatl and the FMLN are not the same (just as the
FMLN and al-Qaida are not the same; we should avoid the game of equivalences), but each participates
in the continuum that Williams describes as “the nomadic savagery of subaltern insurrectional
commonality.” Both the FMLN and the Atlacatl are multitudinous; but, as I explain at more length in
my conclusion, we should distinguish also between multitudes. And Williams’s constant refrain of
“perhaps” cautions us against any certainty as to which are which.

Terror reverberates through contemporary society now more than ever. Affect is
the very matter of culture, rather than merely its “underside.” As internal borders are
dismantled, so that it is hard to distinguish between factory, madhouse, hospital, and
everyday life, and as the external border between reason and terror comes under attack,
society’s increased porousness allows for the capillary circulation of low intensity affect,
ubiquitous and disturbing, if also part of a mechanism of universal control. This at least
is what Massumi suggests with his discussion of “low-level fear. A kind of background
radiation saturating existence.” Everywhere, we see warnings and dangers: trans fats
and passive smoking, street crime and AIDS. For Massumi, “fear is the inherence in the
body of the ungraspable multicausal matrix of the syndrome recognizable as late
capitalist human existence (its affect).” Low-intensity fear and high-intensity terror
alike differ from fear as it is usually understood, and so also from emotions more
generally. We normally admit that there is something that makes us afraid: I am scared
of spiders, heights, crowds, or whatever. These fears can be named and categorized:
arachnophobia, vertigo, agoraphobia. They invoke a subject and an object (“I,”
“spiders”), and indeed help define and delimit the subject (“I am an arachnophobic;
that is part of what I am"). They may not be rational, though they may also have a rational basis (some spiders, heights, and crowds are dangerous) and they are certainly rationalizable. Treatment strategies and risk management help us deal with such fears, which then function as input variables for a mechanism of risk and calculability. Risk with its associated statistical logic comes to precede and regulate fear: it is risky to walk across the park at night (a number of people have been mugged), so I fear crossing the park, because I fear being mugged. I alter my behavior accordingly, perhaps by walking around the park or by making sure I start my journeys before sundown. Alternatively, faced with the relevant statistics (in fact, the park is not so risky as I imagine it to be), I can regulate my fear and so reduce the need for behavior modification. With care, I will cross the park. Risk, fear, and regulation combine to produce and manage rational choice.

Rationalizable fear founds state reason and the social contract: fear of the consequences of the “war of all against all” leads, in Hobbes’s conception, to an assessment of the reduced risks in co-operation, and the surrender of natural rights to the care of the state as protector. Whereas terror threatens the state and the social order, self-interested fear holds that order together and constructs us as rational subjects bound by mutual contractual obligations. We should all be a little afraid, especially of the sanctions that could result were we to break our side of the contract. Fear is the motor of discipline, the key to subjectification. “Hey, you there!” calls the police officer in Marxist theorist Louis Althusser’s account of interpellation, and in that moment, in the recognition that it is me to whom he refers, is born also a fear of what might happen were I to ignore the call. Moreover, fear categorizes social subjects: whether I turn to face the officer or whether I run away, I am equally interpellated; but if I face him, I am
the model (of the) citizen, and if I flee I suggest I am a criminal with something to hide. Affect becomes personalized, and it both personalizes and regularizes.

Low-intensity fear, on the other hand, differs from normative fear. Like terror, low-level fear has neither subject nor object; it is ubiquitous and collective. “We” in general are faced by innumerable unspecified threats. Now we are afraid of “whatever.” In Massumi’s words, “ever-present dangers blend together, barely distinguishable in their sheer numbers. . . . they blur into the friendly side of life. . . . From the welfare state to the warfare state: a permanent state of emergency against a multifarious threat as much in us as outside.”

Whereas normative fear is possessed by a subject (my fear of spiders), low-level fear possesses and envelops us. We are enfolded within affect and become one with it, as all determinate boundaries—between inside and outside, subject and object, or subject and subject—become mutable. This affect is immanent, and we become immanent to affect. The Hobbesian social contract, premised on a distinction between the welfare of the state and the warfare of natural man, dissolves in favor of affective contact, proximity. A host of other low-level affects arise. A generalized fear fades into generalized pleasure, or generalized boredom. Whatever! And in boredom, as in terror, we approach the condition of bare life: “We suddenly find ourselves abandoned in emptiness.”

Fluidity is all. While the self does not disappear altogether, it is decentered: “The self is a process of crossing boundaries.” Affect does not necessarily imply homogenization or equalization: fear differs from terror, but as a matter of degree, or intensity; similarly, fear is distinct from pleasure, but the shift between the two involves modulation rather categorical change. It might be better to say that fear and pleasure are not so much distinct as approximate; one affect can always lead to another.
Guerrilla happiness can quickly turn to fear. In Ponceele’s words, “After the happiness comes the fear. Because when we take a town the army goes, but a few days later it almost always tries to take back what it has lost, and the combat begins again. . . . Who is not afraid of war?” The life of a guerrilla is a continual series of modulations; the guerrilla is always between affective states and between geographical positions, a vector in the mobile coordinates of political control that constituted El Salvador’s war of shifting intensity. FMLN combatants live out an affective continuum that covers the gamut of highs and lows, varying intensities, joy, fear, listlessness, activity. But the 1992 peace accords did not put an end to this mode of inhabiting affect: instead, and rather than marking the return of a social contract, they made the war general. Indeed, some statistics suggest that the intentional homicide rate had risen rather than fallen by 1995, to the astounding figure of 136.5 per 100,000 population, far above “Costa Rica’s rate [of] 3.9 per 100,000; the United States’, 8.5; Mexico’s, 19.4” or even “urban Colombia’s 110.4.” Political scientist Mo Hume, who gives a murder rate of “over 100 per 100,000 inhabitants,” notes that “one of the most noticeable legacies of the civil war has been the extreme militarization of society. At a conservative estimate, there are some 400,000-450,000 arms in the hands of civilians.” Hume also reports on the growth of private security firms, increased domestic violence, and the arrival of youth gangs or “maras” such as the Mara Salvatrucha and Mara 18. She quotes an eye-opening estimate that “membership of maras outnumbers that of the guerrilla forces during the war twofold.” These gangs have “transnational links throughout Central America, Mexico and the US.” Awash with weapons and with people trained to use them who often also have old (or new) scores to settle, a particularly intense node in an international network of gang violence, and with private security services blurring any line between state and society, El Salvador resonates with anxiety and fear. The civil war ushered in a new, more generalized regime of affect.

The Salvadoran civil war was part of a broader, global transition. Let us return to the FMLN occupation of the Sheraton. As the guerrilla forces quietly slipped away from the scene, and as the fighting across the country began to subside, on the other side of the world the Cold War was ending. The FMLN offensive had taken place in the brief interlude between the fall of the Berlin wall on November 9, and the first Eastern European Communist regime to collapse (in Czechoslovakia) on November 24. The November offensive (“in all probability, the biggest guerrilla offensive ever mounted against a Latin American government”), and particularly the incident in the Sheraton with
which it ended, was a hinge: both the last confrontation of the Cold War era, and the first post-Cold War conflict, a premonition of future actions against tall buildings. In the incident at the Sheraton, the FMLN crossed the boundary that separates subaltern from hegemonic project, but without staking any claims, making any demands, or articulating any particular project. There was no attempt to construct equivalences or antagonisms. One day they simply appeared; shortly thereafter they vanished again. They undercut pretensions to hegemony, providing a foretaste and example of posthegemony. Perhaps, then, San Salvador provided a better indication then Berlin or Prague of how the world would soon look. For all the euphoria of the border-breaching and deterritorialization in Eastern and Central Europe, Central America offered a clearer index of the low-intensity fear and control societies emerging from the shell of Cold War ideological tussles.

The state now seeks to manage otherness by means of a succession of ever-more scientific designations: in place of stigmatizing madwomen, it diagnoses post-partum depression or bipolar disorder; in place of mere criminality, it sees a gamut of antisocial tendencies. Management becomes more complex, and not simply a matter for repression or sequestration. Normalization strategies range from cocktails of drugs enabling so-called schizophrenics to function beyond the walls of the asylum, to electronic tagging in place of incarceration, or (in Britain) “Anti-Social Behaviour Orders” that restrict not crime but everything from loitering in specific streets to swearing in public. The precise measures imposed are tailored to the individual or locality, rather than applying to an entire category of citizens. In place of generalized abstraction, then, there is an increased attention to the specific and the singular. Even, as on London’s orbital motorway, the M25, speed limits can be varied automatically by sensors that compute current traffic conditions and optimum flow-rate. Such calculations depend on modes of surveillance and tracking that are more ubiquitous than could previously have been imagined: closed circuit television is trained to
recognize suspicious activity while mobile phones and bus passes leave electronic traces of our every movement, turning familiar, quotidian possessions into our very own electronic tags. At the same time as it pervades everyday habits and practices, the state also intervenes directly on the body. It seeks more than ever to get under our skin, often quite literally as with plans to implant GPS microchips into the flesh of sex offenders on probation. It becomes diffuse, contracting out its operations or encouraging self-regulation, self-medication among its citizenry. Its effects are felt on the field or plane from which everyday behavior emerges. In short, immanently orchestrating and managing bodies’ capacity to affect and be affected, while gradually abandoning any universal norm for a continuum of flexible impedances and incitements, the state itself becomes affective.

Deleuze describes the shift from societies structured by bureaucratic “sites of confinement” to societies in which all these “interiors” have suffered a “general breakdown” as a transition from “disciplinary societies” to “control societies.” Control societies constitute a “new system of domination” that reconfigures the penal, educational, health, and business systems. Internal limits once divided prison from school from hospital from factory from society at large; now there is only the external limit drawn by the war on terror, and that too is crumbling. At stake in that external limit is the fate of difference and so of identity itself. For within control societies, difference is variable, intensive rather than extensive and subject to constant “modulation” rather than contained within fixed “molds.” If the mad, the bad, and the sick walk among us (thanks to care in the community, tagging, outpatient services, and so on), this is because we are all now therapized, criminalized, and medicalized. We are all now expected to be taking Prozac or Ritalin, subject to random search at airports or on trains, and urged to exercise, diet, and keep track of our stress or
cholesterol. This is biopower. The end of confinement and discipline hardly signals liberation. Indeed, it is harder to imagine sites from which alternative social logics could be envisaged or established. When we are all equally under police suspicion, then criminality is no longer distinguished from, and so potentially critical of, the norm (as it had been for, say, Jean Genet or Eldridge Cleaver). When we are all half-mad, then there are no more asylums from within which to challenge convention (as, for example, in Ken Kesey’s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest). Likewise, trades unions or student movements have no purchase when factories and schools are no longer spaces apart, when they become simply “transmutable or transformable coded configurations of a single business where the only people left are administrators.”

The shift from discipline to control goes hand in glove with neoliberalism’s elimination of politics by managerialism.

We reject the postulation of a civil society standing up to the state as well as hegemony theory’s insistence on populist re-articulations. Yet to see resistance or insurgency as immanent affect escaping stately claims to transcendent sovereignty is but a partial improvement. Not only does affect constitute the state by being captured and transformed into a patriotic (and territorialized, bound) emotion; equally, the state becomes immanent, however destructively, suicidally, or unstably. The “global suicidal state” that theorist Paul Virilio notes emerges after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington is also a “global covert state.” The state can become subaltern, passing beneath visibility, and remain the state. A consideration of affect and of the state’s limits shows how the state is a set of immanent, corporeal processes as well as a transcendent institution. Terrorism is always doubled (Sinn Fein-IRA; FMLN-FDR), but so is the state, which is constituted twice, in a double inscription of institutions and affect. And though the institution claims to be affect’s source or cause (Evita inspiring
the masses’ devotion), it is but quasi-cause, for which appearance is all. Affect remains autonomous.

The affective processes induced by or constitutive of the state usually appear to be in synch with the institutional structures by which the state becomes visible. They leak or escape away, but slowly. Only rarely, at moments of crisis, does the state embark on a full-scale (fascistic) line of flight (and revolution). When the “secret state” spawned by crisis outstrips and flees before the visible state of bureaucratic functionality, the state apparatus as a whole teeters on the verge of collapse. Normally, however, the affects engendered in and through the state are low-intensity, humdrum, routine and unremarkable. They are the habits of everyday life, the glue of social order underlying and resonating with state institutions at a level well below discourse. Deleuze describes this regulated affect as “habit,” as the “contraction” that is also “the foundation from which all other psychic phenomena derive.” 124 It is “the affect of self by self, or folded force” that generates “subjectivation.” 125 But the foremost theorist of this folded force is Pierre Bourdieu, whose work “could be thought of as the negative to Deleuze and Guattari’s positive. Reproduction as the negative of becoming.” 126 For Bourdieu, reproduction is also an immanent process, grounded in what he terms the “habitus.” It is to habitus that I now turn, to the immanent structuring of affect, the everyday resonance with social authority that explains authority’s persistence.
Notes

1 Jameson, “Postmodernism,” 61, 64.
2 Jameson, Postmodernism, 313, 316.
3 Rubin, Fear: The History of a Political Idea; Bourke, Fear: A Cultural History; Brennan, The Transmission of Affect; Damasio, Looking for Spinoza; Massumi, Parables for the Virtual; Sedgwick, Touching, Feeling.
4 See Ticineto Clough, The Affective Turn.
5 Jameson, “Postmodernism,” 64.
6 Brennan, The Transmission of Affect, 6, 5.
7 Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 28.
8 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 28.
9 Sedgwick, Touching, Feeling, 18, 19.
10 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 42, 43.
11 Spinoza, Ethics, 84, 50.
12 Deleuze, Spinoza, 49, 39, 50.
13 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 35, 16, 35.
14 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 341.
15 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 41.
16 Ibid., 42, 49, 40, 41.
17 Ibid., 62, 45, 218, 217.
18 López, “Are All Latins from Manhattan?” 77.
19 Ortiz, Cuban Counterpoint, 206.
20 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 218.


23 See Linebaugh, *The London Hanged*.


26 Ibid.


29 Lauria-Santiago and Binford, “Local History, Politics, and the State,” 9, 2.

30 Binford, “Peasants, Catechists, Revolutionaries,” 108.

31 Bracamonte and Spencer, *Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas*, 16.


33 Dunkerley, *The Long War*, 189.


Bracamonte is the pseudonym of an ex-combatant; Spencer is a freelance analyst and writer who has also taught at the U. S. Air Force Special Operations School and the Security Studies Institute of the U. S. Army War College.


36 Espinaza, “Preliminar,” 11.

37 Massumi, “Fear (The Spectrum Said),” 34.


42 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 10.
43 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 448, 400.
44 Ibid., 352, 357.
46 Bracamonte and Spencer, Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas, 8.
47 Alegría, They Won’t Take Me Alive, 72.
48 Ibid., translation modified.
49 Clements, Witness to War, 30, 221.
50 Metzi, Por los caminos de Chalatenango, 165.
51 López Vigil, Muerte y vida en Morazán, 73-74.
52 López Vigil, Rebel Radio, 45.
53 Henríquez Consalvi, La terquedad del Izote, 95.
54 López Vigil, Rebel Radio, 46.
55 Foucault, Abnormal, 325.
56 Todorov, The Conquest of America, 50.
57 Torgovnik, Primitive Passions, 14.
58 Ibid., 15, 109, 103.
59 See for instance Bongie, Exotic Memories, for a compelling critique.
60 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 208; Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 321.
61 Alegría, They Won’t Take Me Alive, 145, translation modified.
62 Ayala, El tope y más allá, 60, 277.
63 Ibid., 276. The original Spanish is “Salí de la multitud para acercarme a una persona.”
64 Danner, The Massacre at El Mozote, 10.
65 López Vigil, Muerte y vida en Morazán, 94.
66 López Vigil, Rebel Radio, 134.
67 Mena Sandoval, Del ejército nacional al ejército guerrillero, 344, 349.
68 López Vigil, Muerte y vida en Morazán, 74, 88, 89.
69 López Vigil, Las mil y una historias de Radio Venceremos, 259.
70 Lievens, El quinto piso de la alegría.
71 On air power, see Lindqvist, A History of Bombing.
72 See Multimedia Development Corporation: Driving Transformation,
http://www.mdc.com.my/msc/, and MSC Malaysia: Spearheading Transformation,
http://www.mscmalaysia.my/.
73 López Vigil, Rebel Radio, 229.
74 Simon Tisdall, “Green Berets walk free from Salvador Siege,” The Guardian,
75 Tom Gibb, “Sheraton Siege Ends as Rebels Withdraw,” The Times (London),
77 Gilbert and Guhar, The Madwoman in the Attic, 77.
79 Khanna, Dark Continents, x.
80 Torgovnik, Primitive Passion, 217.
81 Furedi, Politics of Fear, 132, 169.
There is no better or more disturbing meditation on the mute logic of violence in Northern Ireland (or even, perhaps, anywhere else) than Alan Clarke’s film, *Elephant* (1989). See Kirkland, “The Spectacle of Terrorism in Northern Irish Culture.”


Berger, “America Under Attack.”


Colectivo “Huitzilipochtli,” *El “Cipitío” en el Salvador Sheraton*, 7, 9, 11; ellipses in original.

Ibid., 11, 48, 33, 36.

Ibid., 62, 14-15, 14, 63; ellipses in original.


Ibid., 128, 132, 134.


Ibid., 187.

Ibid., 174.


Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, 144, 140.

102 Land, “Making It with Death,” 75.

103 Land, “Meltdown.”

104 Redding, *Raids on Human Consciousness*, 204, 211.

105 Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual*, 220.


109 Williams, *The Other Side of the Popular*, 193, 194, 192.

110 Ibid., 193, 213.

111 Massumi, “Everywhere You Want to Be,” 24, 12.


114 Agamben, *The Open*, 64.

115 Massumi, “Everywhere You Want to Be,” 27.


117 Moodie, “‘El Capitán Cinchazo,’” 227.


119 McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America*, 84.

120 Deleuze, “Postscript on Control Societies,” 178, 177, 182.

121 Ibid., 178.

122 Ibid., 181.

123 Virilio, *Ground Zero*, 37, 82.
124 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 73, 78.

125 Deleuze, *Foucault*, 104.

126 Whelan, “Appropriat(e)ing Wavelength,” 132.