| I work primarily in philosophy of psychology/cognitive science, and more generally, philosophy of mind. In recent years, I have increasingly focused on perceptual and affective consciousness. My current research involves developing a theory of sensory affect that would also illuminate perceptual consciousness. I have also been working on a book project developing an information-theoretic (but internalist) account of perceptual consciousness and its introspection with phenomenal concepts with an aim to show how to properly respond to various recent anti-physicalist arguments.
Short Bio: I received my B.A in philosophy in 1986 from (formerly, ) in , and my doctoral degree from (UMCP) in 1993. After spending one and a half years at , , as a visiting scholar, I moved to the in October 1994 as an assistant professor. Between 2001 and 2007, I was an associate professor in the
at the . Since July 2007, I have been a professor in the at .
Here is an listing (mostly) philosophical works on pain.
Some recent works:
- "A Contemporary Account of Sensory Pleasure" to appear in Pleasure: A History, edited by Lisa Shapiro (Oxford University Press).
- "How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal," Review of Philosophy
5(1): 119-133, 2014. [Here is a slightly longer & revised version, January 2014]
- "Affect: Representationalists' Headache" (with Matt Fulkerson), Philosophical Studies, 170(2): 175-198, 2014.
DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0206-7. (Penultimate draft of Sept 2013)
- "" [PDF] Journal of Philosophy, October 2009.
- "Pain" in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (May 2009; new revised version coming soon)
- "" [PDF] (with ) in Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition edited by Philip Robbins & Murat Aydede, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- (MIT Press, 2007) [HTML]. , 2008.01.02.
- "" [PDF] (with Güven Güzeldere). .
Working drafts: (Send me an email for a copy.)
- "Is the Pain Experience Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities"
(Comments would be much appreciated!)
Abstract. I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the Transparency Datum (TD). Pain experiences are consistent with TD. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis (ST) that is entailed by (strong) representationalism about phenomenology. I argue that pain experiences (as well as some other similar experiences) are not transparent in this strong sense. Hence I argue that representationalism is false. Then, I outline a framework about how the introspection of phenomenal qualities works in light of TD, but consistent with the rejection of ST. The result is a form of qualia realism that is naturalist and intentionalist (weak representationalist), and has close affinities to the adverbialist views developed in the latter part of the last century.
- "Theories of Sensory Affect: Compare and Contrast" (with Matt Fulkerson). This is an incomplete draft in progress -- originally written for a symposium on sensory affect at the 2014 Pacific APA meeting in San Diego. We'll probably divide it into separate pieces. Comments and criticisms are welcome.
Some sensory experiences are pleasant, some unpleasant. This is a truism. But understanding what makes these experiences pleasant and unpleasant is not an easy job. Various difficulties and puzzles arise as soon as we start theorizing. There are various philosophical theories on offer that seem to give different accounts for the positive or negative affective valences of sensory experiences. In this paper, we will look at the current state of art in the philosophy of mind, present the main contenders, critically compare and contrast them. In particular, we'll discuss, evaluativism, imperativism, and psychofunctionalism (adverbialism). We will see that all of them share a common core at the end. Thus although our survey will be critical, our aim is constructive: we will provide a unifying framework.
- "How to Combine Qualia Realism with Intentionalism about Perception"
- "Secondary Qualities and the Grain Problem"
- "" incomplete rough working draft (comments are welcome).
[Click for (almost) a complete list of my works with abstracts]
(co-editor with )
[Order a copy from ]
[Order a copy from ]