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Introduction: A User's Guide

In this book there are two texts which simply alternate; you might almost believe they had nothing in common, but they are in fact inextricably bound up with each other, as though neither could exist on its own, as though it was only their coming together, the distant light they cast on one another, that could make apparent what is never quite said in one, never quite said in the other, but said only in their fragile overlapping.

--Georges Perec, W

One beginning and one ending for a book was a thing I did not agree with.

--Flann O'Brien, At Swim-Two-Birds

## Definitions

There is no hegemony and never has been. We live in cynical, posthegemonic times: nobody is very much persuaded by ideologies that once seemed fundamental to

securing social order. Everybody knows, for instance, that work is exploitation and that politics is deceit. But we have always lived in posthegemonic times: social order was never in fact secured through ideology. No amount of belief in the dignity of labor or the selflessness of elected representatives could ever have been enough to hold things together. The fact that people no longer give up their consent in the ways in which they may once have done, and yet everything carries on much the same, shows that consent was never really at issue. Social order is secured through habit and affect: through folding the constituent power of the multitude back on itself to produce the illusion of transcendence and sovereignty. It follows also that social change is never achieved through any putative counter-hegemony. No amount of adherence to a revolutionary creed or a party line could ever be enough to break things apart. The fact that now people no longer believe in radical change in the ways in which they may once have done does not mean that everything will carry on much the same. Social change, too, is achieved through habit and affect: through affirming the constituent power of the multitude. But change is not a matter of substituting one program for another. This book offers no blueprint, because the multitude betrays the best-laid plans.

By “hegemony,” I do not mean mere domination. To say “posthegemony” is not to say that domination is at an end. Command and control, exploitation and oppression, still manifestly continue. If anything, they are now more savage and more pernicious than ever as the state increasingly permeates everyday life and as politics becomes “biopolitics.” Nor by hegemony do I mean the concept in International Relations of a single dominant world power. It may be that such a power no longer exists, but this is more a symptom of posthegemony than an illustration.<sup>1</sup> By hegemony I mean the notion, derived from the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, that the state maintains its dominance (and that of social and economic elites) thanks to the consent of those it

dominates. Where it does not win consent, this theory suggests, the state resorts to coercion. By contrast, in stressing the role of habit (rather than opinion) I point to processes that involve neither consent nor coercion. A focus on habit enables us to grasp the workings of the habitus: a collective, embodied feeling for the rules of the social game that is activated and reproduced beneath consciousness. And in stressing the role of affect (rather than emotion) I turn to other feelings: the impersonal and embodied flow of intensities that undermines any concept of a rational subject who could provide or withdraw his or her consent. But in stressing the notion of the multitude (rather than the people) I show that subjectivity continues to play a vital role: the multitude is the subject of a constituent power that is prior to the constituted power of the state and the sovereign. Habit, affect, and the multitude are the three components of a theory of posthegemony. All three are responses to the puzzle posed by the seventeenth-century philosopher Benedict de Spinoza: "No one has yet determined what the body can do."<sup>2</sup> Habit describes the way in which bodies act out the regular and repetitive activities that structure daily life. Affect indicates the power of a body (individual or collective) to affect or be affected by other bodies. And the multitude encompasses and expansive collection of bodies that, in organizing itself so as to increase its powers of affection, constitutes society and drives time onwards. All three terms, moreover, refer to immanent processes: they incarnate a logic from below that requires neither representation nor direction from above. Or rather, they undo the spatial metaphor of "above" and "below." They are sufficient unto themselves. So although we may think about posthegemony negatively, in terms of flight or Exodus from the current order of things--moving beyond ideology, escaping social constraints--the real question concerns the reverse process. What is the origin of the wrinkles in immanence that give rise to the illusion of transcendence, the fiction of hegemony, the presupposition of the state, and

the presumption of a social pact? Why do we stubbornly take these effects for causes? For in fact what we most immediately perceive are bodies, with their habitual movements, their affective intensities, and their striving to be part of a multitude. Posthegemony is an attempt to rethink politics from the ground up, rooted in the material reality common to us all.

I am not the only person to have advanced a concept of posthegemony, though this book is the first to define it at such length and in these terms. Sociologist Scott Lash, for instance, argues that “power now . . . is largely post-hegemonic” and suggests that “cultural studies should look mostly elsewhere for its core concepts.”<sup>3</sup> But Lash’s conception of posthegemony is purely temporal: he argues merely that power is now posthegemonic. My aim is a more comprehensive critique of the idea of hegemony, and of the cultural studies that, as Lash rightly but too reverently observes, it defines. Likewise, theorist Nicholas Thoburn contends that social theory has to take account of the fact that the concept of civil society (for Gramsci, intimately linked to the notion of hegemony) no longer holds.<sup>4</sup> My criticism of the notion of civil society is again more wholesale: I argue that it has always been an accomplice of state containment, a means to stigmatize affect and the multitude as somehow barbarous and apolitical. By contrast, political theorist Benjamin Arditì is skeptical of the proposition that the era of hegemony is at an end, but argues that politics is, perhaps increasingly, not simply about hegemony. Arditì points to two forms of posthegemonic politics: the Exodus or defection of the multitude; and the viral politics of informal networks. (I see no significant distinction between the two.) Both are “ways of doing politics that bypass the neo-Gramscian logic of hegemony and counter-hegemony characteristic of most of what is usually inventoried under the name of ‘politics’ today.” For Arditì, posthegemony supplements but does not replace politics as “usual.” If anything, in his

view posthegemony reinforces the concept of hegemony, by giving it “an outside to define it.”<sup>5</sup> My disagreement with traditional politics, however, is more sweeping: I argue that it offers at best a temporary palliative, at worst a fatal distraction from the real workings of power and domination.

My understanding of posthegemony is, like Ardití's, related to debates within Latin American Studies, about the political and theoretical limits to the concept of hegemony rather than simply about its contemporary obsolescence. In his 1990 book, Modernism and Hegemony, the Marxist cultural critic Neil Larsen engages with both the “crisis of representation” in modernist aesthetics and also the “crisis of hegemony” that has long seemed to plague Latin America. He argues that this supposed crisis of hegemony is in fact merely its inversion: it is a hegemony enshrined in cultural goods rather than political discourse that thereby “render[s] visible what is hidden in the posthegemonic conditions of the center,” that is, that aesthetics can no longer be a refuge from “the real space of hegemonic state power.”<sup>6</sup> Larsen does not develop this concluding and rather gnomic hint that the collapse of the state, its inability to articulate a coherent or convincing discourse, is really its expansion into culture as a whole, its disarticulated diffusion throughout what was once imagined to be civil society. Five years later, however, critic George Yúdice takes up the term posthegemony as part of a qualified defense of civil society. Likewise observing “a weakening of the articulation of national discourse and state apparatuses,” Yúdice argues that “we might say that, from the purview of the national proscenium, a posthegemonic situation holds.” Again, posthegemony in this instance means that hegemony is no longer tied to the state; but it also implies that hegemony has expanded well beyond national boundaries, “to naturalize global capitalism everywhere.”<sup>7</sup>

I agree with Larsen and Yúdice that today power is obviously at work everywhere, that representation has collapsed, and that the state is effectively dissolved into what was once known as civil society. But this means that civil society, which is defined by its distinction from the state, has now withered away.<sup>8</sup> This diffuse ubiquity of politics is what, following the French philosopher Michel Foucault, I term biopolitics. It is not the expansion of hegemony, but its evacuation. More clearly than ever, power works directly on bodies, in the everyday life that once appeared to be a refuge from politics. Yet for Larsen and Yúdice, posthegemony is ironically hegemony's triumph: hegemony is everything and everywhere. I argue that it is this misconception that lies at the root of cultural studies, encouraging a populism that equates the state's dissolution in the everyday with its disappearance altogether.

Discussion of posthegemony within Latin American Studies took a new turn following an engagement with subaltern studies. Despite adopting the Gramscian concept of the "subaltern" with alacrity, refashioning it to refer to non-elite members of colonial and postcolonial societies, the South Asian historians who formed the subaltern studies group in the 1980s took issue with what for Gramsci was the related notion of hegemony. For the group's founder Ranajit Guha, for instance, the subaltern is inconstant and unpredictable and refuses to admit the existence of any single sphere (secular, religious or nationalistic) within which hegemony could be sought or won. Hence "the swift transformation of class struggle into communal strife and vice versa" for which the most well-intentioned narrative of solidarity can offer "only some well-contrived apology or a simple gesture of embarrassment."<sup>9</sup> Guha suggests that the subaltern inevitably turns its back on or betrays any putative hegemonic project: it refuses to give consent to consent. If hegemony is the struggle to gain consent, its operation requires the prior, implicit agreement that it is consent that is at issue in

political struggles. Hegemony itself has to become dominant. As Guha argues in Dominance without Hegemony, this implies an equation between civil society, the nation, and the state: an echo chamber within which the terms of struggle are more or less pre-determined.<sup>10</sup> But the subaltern always disrupts the boundaries of any such delimited space. Subalternity deconstructs hegemony: as postcolonial critic Gayatri Spivak consistently argues, the subaltern is the mute and impossible remainder that always undoes hegemony's claims.<sup>11</sup>

In books published in 2002 and 2001 respectively, Latin Americanist cultural critics Gareth Williams and Alberto Moreiras redescribe subaltern remainder in terms of posthegemony. In Williams's words, posthegemony "permits us to give a name to hegemony's subaltern residues, negative languages, fragmentary responses, cultural leftovers, and fissured experiences." He continues: "Posthegemony, in this sense, is no longer a name for the hegemony of transnational capital, but the name of those 'places in which hegemony ceases to make sense.'"<sup>12</sup> Or, in Moreiras's version, the realization that hegemony can never exhaust the "infinite of the social" enables "a radical opening to the subaltern position, calling as such for the permanent destabilization of hegemonic ideology and the passage to a thinking beyond hegemony."<sup>13</sup> Posthegemonic subalternism, in this account, maintains a vigilant and unceasing critique of power on the basis of hegemony's inevitable failures. It warns against the hegemony of hegemony: against, that is, any belief in hegemony's promises that it may one day become total, its fiction of an all-inclusive pact. In reality, Williams and Moreiras suggest, the more that hegemony expands, the more that its limits are violently and viciously patrolled by state forces. As hegemony approaches its limit, the disjuncture between hegemon and subaltern is all the more arbitrary, all the more the site of conflagration and genocide.

Where I differ from Williams and Moreiras is that I am not content with deconstruction, with posthegemony as permanent critique or labor of the negative. Subalternism holds on to a distinction between inside and outside, and so perpetuates the fundamental binarism of both hegemony and civil society: a differentiation between hegemon and subaltern, civil and fanatic. Subaltern studies still believes in a social contract designed to separate civilization from barbarism, even if it champions the nether side of that distinction and refuses any myth of closure. To put this another way: Gramsci always conceded that hegemony was necessarily incomplete. And in the Argentine Ernesto Laclau's re-elaboration of hegemony theory, the stress is on what he calls the incommensurability between a hegemonic signifier that aspires to represent the whole of society and the real that always recedes from such claims to universality. The difference between hegemony theory and subaltern studies is simply that the political polarity is inverted: whereas Gramsci and Laclau would insist that politics is a matter of playing the game of hegemony, Spivak, Williams, and Moreiras question the rules of that game by pointing to the aporetic excess for which it can never account. But they do not doubt the game itself. By contrast, then, in my conception posthegemony goes beyond the wreckage of any hegemonic project. I aim to redescribe and reconstruct an image of society that no longer depends upon that society's own self-portrayal. My project is constitutive as well as critical. Central to this work of redescription and reconstruction is the concept of the multitude, which I take from Italian political theorist Antonio Negri. The multitude, Negri argues, both pre-exists modern society, as "the conjunction of persons who inhabited a pre-social world that had to be transformed into a political society,"<sup>14</sup> and returns in that society's death throes. It is both excessive and foundational. The multitude is an agent of violent transformation and also the

constitution of what is to come. Perhaps posthegemony can affirm its constituent power.

### Structure

Before constitution, critique. This book has two parts. The first is a critique of cultural studies on the one hand, and the social scientific discourse of civil society on the other. I suggest that cultural studies' definition of culture as discursive articulation, and its reductive definition of politics in terms of hegemony, substitutes culture for the state, and therefore also confuses culture and the state. This is true even of a more idiosyncratic definition of hegemony, such as that of anthropologist William Roseberry, who rejects hegemony as consensus but still stresses that hegemonic projects aim to construct "a common discursive framework."<sup>15</sup> At its limit, the logic of hegemony simply identifies with the state, by taking it for granted. My argument proceeds by way of a history of cultural studies, to show how and why hegemony theory became its distinguishing feature, as well as through a close reading of Laclau, the foremost theorist of hegemony. Second, I examine the way in which a focus on civil society excludes culture from the political in the name of rational discourse. At its limit, however, civil society theory is overwhelmed by the affects it sets out to exclude. Here my argument works through an account of the discourse of new social movements and democratization, to explain how and why the venerable concept of civil society has been revived over the past twenty-five years, as well as by way of a close reading of Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, the most thorough theorists of civil society. What cultural studies and civil society theory share is an emphasis on discourse and on transcendence. They fail to confront immanent processes: either the embedded

institutional structures that underpin the discursive (in the case of cultural studies) or the affective flux that escapes it (with civil society theory). Moreover, neither are concerned with the means by which the state, or state effects, are constituted. Social science straightforwardly assumes that all politics is state politics, and posits civil society as the threshold through which social movements must pass. Cultural studies simply forgets about the state, and so lets it in by the back door, while transfixed by its fetishized substitutes.

My critique of cultural studies and civil society is also, pragmatically, that they mimic the structures of power that they set out to understand. These structures of power have been paradigmatic in twentieth-century democratic societies: populism and neoliberalism. Cultural studies is, effectively, populist. Civil society theory is, for all intents and purposes, itself neoliberal. Despite the best intentions of their practitioners, neither can be the standpoint from which to launch a critique of, respectively, a populism that claims culture can substitute for the state, and a neoliberalism that purports to exclude culture from its domain. At best they can offer distorted glimpses of a politics beyond populism or neoliberalism, for instance in cultural studies' concern for everyday life or civil society theory's anxious fixation on social movement fundamentalism. Only posthegemony, with its understanding of what I call the double inscription of the state (as both immanence and transcendent quasi-cause) provides a foothold from which the unsaid as well as the said of these political formations can be observed and analyzed.

The book's second part turns to affect and habit as forms of (dis)organization beneath and beyond discourse, and so beyond the conceptual apparatus of cultural studies and civil society theory. Affect and habit are the basis of posthegemony. I examine French philosopher Gilles Deleuze's conception of affect, for which immanence

is generally a space of liberation, and then sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's conception of habitus, for which it is social control that is immanent, and all the more effective as such. Though these two approaches appear to be opposed, I argue that they are complementary, not least because each opens up to the other at critical moments: Deleuze's theory of affect when it has to account for the suicidal state, and Bourdieu's theory of habitus when social crisis reveals the potential creativity of habit. Together, Deleuze and Bourdieu point to the need to take account, first, of the state's double inscription and, second, of the various possible modes of immanent organization. In conclusion, I suggest that Negri's theory of the multitude helps explain the state's doubleness: multitude and state incarnate a sometimes complicitous confrontation between constituent and constituted power. Yet the multitude is also a social subject that constitutes itself through resonance and the logic of encounter on the plane of immanence, offering the prospect of forms of community that might do without transcendence, without either the state or sovereignty. I warn, however, that the multitude may turn bad, and ultimately become indifferent from the Empire that it confronts. The concept of "corruption" that Negri employs to differentiate the two is in the end insufficient. Against Negri, then, I argue for a distinction between good and bad multitudes. I further caution that even should the multitude emerge in full, autonomous and unlimited, we may hesitate at the end of history that would result. Hence, inspired by the Irish novelist Flann O'Brien, I offer two endings: a conclusion that leads to a meditation on uneventful eternity and death; and a postface that hints at a celebration of insurgent history and life.

We may or may not want to embrace posthegemony as a political project for what Negri prophesies will be a future constituent republic. But posthegemony as analysis offers a new understanding of the constitution of the present, and of the origins

and the limits of politics and political theory. It offers new tools for political and historical investigation. My move from critique to constitution contends that these three theorists (Deleuze, Bourdieu, and Negri) can be productively combined to trace a social and historical plane of immanence, a political and social theory that would reject, and yet also explain, transcendence at every point. This is the book's affirmative project, its elaboration of a theory of posthegemony that re-reads social processes in terms of affect, habit, and the multitude. Posthegemony encompasses populism and neoliberalism, but also goes beyond them, and beyond even modernity's contractualist tradition of which the current so-called left turns (Chávez, Morales, . . . Obama?) constitute the apogee and last gasp. It outlines a path through the everyday biopolitics that structures our long post-disciplinary interregnum. For we are indeed now moving beyond the period in which the state is constituted by means of double inscription, and entering a period in which immanence is (nearly) all, an epoch now posthegemonic in the temporal sense, beyond even the fiction of hegemony.

### Latin America . . . and Beyond

Parallel to its theoretical argument, this book engages with Latin American social, political, and cultural history. This history is arranged as a series of case studies, each of which resonates with a specific aspect of the theoretical argument. My historical narrative moves from intensive moment to intensive moment rather than following a strict narrative teleology. It jumps from decade to decade. The case studies may perhaps be read separately, skipped, or, better still, supplemented or replaced by other cases that readers may wish to bring to and test with the theoretical matrix of posthegemony: if not El Salvador, then Colombia, say; if not Chile, then Poland; if not Argentina, then

the USA. Running through these plateaus are several recurrent concerns: first, Latin American left movements from populism to Maoism, national liberation movements, new social movements, neopopulism, and the left turns; second, the role played by cultural genres such as film, television, testimonio, and the novel in Latin American societies; and third, the models of social structure found in Argentina, Peru, El Salvador, Chile, and Venezuela, and the relations between culture and politics in each. Throughout the book, theory and history are interwoven, even as each remains distinct and relatively autonomous. Within each chapter the historical and theoretical arguments are woven together via a mechanism of textual differentiation, in which the historical material bearing on Latin America appears in a smaller font size. This arrangement is not to indicate any hierarchy of the theoretical over the empirical; indeed the historical and cultural could be viewed as the infrastructure for the theoretical, which the reader may or may not wish to peruse. The stories from Latin America include vignettes that have, I suggest, their own specific importance: for instance, the assault on a San Salvador hotel that was the real hinge between the Cold War and the Age of Terror; the Chilean shopping malls that reveal the true architecture of neoliberal consumerism; or the Gabriel García Márquez story that is a telling parable of bare life. In short, “you might almost believe,” as French novelist Georges Perec notes in another context, that the two levels of text “had nothing in common, but they are in fact inextricably bound up with each other.”<sup>16</sup>

A history of the contract also runs through my historical case studies. We see right at the outset of modern imperialism instances of contracts and compacts that fail to have their purported effect, not least the pact in the dark as the conquistadors read the so-called Requerimiento, designed to justify colonization to the natives, while its putative addressees were fast asleep in their beds. The pact does not establish the social

relation it claims: that will have to be established by some other means, in this case by force. I analyze the theory of the contract in my concluding chapter, but the intervening historical analyses also involve failed pacts: a series of attempts to bind culture to state, or to secure the legitimacy of the state, that endlessly break down. Peronism, in chapter one, is a compact between people and nation that is (almost) all-encompassing, that tries to sweep the people up in its promise of populist love that would come to stand in for the state, which spectacularly fell apart in the mid-1970s. Neoliberalism, illustrated in chapter two in its fatal dance with Peru's Sendero Luminoso during the early 1980s, is likewise expansive in its attempt to cement the whole of society to the state, but shatters in its encounter with the affect that it would abolish from civil society. In chapter three's focus on the Salvadoran national liberation movement at its peak in the offensive of 1989, I examine insurgency and terror, as the absolute limit of societies of control. The example of Chile in chapter four, in the early 1990s transition from dictatorship to postdictatorship, focuses on everyday life and biopolitics, suggesting resonance and conatus (or striving) as concepts through which to understand the relation between culture and state, social movement and reproductive project. The concluding chapter revisits these case studies to recapitulate the crisis of the social contract in parallel with a theoretical argument concerning the multitude, the ambivalent and treacherous social subject that refuses all pacts and all solidarity. In the postface, Venezuela's 1989 Caracazo and then the coup and counter-coup of 2002 show how the multitude breaks even the contracts offered first by Latin America's most successful pacted democracy, and second by its most promising instance of the current left turns, preferring unrepresented, perhaps unrepresentable, insurrection.

These case studies exemplify both the discontinuous history of state projects to bind the multitude, and the unbroken red thread of the multitude's ever-expansive

constituent power to which the state reacts. They point towards a history of the Latin American multitude through modernity: from the near-mutiny on Columbus's first voyage of 1492 to the chavista counter-counter-insurgency of 2002. This history might also encompass indigenous revolts during the colonial period, the wars of independence in the 1820s, or late nineteenth-century immigration and urbanization. Among more recent movements, one might consider the Zapatista uprising in Mexico or the piqueteros in contemporary Argentina. This would be an underground, alternative history of Latin America, a history of insurgencies but also of the stratagems by which hegemonic projects have attempted to turn those insurgencies to the advantage of the state: from the New Laws of the Indies, the Bourbon reforms, or the post-independence settlement, to the twentieth-century history that is more fully outlined here. It is precisely such mechanisms of reactionary conversion--of culture into state, affect into emotion, habit into opinion, multitude into people, constituent into constituted power--that are the ultimate interest of this book.

This is a book about cultural theory and Latin America, not cultural theory in Latin America, or Latin American cultural theory. Its juxtaposition of the two terms is not quite contingent, not quite necessary. In one sense, its analyses of Latin American history and culture are interchangeable, almost disposable. In another sense, they anchor the theoretical argument. In still another, they contaminate and decenter it. The theory of posthegemony draws from but is also tested by Latin American history. Deleuze, Bourdieu, and Negri are European theorists, but European theory's passage through Latin America relocates and dislocates that theory. Passing such theory (and the theory of posthegemony) through other contexts would dislocate it in other ways, forcing revision and reappraisal. At the same time, at least one of my examples is not strictly Latin American at all: despite Columbus's protestations, on October 10, 1492 he

had not yet “discovered” the continent that would become the Americas. Indeed, the term “Latin America” would not be coined for another 350 years, and even now one would be hard-pressed to define its limits. Part geographical, part political, part cultural, Latin America overflows its bounds: is Belize Latin America? Québec? Miami? Lavapiés, Madrid? The Gaucho Grill, Manchester? Elsewhere I argue that Latin America becomes viral, diffusely global, in contemporary postmodernity.<sup>17</sup> But the history of the conquest, of the colony and its immense transatlantic trade, of populism and neoliberalism, shows that Latin America has always been global, has always directly affected and decentered the global system. The Latin American multitude goes beyond regional borders, and infiltrates the metropolis.

Perhaps posthegemony starts in Latin America, or in discussions of Latin America, but that is no reason for it to stop there. After all, most everything begins in Latin America: modernity, nationalism, the industrial revolution . . . .<sup>18</sup> The theories that are the object of my critique--cultural studies and civil society theory--also have a hidden, Latin American history. Returning the theory of hegemony (via Laclau) and the theory of civil society (via Cohen and Arato) to a Latin American milieu repositions those theories in the contexts for which they are most adequate. I give those theories their best shot: not only do I choose what I claim are their strongest and most developed articulations (in Laclau and in Cohen and Arato), I also test them in contexts that should be favorable to their assumptions. Hence the choice of locations in which to test the theory of posthegemony: if posthegemony can do a better job of explaining the Central American liberation movements (the point of entry for cultural studies in Latin America) and the transition from dictatorship in the Southern Cone (favored locale for civil society theory) then it is all the more adequate to explain other conjunctures. This is why I am happy to leave, say, zapatismo or the piqueteros out of my analysis, even

though these are the movements that have to date most attracted scholars who work with theorists such as Deleuze and Negri.<sup>19</sup> I take for granted that posthegemony best explains these phenomena, if it also best explains the FMLN and the Chilean new social movements. In other words, although the theory of posthegemony arises from a specific Latin American context, it is not beholden to any one location. It is, I hope, portable. With every iteration, however, the theory is bound to change. Something always escapes!

Notes

<sup>1</sup> See Keohane, After Hegemony.

<sup>2</sup> Spinoza, Ethics, 71.

<sup>3</sup> Lash, "Power after Hegemony," 55.

<sup>4</sup> Thoburn, "Patterns of Production."

<sup>5</sup> Ardit, "Post-Hegemony," 215, 209.

<sup>6</sup> Larsen, Modernism and Hegemony, 97.

<sup>7</sup> Yúdice, "Civil Society," 4.

<sup>8</sup> See Hardt, "The Withering of Civil Society."

<sup>9</sup> Guha, "The Prose of Counter-Insurgency," 83.

<sup>10</sup> Guha, Dominance without Hegemony, xi.

<sup>11</sup> See Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?"

<sup>12</sup> Williams, The Other Side of the Popular, 327 n. 7.

<sup>13</sup> Moreiras, The Exhaustion of Difference, 263.

<sup>14</sup> Negri, El exilio, 38.

<sup>15</sup> Roseberry, "Hegemony and the Language of Contention," 364. Roseberry's version of hegemony is rather similar to Bourdieu's conception of the delimitation of a divide between discourse and "doxa": between "the universe of the thinkable" and "the universe of the unthinkable . . . what cannot be said for lack of an available discourse" (Outline of a Theory of Practice, 170). But Bourdieu would be the first to note that power works also through the unthinkable and the unsayable (in other words, through habit), not simply through establishing a framework for what can be said.

<sup>16</sup> Perec, W, [vii].

<sup>17</sup> Beasley-Murray, "Latin America and the Global System."

<sup>18</sup> See, again, Beasley-Murray, "Latin America and the Global System."

<sup>19</sup> See, for instance, Holloway, Change the World without Taking Power, and Mentinis, Zapatistas.