Philosophy of Mind & The Mind-Body Problem

• Cluster of problems and questions:
  – Free will
  – Personal identity, etc.

– The mind-body problem
  • Metaphysical problem:
    relation between the mental and physical
Supervenience

• *Local Mind-Body Supervenience I.* The mental supervenes on the physical in that things (objects, events, organisms, persons, and so on) that are exactly alike in all physical properties cannot differ with respect to mental properties. That is, physical indiscernability entails psychological indiscernability.

• *Local Mind-Body Supervenience II.* The mental supervenes on the physical just in case if anything \( x \) has a mental property \( M \), there is a physical property \( P \) such that \( x \) has \( P \), and necessarily any object that has \( P \) has \( M \).

• *Global Mind-Body Supervenience III.* The mental supervenes on the physical in that worlds that are alike in all physical respects are alike in all mental respects; in fact, worlds that are physically alike are exactly alike overall.2
Physicalism

• Start with global supervenience (GS)
  – Cartesian dualism not compatible with GS
  – Priority of the physical
  – Dependence, determination, necessitation

• Mind-Body Dependence. The mental properties a given thing has depend on, and are determined by, the physical properties it has. That is to say, our psychological character is wholly determined by our physical nature.

• Ontological Physicalism. All that exists in this world are bits of matter in space-time and aggregate structures composed exclusively of bits of matter. There is nothing else in the spacetime world.
Property dualism/monism

- **Property Dualism, or Nonreductive Physicalism.** The psychological properties of a system are distinct from, and irreducible to, its physical properties.

- **Property Monism, or Reductive Physicalism.** Psychological properties are reducible to, and reductively identifiable with, physical properties. There are only properties of one sort exemplified in this world, and they are physical properties.
Space of Ontological Positions - Materialism

Three main positions on the Mind-Body Problem

Materialism/Physicalism  Dualism  Idealism

Materialism/Physicalism

Eliminative Materialism

Methodological Behaviorism
  - Watson
  - Skinner

- Quine
- Feyerabend
- Rorty
- Churchlands
- Stich

Eliminativism

Type-Identity Theory
  - Place
- Smart
- Kim (?)

(Early) Carnap

Hempel

Ryle (?)

Wittgenstein (?)

Reductive Materialism

Philosophical Behaviorism

- (Early) Carnap
- Hempel
- Ryle (?)
- Wittgenstein (?)

Nonreductive Materialism

Functionalism

- Putnam
- Lewis
- Armstrong
- Campbell
- Fodor

Anamolous Monism

- Davidson
Space of Ontological Positions - Dualism

Three main positions on the Mind-Body Problem

Materialism/Physicalism  Dualism  Idealism

- Neutral Monism
- Double-Aspect Theory (Non-Interactionist)
  - Spinoza
  - Russell (?)
- Person Theory (Interactionist)
  - P. Strawson
- Naturalistic
  - Functionalism (See under 'Materialism')
  - Emergentism
    - C.D. Broad
    - S. Alexander
    - A.O. Lovejoy
  - Epiphenomenalism
  - Emergentism
    - Huxley
    - Jackson
  - Epiphenomenalism
    - Campbell (?)

- Property Dualism
- Materialistic Property Theory
- Substance Dualism
  - Descartes
  - Locke
  - Malebranche

- Non-Naturalistic
  - Individual "mysterian" position
    - Shaffer
    - Nagel
    - Block
    - McGinn
    - Searle
    - Levine (?)
    - Kripke (?)

- Non-Naturalistic
  - Materialistic
    - Property Dualism
      - Neutral Monism
      - Double-Aspect Theory (Non-Interactionist)
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Cartoon by Roderick Chisholm
Varieties of Mental Phenomena

- Sensations, states with sensory/perceptual/experiential qualities,
  - Qualia, phenomenal qualities (the "what it is like" character of experiences)
- Propositional attitudes
  - *Informational* and *conative* cognitive attitudes towards propositions:
  - Believing that snow is white
  - Desiring that it rains tomorrow
  - Judging that John is not qualified for the job
  - Noticing that P, observing that Q, hoping that R, etc.

*Intentional and qualitative states*

Emotions, traits, volitions, habits, etc.
Mark of the mental?

- **Epistemological criteria**
  - Direct or Immediate knowledge
  - Privacy, or First-Person Privilege
  - Infallibility and Transparency (Self-Intimacy)
    - *Infallibility*:
      - If I believe that I am in pain, then I am in pain
    - *Self-intimacy*:
      - If I am in pain, then I believe that I am in pain

- **Mentality as non-spatial**
- **Intentionality as mark of the mental**
Intentionality as mark of the mental

• Brentano quote:

"Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. . . In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on."

• Referential versus content intentionality
• Genuine versus derived intentionality