

Performance Pay, Wage Flexibility, and Hours of Work*

[Preliminary and Incomplete]

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27th March 2009

Abstract

Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we study the impact of local labor market shocks on wages, hours of work and employment under different contractual arrangements. We divide jobs on the basis of whether they pay for performance, and whether they are covered by collective bargaining agreements. Using the county unemployment rate as a proxy for local labor market shocks, we find that wages and hours of work respond very differently to shocks depending on contractual arrangements. Wages are most flexible under non-union performance-pay contracts, and least flexible under non-performance-pay union contracts. Precisely the opposite happens in the case of hours of work that are the least sensitive to shocks under non-union performance-pay contracts, and the most sensitive under union non-performance-pay contracts. We discuss the implications of these findings for labor market inequality and the role of the labor market in the transmission of shocks in the macroeconomy.

*The authors would like to thank John Haltiwanger, Lawrence Katz, Till von Wachter, and Michael Woodford for useful discussions, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) for research support.

1 Introduction

Unemployment and the role of the labor market in transmitting real and monetary shocks has long played a central role in macro economics. Beginning with Keynes, it has been speculated that the labor market is not perfectly competitive. A great deal of research work has explored the extent to which search frictions and optimal inter-temporal risk sharing contracts can explain the evidence.

It has been found that these models cannot explain all aspects of the data, and as a consequence recent work has returned to exploring the implications of models with sticky nominal wages. These models are typically at the aggregate level, and suppose that different sectors of the economy experience the same degree of stickiness. One reason for this is analytical convenience. A second reason is that lack of evidence on the extent to which contract form is heterogeneous in the economy in a way that is meaningful.

This is a major shortcoming since a number of studies have shown that contractual arrangements in the labor market have undergone major changes over the last few decades. As is well known, the rate of unionization in the U.S. and several other countries has declined dramatically since the 1970s (Farber and Western (2001)). Most unionized workers are now working for the public sector, while the unionization rate among private-sector workers is now below 10 percent. This is a major development as union contracts typically fix wages over the duration of the contract (typically 2-3 years), which results in a staggered wage structure “a la” Fischer (1977). No such explicit medium terms contracts typically prevail in non-unionized firms.

Furthermore, Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009) show the fraction of workers who receive part of their compensation in the form of bonuses or commissions has grown substantially over the same time period. Since wages under these performance-pay contracts explicitly depend on the worker’s performance, they are likely more flexible than under more traditional pay systems. Other developments such as the growth of contingent employment and temporary work agencies (Segal and Sullivan (1997)) has also contributed to the movement away from more traditional, and union-based, pay systems.

In this paper we present direct evidence that wages, employment, and hours of work respond very differently to labor market shocks under different contractual arrangements. We divide jobs into four categories based on whether the workers are unionized and are covered by performance-pay schemes. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),

our main finding is that wages are most responsive to shocks for non-union workers covered by performance-pay schemes, and least responsive for union workers who are not paid for performance. Interestingly, precisely the opposite happens in case of hours of work. This confirms our expectation that shocks have a larger impact on employment under traditional contractual arrangements where rigid wages results in more employment (and output) response to shocks.

Our findings have two important implications. First, as contractual arrangements have moved away from the traditional or union-based model over time, our results suggest that this “modernization” of the U.S. labor market has reduced its role in the transmission of real or monetary shocks to the macroeconomy. Second, while we show in our earlier work (Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009)) that performance-pay results in more (hourly) wage inequality, it also reduces variability in hours of work. This mitigates substantially the overall impact of performance pay on total earnings inequality in both a static and dynamic sense.

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present our theoretical model and derive some predictions regarding the impact of productivity shocks under different contractual arrangements. In Section 3, we present our empirical model and explain how to test the key implications of the theoretical model. We present the PSID data and discuss how we empirically classify workers into the different types of contracts in Section 4. The main empirical results are presented in Section 5. We discuss the implication of our findings for inequality and the transmission of shocks in the macroeconomy in Section 6, and conclude in Section 7.

2 Wages, Hours, and Contractual Arrangements

In this section we consider different contractual settings and compare their implications for the impact of demand shocks on wages, hours of work, and employment probability. We focus our discussion on the distinction between performance-pay and fixed-wage contracts. This distinction follows Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009) who consider a situation where employers don’t observe the level of effort of workers. We then extend the discussion to the case of union and non-union wage setting.

Employment relationships are by their nature very complex. One purpose of the labor market is to first find the worker who is the best fit for a job - this entails a matching of

worker skills with the needs of the firm. A second purpose is to ensure that the worker supplies the appropriate labor services once a worker has been chosen. In practice it is not possible for firms to know what are exactly the needs of their workers in advance. Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009) introduce a model of performance pay in which the goal is to enhance the ability of the worker to provide the appropriate level of services *ex post* given their skills. We show that such a system of performance pay results in a better matching of income with labor productivity. This in turn implies that an increase in the incidence of performance pay leads to an increase in wage inequality. The focus of that paper was on the interplay between worker heterogeneity and performance pay. In this paper we look at the other side of the market.

Namely, we explore the matching of the worker at the extensive margin between employment and unemployment that arises due to fluctuations in firm productivity. There is a long tradition, beginning with Keynes, that associates high levels of unemployment with rigidities in the wage setting process. Weitzman (1985) argued that firms should use more profit sharing schemes to stabilize employment. While there is some evidence that profit sharing may work, it is a very crude method of compensation since it is not sensitive to the characteristics of individual workers. In this section we introduce a very simple model that illustrates how performance pay may lead to a more stable employment relationship. In order to have some bite it must be the case that there is a transactions costs that makes it optimal for firms to offer rigid wages in some circumstances.

The traditional approach to this problem has been to assume that the wage contract provides risk averse workers insurance against firm productivity shocks (see. e.g., Azariadis and Bailey). In this paper we build upon the recent incomplete contracts literature, beginning with Grout (1984) and Hart and Moore (1988). These models show that if there are relationship specific investments, then optimal contracts should be *ex post* rigid. MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) show that when applied to wage contracting, the holdup model implies that wages should be rigid in the short run. The version of the model we use here builds upon the result that when there are search costs, then the optimal long term contract entails rigid wages. To this model we add Moore (1985)'s insight that when worker productivity is private information then the optimal contract may entail inefficient layoffs.

In this section we introduce a simple model that illustrates the trade-off between performance pay and employment stability. We then derive the labor market equilibrium implications

of the model, and relate to our empirical model.

2.1 Wages and Productivity Shocks

Consider a model of the worker-firm relationship in which a risk neutral firm offers a contract to a risk neutral employee. It is assumed that firms are heterogeneous and workers are identical. We then work out the implications of the model for employment and contract form as a function of labor market shocks. The model we use is the simplest one that is rich enough to illustrate the effects we observe in the data.

Each period we have the following timing:

1. The worker has an alternative offer yielding a utility of u^0 , and the firm makes a take it or leave it offer of employment with wage w , or possibly with only a promise of employment with the wage determined in period 2.
2. After employment begins, the employer learns whether job productivity is $\theta + \Delta$ or $\theta - \Delta$, which for simplicity are assumed to be equally likely. The firm is characterized by the parameters (θ, Δ) , which is assumed to be observable. However, it is assumed that the worker cannot observe, or equivalently cannot verify, whether the firm gets a positive or negative shock.
3. If the worker leaves she gets $u^0 - m$, where m is the cost of going back into the labor market to search for a job. Firm can offer a new contract, employ the worker at wage w , or lay the worker off.
4. If laid off the worker gets unemployment insurance income w^u and does not search for other employment in the anticipation of being rehired the next period.

The payoffs to the worker and firm once employment begins are:

<i>Payoff</i>	<i>HL</i>	<i>HE</i>	<i>LL</i>	<i>LE</i>
<i>Worker</i>	w^u	$w - v$	w^u	$w - v$
<i>Firm</i>	0	$\theta + \Delta - w$	0	$\theta - \Delta - w$

where *HL* denotes a layoff in the high state, *HE* denotes employment in the high state, *LL* and *LE* are the corresponding low state outcomes, and v is the cost of effort.

This model captures in the most basic form the holdup model that is central to the modern theory of the firm (see Williamson (1985), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1988), MacLeod and Malcomson (1993)). The point is that the worker faces a cost m if she decides to re-enter the labor market and get additional job offers. In order to avoid being held-up by the firm after employment begins the firm commits to a wage w . This however comes at a cost - if the firm faces a negative shock, then the productivity of the worker may be lower than the wage. In that case the firm would lay the worker off rather than continue employment.

This is consistent with the right to manage clause that is contained in most union contracts. In the first case we consider we suppose that the firm cannot credibly communicate the negative shock. As Card (1990) has shown, this is also consistent with the evidence of contract renegotiation. It also provide a role for the introduction of performance pay. As in Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009), performance pay is introduced by supposing that at a cost k the firm can introduce a measurement system that allows pay to be conditioned upon the shocks faced by the firm, and thereby reduce the level of inefficient layoffs.

In this next section we work out the optimal contract as a function of the model parameters.

2.2 Optimal Employment Contract

First consider the case where there is no contract. In that case, given that the firm is assumed to have the bargaining power *ex post*, then the worker will get at best $u^0 - m$. As long as $m > 0$, the worker would reject any offer of employment that does not have some wage guarantee. This illustrates that one does not need risk aversion to motivate the existence of a wage contract - that fact that it is costly to re-enter the labor market after employment has begun provides a justification for offering a rigid wage contract.

Proposition 1. *An offer of employment without a wage commitment is rejected by the worker whenever there are transactions costs associated with search, $m > 0$.*

In order to motivate the existence of a fixed wage one does not need to suppose that the worker is risk averse. The fact that re-entering the labor market is expensive provides a motive to set wages in advance. Also, observe that the source of the problem is an *idiosyncratic* shock at the firm level, and hence indexing to the aggregate price level is not a solution.

The issue then is what happens if the firm faces short run productivity shocks so that it is not efficient for the worker to leave and find alternative employment, either because of high search costs or high levels of relationship specific capital? If there are no transactions costs one could suppose that the firms chose a complete set of state contingent contracts. In practice, we know that the design performance of contingent pay is very complex. Here we consider the implications of supposing that there are costs to creation of such contracts (see Townsend (1979) and Dye (1985)). This will generate predictions that will help us interpret our empirical findings.

Suppose that the firm's productivity shock is not observed by the worker, and hence compensation cannot be credibly conditioned upon this information. Further suppose that the worker and firm agree to a right to manage contract, namely that the firm can lay off the worker if it wishes. In practice, firms do face shocks that make it efficient to lay off workers, and hence perfect security of employment is rarely optimal. In our benchmark example we suppose that the monitoring cost that has to be incurred under a bonus pay scheme is expensive, so that initially the firm does not wish to pay this cost.

Thus, if the firm offers a fixed wage contract w , then in period 2 the work will be laid off if and only if $\theta - \Delta - w < 0$. It is implicitly assumed that when a worker is hired she enters into a long term relationship with the firm, and hence layoffs are viewed as temporary. In the next period the worker expects to get utility u^0 and hence does not gain by leaving the firm when there is a layoff. Given that the cost of effort is v , then under these assumptions layoff is inefficient whenever $\theta - \Delta - v > 0$. When firm productivity has sufficiently low variation (Δ is small) that $\theta - \Delta - w > 0$, then layoff is not efficient and a rigid wage generates the first best. Note that unemployment insurance provides a lower bound to a worker's fixed wage. We have assumed that there is a cost v of supplying effort, and hence it is efficient for employment to occur in the low state if and only if $\theta - \Delta \geq v$. The next proposition summarizes the structure of the equilibrium contract under rigid wages.

Proposition 2. *Given the state of a match between a worker and firm: $\omega = \{\theta, \Delta, u^0, w^u\}$, the optimal rigid wage contract is as follows:*

1. If $\omega \in F(u^0) = \{\omega | \theta - \Delta \geq w^F\}$ it is optimal to offer full time employment, where $w^F = u^0 + v$ is the wage.
2. If $\omega \in PT(u^0, w^u) = \{\omega | \theta - \Delta < w^F, (\theta + \Delta)/2 \geq w^L/2\}$, where $w^L = 2u^0 + v - w^u$

is the wage when employed, the worker accepts a contract that entails a layoff in the low state.

3. If $\omega \notin F(u^0) \cup PT(u^0, w^u)$ there is no match.

Case 1 corresponds to the situation where the productivity of the firm in the low state is greater than the marginal cost of labor, in which case the rigid wage contract achieves the first best. In the second case, if the productivity is sufficiently high in the good state, then it may be worthwhile for the worker to accept a high wage in the good state, and collect unemployment insurance in the low state. This outcome is inefficient whenever employment is preferred to unemployment, namely when $\theta - \Delta > v$.

Figure 1 illustrates the regions corresponding to each case in terms of firm characteristics. The dotted region is where there is no employment. When Δ is very large then it is efficient to employ the worker only in the good state, regardless of the contract. Wage rigidity generates inefficiency only in the region between the 45° lines starting at v and w^F . Notice that an increase in u^0 results in an increase in both w^F and w^L , and hence a decrease in the states that lead to employment.

Efficiency can be enhanced if the firm and worker could agree upon a bonus pay contract at which a bonus b is paid if and only if the firm is in the high state. In general the introduction of a bonus pay system requires the creation of a measurement system. This is potentially challenging because the firm always has an incentive to manipulate measured performance down in order to avoid paying a bonus. We model this by supposing that the creation of a credible performance pay system comes at a cost k . Let us continue to suppose, as we have above, that the unemployment insurance system is in place (unemployment compensation of w^u), and let $\{w, b\}$ be the corresponding employment contract, consisting of a base wage w and bonus pay b . In this case, the payoffs for the worker and firm in each state are:

<i>Payoff</i>	<i>HL</i>	<i>HE</i>	<i>LL</i>	<i>LE</i>
<i>Worker</i>	w^u	$w + b - v$	w^u	$w - v$
<i>Firm</i>	$-k$	$\theta + \Delta - w - b - k$	$-k$	$\theta - \Delta - w - k$

With bonus pay, the firm can set a low base pay, and then pay a bonus in the good state. This system increases the set of states where there is full employment, however it does not reach the first best for two reasons. First, there is the transactions cost k of setting up a system to verify performance.

In order to characterize the optimal contract we need to define some sets of firm characteristics. The set of characteristics where a rigid wage implements the efficient level of employment is defined by

$$F(u^0), \quad (1)$$

as given in proposition 2. Since this achieves the first best, then relationships that use either bonus pay or layoffs are in the complement of this set, denoted by $F^c(u^0)$. To maintain consistency with the idea that layoffs are temporary, the lowest wage that the firm can offer is $w = v$, the opportunity cost of effort (this might for example be the wage in the temporary work market).

$$BIC(u^0, m) = \{\omega | \theta - \Delta \geq v\}. \quad (2)$$

In order to use bonus pay it must be more profitable than not operating:

$$BP(u^0, k) = \{\omega | \theta - k - w^F \geq 0\}.$$

In addition bonus pay contracts are used if and only if they are more profitable than contracts that entail layoffs:

$$BL(u^0, w^u, k) = \{\omega | \theta - k - w^F \geq \frac{\theta + \Delta - w^L}{2}\}$$

Given these assumptions we have the following proposition.

Proposition 3. *Given the state of a match between a worker and firm: $\omega = \{\theta, \Delta, u^0, w^u\}$, and a cost k of implementing bonus pay, the optimal wage contract is as follows:*

1. If $\omega \in F(u^0) = \{\omega | \theta - \Delta \geq w^F\}$ it is optimal to offer full time employment at a wage $w^F(\omega) = u^0 + v$.
2. If $\omega \in B(u^0, w^u) = F^c(u^0) \cap BIC(u^0, m) \cap BP(u^0, k) \cap BL(u^0, w^u, k)$ then a bonus pay contract, $\{w^b, b^b\}$ is offered with fixed wage $w^b \in [u^0 - m + v, \theta - \Delta]$ and bonus pay $b^b = 2(w^F - w^b)$.
3. If $\omega \in P^b(u^0, w^u) = PT(u^0, w^u) \setminus B(u^0, w^u)$ a fixed wage contract with layoff is offered.
4. In all other cases there is no employment

Notice that the introduction of a bonus contract does not affect the fixed wage contracts. Its effect on employment when $k = 0$ is also illustrated in figure 1. In the region that is the intersection between the light grey and dotted areas new jobs are added. In the remaining part of the light great area bonus pay ensures that there are no layoffs, resulting in an increase in productivity. The bonus pay does not affect those jobs where it is efficient to layoff workers, given by the top white area in figure 1.

2.3 Market Equilibrium.

We can now use the simple market to explore the effect of labor market fluctuations and characteristics upon equilibrium wages and employment. Suppose that in this market labor supply is a continuous, increasing function of u^0 , given by $L^S(u^0)$. Suppose that w^u, m, k are exogenous parameters and that the distribution of firms with characteristics $\{\theta, \Delta\}$ is given by the measure μ_{u_t} , where u_t represents time dependent demand shocks. Note that when k is very large there are no bonus pay contracts, hence the characterization of the optimal contract in proposition 3 implies proposition 2 as a special case. Therefore, we may use the characterization of proposition 3 to derive labor supply and demand:

1. The demand for fixed wage jobs: $L^F(u^0|u_t) = \mu_{u_t}(F(u^0))$.
2. The demand for bonus pay jobs: $L^B(u^0, m, k, w^u|u_t) = \mu_{s_t}(B(u^0, w^u, m, k))$.
3. The demand for jobs that entail layoffs, or part-time work: $L^P(u^0, m, k, w^u|u_t) = \mu_{s_t}(P^b(u^0, w^u, m, k))$.

Given this, the market level of utility and employment is given by:

$$L^S(u^0) = L^D(u^0, m, k, w^u|u_t) = L^F(u^0|u_t) + L^B(u^0, m, k, w^u|u_t) + L^P(u^0, m, k, w^u|u_t).$$

3 Empirical Model and Testable Implications

We can now derive a number of interesting implications from the model. First, we can compare the characteristics of performance pay jobs and non-performance pay jobs. Second, we can ask what is the impact of an increase in the incidence of performance pay. This can be examined by asking how a decrease in the cost of monitoring, k , affects the market

equilibrium. Third, it is possible to ask what are the implications of performance pay for fluctuations in total demand. A positive demand shock corresponds to a increase in the mean productivity, θ , of firms. Before considering these implications in details, let's first consider the basic empirical specifications to be estimated using the PSID data.

3.1 Estimating Equations

The wage equation for worker i at time t under performance pay is

$$w_{it}^p = a^p + x_{it}b^p + c^p u_t + d^p \theta_i + \varepsilon_{it}^p, \quad (3)$$

while the wage for non-performance-pay jobs is

$$w_{it}^n = a^n + x_{it}b^n + c^n u_t + d^n \theta_i + \varepsilon_{it}^n, \quad (4)$$

where x_{it} represents standard observable characteristics such as potential experience, education, occupation, θ_i is the unobservable ability component; u_t is a demand shock; and ε_{ijt}^p and ε_{ijt}^n are idiosyncratic error terms. Note that, as a matter of notational convention, we use the superscript p for performance-pay jobs, and n for “non-performance-pay jobs” (i.e. fixed-wage jobs).

Consider the following equation for hours of work among performance-pay workers:

$$h_{it}^p = a_h^p + x_{it}b_h^p + c_h^p u_t + d_h^p \theta_i + \nu_{it}^p. \quad (5)$$

Our fixed wage job can also be interpreted as a “right-to-manage” model where a firm and a union bargain on a (fixed) wage, and the firm later sets employment at the level such that the marginal product of labor is equal to the wage. In this setting, employment moves along the labor demand curve in response to productivity shocks. The coefficient c_h^n in the hours equation for non-performance-pay jobs

$$h_{it}^n = a_h^n + x_{it}b_h^n + c_h^n u_t + d_h^n \theta_i + \nu_{it}^n, \quad (6)$$

should be larger than c_h^p if labor demand is more elastic than labor supply.

3.2 Performance Pay versus Fixed Wage Contracts

The first empirical implication of the model concerns the characteristics for a performance pay job compared to a fixed wage job. Our theoretical model distinguished between workers who are never laid off and those who may face a layoff under a fixed wage contract. We group these groups together for our private sector jobs. We could associate fixed wage jobs with employment security with public sector jobs.

We can estimate this with a panel by comparing the wages and hours of a worker who holds both types of jobs. First note that some fixed wage jobs entail layoffs, and hence in order for a worker to be indifferent between the two types of jobs it must be the case that the wage in fixed wage job is higher than in a performance pay job. This follows from our model where we have $w^L > w^F > w^P$. This implies that $a^n > a^p$.

Workers who are laid off do not supply effort and receive unemployment insurance while laid off. Thus the annual income of workers on performance pay should be higher than on a fixed wage. This follows from our model where workers on performance pay receive $v/2$ more than workers who face the threat of layoff. Since our estimating equations are in logs, this implies that $a^p + a_h^p > a^n + a_h^n$.

3.3 Effect of Monitoring Costs

Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009) established that there has been a secular growth in performance pay over time. There we explored two hypothesis for this result. The first is that there has been an increase in the returns to skill that in turn has increased the benefit from a performance pay system. The second is a decrease in the cost of monitoring performance. When one conditions upon individual skill one cannot distinguish between the two models, and hence the predictions for this model do not depend upon which secular shifts causes the increase in performance pay.

A decrease in k leads to an increase in performance pay jobs. In addition to causing fixed wage jobs to switch to performance pay jobs, there is also a net gain in the number of jobs, as given by the triangular region in figure 1. This implies:

$$\frac{\partial L^D}{\partial k} < 0,$$

from which we conclude that wages should rise and the number of jobs with layoffs should fall.

The later point would imply that there should be more stable employment over time, a result that is consistent with the *great moderation*. Second, this implies an increase in the fixed wages relative to performance pay:

$$w^L - (w^b + b) = u^0 - w^u.$$

What this says is that workers on fixed wage who face the risk of layoff must receive proportionally more income to compensate them for the opportunity cost of a layoff.

3.4 Effect of Demand Shocks

Our simple model illustrates the point that demand shocks can take at least three forms. The first is a secular change in mean productivity of firms. This corresponds to a shifting of the mass in figure 1 to the right. This unambiguously increases labor demand, and hence wages and hours. The effect on the frequency of performance pay jobs is ambiguous - it depends upon the marginal distribution of the Δ 's.

A second possible shock is information on the realization of Δ or $-\Delta$. This type of shock implies $c^p > 0$ and $c^n = 0$ since productivity shocks should not affect wages when they are set in advance of wages, where the effect of productivity shocks under performance-pay is c^p and non-performance-pay contracts is c^n in the wage equations. As we will see below, however, the prediction that $c^n = 0$ may be too strong since we do not have a perfect measure of whether or not a worker is paid for performance. We nonetheless expect to find that $c^p > c^n$. The key empirical implication of the model is thus that productivity shocks should have a larger impact on wages in performance-pay than in non-performance-pay jobs.

With both hours and wages expressed in logs, the ratio c_h^p/c^p represents the labor supply elasticity. Since our analysis is restricted to a sample of men (more below), we expect c_h^p/c^p to be fairly small, i.e. the impact of shocks on hours of work (c_h^p) to be much smaller than the impact of shocks on wages (c^p).

A third possible shock is an increase in the variance of productivity shocks. This is given by a movement of the mass of firms up in figure 1. The effect of total productivity is ambiguous, as is the effect upon the incentives of performance pay. One of the features of the great moderation is a decrease in the variance of output. In our model this could easily lead to an increase in performance pay incidence, with correspondingly lower hours variability. This would occur if the marginal productivity of a worker increases along with a decrease in

output variability. This would increase the gains to maintaining full time employment, and hence would lead to more performance pay. Thus we are forced to look at the data to get a definitive answer.

What will be true is that if we find an increase in the incidence of bonus pay, then our model suggests that reducing the amount of bonus pay will increase employment variability and lower total demand for labor.

3.5 Unions

At this stage, we simply view unionization as an additional indicator of the type of contract involved. While the above model draws a sharp contrast between performance-pay and fixed-wage contracts, we will see below that there are difficulties in measuring these two concepts empirically. For simplicity, we expect that unionization gets us even closer to a fixed wage setting, since collective bargaining agreements indeed tend to pre-specify wages over the duration of the contract (2-3 years, often more in recent years). Interestingly, however, some union contracts allow for a limited amount of pay-for-performance, which generates more flexibility in response to labor market shocks.

In practice, we divide contracts into four categories based both on the union status and performance-pay status. We expect union contracts without performance-pay to exhibit the least wage flexibility and the largest hours response. At the other extreme, given that unions might be better able to monitor the credibility of employer productivity gains, then performance pay in union settings should be the most flexible.

4 Data

The bulk of our analysis is conducted using data from the PSID. The main advantage of the PSID is that it provides a representative sample of the workforce for a relatively long time period. One disadvantage of the PSID is that our constructed measures of performance pay are relatively crude for reasons discussed below.

4.1 The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1976-1998)

The PSID sample we use consists of male heads of households aged 18 to 65 with average hourly earnings between \$1.50 and \$100.00 (in 1979 dollars) for the years 1976-1998, where the hourly wage rate is obtained by dividing total labor earnings from all jobs by total hours of work, both reported retrospectively for the previous calendar year.^{1,2} Given our focus on performance pay, this wage measure based on total yearly earnings, inclusive of performance pay, is preferable to “point-in-time” wage measures that would likely miss infrequent payments (e.g. bonuses) of performance pay.

Individuals who are self-employed are excluded from the analysis since our measure of performance pay based on receiving bonuses, commissions, or piece-rates is defined for employed workers only.³ We also exclude workers from the public sector since it is not clear what it means to pay workers for their productivity in a sector where employment and wage setting decisions are not based on profit maximization. This leaves us with a total sample of 26,146 observations for 3,053 workers. All of the estimates reported in the paper are weighted using the PSID sample weights.

Identifying Performance Pay In the PSID, we construct a performance-pay indicator variable by looking at whether part of a worker’s total compensation includes a variable pay component (bonus, commission, or piece-rate). For interview years 1976-1992, we are able to determine whether a worker received a bonus or a commission over the previous

¹In the PSID, data on hours worked during year t , as well as on total labor earnings, bonuses/commissions/overtime income, and overtime hours, are asked in interview year $t+1$. Thus we actually use data covering interview years 1976-1999. Annual earnings were top coded at \$99,999 until 1982 (and not top coded since then), but only a handful of individuals were at the top code. We trim very high values of wages (above \$100.00 in 1979 dollars) but do not otherwise adjust for top coding.

²Our focus on male heads of households stems from the fact that only heads are asked about their income derived from bonuses, commissions, or overtime. In the PSID, males are designated as the head in all husband-wife pairs. The same is true if the female has a boyfriend with whom she has been living for at least a year, even if the female is the person with the most financial responsibility in the family unit. Consequently, the sample of female heads is relatively small. Using the same sample selection criteria as the ones we use for males would leave us with 1,367 females for a total of 8,185 observations. Perhaps more importantly, issues of representativeness would arise as those female heads are disproportionately nonwhite (24.4 percent) and are much less likely to be married (9.2 percent).

³Self-employed workers can be viewed as being, by definition, paid for performance regardless of the mode of payment (earnings, dividends, etc.) they use to remunerate themselves.

calendar year through the use of multiple questions. First, workers are asked the amount of money they received from working overtime, from commissions, or from bonuses paid by the employer.⁴ Second, we sometimes know only whether or not workers worked overtime, and if they are working overtime in a given year, not the amount of pay they received for overtime. Thus, we classify workers as not having had a variable pay component if they worked overtime. Third, workers not paid exclusively by the hour, or not exclusively by a salary, are asked how they are paid: they can report being paid commissions, piece-rates, etc., as well as a combination of salaried/hourly pay along with piece-rates or commissions.⁵ Through this combination of questions, we are thus able to identify *all* non-overtime workers who received performance pay in bonus, commission, or piece-rate form.

Starting with interview year 1993, there are separate questions about the amounts earned in bonuses, commissions, tips, and overtime for the previous calendar year. Thus, there is no need to back out an estimate of bonuses from an aggregate amount since the question is asked directly. For the sake of comparability with the pre-1993 years, we nevertheless classify as receiving no performance pay all workers who report any overtime work. In this way we are able to determine whether a worker's total compensation included a performance-pay component for each year of the survey. One obvious drawback is that it is likely that the performance-pay component we construct will be noisy for hourly workers, though not for salaried workers who are not eligible for overtime payments. However, due to our treatment of overtime workers, we conservatively lean on the side of misclassifying workers as receiving no performance pay even when they do.⁶

⁴Note that the question refers specifically to any amounts earned from bonuses, overtime, or commissions in addition to wages and salaries earned.

⁵In many survey years workers are not asked if their compensation package involves a mixture of salary/hourly pay and a variable component. All they are asked is how they are paid if not by the hour or with a salary. Although there is no way to directly verify it, this likely results in understating the incidence of any form of variable pay because workers are not allowed to answer that they are paid, say, a salary, and then report a commission: they have to choose. Our assertion that this response likely understates the extent of variable pay is motivated in part by the fact that workers in the NLSY, to be described below, are not restricted in describing the way they are paid. We find that workers in the NLSY are more likely to report having part of their compensation package contain a performance-pay component.

⁶In an earlier version of the paper, we re-did the analysis for 1992 to 1998 using the finer measure of performance pay that allows us to identify the performance-pay status of overtime workers. Doing so had little impact on the results. It only increased the fraction of workers on performance-pay jobs (for 1992-98) by one percentage point, and regression coefficients were essentially unchanged.

Defining Performance-pay Jobs We define performance-pay jobs as employment relationships in which part of the worker’s total compensation includes a variable pay component (bonus, a commission, piece-rate) at least once during the course of the relationship.⁷ Since we use actual payments of bonuses, commissions or piece rates to identify performance-pay jobs, we are likely to misclassify performance-pay jobs as non-performance-pay jobs if some employment relationships are either terminated before performance pay is received, or partly unobserved for being out of our sample range. This source of measurement error is problematic because of an “end-point” problem in the PSID data. Given our definition of performance-pay jobs, we may mechanically understate the fraction of workers in such jobs at the beginning of our sample period because most employment relationships observed in 1976 started before 1976, and we do not observe whether or not performance pay was received prior to 1976. Similarly, jobs that started toward the end of the sample period may be performance-pay jobs but are classified otherwise because they have not lasted long enough for performance pay to be observed.

The problem is that, conditional on job duration, we tend to observe a given job match fewer times at the two ends of our sample period than in the middle of the sample. Consider, for example, the case of a job that lasts for five years. For jobs that last from 1985 to 1989, all five observations on this job match are captured in our PSID sample. For jobs that last from 1973 to 1977, however, only two of the five years of the job match are observed, which mechanically reduces the probability of classifying the job as one with performance pay.

Because of this end-point problem, we get an unbalanced distribution of the number of times job matches are observed at different points of the sample period. One simple solution to the problem is to “rebalance” the sample using regression or other methods. In practice, we adjust measures of the incidence of performance pay over time by estimating a linear probability model in which dummies for calendar years and for the number of times the job-match is observed are included as regressors (estimating a logit gave almost identical results). We then compute an adjusted measure of the incidence of performance pay by holding the distribution of the number of times the job-match is observed to its average

⁷We use “jobs”, “employment relationship”, and “job match” interchangeably. Although the PSID does have information on tenure in the position in most of the survey years spanning the sample period, we do not use it. As is well known, simply determining employer tenure in the PSID can be problematic (see Brown and Light (1992)). As a result, what we call a “job match” could be called an “employer match” instead. We generally use the word “job” for the sake of simplicity.

value for the years 1982 to 1990, which are relatively unaffected by the end-point problem.

The end-point problem could also affect the estimates of the effect of performance pay on both wage, hours, and earnings because the sample of non-performance-pay jobs is being contaminated by observations from performance-pay jobs for which performance-based payments are never observed. Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009) have investigated this issue in detail and concluded that, if anything, this measurement problem biases downward the estimated effect of performance pay. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, the wage we report in the next sections are unadjusted for these measurement issues.

4.2 Descriptive Statistics from the PSID

Table 1 compares the mean characteristics of workers on performance-pay and non-performance-pay jobs, respectively. First, notice that 36 percent of the 27,899 observations are in performance-pay jobs. Workers on performance-pay jobs tend to earn more and have higher levels of education than workers on non-performance-pay jobs. Note that the hourly wage rate includes both regular wage and salary earnings and performance pay in the case of workers on performance-pay jobs. Annual hours worked and employer tenure also tend to be higher for workers on performance-pay than non-performance-pay jobs.

The unionization rate (percent covered by a collective bargaining agreement) is much lower among performance-pay workers. This suggests that, as expected, the pay structure in union firms corresponds more closely to the fixed-wage contracts discussed in Section 2. Another important difference is that there is a much higher fraction of workers paid by the hour in non-performance-pay than performance-pay jobs. Conversely, workers on performance-pay jobs are more likely to be salaried workers than those on non-performance-pay jobs.

An important point illustrated at the bottom of the table is that, of the 3131 workers, 1318 are observed on a performance-pay job, and 2715 are observed on a non-performance-pay job. So 902 workers ($1318+2715-3131$) are “switchers” observed on both types of jobs, which is useful for identifying models with fixed effects presented in Section 5.

Figure 2 shows the incidence of performance pay over the 1976-98 sample period. Note that we correct for the end-point problem using the procedure described above. Figure 2 shows that the overall incidence of performance-pay jobs has increased from about 35 percent in the late 1970s to around 45 percent in the 1990s. The figure also shows the simpler measure

based on the fraction of workers actually reporting performance pay in a given year. This alternative measure clearly understates the incidence of performance-pay jobs since workers on performance-pay jobs will not necessarily receive a performance payment (like a bonus) in each year on the job. One advantage of this simple measure, however, is that it is not affected by the end-point problem and provides additional evidence of the robustness of the underlying trends in performance pay. Indeed, even this crude measure of performance pay clearly increases over time, especially in the 1980s.

Figure 2 also shows the fraction of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Interestingly, the decline in unionization and the growth in performance pay are both concentrated in the same period (the 1980s). Figure 3 presents kernel density estimates of the distribution of annual hours for performance-pay and non-performance-pay jobs. The figure shows that annual hours have a higher mean and median, and are less evenly distributed among performance-pay than non-performance-pay jobs.

Note that performance pay represents a relatively modest share of total earnings (Figure 4). However, this does not mean that performance pay has a limited impact on total compensation since we expect the straight wage component to be more sensitive to workers' characteristics on performance-pay than non-performance-pay jobs. In order to pay for performance, the employer must evaluate the worker, which then affects the straight wage through promotions and job assignment. Hence, even though performance pay is a relatively small fraction of compensation for most workers, the fact that it exists is a signal of more careful monitoring.

5 Estimation Results

The model of Section 2 provides a number of testable implications about the effect of local shocks in performance-pay and non-performance-pay jobs. We now present the estimation results and show that they are consistent with the predictions of the model outlined in Section 3.

We first report in Table 2 some descriptive regression models to illustrate the link between performance-pay and the level of (hourly) wages, annual hours of work, and annual earnings. All models include a large set of covariates that are not reported in the table: polynomials (cubic) in potential experience and tenure, years of completed schooling, and dummies for

occupation, industry, race, marital status, collective bargaining, and calendar year. Standard errors are clustered at the job-match level.

In all regression models reported hereinafter, we show three sets of models for two different sample of workers. We start with simple OLS estimates, then move to models with worker-specific fixed effects that capture unobserved ability θ_i , and then report models with a full set of job match effects. Note that the direct effect of performance-pay can be identified in the models with worker-specific fixed effects because of workers who are observed to switch between performance-pay and non-performance pay jobs (and vice versa). The direct effect of performance-pay cannot be identified, however, when job-match fixed effects are included since performance-pay status is determined at the job level. It is still possible to identify, however, the differential effect of the local unemployment rate (or other variables) in performance-pay and non-performance-pay jobs even with job-match fixed effects included. Estimates from these models are particularly credible as they solely rely on differential variation in the local unemployment rate, after controlling for year effects and job-match effects to identify the differential responsiveness to unemployment shocks in the different types of jobs.

The two sample of workers used are based on whether or not the worker is unemployed at the time of the interview. In our PSID sample, we only keep workers with at least some positive earnings and hours of work in the previous calendar year. These workers may or may not be working at the time of the interview. We first report results for the more “stable” sample of workers employed at the time of the interview, and then for the broader sample that also includes workers unemployed at the time of the interview.

Panel A of Table 2 shows that most of the difference in wages between performance-pay and non-performance-pay workers documented in Table 1 vanishes when standard covariates are controlled for in the wage equation (columns 1 and 4). After controlling for worker-specific fixed effects (column 2 and 5), there is no longer a significant different between the two types of jobs. Not surprisingly, workers earn more in years when they actually receive a performance-based payment. The estimated effects in the 4-5 percent range more or less corresponds to the size of performance-based payments documented in Figure 3.

Panel B of Table 3 shows that, unlike wages, annual hours of work on performance-pay jobs remain higher than on non-performance-pay jobs even after controlling of standard covariates and worker-specific fixed effects. Interestingly, after controlling for these factors

there is no significant effect of receiving a performance-based payment in a given year on hours of work in that year. Not surprisingly, the results in columns 4-6 indicate that workers observed to be unemployed at the time of the interview tend to have worked less hours in the previous year.

Panel C puts the hourly wage and hours together by showing the overall impact of performance-pay status on total earnings (wage times hours). Consistent with the hours results, earnings are higher on performance-pay jobs even after controlling for covariates and worker-specific fixed effects. Consistent with the wage results, earnings are 4-5 percent higher in years when an actual performance-based payment is actually observed.

The main results of the paper are reported in Tables 3 and 4. As mentioned in Section 3, at this stage we simply use the local (county) unemployment rate as a proxy for the productivity shock u_t in the regression models. Since the results across specifications and samples tend to be quite similar, we focus the discussion on the models reported in column 3 of the tables where only workers employed at the time of the interview are used, and job-match fixed effects are included. Table 3 shows the estimated effect of the local unemployment rate for performance-pay and non-performance-pay jobs, respectively. Table 4 goes further by dividing jobs on the basis of both the performance-pay and union status on the job. In both cases, we cluster the standard errors at the county times year level.

Panel A of Table 3 shows that, as expected, the unemployment rate has a negative and significant effect of wages in performance-pay jobs, but no significant effect on non-performance-pay jobs. The estimated coefficient for performance-pay jobs varies across specification but is generally close to -0.01, suggesting that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a one percent decline in the hourly wage.

Panel B of Table 4 shows that precisely the opposite happens in the case of hours of work. The unemployment rate has a negative and significant impact on hours of work for workers not paid for performance, but an insignificant impact for performance-pay workers. The latter effect is consistent with a fairly inelastic labor supply elasticity for performance-pay workers. By contrast, since wages fail to adjust for non-performance-pay jobs, employers have little choice but to cut back on hours and employment in the presence of adverse productivity shocks.

The results for hours are in levels. They are not directly comparable to those for wages (in logs). Since average yearly hours is about 2000, the -10 estimate reported in Panel B

corresponds to a 0.5 percent decline in hours. This is fairly similar in terms of magnitude to the estimated effect on the wages of performance-pay workers (Panel A of Table 3). It suggests that the total effect of the unemployment rate on earnings (wages time hours) should be roughly comparable for performance-pay and non-performance-pay jobs. The only difference is that the adjustment happens along the wage margin for performance-pay workers, but along the hours margins for non-performance workers.

This conjecture is confirmed in Panel C of Table 3, which shows the estimated effect of the local unemployment rate on the log of annual earnings. In our preferred specification with job-match fixed effects, the effect of the unemployment rate on annual earnings is equal to about $-.008$ for both performance-pay and non-performance pay jobs. This means that a one percentage point increase in the local unemployment rate reduces earnings by close to one percent in both sectors. The difference is that hourly wages account for essentially all the earnings adjustment in performance-pay jobs, while hours account for the bulk of the adjustment in non-performance-pay jobs. While the implications are the same in terms of workers' earnings, the fact that there is little impact on hours of work for performance-pay jobs suggests that shocks have a smaller impact on firms' output under these more "flexible" pay arrangements, which has important implications for the role of labor market in the transmission of shocks in the macroeconomy. We plan to explore these issues in more detail in the next version of this paper.

Table 4 presents similar estimates except that we now divide jobs both in terms of performance-pay and union status. As discussed in Section 3, we expect wages to be most responsive to shocks in performance-pay jobs that are not unionized, and least responsive to shocks in unionized non-performance-pay jobs. We also expect the exact opposite to happen for hours of work. The two other types of contractual arrangements (union/performance-pay and non-union/non-performance pay) should fall somewhere in between these two extreme cases.

Looking once again at our preferred specification (column 3), we see that the results are consistent with these expectations. Panel A of Table 3 shows that the unemployment rate has the largest impact on non-union performance-pay jobs (-0.0076) and the smallest (and not statistically significant) impact on union non-performance-pay workers (-0.0001). By contrast, exactly the opposite happens in the case of hours of work (Panel B). As a result, the overall impact on annual earnings is more or less similar for all four types of contractual

arrangements (Panel C).

One potential concern with these results is that some of the differential responsiveness to shocks under differential contractual arrangements is due to composition effects. For example, performance-pay workers tend to be more concentrated in occupations such as managers and professionals (see Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009)) that may be less sensitive to the business cycle than blue collar occupations. One simple way of checking for this is to rebalance the performance-pay and non-performance pay samples so that they have the same distribution of observed characteristics. We did so using a reweighting method and this did not substantially changed the results.

6 Implications

In this section we first discuss implications of our finding for inequality. We then briefly mention how our results have important implications for understanding the role of contractual arrangements in the labor market in the transmission of shocks in the macroeconomy.

6.1 Inequality

In Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009), we show that performance pay tend to increase cross-sectional inequality in hourly wages. The main reason for this finding is that both observed and unobserved dimensions of skills tend to be more rewarded in performance-pay than in non-performance-pay jobs. In the case of unobserved skills, this result follows directly from the prediction of the model. While the return to the unobserved worker-specific component $\theta_i = \alpha_i - \hat{\alpha}_i$ is positive in performance-pay jobs, it is equal to zero in non-performance-pay jobs.

This finding leaves two important questions open. First, while the hourly wage is an important component of overall inequality, it is also useful to look at broader measures such as inequality in annual earnings. Second, it matters from a welfare point of view how much cross-sectional inequality is due to a transitory as opposed to a permanent inequality component (Moffitt and Gottschalk (1994)).

Our results suggest that when going from hourly wages to annual earnings, inequality likely increases more in non-performance-pay than non-performance-pay jobs because hours vary more in the latter sector in response to shocks. If that variation in hours is more volatile

than the variation in wages it is not clear, however, that this results in more permanent inequality in annual earnings.

To explore these issues, we first “residualize” wages and earnings by running regressions on the rich set of covariates used in Tables 3 and 4. We focus on this “residual” or “within-group” component of inequality, as opposed to the more systematic “between-group” component, which is not presumably affected very much by transitory labor market shocks.

Appendix Table 1 shows the raw autocovariance matrices for wages and earnings in performance-pay and non-performance-pay jobs. A number of interesting patterns can be observed in the raw data. First, cross-sectional inequality as measured by the variances (zero order covariances on the diagonal) tends to increase over time. Second, while the variance of wages is generally larger in performance-pay than in non-performance-pay jobs, the variance increases much more in non-performance-pay jobs when we move to the broader measure of inequality based on annual earnings. Third, the autocovariances decline slower when we move off the diagonal for performance-pay than non-performance-pay jobs. This is particularly striking in the case of earnings and suggests that the larger variance in non-performance-pay jobs is due to transitory variability in hours.

These main findings are easier to see in Figures 5-6 that plot the evolution of the different variances over time, and in Appendix Table 2 that shows the average values of the autocovariances (for workers employed at the time of the survey). Comparing columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table 2, it is clear that going from wages to annual earnings has little impact on the autocovariances in performance-pay jobs. By contrast, there is a large difference between the autocovariances of wages and earnings in non-performance-pay jobs (columns 3 and 4). This is consistent with our finding in Table 3 that there is much more variation in hours in response to shocks in non-performance-pay jobs. The difference also diminishes quickly as we increase the order of the autocovariances, suggesting that most of the variation in hours is transitory. As a result, the autocovariance in earnings in performance-pay jobs is larger than in non-performance-pay jobs for all autocovariances except the zero order autocovariance (the variance).

We now explore these issues more formally using some parametric models for the autocovariance of wages and earnings. Following Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009), we look at a transitory (ε) and permanent (θ) component of wages and earnings, plus a job-match specific component (ν). Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009) argue that the latter com-

ponent is more important in non-performance-pay jobs since the “job” one has in that sector plays a more important role than under performance-pay where all that should matter is the skills and ability of the worker, and not the job *per se*. For simplicity, we only present this model for performance-pay and non-performance-pay workers, but also divide workers according to union status in the empirical application.

Consider the residual for performance-pay jobs, e_{ijt}^p ,

$$e_{ijt}^p = d_t^p \theta_i + \nu_{ij}^p + \varepsilon_{ijt}^p, \quad (7)$$

while the residual for non-performance-pay jobs, e_{ijt}^n , is

$$e_{ijt}^n = d_t^n \theta_i + \nu_{ij}^n + \varepsilon_{ijt}^n, \quad (8)$$

where the subscript j refers to the job (i.e the employer-employee or job-match). The parameters of interest to be estimated are the variances of each of the six error components in equations (7) and (8). We estimate the model under the simplifying assumption that the idiosyncratic error terms ε_{ijt}^p and ε_{ijt}^n are uncorrelated over time. Following Parent (2002), we estimate the variance components by fitting regression models to all the cross-products of residuals for the same individual.⁸ This procedure is similar to the equally-weighted minimum distance approach of Abowd and Card (1989), but provides an easy way of dealing with an unbalanced sample like ours.

The results are reported in Tables 5-8 for various samples and specifications. In all cases, we first report estimates from a simple model where the factor loadings d_t^p and d_t^n are assumed to be fixed over time, and the job-match component is set to zero. We then add the job-match component in a second specification, and free up the factor loadings (return to unobserved ability) and the variance of ε_{ijt}^p and ε_{ijt}^n to reflect the well-known growth in inequality over time.

In all four tables, we first report (Panel A) results estimated over the whole sample. One potential pitfall of using the whole sample is that some individuals are only observed on performance-pay jobs, while others are only observed on non-performance-pay jobs. As a result, the variance of the worker-specific effect θ_i may not be the same in the two subsamples, and differences between the estimated variance components $var(d_t^p \theta_i)$ and $var(d_t^n \theta_i)$ may

⁸See Parent (1999) for a related analysis with the NLSY comparing piece-rate/commission workers and those receiving bonuses to salaried and hourly paid workers. More details on the identification and estimation of the variance components models are provided in Appendix 2.

reflect composition effects related to θ_i , as opposed to true differences in the return to unobservables d_t^n and d_t^p . To control for this potential problem, we report in Panel B the results for the subsample of “switchers” who are observed on both performance-pay and non-performance-pay jobs.

As a benchmark, we report in Appendix Table 3 the results of the wage decomposition in Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009). Consistent with the pattern observed in the empirical autocovariances (Appendix Tables 1 and 2), the results confirm that the permanent component of wages (variance of θ_i) is substantially larger in performance-pay than non-performance pay jobs. The rest of the tables (Table 5-8) report the results for the broader measure of inequality based on annual earnings.

For performance-pay jobs, the variance decomposition of earnings reported in Table 5 is fairly similar to the decomposition for wages in Appendix Table 3. The only noticeable difference is that the transitory variance (variance of ε_{ijt}^p) is slightly larger than in the wage models. By contrast, the transitory variance is almost twice as large for earnings than wages in non-performance-pay jobs, while the permanent variance is only slightly larger. This is consistent with the pattern of results documented in the raw data reported in Appendix Tables 1 and 2. The transitory variance becomes even larger when workers unemployed at the time of the interview are also included in the sample in Table 6. Even in that case, however, the variance linked to the permanent wage component θ_i remains larger in performance-pay than non-performance-pay jobs.

Finally, we report in Table 7 and 8 separate results for the four types of contractual arrangements based on union and performance-pay status. For the sake of simplicity, we focus our discussion on the simplest models reports in columns 1 and 4. Consistent with the large literature on unions and wage inequality, both the transitory and permanent components of inequality tend to be lower in union than non-union jobs (see, e.g., Lemieux (1998)). Other than this, the results are fairly consistent with those reported in Table 5 and 6. The permanent component is larger in performance-pay jobs, while the transitory component is larger in non-performance-pay jobs. This confirms that the results in Tables 5 and 6 truly reflect the role of performance-pay jobs, and not the fact that performance-pay jobs are less likely to be unionized, and vice versa.

In summary, looking at earnings instead of just hourly wages first suggests that inequality is actually smaller in performance-pay than non-performance-pay jobs, contrary

to what Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009) found for hourly wages only. This result only holds, however, for purely cross-sectional measures of inequality. Since the variation in hours is mostly transitory, from a welfare point of view inequality likely remains larger in performance-pay than non-performance-pay jobs. The fact that hours of work are quite volatile and respond more to shocks in non-performance-pay jobs has a substantial impact on earnings in the short run, but little impact on long-run measures of both the level and the inequality of earnings.

6.2 Transmission of shocks

The finding that local unemployment shocks have very different impacts on wages and employment have potentially important macroeconomic implications. Roughly speaking, the U.S. labor market has been moving towards contractual arrangements (performance-pay and lack of union representation) where workers absorb a larger share of the shock through their wages. As a result, employer don't need to adjust the level as employment as much as they used to. This suggests that the U.S. labor market is more flexible than it used to be, and that monetary and real shocks may have less impact than they used to have.

Probing in more details this hypothesis requires estimating a more complete dynamic model to see how wages and employment adjust in the few years after a shock happens. For instance, even if wages in non-performance-pay jobs are rigid in the short run, they may eventually adjust so that the medium run impact of shocks is not so different in the two different types of contractual arrangements. Some preliminary investigation of this hypothesis suggest this is not the case, however. We plan to evaluate this issue in much more detail in the next version of the paper.

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to study the impact of local labor market shocks on wages, hours of work and employment under different contractual arrangements. We divide jobs on the basis of whether they pay for performance, and whether they are covered by collective bargaining agreements. Using the county unemployment rate as a proxy for local labor market shocks, we find that wages and hours of work respond very differently to shocks depending on contractual arrangements. Wages

are most flexible under non-union performance-pay contracts, and least flexible under non-performance-pay union contracts. Precisely the opposite happens in the case of hours of work that are the least sensitive to shocks under non-union performance-pay contracts, and the most sensitive under union non-performance-pay contracts.

We also consider the implication of these findings for inequality. Looking at earnings instead of just hourly wages suggests that inequality is actually smaller in performance-pay than non-performance-pay jobs. This result only holds, however, for purely cross-sectional measures of inequality. Since the variation in hours is mostly transitory, from a welfare point of view inequality likely remains larger in performance-pay than non-performance-pay jobs. The fact that hours of work are quite volatile and respond more to shocks in non-performance-pay jobs has a substantial impact on earnings in the short run, but little impact on long-run measures of both the level and the inequality of earnings.

Appendix 1: Estimation of the Variance Components Model

To see how the variance components model of Section V.3 is identified, consider the expected value of the different cross-products of residuals in the case where the factor loadings (the d 's) do not change over time. For individuals on performance-pay jobs, the expected value of the squared residuals is $E(e_{ijt}^p \cdot e_{ijt}^p) = (d^p)^2 \cdot var(\theta_i) + var(\nu_{ij}^p) + var(\varepsilon_{ijt}^p)$, the expected value of cross-products for two observations (at time t and time s) on the same job j is $E(e_{ijt}^p \cdot e_{ijs}^p) = (d^p)^2 \cdot var(\theta_i) + var(\nu_{ij}^p)$, and the expected value of cross-products for two observations on different jobs j and k is $E(e_{ijt}^p \cdot e_{iks}^p) = (d^p)^2 \cdot var(\theta_i)$. In this simple example, we can estimate the three error components $(d^p)^2 \cdot var(\theta_i)$, $var(\nu_{ij}^p)$ and $var(\varepsilon_{ijt}^p)$ by taking simple differences of the sample analogs of $E(e_{ijt}^p \cdot e_{ijt}^p)$, $E(e_{ijt}^p \cdot e_{ijs}^p)$, and $E(e_{ijt}^p \cdot e_{iks}^p)$. The same procedure can then be used to estimate the three components $(d^n)^2 \cdot var(\theta_i)$, $var(\nu_{ij}^n)$ and $var(\varepsilon_{ijt}^n)$ for non-performance-pay jobs. The ratio of the (square) return to unobserved worker characteristics in the two sectors, $(d^p/d^n)^2$, can then be computed as the ratio of the estimated components $(d^p)^2 \cdot var(\theta_i)$ and $(d^n)^2 \cdot var(\theta_i)$.

In the case where factor loading change over time, the expected value of the own-product becomes $E(e_{ijt}^p \cdot e_{ijt}^p) = (d_t^p)^2 \cdot var(\theta_i) + var(\nu_{ij}^p) + \sigma_{\varepsilon,t}^2$, where the factor loading d_t^p and

the idiosyncratic variance $\sigma_{\varepsilon,t}^2 = \text{var}(\varepsilon_{ijt}^p)$ are allowed to change over time. The expected value of cross-products for two observations (at time t and time s) on the same job j is $E(e_{ijt}^p \cdot e_{ijs}^p) = d_t^p \cdot d_s^p \cdot \text{var}(\theta_i) + \text{var}(\nu_{ij}^p)$. Since these equations are now non-linear in the parameters (factor loadings), we estimate the models by jointly fitting equations for all the cross-products using non-linear least-squares.

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Figure 1. Optimal Employment Regimes




Figure 2. Performance Pay Job Incidence
PSID 1976–1998




Figure 3. Distribution of Hours Worked
PSID 1976–1998




Figure 4. Share of Performance Pay in Total Earnings
PSID 1976–1998
Vertical Line Indicates Median Share (4.4%)





Figure 5. Total Log Earnings Inequality

Panel A: Sample Includes Only Employed Workers

3-year Moving Average



Panel B: Sample Includes Employed and Unemployed Workers

3-year Moving Average




Figure 6. Inequality in Annual Hours Worked

Panel A: Sample Includes Only Employed Workers

3-year Moving Average



Panel B: Sample Includes Employed and Unemployed Workers

3-year Moving Average




Table 1. Summary Statistics: Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1976-1998

	Non Performance Pay Jobs	Performance Pay Jobs
Average Hourly Earnings (\$79)	8.24	10.81
Education	12.49	13.37
Potential Experience	19.57	19.54
Employer Tenure	7.22	9.20
Married	0.71	0.77
Unionized	0.27	0.15
Non White	0.14	0.09
Paid by the Hour	0.63	0.31
Paid a Salary	0.30	0.50
Fraction Unemployed at Interview	0.073	0.018
Annual Hours Worked	2061.6	2272.1
# workers (Tot:3131)	2715	1318
# Job Matches (Tot: 8689)	6819	1870
# Observations (Tot: 27899)	17934	9965

Notes: The sample consists of male household heads aged 18-65 working in private sector, wage and salary jobs. All figures in the table represent sample means. Education, potential experience, and employer tenure are measured in years. Potential experience is defined as age minus education minus 6. Performance-pay jobs are employment relationships in which part of the worker's total compensation includes a variable pay component (bonus, commission, piece rate). Any worker who reports overtime pay is considered to be in a non-performance-pay job. Workers are considered unionized if they are covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Temporarily laid off workers are included among the unemployed. For unemployed workers at the time of the interview, the type of job they have refers to the last job they had.

Table 2. The Effect of Pay-for-Performance on Earnings and Hours Worked: PSID, 1976-1998

Panel A: Log Hourly Earnings						
Sample:	Employed Individuals			All Employed and Unemployed Individuals		
Variable	[1] OLS	[2] Fixed-Effects Within Worker	[3] Fixed-Effects Within Employer	[4] OLS	[5] Fixed-Effects Within Worker	[6] Fixed-Effects Within Employer
Performance Pay Job Dummy	0.0572 (0.0156)	0.0175 (0.0134)	-	0.0608 (0.0155)	0.0183 (0.0133)	-
Current Year's Earnings Based Partly on Performance Pay Component	0.0817 (0.0178)	0.0401 (0.0090)	0.0466 (0.0083)	0.0813 (0.0183)	0.0434 (0.0095)	0.0492 (0.0084)
Unemployed at Interview	-	-	-	-0.0981 (0.0210)	-0.0344 (0.0175)	-0.0190 (0.0301)
Number of Observations	26146	26146	26146	27899	27899	27899
Panel B: Annual Hours Worked						
Sample:	Employed Individuals			All Employed and Unemployed Individuals		
Variable	OLS	Fixed-Effects Within Worker	Fixed-Effects Within Employer	OLS	Fixed-Effects Within Worker	Fixed-Effects Within Employer
Performance Pay Job Dummy	81.21 (16.23)	75.01 (19.83)	-	83.92 (16.53)	73.32 (19.20)	-
Current Year's Earnings Based Partly on Performance Pay Component	61.50 (17.44)	15.74 (11.72)	12.54 (11.38)	64.03 (17.14)	17.46 (11.64)	15.58 (11.17)
Unemployed at Interview	-	-	-	-777.96 (26.04)	-657.03 (26.55)	-598.56 (46.69)
Number of Observations	26146	26146	26146	27899	27899	27899
Panel C: Log Annual Earnings						
Sample:	Employed Individuals			All Employed and Unemployed Individuals		
Variable	OLS	Fixed-Effects Within Worker	Fixed-Effects Within Employer	OLS	Fixed-Effects Within Worker	Fixed-Effects Within Employer
Performance Pay Job Dummy	0.1017 (0.0153)	0.0615 (0.0136)	-	0.1089 (0.0151)	0.0583 (0.0139)	-
Current Year's Earnings Based Partly on Performance Pay Component	0.1054 (0.0185)	0.0457 (0.0087)	0.0525 (0.0077)	0.1060 (0.0184)	0.0497 (0.0087)	0.0562 (0.0080)
Unemployed at Interview	-	-	-	-0.7410 (0.0312)	-0.5782 (0.0280)	-0.5137 (0.0407)
Number of Observations	26146	26146	26146	27899	27899	27899

Notes. Performance pay dummy is equal to 1 if the worker's total annual earnings are based partly on performance pay at least once over the course of the employment relationship. Other covariates include polynomials (cubic) in potential experience and tenure, years of completed schooling, and dummies for occupation, industry, race, marital status, collective bargaining, calendar year, and having part of current year's earnings based on performance pay. Standard errors are clustered at the job-match level.

Table 3. The Effect of Local Labor Market Conditions: PSID, 1976-1998

Panel A: Log Hourly Earnings							
Variable	Sample:	Employed Individuals		All Employed and Unemployed Individuals			
		[1] OLS	[2] Fixed-Effects Within Worker	[3] Fixed-Effects Within Employer	[4] OLS	[5] Fixed-Effects Within Worker	[6] Fixed-Effects Within Employer
Unemployment Rate in County X Non Performance Pay Job		-0.0030 (0.0016)	-0.0066 (0.0016)	-0.0021 (0.0016)	-0.0027 (0.0016)	-0.0075 (0.0016)	-0.0023 (0.0016)
Unemp. Rate in County X Performance Pay Job		-0.0113 (0.0022)	-0.0148 (0.0020)	-0.0072 (0.0021)	-0.0097 (0.0022)	-0.0153 (0.0020)	-0.0082 (0.0021)
P-Value of Test of Equality		0.0009	0.0010	0.0490	0.0050	0.0022	0.0246
Unemployed at Interview		-	-	-	-0.1110 (0.0194)	-0.0400 (0.0165)	-0.0447 (0.0255)
Number of Observations		26146	26146	26146	27899	27899	27899

Panel B: Annual Hours Worked							
Variable	Sample:	Employed Individuals		All Employed and Unemployed Individuals			
		OLS	Fixed-Effects Within Worker	Fixed-Effects Within Employer	OLS	Fixed-Effects Within Worker	Fixed-Effects Within Employer
Unemployment Rate in County X Non Performance Pay Job		-6.04 (2.02)	-10.76 (2.48)	-10.73 (2.62)	-6.79 (1.99)	-11.59 (2.48)	-9.80 (3.13)
Unemp. Rate in County X Performance Pay Job		-0.11 (2.30)	1.68 (2.77)	1.22 (3.15)	0.47 (2.27)	1.43 (2.79)	1.41 (2.58)
P-Value of Test of Equality		0.0511	0.0005	0.0031	0.0160	0.0002	0.0048
Unemployed at Interview		-	-	-	-773.72 (25.13)	-654.51 (24.21)	-617.25 (40.05)
Number of Observations		26146	26146	26146	27899	27899	27899

Panel C: Log Annual Earnings							
Variable	Sample:	Employed Individuals		All Employed and Unemployed Individuals			
		OLS	Fixed-Effects Within Worker	Fixed-Effects Within Employer	OLS	Fixed-Effects Within Worker	Fixed-Effects Within Employer
Unemployment Rate in County X Non Performance Pay Job		-0.0070 (0.0018)	-0.0165 (0.0020)	-0.0076 (0.0019)	-0.0072 (0.0020)	-0.0110 (0.0021)	-0.0064 (0.0018)
Unemp. Rate in County X Performance Pay Job		-0.0116 (0.0023)	-0.0125 (0.0018)	-0.0078 (0.0017)	-0.0096 (0.0023)	-0.0163 (0.0021)	-0.0085 (0.0021)
P-Value of Test of Equality		0.0849	0.1132	0.9376	0.4013	0.2564	0.4478
Unemployed at Interview		-	-	-	-0.7627 (0.0316)	-0.5904 (0.0266)	-0.5514 (0.0411)
Number of Observations		26146	26146	26146	27899	27899	27899

Notes. Estimates come from unrestricted regressions in which all covariates are interacted with the performance pay job dummy. Other covariates include polynomials (cubic) in potential experience and tenure, years of completed schooling, and dummies for occupation, industry, race, marital status, collective bargaining, calendar year, and having part of current year's earnings based on performance pay. Standard errors are clustered at the county X year level.

Table 4. The Effect of Local Labor Market Conditions: PSID, 1976-1998; All Sectors

Panel A: Log Hourly Earnings						
Sample:	Employed Individuals			All Employed and Unemployed Individuals		
Variable	[1] OLS	[2] Fixed-Effects Within Worker	[3] Fixed-Effects Within Employer	[4] OLS	[5] Fixed-Effects Within Worker	[6] Fixed-Effects Within Employer
U. Rate X Unionized Workers X Non Performance Pay Job	0.0162 (0.0017)	0.0052 (0.0018)	-0.0001 (0.0019)	0.0175 (0.0017)	0.0047 (0.0019)	-0.0001 (0.0019)
U. Rate X Non-Unionized Workers X Non Performance Pay Job	-0.0124 (0.0018)	-0.0122 (0.0017)	-0.0036 (0.0017)	-0.0117 (0.0018)	-0.0128 (0.0017)	-0.0036 (0.0017)
U. Rate X Unionized Workers X Performance Pay Job	0.0095 (0.0033)	-0.0101 (0.0033)	-0.0040 (0.0033)	0.0100 (0.0031)	-0.0115 (0.0035)	-0.0060 (0.0035)
U. Rate X Non-Unionized Workers X Performance Pay Job	-0.0145 (0.0026)	-0.0154 (0.0022)	-0.0076 (0.0024)	-0.0138 (0.0025)	-0.0160 (0.0022)	-0.0084 (0.0023)
Number of Observations	26146	26146	26146	27899	27899	27899

Panel B: Annual Hours Worked						
Sample:	Employed Individuals			All Employed and Unemployed Individuals		
Variable	OLS	Fixed-Effects Within Worker	Fixed-Effects Within Employer	OLS	Fixed-Effects Within Worker	Fixed-Effects Within Employer
U. Rate X Unionized Workers X Non Performance Pay Job	-13.32 (2.13)	-14.63 (2.77)	-13.90 (6.96)	-14.71 (2.12)	-15.48 (2.73)	-13.31 (3.05)
U. Rate X Non-Unionized Workers X Non Performance Pay Job	-2.43 (2.18)	-8.62 (2.62)	-7.84 (2.83)	-3.36 (2.15)	-10.09 (2.61)	-6.91 (2.79)
U. Rate X Unionized Workers X Performance Pay Job	3.19 (5.47)	-2.64 (6.79)	2.77 (6.96)	5.65 (4.97)	0.19 (6.11)	1.64 (6.31)
U. Rate X Non-Unionized Workers X Performance Pay Job	-0.14 (2.51)	1.96 (2.91)	1.27 (3.26)	0.05 (2.54)	1.97 (2.98)	0.78 (3.28)
Number of Observations	26146	26146	26146	27899	27899	27899

Panel C: Log Annual Earnings						
Sample:	Employed Individuals			All Employed and Unemployed Individuals		
Variable	OLS	Fixed-Effects Within Worker	Fixed-Effects Within Employer	OLS	Fixed-Effects Within Worker	Fixed-Effects Within Employer
U. Rate X Unionized Workers X Non Performance Pay Job	0.0094 (0.0038)	-0.0021 (0.0020)	-0.0070 (0.0019)	0.0104 (0.0020)	-0.0016 (0.0024)	-0.0055 (0.0022)
U. Rate X Non-Unionized Workers X Non Performance Pay Job	-0.0150 (0.0020)	-0.0172 (0.0019)	-0.0079 (0.0019)	-0.0151 (0.0021)	-0.0180 (0.0022)	-0.0067 (0.0019)
U. Rate X Unionized Workers X Performance Pay Job	0.0106 (0.0038)	-0.0124 (0.0038)	-0.0065 (0.0031)	0.0125 (0.0036)	-0.0131 (0.0040)	-0.0060 (0.0034)
U. Rate X Non-Unionized Workers X Performance Pay Job	-0.0149 (0.0020)	-0.0171 (0.0023)	-0.0077 (0.0021)	-0.0138 (0.0027)	-0.0170 (0.0024)	-0.0090 (0.0022)
Number of Observations	26146	26146	26146	27899	27899	27899

Notes. Estimates come from unrestricted regressions in which all covariates are interacted with the performance pay job dummy. Other covariates include polynomials (cubic) in potential experience and tenure, years of completed schooling, and dummies for occupation, industry, race, marital status, collective bargaining, calendar year, and having part of current year's earnings based on performance pay. Standard errors are clustered at the county X year level.

Table 5
Error Component Models of Annual Earnings by Type of Job: Employed Workers at Time of Interview

Panel A: full sample						
Parameter	Performance-pay jobs			Non-performance-pay jobs		
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Variance of worker component	0.114 (0.001)	0.108 (0.003)	0.084 (0.005)	0.087 (0.001)	0.080 (0.002)	0.067 (0.004)
Factor loading: 1990-93 relative to 1976-79	-	-	1.233 (0.036)	-	-	1.156 (0.046)
Variance of job-match component	-	0.007 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	-	0.012 (0.003)	0.009 (0.003)
Variance of idiosyncratic error	0.096 (0.003)	0.095 (0.003)	0.092 (0.009)	0.160 (0.003)	0.155 (0.004)	0.123 (0.008)
Change in variance, 1976-79 to 1990-93	-	-	-0.009 (0.012)	-	-	0.078 (0.012)
Number of workers	1,271	1,271	1,271	2,616	2,616	2,616
Number of cross-products	64,486	64,486	64,486	99,554	99,554	99,554
Panel B: workers who worked in both types of jobs						
Parameter	Performance pay jobs			Non performance pay jobs		
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Variance of worker component	0.113 (0.002)	0.106 (0.004)	0.080 (0.007)	0.085 (0.003)	0.081 (0.004)	0.061 (0.008)
Factor loading: 1990-93 relative to 1976-79	-	-	1.239 (0.061)	-	-	1.152 (0.099)
Variance of job-match component	-	0.008 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	-	0.009 (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)
Variance of idiosyncratic error	0.101 (0.005)	0.099 (0.005)	0.108 (0.014)	0.160 (0.006)	0.155 (0.007)	0.104 (0.015)
Change in variance, 1976-79 to 1990-93	-	-	-0.023 (0.018)	-	-	0.055 (0.022)
Number of workers	834	834	834	834	834	834
Number of cross-products	32,476	32,476	32,476	19,597	19,597	19,597

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Models in columns 3 and 6 allow the variance of the idiosyncratic errors and the factor loadings on the worker component to vary across the 1976-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1993, and 1994-1998 periods, while models in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 do not. These equally weighted covariance structure models are fit to the cross-products of the residuals of an OLS regression of log wages on the same set of covariates described in Table 3. Note that the factor loadings in columns 3 and 6 are normalized to 1 in the base period (1976-1979), so that the changes in factor loadings can be interpreted as the percentage changes in the return to the worker component.

Table 6
Error Component Models of Annual Earnings by Type of Job: Employed and Unemployed Workers at Time of Interview

Panel A: full sample						
Parameter	Performance-pay jobs			Non-performance-pay jobs		
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Variance of worker component	0.114 (0.001)	0.108 (0.003)	0.084 (0.005)	0.093 (0.002)	0.091 (0.003)	0.069 (0.005)
Factor loading: 1990-93 relative to 1976-79	-	-	1.233 (0.037)	-	-	1.210 (0.054)
Variance of job-match component	-	0.007 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	-	0.003 (0.003)	0.000 (0.004)
Variance of idiosyncratic error	0.107 (0.003)	0.106 (0.003)	0.102 (0.009)	0.227 (0.004)	0.225 (0.005)	0.172 (0.010)
Change in variance, 1976-79 to 1990-93	-	-	-0.007 (0.012)	-	-	0.119 (0.015)
Number of workers	1,318	1,318	1,318	2,715	2,715	2,715
Number of cross-products	66,629	66,629	66,629	110,791	110,791	110,791
Panel B: workers who worked in both types of jobs						
Parameter	Performance pay jobs			Non performance pay jobs		
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Variance of worker component	0.111 (0.002)	0.105 (0.004)	0.081 (0.007)	0.098 (0.004)	0.100 (0.005)	0.049 (0.010)
Factor loading: 1990-93 relative to 1976-79	-	-	1.225 (0.060)	-	-	1.409 (0.164)
Variance of job-match component	-	0.007 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	-	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)
Variance of idiosyncratic error	0.114 (0.005)	0.113 (0.005)	0.114 (0.014)	0.239 (0.009)	0.242 (0.011)	0.185 (0.022)
Change in variance, 1976-79 to 1990-93	-	-	-0.013 (0.018)	-	-	0.083 (0.032)
Number of workers	903	903	903	903	903	903
Number of cross-products	34,484	34,484	34,484	24,606	24,606	24,606

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Models in columns 3 and 6 allow the variance of the idiosyncratic errors and the factor loadings on the worker component to vary across the 1976-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1993, and 1994-1998 periods, while models in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 do not. These equally weighted covariance structure models are fit to the cross-products of the residuals of an OLS regression of log wages on the same set of covariates described in Table 3. Note that the factor loadings in columns 3 and 6 are normalized to 1 in the base period (1976-1979), so that the changes in factor loadings can be interpreted as the percentage changes in the return to the worker component.

Table 7
Error Component Models of Annual Earnings by Type of Job: Employed Workers at Time of Interview

Panel A: Unionized Workers						
Parameter	Performance-pay jobs			Non-performance-pay jobs		
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Variance of worker component	0.073 (0.002)	0.033 (0.012)	0.027 (0.012)	0.059 (0.002)	0.040 (0.004)	0.043 (0.006)
Factor loading: 1990-93 relative to 1976-79	-	-	1.221 (0.191)	-	-	0.968 (0.095)
Variance of job-match component	-	0.041 (0.012)	0.042 (0.012)	-	0.024 (0.004)	0.024 (0.004)
Variance of idiosyncratic error	0.078 (0.005)	0.077 (0.005)	0.097 (0.014)	0.119 (0.004)	0.114 (0.004)	0.097 (0.010)
Change in variance, 1976-79 to 1990-93	-	-	-0.004 (0.019)	-	-	0.042 (0.016)
Number of workers	197	197	197	772	772	772
Number of cross-products	11,061	11,061	11,061	29,081	29,081	29,081
Panel B: Non Unionized Workers						
Parameter	Performance pay jobs			Non performance pay jobs		
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Variance of worker component	0.120 (0.001)	0.119 (0.003)	0.086 (0.005)	0.096 (0.002)	0.087 (0.003)	0.076 (0.006)
Factor loading: 1990-93 relative to 1976-79	-	-	1.288 (0.042)	-	-	1.138 (0.058)
Variance of job-match component	-	0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-	0.014 (0.004)	0.012 (0.004)
Variance of idiosyncratic error	0.099 (0.004)	0.099 (0.004)	0.102 (0.011)	0.171 (0.005)	0.165 (0.005)	0.119 (0.011)
Change in variance, 1976-79 to 1990-93	-	-	-0.021 (0.014)	-	-	0.097 (0.016)
Number of workers	1,116	1,116	1,116	2,213	2,213	2,213
Number of cross-products	52,654	52,654	52,654	64,321	64,321	64,321

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Models in columns 3 and 6 allow the variance of the idiosyncratic errors and the factor loadings on the worker component to vary across the 1976-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1993, and 1994-1998 periods, while models in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 do not. These equally weighted covariance structure models are fit to the cross-products of the residuals of an OLS regression of log wages on the same set of covariates described in Table 3. Note that the factor loadings in columns 3 and 6 are normalized to 1 in the base period (1976-1979), so that the changes in factor loadings can be interpreted as the percentage changes in the return to the worker component.

Table 8
Error Component Models of Annual Earnings by Type of Job: Employed and Unemployed Workers at Time of Interview

Panel A: Unionized Workers

Parameter	Performance-pay jobs			Non-performance-pay jobs		
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Variance of worker component	0.076 (0.002)	0.032 (0.013)	0.019 (0.011)	0.062 (0.002)	0.046 (0.004)	0.051 (0.007)
Factor loading: 1990-93 relative to 1976-79	-	-	1.345 (0.271)	-	-	0.902 (0.093)
Variance of job-match component	-	0.045 (0.013)	0.045 (0.011)	-	0.020 (0.005)	0.021 (0.005)
Variance of idiosyncratic error	0.092 (0.006)	0.091 (0.006)	0.110 (0.014)	0.142 (0.005)	0.138 (0.005)	0.121 (0.012)
Change in variance, 1976-79 to 1990-93	-	-	-0.011 (0.020)	-	-	0.043 (0.018)
Number of workers	206	206	206	787	787	787
Number of cross-products	12,043	12,043	12,043	30,277	30,277	30,277

Panel B: Non Unionized Workers

Parameter	Performance pay jobs			Non performance pay jobs		
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Variance of worker component	0.119 (0.002)	0.118 (0.004)	0.084 (0.005)	0.103 (0.002)	0.102 (0.004)	0.076 (0.007)
Factor loading: 1990-93 relative to 1976-79	-	-	1.304 (0.043)	-	-	1.219 (0.070)
Variance of job-match component	-	0.001 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-	0.002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)
Variance of idiosyncratic error	0.109 (0.004)	0.109 (0.004)	0.111 (0.011)	0.251 (0.006)	0.251 (0.006)	0.180 (0.014)
Change in variance, 1976-79 to 1990-93	-	-	-0.017 (0.014)	-	-	0.140 (0.020)
Number of workers	1,271	1,271	1,271	2,365	2,365	2,365
Number of cross-products	53,744	53,744	53,744	72,330	72,330	72,330

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Models in columns 3 and 6 allow the variance of the idiosyncratic errors and the factor loadings on the worker component to vary across the 1976-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1993, and 1994-1998 periods, while models in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 do not. These equally weighted covariance structure models are fit to the cross-products of the residuals of an OLS regression of log wages on the same set of covariates described in Table 3. Note that the factor loadings in columns 3 and 6 are normalized to 1 in the base period (1976-1979), so that the changes in factor loadings can be interpreted as the percentage changes in the return to the worker component.

Appendix Table 1

Empirical Covariance Matrix Residuals: Workers Employed at Interview Only

Panel A: Performance Pay Jobs

Log Hourly Earnings

Year	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1998	
1976	0.198																						
1977	0.144	0.177																					
1978	0.132	0.119	0.179																				
1979	0.113	0.096	0.101	0.176																			
1980	0.103	0.097	0.096	0.116	0.163																		
1981	0.094	0.087	0.104	0.099	0.116	0.171																	
1982	0.076	0.090	0.089	0.093	0.099	0.102	0.173																
1983	0.109	0.097	0.111	0.097	0.100	0.109	0.110	0.163															
1984	0.100	0.099	0.094	0.089	0.092	0.107	0.109	0.116	0.184														
1985	0.092	0.087	0.074	0.078	0.092	0.098	0.088	0.103	0.117	0.181													
1986	0.097	0.089	0.101	0.086	0.098	0.109	0.091	0.124	0.121	0.138	0.211												
1987	0.095	0.092	0.083	0.074	0.089	0.100	0.091	0.106	0.104	0.122	0.142	0.183											
1988	0.086	0.076	0.089	0.074	0.091	0.111	0.076	0.117	0.101	0.124	0.148	0.137	0.190										
1989	0.078	0.078	0.085	0.073	0.086	0.105	0.080	0.110	0.094	0.114	0.136	0.127	0.143	0.177									
1990	0.093	0.087	0.089	0.081	0.085	0.105	0.082	0.113	0.098	0.115	0.129	0.130	0.131	0.125	0.176								
1991	0.095	0.099	0.107	0.082	0.090	0.116	0.087	0.122	0.105	0.116	0.136	0.131	0.142	0.135	0.142	0.211							
1992	0.112	0.075	0.113	0.075	0.086	0.099	0.079	0.095	0.089	0.105	0.128	0.123	0.134	0.128	0.118	0.124	0.251						
1993	0.102	0.072	0.086	0.093	0.099	0.100	0.077	0.104	0.107	0.101	0.125	0.115	0.130	0.119	0.120	0.133	0.129	0.193					
1994	0.093	0.088	0.083	0.084	0.099	0.099	0.092	0.095	0.094	0.100	0.118	0.105	0.111	0.097	0.110	0.112	0.111	0.116	0.188				
1995	0.089	0.086	0.075	0.070	0.075	0.070	0.084	0.072	0.089	0.089	0.119	0.104	0.111	0.104	0.107	0.110	0.107	0.129	0.118	0.196			
1996	0.087	0.072	0.072	0.059	0.085	0.099	0.086	0.082	0.100	0.104	0.128	0.123	0.126	0.124	0.123	0.123	0.106	0.128	0.128	0.133	0.227		
1998	0.051	0.061	0.065	0.081	0.089	0.081	0.057	0.068	0.084	0.087	0.102	0.097	0.130	0.109	0.125	0.111	0.100	0.132	0.132	0.123	0.132	0.238	

Log Annual Earnings

Year	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1998	
1976	0.212																						
1977	0.133	0.161																					
1978	0.116	0.117	0.160																				
1979	0.116	0.104	0.110	0.193																			
1980	0.097	0.095	0.091	0.133	0.197																		
1981	0.094	0.089	0.100	0.107	0.129	0.192																	
1982	0.091	0.099	0.087	0.102	0.114	0.128	0.218																
1983	0.109	0.108	0.109	0.104	0.107	0.108	0.120	0.203															
1984	0.109	0.110	0.099	0.105	0.106	0.117	0.128	0.136	0.212														
1985	0.090	0.101	0.080	0.094	0.105	0.104	0.104	0.117	0.136	0.188													
1986	0.092	0.110	0.095	0.096	0.113	0.119	0.103	0.138	0.142	0.161	0.268												
1987	0.090	0.108	0.084	0.086	0.092	0.108	0.099	0.111	0.115	0.129	0.156	0.211											
1988	0.093	0.092	0.096	0.089	0.098	0.118	0.097	0.116	0.112	0.133	0.156	0.144	0.207										
1989	0.092	0.090	0.086	0.105	0.108	0.118	0.091	0.113	0.103	0.126	0.150	0.135	0.147	0.232									
1990	0.091	0.092	0.090	0.097	0.093	0.107	0.087	0.113	0.105	0.115	0.129	0.136	0.143	0.146	0.201								
1991	0.099	0.106	0.103	0.102	0.091	0.115	0.089	0.118	0.112	0.120	0.139	0.140	0.146	0.149	0.162	0.236							
1992	0.105	0.083	0.089	0.089	0.094	0.105	0.080	0.100	0.095	0.106	0.138	0.130	0.153	0.134	0.131	0.149	0.215						
1993	0.112	0.093	0.073	0.087	0.085	0.094	0.072	0.094	0.101	0.101	0.122	0.119	0.139	0.131	0.136	0.135	0.145	0.204					
1994	0.097	0.086	0.082	0.088	0.103	0.105	0.099	0.099	0.100	0.106	0.117	0.109	0.130	0.101	0.121	0.118	0.124	0.137	0.213				
1995	0.082	0.069	0.063	0.067	0.061	0.072	0.083	0.084	0.082	0.081	0.105	0.087	0.110	0.106	0.110	0.119	0.105	0.133	0.130	0.213			
1996	0.088	0.083	0.075	0.056	0.083	0.111	0.102	0.107	0.099	0.107	0.127	0.124	0.145	0.154	0.132	0.129	0.117	0.137	0.131	0.143	0.231		
1998	0.053	0.058	0.063	0.067	0.075	0.079	0.055	0.072	0.058	0.084	0.098	0.088	0.120	0.110	0.120	0.106	0.101	0.139	0.137	0.127	0.150	0.234	

Panel B: Non Performance Pay Jobs

Log Hourly Earnings

Year	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1998	
1976	0.154																						
1977	0.093	0.125																					
1978	0.080	0.083	0.166																				
1979	0.071	0.074	0.096	0.162																			
1980	0.073	0.074	0.092	0.094	0.146																		
1981	0.072	0.068	0.084	0.083	0.095	0.156																	
1982	0.060	0.069	0.076	0.076	0.088	0.097	0.164																
1983	0.055	0.058	0.065	0.062	0.076	0.078	0.089	0.137															
1984	0.058	0.056	0.061	0.060	0.071	0.077	0.080	0.076	0.156														
1985	0.047	0.047	0.058	0.063	0.080	0.082	0.085	0.071	0.083	0.161													
1986	0.050	0.050	0.047	0.054	0.061	0.072	0.073	0.074	0.078	0.097	0.146												
1987	0.053	0.047	0.049	0.052	0.068	0.065	0.069	0.060	0.064	0.092	0.080	0.153											
1988	0.045	0.051	0.044	0.035	0.060	0.059	0.070	0.068	0.072	0.088	0.087	0.088	0.167										
1989	0.042	0.038	0.043	0.034	0.051	0.053	0.054	0.056	0.061	0.080	0.069	0.079	0.099	0.143									
1990	0.050	0.046	0.047	0.046	0.048	0.056	0.063	0.070	0.073	0.079	0.078	0.081	0.100	0.108	0.162								
1991	0.046	0.037	0.035	0.037	0.045	0.053	0.062	0.065	0.064	0.073	0.072	0.067	0.090	0.090	0.100	0.154							
1992	0.041	0.027	0.023	0.021	0.037	0.053	0.048	0.068	0.049	0.059	0.065	0.061	0.077	0.082	0.086	0.082	0.221						
1993	0.041	0.042	0.035	0.040	0.041	0.055	0.059	0.087	0.059	0.071	0.072	0.067	0.083	0.075	0.091	0.097	0.074	0.241					
1994	0.030	0.033	0.027	0.026	0.037	0.049	0.044	0.068	0.041	0.068	0.062	0.060	0.069	0.070	0.069	0.074	0.075	0.090	0.199				
1995	0.043	0.028	0.024	0.024	0.045	0.039	0.028	0.049	0.043	0.051	0.052	0.052	0.059	0.067	0.069	0.074	0.064	0.081	0.091	0.173			
1996	0.031	0.025	0.014	0.025	0.041	0.049	0.046	0.061	0.045	0.056	0.066	0.059	0.057	0.051	0.058	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.095	0.192		
1998	0.054	0.026	0.023	0.018	0.033	0.045	0.019	0.055	0.049	0.055	0.060	0.063	0.072	0.065	0.064	0.094	0.076	0.098	0.092	0.090	0.102	0.205	

Log Annual Earnings

Year	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1998	
1976	0.198																						
1977	0.114	0.193																					
1978	0.085	0.109	0.195																				
1979	0.093	0.115	0.120	0.215																			
1980	0.089	0.110	0.122	0.127	0.228																		
1981	0.084	0.103	0.103	0.113	0.131	0.228																	
1982	0.071	0.084	0.085	0.094	0.117	0.124	0.242																
1983	0.070	0.083	0.079	0.089	0.100	0.104	0.112	0.243															
1984	0.063	0.074	0.069	0.081	0.093	0.092	0.097	0.108	0.228														
1985	0.066	0.067	0.064	0.082	0.095	0.096	0.097	0.098	0.107	0.257													
1986	0.071	0.066	0.055	0.076	0.079	0.082	0.096	0.100	0.102	0.127	0.236												
1987	0.086	0.086	0.070	0.080	0.088	0.093	0.093	0.091	0.107	0.122	0.120	0.264											
1988	0.062	0.069	0.048	0.066	0.067	0.070	0.076	0.097	0.089	0.094	0.103	0.122	0.247										
1989	0.054	0.066	0.066	0.051	0.063	0.057	0.073	0.067	0.076	0.094	0.108	0.131	0.114	0.266									
1990	0.046	0.064	0.062	0.053	0.066	0.069	0.084	0.100	0.093	0.098	0.109	0.117	0.126	0.183	0.384								
1991	0.047	0.058	0.040	0.049	0.061	0.059	0.088	0.083	0.071	0.088	0.093	0.096	0.106	0.101	0.128	0.227							
1992	0.028	0.041	0.024	0.044	0.066	0.063	0.064	0.078	0.062	0.075	0.089	0.095	0.097	0.093	0.116	0.119	0.276						
1993	0.046	0.060	0.045	0.055	0.074	0.067	0.063	0.084	0.069	0.077	0.084	0.094	0.079	0.088	0.113	0.108	0.117	0.310					
1994	0.028	0.026	0.012	0.034	0.057	0.056	0.054	0.071	0.051	0.093	0.082	0.093	0.075	0.079	0.088	0.092	0.115	0.130	0.304				
1995	0.038	0.043	0.040	0.040	0.065	0.050	0.064	0.054	0.063	0.072	0.062	0.071	0.067	0.064	0.090	0.086	0.072	0.098	0.122	0.243			
1996	0.032	0.036	0.041	0.046	0.045	0.063	0.073	0.059	0.049	0.067	0.081	0.073	0.063	0.056	0.070	0.085	0.086	0.086	0.096	0.113	0.234		
1998	0.055	0.033	0.024	0.034	0.027	0.043	0.048	0.079	0.087	0.058	0.062	0.057	0.065	0.060	0.077	0.087	0.098	0.099	0.082	0.086	0.103	0.232	

Appendix Table 2: Autocovariances in Wages and Earnings
(workers employed at the time of the interview)

Order of autocov:	Performance-pay		Non-Performance-Pay	
	[1] Wage	[2] Earnings	[3] Wage	[4] Earnings
0	0.193	0.219	0.179	0.318
1	0.123	0.138	0.090	0.136
2	0.118	0.128	0.083	0.116
3	0.114	0.122	0.076	0.102
4	0.108	0.117	0.072	0.091
5	0.108	0.115	0.071	0.091
6	0.102	0.112	0.065	0.089
7	0.102	0.107	0.062	0.082
8	0.099	0.103	0.057	0.082
9	0.096	0.100	0.056	0.077
10	0.094	0.098	0.053	0.074
11	0.088	0.091	0.052	0.066
12	0.087	0.093	0.046	0.059
13	0.086	0.092	0.043	0.059
14	0.089	0.086	0.037	0.050
15	0.080	0.082	0.039	0.057
16	0.077	0.078	0.032	0.037
17	0.078	0.077	0.033	0.048
18	0.080	0.076	0.027	0.038
19	0.078	0.074	0.027	0.044
20	0.075	0.073	0.022	0.024
22	0.050	0.050	0.052	0.028

Appendix Table 3
Error Component Models of Hourly Wages by Type of Job: Employed Workers at Time of Interview

Panel A: full sample						
Parameter	Performance-pay jobs			Non-performance-pay jobs		
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Variance of worker component	0.102 (0.003)	0.102 (0.003)	0.082 (0.004)	0.068 (0.001)	0.057 (0.001)	0.047 (0.002)
Factor loading: 1990-93 relative to 1976-79	-	-	1.202 (0.033)	-	-	1.173 (0.034)
Variance of job-match component	-	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	-	0.018 (0.002)	0.017 (0.002)
Variance of idiosyncratic error	0.083 (0.003)	0.082 (0.003)	0.096 (0.008)	0.098 (0.002)	0.091 (0.002)	0.093 (0.004)
Change in variance, 1976-79 to 1990-93	-	-	-0.011 (0.011)	-	-	0.024 (0.006)
Number of workers	1,271	1,271	1,271	2,616	2,616	2,616
Number of cross-products	64,486	64,486	64,486	99,554	99,554	99,554

Panel B: workers who worked in both types of jobs

Parameter	Performance pay jobs			Non performance pay jobs		
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Variance of worker component	0.104 (0.002)	0.102 (0.004)	0.067 (0.006)	0.065 (0.002)	0.053 (0.002)	0.036 (0.004)
Factor loading: 1990-93 relative to 1976-79	-	-	1.312 (0.061)	-	-	1.309 (0.105)
Variance of job-match component	-	0.002 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)	-	0.026 (0.004)	0.023 (0.004)
Variance of idiosyncratic error	0.085 (0.004)	0.085 (0.004)	0.114 (0.012)	0.108 (0.004)	0.094 (0.004)	0.082 (0.009)
Change in variance, 1976-79 to 1990-93	-	-	-0.027 (0.015)	-	-	0.035 (0.013)
Number of workers	834	834	834	834	834	834
Number of cross-products	32,476	32,476	32,476	52,073	52,073	52,073

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Models in columns 3 and 6 allow the variance of the idiosyncratic errors and the factor loadings on the worker component to vary across the 1976-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1993, and 1994-1998 periods, while models in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 do not. These equally weighted covariance structure models are fit to the cross-products of the residuals of an OLS regression of log wages on the same set of covariates described in Table 3. Note that the factor loadings in columns 3 and 6 are normalized to 1 in the base period (1976-1979), so that the changes in factor loadings can be interpreted as the percentage changes in the return to the worker component.