The Individual Vessel Quota System in British Columbia

Commercial fishers the world over are coming to realize that their fisheries are collapsing and new ways of management need to found. Fishers are having to spend more money, time, and effort to catch fewer and fewer fish. During the 1970s world fish production levelled off at about 70 million metric tons, yet the catch per unit of fishing effort and the catch per dollar invested in the fisheries steadily declined. At the same time the number of fishing vessels grew and fishing technology became ever more effective. Despite a slight increase in overall production during the earlier 1980s the overall catch per unit effort has continued to decline. One of the solutions to this problem is the introduction of individual vessel quotas (IVQs). Spearheaded in New Zealand in the earlier 1980s this approach to resource management has gained rapidly in appeal among resource managers.

The primary feature of IVQs is the privatization of the fishery resource either in the hands of fishers or fishing enterprises. In theory, IVQ’s motivate fishers to maximize their revenues and minimize their costs to earn the highest possible profit on their quota. In practice this means deckhands loose jobs and licenses are concentrated in corporate hands. The primary appeal of IVQ’s for resource managers and fisheries economists is the relatively low cost of management of the IVQ system and the system’s theoretical emphasis on private property rights.

In 1992 after a decade of "derby" style fishing in which fishers raced against the clock in limited openings to catch as much Halibut as possible an IVQ system was introduced. Initially license "stacking" or combining several quotas on one boat was prohibited. After the initial test period ‘Stacking regulations were relaxed. The overall benefits to the fishery in terms of higher ex-vessel prices and aggregate earnings for deckhands left in the fishery is undeniable. However, the IVQ system immediately resulted in fewer jobs in the industry as license holders attempted to "minimize costs and maximize revenues."

In BC the actual IVQs were determined by a formula that combined vessel length and past history. Because the total allowable catch varies from year to year the actual quota is expressed as a coefficient. Thus, a fisher’s individual poundage in any one year will vary according to the yearly TAC but his proportion of the TAC relative to other license holders will remain the same. The accumulation of quota on any one vessel is moderately restricted, but there is no restrictions on how much quota an individual or corporation may own.
IVQ’s (or ITQ’s, individual transferable quotas) are not a panacea to fisheries management problems. They do offer a convenient solution for resource managers. Those fishers fortunate enough to have been in possession of license when the scheme was first introduced have certainly benefited from the system. However, the problems inherent in privatizing the resource are not dealt with and as a consequence small coastal communities throughout British Columbia are suffering as licenses leave and fish processing firms depart to larger urban centres.