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Week 12 (Nov 24-26). Foreign Policy Challenges: Rise of China and Global Warming

Toward Reconciliation or Conflict?:
How Japan Manages the Rise of China

Two Images of the Rise of China

Outline of Presentation

1. Framework - the Stakes

2. Evaluating the Rise of China

3. Japan’s Response

4. Conflict Points

5. Possible Scenarios for the Future

Overall Argument

• Rise of China = a fundamental geopolitical transformation (10% growth per year, technological leapfrogging, finance, miltary modernization)

• A global challenge: change in power relations, challenge to US supremacy and Japan’s regional dominance

• High impact on Japan at all levels

• High risks for this power transition, due to the absence of thick institutions to embed it

October 2003

2007 big event

1. Framework

A. Domestic Caveats

• Unorthodox approach to globalization: strong state involvement and selection

• Is the Chinese model stable and sustainable? (layoffs, end of iron rice bowl, high social risks, banking risks, political risks etc..)

• Is the regime stable? Can the dual pathway continue?

• Risks regarding national unity

B. The Key Question

• A great challenge for the international system: the first case of hegemonic transition since the 1920s (Gilpin’s model)

• Can China safely be integrated into a current global system that has been dominated by the US and Japan? (historical precedent)

• Aggravating factor: unsolved tensions inherited from WWII

Five Possible Lenses

1. Realism: power relations dominate IR: expect rising tensions, potential preemptive moves by the US and Japan, challenges by China

2. Historical cycles (China’s position): return to historical status quo - peaceful Chinese domination

3. Liberalism: trade and financial integration will limit tensions and risks

4. Institutionalism: the only solution lies in rapidly building institutions (the EU example)

5. International norms: human rights and rule of law will soon filter into China - a new world phase

Historical background: Zheng He 1405-1433

2. Evaluating the Rise of China

• Economic growth: 10% per year

• GDP in 2006 = FR. Will pass Japan around 2015 and the US in 2025?

• Technological Rise

• Trade Explosion (passing Japan)

• Massive Impact on Oil Market

• Large Weight on all global issues

• Rapid military modernization

A few scorecards

• Trade surplus with US in 2006: $260 Billion

• 2004: China became Japan’s first trade partner (before the US): $200 billion

• Phenomenal production: 85% of world’s tractors, 75% of watches, 70% of toys, 50% of personal computers..

Financial weight

• 2009: Financial reserves > $2 Trillion, above Japan’s

• China can now determine the future of the US$

• Enormous % of US obligations purchases: 30% of foreign holdings

• Aug to Nov 08: From $540 to 700 billion + up to $400 billion in Freddy Mac bonds

Weight of Chinese reserves

Evaluation of Military Budget

Recent Events (1996, 2004)

3. Response by Japan’s Leadership (under Koizumi)

1. Great Debate on the Chinese threat - threat amplification

2. Administrative reorganization, NSC creation

3. Rise of Nationalist and Security Entrepreneurs - assertion of Japan’s interests (including Yasukuni) - setting tit for tat reaction

4. Reinforcement of US-Japan alliance

5. Military Build-up (navy and airforce)

6. Competition over FTAs in South East Asia

7. Support for democratic counter-alliance

The Road not Taken

• 2001-2006: a definite Japanese move toward political confrontation with China:

  • A. domestically: response first to domestic interests (LDP)

  • B. int’l: realism, alliance with US, robust posture

• Institutional Cooperation frozen (regional and global) - reverse of EU pathway
• Abe government: tactical pull-back, but no clear direction

Mainstream Nationalist: Ishiba Shigeru

Riding Nationalism to Power: Abe Shinzo

More Extreme Nationalism: Ishihara Shintaro

Recent Turn of Events     

• When nationalist PM Abe Shinzo took power in Sept 2006, he surprised everyone by spending his first week traveling to China and Korea, initiating détente

• Yet, not followed by actual policies

• PM Fukuda more open pro-China, initiating a marked warm-up, but without political strength

PM Fukuda’s Visit to China in Dec 07

4. Clash Points

A. Yasukuni Jinja: Sticky Problem

The crux of the problem: 1978 enshrinment of war criminals

• October 17, 1978, secrete enshrinment of 14 class A war criminals (including Tojo Hidekki). Announced many months later in April 1979.
• Formally a private decision of the Shrine's priest (nationalist), but acting on lists of recipients of war pensions by government.

The other problem: the Yushukan Museum

• Museum attached to the shrine, fully renovated a few years ago
• Main narrative: a story of resistance to the imperial powers of the West and of Japan's eadership in a rebellion that spans the continent of Asia
• Artifacts praise the glory of the Imperial Army in the war (big map of 1942 victories); kamikaze torpedoes and planes etc..
• A key to know more --> [link]

The Meaning of Yasukuni in Japan - Concentric Circles

• Association of War Bereaved Families (2 Million, core LDP support groups) = litmus test of support for veterans
  
• Nationalist Politicians, Bureaucrats, Thinkers: important to make a point that 60 years of shame must end. Time to assert a proud Japan
  
• Koizumi: praying for piece and paying respect to war veterans (but catering to nationalist supporters of LDP)
  
• Larger population: low salience, quite indifferent and divided; but reacts against Chinese or Korean anger (rallying around the PM)

The Koizumi Escalation

Visit in 2002

The Final Koizumi Trick: August 15, 2006

• Thick context: Koizumi became key issue on national political agenda in 2006, Fukuda-Kato-Yamazaki vs Koizumi
  
• July 06: Memo by Showa Emperor leaked by Nikkei newspaper: angry at enshrinment of 14 war criminals in 1978
  
• Opinion moving away from support to visits
  
• Koizumi turns everything around in one go

Abe/Fukuda Position

• At core, more extreme than Koizumi, namely Abe questions legitimacy of Tokyo war tribunal. Strong supporter of Yasukuni and its larger meaning
  
• Went repeatedly to Yasukuni, most recently in April 06 (secretly)
  
• Yet, no need to prove nationalist credentials. Will not go this year and obtained China summit immediately
  
• Abe ended up not going
  
• Fukuda is openly against Yasukuni visits
  

The Meaning of Yasukuni in China and Korea

• In China, the Yasukuni Shrine plays both at the elite and mass level: the CCP has used it as a tool to pursue other policy objectives; but there is genuine grassroots resentment and anger (which can become uncontrolled).
  
• Yasukuni seen as litmus test of Japan’s genuine acceptance of war responsibility (persecution during colonialism for Korea, war crimes for China)
  

Deeper Problem:

• The Yasukuni issue represents a deeper problem, namely:
  
  • The absence of a common narrative of the war (and imperial period) between Japan and its neighbors
    
  • And continued ambiguities within Japan about the war and war responsibility. Party due to middle position of Japan as oppressor and victim at the same time (caught between dangerous external system and vulnerable neighbors).
    
• Void exploited by nationalists - vulnerability

Dispute about History Textboooks

Dispute over UN Reforms

• Context: NY Summit in 2005

• Japan: a long quest for representation on the UN SC

• Japan covers 19% of the UN budget and yet has no permanent presence on UNSC

• China’s Response: public opposition, convergence with the US

High Point: April 2005

Taiwan and Japan’s Role

Senkaku- Daoyutai

5. Scenarios for the Future

• A. Growing competition, rising tensions, not mediated, tit for tat - potential for conflict

• B. Tighter US-Japan alliance directed against China - a new cold war?

• C. Peaceful power transition, facilitated by new institutions and agreements (and norms) - power sharing

• D. Unilateral Chinese rise, Japan’s withdrawal (Swiss model)

Conclusion

• Rise of China = a fundamental power transition

• The China-Japan relation remains frozen by the inability to get over historical grievances (grievances sustained by domestic lobby groups on both sides).

• Current relationship is unstable

Is Japan Turning European?
Inertia and Change in Japan’s Climate Change Politics

Putting Things in Context

Context:

• Japan played an important role in hosting the Kyoto conference in 1997 and ratifying Kyoto in 2002 (despite US and industry pressures).
  
• Japan made significant initial efforts toward implementation (energy efficiency, industrial innovation etc..).
  
• But the estimation for 2010 is that Japan will be at least 6% above 1990 levels, or 12% above target (before using Kyoto mechanisms
  
• 2008 results +7.4% (Asahi, 30 Oct 09) (a cut from +9% in 2007, in part due to recession).
  
• In 2006-2009, Japan slacked and avoided painful measures, siding with the US and Canada at Bali. PM Aso proposed the target of an 8% cut from 1990 by 2020.
  

Big Picture Today

• Japan is in the process of the most profound regime change since 1955 with the election on August 31 of a new centrist/social democrat majority led by the DPJ
  
• The DPJ is attempting to tilt policy-making toward a social-democrat direction and toward a new foreign policy that explicitly presents the EU as a model.
  
• The DPJ made a conditional public pledge to cut emissions by 25% from 1990 by 2020 (34% cut from 2007!), despite fierce and public opposition by industry.
  

Outline

1. Background: Japan and the Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol
   
2. Tug of War over Implementation – Structural Inertia
   
3. The Bali Moment
   
4. The New Hatoyama Administration – Background
   
5. Hatoyama and the Great New Pledge – where from?
   
6. Toward an EU-Japan Axis?

Acknowledgement

• Core work on Japan and Kyoto done with Miranda Schreurs as part of larger project

• Comparative Project funded by the Weyerhauser Foundation
  
• Led by Kathryn Harrison (UBC, Poli Sci – Assoc Dean of Arts)
  
• Focus on the Comparative politics of ratification and implementation of the Kyoto protocol in the US, Canada, EU,
• Japan, Russia, Australia – with added chapters on India and China in the book.
  
• Systematic Comparison across cases of Interests, Ideas, and Institutions – domestic and international.
  
• Special Issue of Global Environment Politics (GEP) in Fall 2007
  
• Global Commons and National Interests: the Comparative Politics of Climate Change. Under review with MIT Press (submitted Oct 2008). Edited by Kathryn Harrison and Lisa Sundstrom.

1. Background: Japan and the Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol

Structural Analysis: Climate Change Policy in Japan

• Japan’s Climate Change Policy-making is marked by two core features that interact and can lead to different outcomes
  
  1. Entrenched policy-making networks between Industry, METI (bureaucracy), and LDP supporters (dominating party).
  2. Also a Westminster parliamentary system with capacity for major shift in majority and centralized top-down policy leadership
     

Three Classic Cleavages in Japanese Context

A/ Economic Interest Groups vs NGOs (especially 5/31/01: Ngo-Koizumi meeting) Changing Balance of Power: is this enough? No when Keidanren unified
B/ Bureaucratic Balance of Power in Flux: METI vs MOE+MAFF, MOFA on the fence
C/Foreign Policy Pressures: US-Japan Axis (JUSCANZ) vs new international agenda and links with EU - not enough to tip the balance

Arguments on Kyoto Ratification (Tiberghien and Schreurs 2007)

• Environment/Climate Change Policy is classically dominated by structural relationships linking Keidanren (industry), METI (core ministry), and a public opinion reluctant to face big taxes or costs
  
• This coalition has been occasionally put under pressure by political leaders responding either to electoral calculations or new NGO linkages
  
• On Kyoto, the influx of political leadership and the weight of symbolic politics allowed to move forward with ratification.
  
• Yet, the multiple battles of implementation required this continuous influx of political leadership to tilt the balance away from the default coalition; and it was often lacking.

NGOs and Policy-Making in Japan: Successful Mechanisms 

1. Petitions and Protests appealing to morality and higher good (reminiscent of Ikki tradition): nuclear, gender, environment
   
2. Using the courts as platforms for protests (itai itai disease, Minamata mercury poisoning)
   
3. Networking with local governments (cf referenda on dams, Shikoku, Nagano)
   
4. Networking with Diet MPs to change bills, under propitious conditions; coalitions, divided governments, weak bureaucracy
   
5. Naming and shaming, using international norms and treaties (gender, minorities)
   
6. Global networking with global civil society (comfort women, burakumin)

NGOs and Climate Change – growing impact

• Contributions: information gathering, smoking alarm, outreach and education, coalition building
  
• Key link = link with politicians and sympathetic media; moving from confrontation with bureaucracy to cooperation / cooptation (easier with MOE)
  
• Numerous NGOs such as Greenpeace Japan, Kiko (Climate) Forum, WWF, and Friends of the Earth, A SEED JAPAN, and Citizens’ Alliance for Saving the Atmosphere (CASA) repeatedly lobbied the government to ratify the agreement.

High Noon - July 2001and Ratification of Kyoto

• July 2001: the future of Kyoto in balance in Tokyo
  
• July 3, 2001 - Camp David Meeting Koizumi-Bush - Japan appears to bail out from Kyoto
  
• Business interests, METI argue that Kyoto was never meant without the US +US-Japan alliance normally trumps multilateralist inclinations for Japan
  
• July = frantic diplomatic and political ballet, culminating in general Upper House elections 7/28
  
• Yet, by July 23, Koizumi has taken the plunge

2. Tug of War over Implementation – the Weight of Inertia

• Between 2002 and 2009, Japan reiterated its commitments, yet stuck to a soft implementation pathway without C-tax or ETS.
  
• Efficiency and innovation were present, but the gap to target remained
  
• Lack of political leadership to tilt the balance toward MOE and away from METI-Keidanren

Yomiuri Poll on Carbon Tax (Nov 2004)

• 45% for a Carbon tax
  
• 29% against
  
• 70% think govt and industry not doing enough, want mandatory regulations

Case in Point: 2005 Plan to Address Remaining 13% Gap

• Energy conservation and more efficient energy production: -4.8%
  
• Further cuts in uses of fluorinated gases: -1.3%
  
• Further cuts in Methane uses, N2O and CO2 from non-energy sources: - 0.4%
  
• Carbon sinks (mostly forests): - 3.9%
  
• Kyoto Mechanism: -1.6% (could become higher, as this constitutes the slack absorber).

Cool Biz Campaign! (2005)

• June-September, urges all working men to shed tie and jacket
  
• High advertising with Prime Minister and Ministers, all officials instructed
  
• Set Air Conditioning at 28C
  
• Huge boom in retailing (cool biz corners in all department stores)

3. Bali Conference 2007

The Game at Bali – Dec 2007

• The EU tried to get a commitment of 25-40% cut by developed countries from 1990 to 2020
  
• EU blocked by US-Canada-Japan bloc (a major shift in coalitions). China and G77 forced a softening of commitments by developing countries.
  
• Context: political shift in Canada and political vacuum in Japan
  
• Compromise outcome: 2-year process until Dec 09 to get a new Kyoto Protocol Deal with targets (“deep cuts needed”, but no target).
  
• Drama: US nearly walked out even on that compromise.

Bali- Japanese Context

• METI-Keidanren gained the upper hand in the absence of political leadership on the side of MOE and absence of political visibility
  
• PM Fukuda later tried to rebalance somewhat with stronger leadership at the G8 in Hokkaido
  

4. The New Hatoyama Administration- Sept 09

Meet the New Power Couple in Tokyo

The Election: Great Reversal

The New DPJ Leadership

The Big Picture: Social-Democrat Shift?

• “Put people before concrete”
  
• Attempt at transferring government funding away from construction and LDP-interest group particularistic redistribution and toward social welfare (child care allowance, pension, minimum wages, rights of temp workers, etc..)
  
• Major rhetorical change around foreign policy: rebalancing US-Japan alliance, economic integration with China and Asia, currency integration. Already a US backlash.

Added Factor: Coalition in Power with SDP committed to Env

The Key Driver: UH – 12 seats short

By Election Oct 25- Shift in the UH – DPJ to 115

• Kaneko in Yokohama
• Tsuchida in Shizuoka

And the Bigger Win: Oct 20, Return of 4 UH members, Renaissance Party (新緑風会)

5. The Big Pledge: 25% cut from 1990 by 2020 (public at the UN)

Target in Context

The Election Manifesto: limited promises

1. Increase ratio of renewable energy to total primary energy supply to 10% by 2020
   
2. Boost environmental technology, including biomass, fuel-cell, superconductivity. Increase R&D

Yet also, one major contradiction

• One major electoral promise made by the DPJ (and to be implemented shortly) is an immediate removal of expressway tolls
  
• Made for political reasons (settling scores with LDP lobby groups)
  
• Setting back the climate change cause
  

How can they do it?

• Key Committee: 3 ministers (MOE, METI, MOFA)
  
• Oct 7- 2 tasks forces (on domestic implementation and Hatoyama Initiative) set up under Kan and MOE’s Ozawa
  
• Would include credits purchased overseas and development aid (large-scale, despite budget constraints)
  
• Floating a “Global Warming Tax” idea. Oct 30- MOE floating fossil fuel tax
  
• Expand Renewable Energy for electricity
  
• Floating Emissions Trading System with cap-and-trade structure
  
• Long way to go!
  

Early Declarations by MOE Minister Ozawa (Sept-Oct 2009)

• Floated Climate Change Tax (温暖化対策税) of 2400 Yen per ton of Carbon on oct 30
  
• Would like to reach 2 trillion Yen income, or about Yen 10,000 per household per year
  
• Interested in participating in the international system of emission trading

Long way to go

• How we get there? Path to reducing Japan's greenhouse-gas emissions; in billions of metric tons
• Compared to the base year FY1990, the gas emission in 2007 increased by 9% point.
• To meet the "Medium term target, Japan needs to reduce the gas emission by 25% from the 1990 level.
• The breakdown of 25% would be:
  • 15% - Domestic measures
  • 10% - Purchasing emission credits from overseas, etc.

Source: The Nikkei Marketing Journal

High potential cost /Uncertainty

• One estimate – Nikkei, Sept 14
  “Meeting the target without purchasing carbon credits from overseas could end up adding 360,000 yen ($3,910) to a typical household's annual utility bill.”
• OTHER: “According to an estimate by the government under Prime Minister Taro Aso, the 25% cut would require a cocktail of difficult measures -increasing the use of solar power 55-fold, increasing the ratio of green car sales to all new car sales to 90%; cutting steel and cement production by 10-20%.”
  

Additional Dimension: “Hatoyama Initiative”

• A package of financial and technical support for developing countries tied to the fight against climate change.
  
• Aid would be given to developing nations that “eagerly” strive to cut GHG emissions with reduction plans.
  

Causality- what lies behind the big shift? Is it sustainable?

• One underlying variable: strengthening public opinion, although sensitive to taxes
  
• The core source of change is political leadership by Okada (acquiesced by PM Hatoyama), and a strong linkage with NGOs through a policy entrepreneur (Fukuyama).
  
• With it, comes the realignment of MOFA as strong pro-action ministry, backing MOE
  
• It came as part of the larger package of regime change in the Aug 31 election; yet the party leadership is not completely unified.
  
• Added lever of coalition partner - SDP

Genealogy: DPJ is relative late comer to the issue, linked to electoral strategy and policy Entrepreneurs

• May 2007: initial party proposal with 20% target by 2020, issued by Fukuyama committee
  
• Already includes C tax idea (Y 3000 per t)
  
• Follows earlier weak proposals from 2002
  
• From Jan 2008, Okada becomes key person: head of Unit (Honbu) in charge of climate change policy (Sec Gen: Fukuyama)
  
• Only in June 2009, does DPJ move up from 20% to 25% target.

Supporting Underlying Public Opinion… up to a point…

• 70-75% of Japanese support the 25% pledge made by Hatoyama in principle (polls by Asahi, Yomiuri, Nikkei, Oct 11 to Nov 8)
  
• 81% see climate change as urgent and support a new Kyoto deal at Copenhagen
  
• But a Nikkei poll with priming got :
  
  • 19%: achieve goal with increased costs for households
    
  • 69%: have an option which does not increase cost for households
    

Some movement on C Tax
(Kantei Survey – evolution)

A Major New Positioning: Survey shows 84% of DPJ MPs for C tax

Attitudes toward environmental tax by party members

FM Okada at the Origin of the Pledge – a change in primary leadership

Key Political Entrepreneur: Fukuyama Vice Minister of FA

Other Key Actor: MOE Minister Ozawa Sakihito (close to Hatoyama, center left, some link to Ozawa NFP)

Fukuyama in NGO forums

Fukuyama and Okada with NGO “Make the Rule Campaign”

FM Okada and Consumption Minister Fukushima with E NGOs

Some Overlap in Contents with NGOs

• Greenpeace Japan proposed 25% target for a while and strongly supports Hatoyama’s position
  
• Kiko Network has lobbied for 30%
  
• WWF Japan supports Hatoyama’s position, but pushes for 80% cut by 2050. Heavy lobbying of DPJ.

But Uncertainty Among Other DPJ Leaders and Supporters

• Hatoyama seems to have espoused climate change with Okada, but as part of a large political vision that could shift
  
• Ozawa has no record of strong positions on climate change (either way) – focused on pragmatic politics
  
• Maehara – no record (focus on for policy)
  
• Kan – not much record (focus on construction, budget, bureaucracy)
  
• RENGO (Union): concerned about the 25% target and urging caution
  

Tensions with Business Community

Contemplating change: Major policies of DPJ, evaluations from related sectors, anticipated effects

Notations: $$ Strongly beneficial; $ Beneficial; * Somewhat unfavorable; ** Strongly unfavorable

Conclusion: Toward an EU-Japan Axis in Copenhagen?

• Japan’s abrupt shift put Japan on the EU side of the ledger at Copenhagen
  
• FT Sept 9, 2009: “That Japan is raising its game ahead of Copenhagen is to be applauded; other countries must now follow suit.”
  
• But too little too late? The core negotiation axis for Copenhagen increasingly is a G2 between the US and China.
  
• Japan and Europe have not yet cooperated on how to influence the US and China

EPILOGUE: APEC

Hatoyama at APEC- Singapore – Nov 15, 2009

• GREEN ASIA:
  The premier expressed hope that developing countries will take advantage of advanced energy-saving technologies, water purification techniques and other environmentally friendly technologies owned by Japanese companies as they aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions while pursuing sustainable growth to achieve a ''Green Asia.'’

• COPENHAGEN
  He stressed that countries need to ensure the success of a key U.N. climate change meeting in December in Copenhagen, where the world will try to strike a deal on a successor to the carbon-capping Kyoto Protocol, which expires in 2012. (Nikkei, Nov 15, 2009)
  

Yet, APEC sways the other way

• Copenhagen downgraded:
  “US Deputy National Security Adviser Mike Froman said the leaders had reached the conclusion that "it was unrealistic to expect a full, internationally legally-binding agreement to be negotiated between now and when Copenhagen starts in 22 days".

• Target of 50% cut of GHG by 2050 is abandoned

Meanwhile, a counter-move

• Sarkozy-Lula Meeting on Nov 14 in France
  
• The G2 as target
  
• Seeking global deal with developing countries
  
• Includes funding from a planned Tobin Tax